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Introduction 
 
Perception is one of the fundamental ways in which we are in contact with the world. We 
inhabit the world with others; our lives are determined and structured by this fact. The texture 
of our lives—what we do, the things we encounter everyday, and the things that are significant 
for us—is largely perceptual, and this perceptual character is woven into the fabric of our 
relations with others. Perception, as a way of relating to the world, and sociality, as a fact of our 
lives, belong together. This is what social enactive perception is about.  
This dissertation offers the Social Enactive Theory of Perception, or SEP, a theory of 
perception that accounts for this mutually constitutive link. According to SEP, perception 
consists in socially constituted, sensory-based practices of interaction with objects, events, and 
states of affairs.  SEP situates itself in opposition to representationalist views—the paradigm in 
Modern and contemporary thought about perception—, and on the side of a family of theories 
comprising realism, relationalism, as well as situated cognition theories and other theories of 
phenomenological inspiration. More precisely, and in a positive fashion, SEP is a refinement of 
enactivism about perception, whose most notorious representatives are Alva Noë, Susan Hurley, 
Evan Thompson, and Daniel Hutto.  
The most distinctive feature of SEP, and a common denominator of both its rejection of 
representationalism and its improvement of enactivism, is its social character. It is customary to 
think of perception as an essentially and incontestably individual business through and through. 
After all, the thought goes, I smell with my nose—it is my nose, I like the smell or I don’t, it is 
my nerves, it is my brain cells and circuits. What can be more personal than the way things 
appear perceptually to me? Whatever social features seem to appear in perception, the standard 
theory says, they are not properly perceptual. In the case of representationalism, since 
perception is understood as a matter of personal representations that play the functional role of 
inputs, there is no room ex hypothesi for the social. In the case of standard enactivism, perception 
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is conceived as a matter of sensorimotor individual correlations, so there is only room for 
perception as an individual occurrence. In SEP’s view, conceiving of perception as an individual-
only business is fundamentally wrongheaded.  
For SEP, perception is neither only nor mainly an issue of smells and colors and the way 
they are translated or not into brain lingo. It is neither only nor mainly about qualia—about 
how it feels to smell or taste something. It is not about mental things, if that means things 
happening in consciousness as in an inner space.  
For SEP, the problems of perception are problems of fundamental philosophical 
anthropology. In order to understand perception, it is necessary to understand perceivers, and 
understanding perception helps us understand what perceivers are. The key to perception lies in 
the type of life we lead—in the way we inhabit the world. What lives do we lead? This issue is 
largely a matter of how we see ourselves, a matter of the type of beings that we think we are. 
We must have a theory of perception in which we can recognize ourselves—in the one who 
dances and plays music, in the one who cooks handed-down recipes, in the one who pets a dog 
or a cat, in the one who is moved by the memories that a smell conjures. We must be able to 
recognize the rich, finely grained, and nuanced ways in which we do things with and about the 
things we perceive, and the importance these things have in our lives.  
The Social Enactive View is heavily influenced by the contextualist, pragmatic view of 
Wittgenstein, and by the phenomenological views of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, and of their 
contemporary heirs.1 Through his notion of social practices, Wittgenstein proposes a way of 
looking at forms of life that situates what we do as partaking of the active as well as of the 
social. The significance of his view for perception is hinted at by Hurley, who says: “What is 
needed, rather, is to understand why it is no accident that only perceivers are agents, as well as 
why it is no accident that only agents are perceivers: to understand the interdependence of 
perception and action” (Hurley 1998, 242). For the phenomenologists, perception is a matter of 																																																								
1 Heidegger’s and Levinas’ phenomenologies have also been important influences for this work, though their 
influence is more global than specific.  
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the essential link between our embodied nature and our own mode of being in the world, both as 
subjects and as members of intersubjective communities.  
As a sort of synthesis of both influences, conceptualizing perception as a practice consisting 
of perceivers’ interactions with the world reflects the idea that there is no proper theory of 
perception that does not entail substantive commitments about what perceivers are and what 
the world is. The interrelation between subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and world has been a 
central tenet of phenomenological thought, especially in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, and more 
recently in the situated approaches to cognition, of which enactivism is a part.   
The distinctive element of SEP is its social element and the way it qualifies our engagement 
with the world. Let me then make explicit what I mean by the social.2 While I think that social is 
not exclusively a human category, I only refer here to human sociality, which I take to be 
synonymous with intersubjectivity.3 For SEP, the social is an ontological condition of the human 
being. It is a dimension of our existence constituted by the fact that we partake in ways of doing 
things, and that our individual engagement with things is based on those shared styles. Our 
common ways of doing things, our practices, depend on the fact that human beings live 
together: we are born in the midst of communities, are raised by others, are taught by others, 
create ties and relationships with others, exert our natural capacities with others. Our social 
practices, which define sociality, rest upon our physically living together.4  
 Living together, not just physically, is defined by the participation in shared patterns of 
behavior. Concretely, the social is instantiated in shared ways of doing things. Sociality is 
expressed in families, cultures, political organizations, generations, religious communities, 
sexual orientation-defined communities, political communities, dominant groups, cultural elites, 																																																								
2 This view of the social is embedded all throughout this dissertation, but it can be seen with special clarity in chapter 
1 and in the last section of chapter 2 (section 2.3.3). 
3 For an account of sociality pertaining animal groups in general see my Animal Groups and Social Ontology 
(Arango, 2015). 
4 For SEP social practices are what we intuitively find in familial customs, cultural habits, class styles, generational 
similarities, which are taught to or picked up by newcomers—newborns are a type of newcomer. A language, with all 
its regional, class, temporal, dialectal, lexical, and phonological variations, is the paradigm of a social practice.  The 
cultural anthropologists’s objects of study are social practices in the sense here employed (Lance and O’Leary-
Hawthorne, 176). 
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guilds, groups of friends, etc. The characteristics of human groups or social formations depend 
on the activities people undertake in shared ways. The political, the aesthetic, the ethical, the 
epistemological, and the perceptual, among others, are spheres of practices and determine 
communities. All practices are worldly and historical practices. There is no practice that is not a 
way of inhabiting a space. There is no practice that does not stand in relation to a history of 
practices. As for origins, in the social domain there is never truly a first time—a first time for 
cooking, a first time for speaking, a first time for feeling pain—for there is always a gradient of 
something that was there before.  
Thus, wherever there are social practices, there is a social formation. And the type of social 
formation depends on the type of practices in common—from guilds of carpenters to nations as 
political organizations. Further, social formations range both in size and in duration, from the 
small and ephemeral to the broad and temporally stable—from families to cultures.5 Sociality is 
a function of the endless overlapping and interweaving of social formations defined by shared 
practices.  
SEP’s conception of sociality has the characteristic that it is synonymous with 
intersubjectivity. This fundamental characteristic means that individuals are never merely 
subsumed under groups, for those shared practices are still performed by individuals, and while 
a good deal of meaning depends on shared aspects, the person still contributes to her own take 
on things. Individual performances do not stand in a social void. Intersubjectivity supposes 
subjectivity, but it does not assume either’s primacy.6 In the crisscross of the multiple, 
																																																								
5 In the discussion about what culture is, I take culture to be a pole in the continuum of intersubjective human life. 
Culture consists in sets of practices common to groups of people that normally inhabit the same territory and have 
had a similar history, that is transmitted mostly generationally, that is constantly transformed, and that encompasses 
beliefs, norms, rules, cognitive approaches, and material dependencies, all of which are nevertheless understood as 
dependent on the level of practices. I situate myself between those who think of culture as the commonality of 
customs and uses, of norms and rules, or of “shared routines” of people inhabiting a territory (Brumann 1999) and 
those who are skeptic of culture in light of social fluidity, particularly the fluidity of the contemporary world. I 
certainly do not think that the commonalities are about beliefs and mental representations, as mainstream cognitive 
anthropologists think (Atran, Medin, and Ross 2005, 744–750, Romney 1999). 
6 While in animal species there is a notion of individual organism that is necessary for an account of sociality (see 
Arango 2015), there may be other living species whose sociality does not require a notion of individuality. In the case 
of the human being, our individuality is a subjectivity, and our sociality is an intersubjectivity. 
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overlapping social formations to which a person belongs, she expresses her individuality, which 
is never an entirely original, isolated, and individual performance. 
I would like to add a couple caveats about two things that SEP is not and does not do. 
First, SEP is not a theory of the perceptual aspect of social things, but about the social nature of 
perceptual things.7 Second, I do not examine the influence of language on perception. SEP does 
not conceive of perception as a linguistic issue. Our linguistic practices are in some cases part of 
our perceptual practices, and they are at times mutually constitutive, as in the case of speech. 
SEP is not an analysis of perception in terms of the words we use or the languages we speak. 
There is undoubtedly a place for that analysis, but SEP is a philosophical theory of perception in 
its non-linguistic aspect: in the things we do, which, I claim, are those aspects of perception that 
take place based upon a consensus of action with others.  
																																																								
7 Some enactive theorists like De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007) and McGann and De Jaegher (2009) have proposed 
other ways of linking enactivism and the social domain. One strand of these social enactive proposals focuses on the 
constitution of meaning as it happens in interactions with the world and others—what they call “participatory sense-
making” (“how meaning is generated and transformed in the interplay between the unfolding interaction processes 
and the individuals engaged in it” (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007, 486)). In this case, the object of study is the 
consitution of meaning in the social domain, and the analysis is not perceptual.  
A different area explored by social enactivists (McGann and De Jaegher 2009) is referred to as “social cognition,” 
by which they mean cognition of others, specifically our undestanding of the other in interpersonal interactions. In 
other words, it is about how we make sense of others. To put it in more traditional terms, they take up the problem of 
other minds, and offer an enactivist solution to it. The specific connection with perception is perhaps more clear in De 
Jaegher’s “Social understanding through direct perception? Yes, by interacting” (2009). Here the focus is the 
understanding of others, not perception. Perception is instrumental to the goal of social understanding. The 
difference between this social enactivism and SEP is the difference between an account of the understanding of others 
partly through perceptual interaction, and an account of perception itself as an interaction, which is at the heart of 
SEP. However, for SEP our interactions with others are also interactions with the world, however peculiar, and in 
that sense, they fall under the scope of SEP. See chapter 1, footnote 29, for further clarification on the relation 
between SEP and the perception of others.  
McGann and de Jaegher have talked about understanding others as a perception-based activity that, instead of 
sensorimotor contingencies (sensorimotor enactivism), relies on mastery of self-other contingencies. If Noë’s enactivism 
cashes the relation action-perception in terms of sensorimotor knowledge, McGann and de Jaegher propose a 
knowledge of the ways in which the subject’s behavior is attuned to others’, that is, how the subject masters the way 
in which others change according to her behavior, and the way she adapts to others’ behavior’s changes. These self-
other contingencies are not perceptual, though they are perceptually based. For SEP, however, something more is 
needed. As an understanding of perception in general, SEP requires contigencies—or dependencies, as I call them—
that are part of perception in general. The result is the three dependencies of perception that I develop in chapter 3.  
Thus, in contrast with the social enactive theories just mentioned, the Social Enactive Theory of Perception 
(SEP) does not focus on the perceptual aspect of elements of the social, including the perception of others (as if 
perception occupied itself sometimes with social stuff and at other times it didn’t), but rather on the social aspects that 
are constitutive of perception in general. Instead of taking the social at first as its object and inquiring for how perception 
serves that goal, what is distinctive about SEP is that it takes perception and inquires into how perception, in its 
workings, is intrinsically social, that is, in how perception is partly constituted by the intersubjective domain. The 
different social enactivisms just reviewed are linked and are complementary in various ways, and I consider SEP to be 
broadly compatible with other available social enactivisms. 
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In order to situate sociality in a constitutive relation to perception that takes place in the 
form of an active engagement with the world, SEP is deployed in two tempos or gears. Chapter 
1 offers the overall framework for the understanding of perception as a matter of practices: 
shared ways of doing things with perceptual objects. Perception is woven into social perceptual 
practices that are characterized by contextuality, performativity, expressivity, and normativity. This is 
a diachronic approach to perception. The second gear is a synchronic approach to perception, 
executed in chapters 2 through 5. In those chapters I focus on the shortly temporally bounded 
individual interactions of a perceiver with worldly things. A central feature of SEP is that the 
practice-based view of chapter 1—that perception is best understood as a type of social 
practice—entails that the diachronic conditions the synchronic. In other words, that social practices 
condition individual interactions.  
The significance of this relationship between the diachronic and the synchronic approaches 
is that even seemingly individual-only, practice-independent aspects and elements of perception 
are, in relevant respects, constituted by social practices. The aspects and notions that have been 
traditionally considered the descriptive and explanatory blocks of perception are: recognitional 
and discriminatory capacities; individuation of perceptual objects, sensory properties, and 
phenomenal qualities; perceptual content; and normativity of perceptual content. Thus, in 
chapters 2 through 5 SEP investigates the traditional topics of philosophy of perception in a 
broad framework that makes justice to the complexity of perception. 
It is important for SEP’s take on the social that it does not reduce perception to shared 
practices, as if the normative onus is on the social side alone—this goes in hand with 
understanding sociality as intersubjectivity.8 Perceptual interactions operate on the basis of a 
baseline knowledge—the mastery of techniques in which practices consist—, in which the 
subject is able to interact and produce in manners that are partly individual.9 As in the case of 
																																																								
8 See Medina (2010) for an argument rejecting both individual and social normative inflation. 
9 There is a second sense of pragmatic dependence, namely, that in individual interactions perceptions and their 
aspects depend on the personal-level activity in which a person is engaged. For instance, in a perceptual comparison 
between two kinds of paper (in order to choose one notebook over another, or in order to determine which one fits a 
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speaking a language or playing an instrument, the fact that the techniques are fundamentally 
social does not mean that they are the sheer repetition of models, bur rather enactments of 
possibilities in the midst of pragmatic circumstances, in which individual goals, styles, and 
constraints also operate. It is the same sense in which an individual speaker of the Spanish 
language is likely to use a noun after an article because of grammar structure, which is a feature 
of our linguistic practices, even though the speaker is performing an individual activity. When a 
person speaks, her use of a language is not a private fact of her life, although it is certainly 
something she does.10  
Chapters 2 through 5 present the synchronic instantiation of the diachronic perceptual 
practices in the following way. Chapter 2 starts by developing a notion of perceptual experience 
as interaction with worldly objects, events, and states of affairs, characterized by the fact that 
these objects are temporally extended and appear only in perspectives or appearances, and do so 
as a function of the materiality of perceptible reality and of the activities in which perceptual 
interactions consist. This constitutive link between experience and the contents of experience is 
further explored in chapter 3 through a detailed comparison with the way representationalism 
conceives the connections between experience and content. This broad scope makes this chapter 
be the longest one in this dissertation. Particular attention is paid to two structuring elements 
of the representationalist view: perception’s intrinsic need for veridicality and perception’s 
fundamental indirect character. SEP’s rejection of both these features is at the very core of the 
Social Enactive View. SEP objects to these views by offering a series of arguments for the 
directness and trustworthiness of perceptual appearances. The appearing of objects in 
perspectives will then be qualified through the three types of dependencies or mediations at 																																																																																																																																																																					
certain job better) the perceiver may not be aware of the color of the papers at all. Although most of this interaction 
can be seen as instantiating a perceptual practice—the idea of comparing papers’ thickness for the socially constituted 
activity of notebook use—, it is possible to see in what sense the dependence is to an extent event-bounded. This 
sense of pragmatic dependence is secondary. It will be accounted in chapters 2 through 5. 
10 Naturally, SEP takes into account the existence of physiological constraints, some of which are universal or nearly 
universal (i.e. the range of electromagnetic spectrum to which retina’s rods and cones are sensitive, or the frequencies 
that are normally captured by the human ear). However, even the relative significance of sensory properties (smells, 
flavors, colors) or perceptual categories (parts and wholes) are subject to pragmatic determination. These two 
elements are present all throughout the dissertation and will be specifically targeted where appropriate. 
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work in perception: idiosyncratic, non-socially pragmatic, and socially pragmatic. I argue that the 
appearing of things specified along the lines of these dependencies is the proper meaning of 
directness in perception, which provides further explication for dropping veridicality as a 
concern about perception.  
Chapter 4 is devoted to perceptual content, where, on the basis of the distinction between 
perceptual object and object-as-perceived, it is argued that the full content of a perceptual 
interaction should be parsed between core content, which picks the always-changing, dynamic 
specific object or aspect of our actions and predications, and environing content, which picks 
perceptual aspects surrounding objects that play a role in perceptual transitions and variations 
of objects, and go all the way down to the very contact with physical properties of the world. 
This division between core and environing is not about the nature of content, but about its 
structure and about levels of concretion of possibilities within the whole perceptual field.  
Chapter 5 further investigates perceptual normativity, now addressed under the synchronic 
lens. This section responds to SEP’s dropping of the narrow concern for veridicality. It is shown 
that SEP has a more appropriate notion of normativity for perception than representationalism. 
This version articulates our ways of doing things perceptually, the relation of perception with 
other aspects of our mental life, and the relation between objects and content. In this view, 
normativity is about the placement of perceptual stuff in a system of possibilities and 
expectations—a matter of degrees of fulfillment of expectations in a horizon of pragmatic 
significance, where both expectations and horizon are a function of the socially constituted 
interactions between perceivers and a rich theory of appearances. 
Chapter I 
 
Perceptual Practices 	
In perception, we relate to worldly objects, events, and states of affairs on the basis of what we 
smell, what we taste, what we hear, what we touch, what we see, the feeling of our own bodies, 
and what we perceive through other modalities, such as the feeling of temperature, and different 
combinations of these modalities. Perception is about our sensory acquaintance with worldly 
objects, events, and states of affairs, including our own bodies.  
Our mastery of things perceptual extends to every nook of our lives. Our perceptual 
mastery is not about abstract sounds or geometrically defined shapes. Our mastery of perception 
is about the food we cook, the clothing we put on, and the music we listen to, dance to, enjoy 
and dislike. It is about the way we speak and the way we relate to others’ utterances, 
exclamations, and expressive sounds. It is about the importance we give to the smell of things 
and people, about the things or spaces we make smell as we like. It is about the fabrics, walls, 
and skins that surround us and whose textures matter for us. Thus, in perception, we are 
constantly in relation to others. In this relationship with the world and with others, we are not 
simply receptive. We are also active and productive. We move closer to others in order to hear 
them better, we present ourselves to others through fabrics and their colors, or through the 
smells we put on or simply allow. And in everyday life, in the food we eat, in the food we cook—
that we serve, eat, smell, and taste—we are actively relating to others in complex ways that 
reflect our backgrounds, stories, styles, personalities, and also preferences.  
In this chapter I propose the view that perception is properly understood as woven into a 
type of social practices that includes food, dance, dress, music, languages, etc. More specifically, 
I propose that perceptual practices are the enactment of culturally structured, normatively rich 
techniques of commerce of meaningful multi- and inter-modal perceptible material. This thesis 
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constitutes one of the central tenets of the Social Enactive Theory of Perception (SEP). On 
SEP’s view, perception is not an individual process of recognition and assessment of perceptual 
properties, playing only the functional role of input for a separately conceived output, partly 
serving higher-level cognitive activities. SEP agrees that there are individual processes involved 
in perception, i.e. brain-processes, and that perception can be understood at times as receptive, 
provided receptivity is not characterized by passivity. SEP denies, though, that individual 
processes and receptivity are the categories under which perception should be placed and 
understood. In contrast, SEP holds that all things perceptual are defined by their being woven 
into perceptual practices and, as such, dependent on their motivations, methods, and goals. 
Perception is a social practice whose activities have significance for everyday life. While the 
perceptual aspect does not exhaust the nature of these practices (for cooking is also about the 
sustenance of the organism, and listening to music could also be for the sake of someone’s 
emotional well-being) perception is at their core—it is essentially woven into them.1  
This chapter follows a Wittgensteinian way of thinking about practices. I first outline the 
contextual pragmatism of Wittgenstein and extend the mostly linguistic-based arguments of 
Wittgenstein and several commentators to the perceptual domain. I will argue that perception 
is the type of thing that finds “bedrock” at a pragmatic level, instead of at a semantic or syntactic 
one.  I will show how perceptual practices evince the triple structure Medina (2003) has 
identified in practices: contextuality, performativity, and normativity. To these three characteristics, 
I will add expressivity as an essential feature of perceptual practices. 
The notion of perceptual practices shares the basic enactive insight that perception is not 
merely receptive, but rather, that perception is a way of acting. In this chapter I begin to 
distinguish the Social Enactive Theory of Perception (SEP) from sensorimotor enactivism, 
whose best-known representatives are Alva Noë, Susan Hurley, Evan Thompson, and Daniel 
																																																								
1 About language-games, Wittgenstein said: “I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the activities into 
which it is woven, a ‘language-game’” (2009a, §7). German-English bilingual editions of Wittgenstein’s works are 
confusing as to pagination, hence I give the number of the sections or remarks where quotations are located, except 
for the English version of The Blue and Brown Books (1965), where I stick to the standard pagination usage. 
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Hutto. Instead of talking about individual sensorimotor actions, where movement is the key to 
perceptual interactions, I argue that perception encompasses a richer set of determinations, 
namely, those that belong to the socially constituted techniques in which it plays a role. 
Perceptual practices are not simply individual actions, but socially structured ways of going 
about perceptual things. While individual variations aren’t precluded, a social background is 
built into practices insofar as they are the product of processes of learning. Perceptual practices 
are ways of inhabiting the world, and they are social. Following Wittgenstein, I hold that 
perceptual practices constitute forms of life. 
 
1.1 Social Practices And Their Theoretical Role 
I take the lead to think about practices from Wittgenstein and the non-skeptical branch of his 
commentators. On the non-skeptical view, Wittgenstein’s philosophy is not occupied with 
solving philosophical problems, but rather with dissolving them by showing how the very 
conceptual scaffolding on which such problems arise is not self-evident or commonsensical, as 
the skeptics, and several traditional views, think.2 But what are the problems that are dissolved 
by appealing to social practices? What are the issues and concepts that a contextualist, practice-
based view addresses? 
A well-established tradition of commentators takes the issues to be located in the 
philosophy of language.3 In this case we find, for instance, the issue of the skeptical threat of 
meaning-indeterminacy relative to sensations and sentences: there is no non-arbitrary way of 
securing our utterances’ references and meanings. Others think that the issues that the appeal to 
practices addresses have to do with the nature of meaning itself (whether it applies to sentences, 																																																								
2 Non-skeptical commentators of Wittgenstein include Hurley (1998), Lance and O’Leary Hawthorne (1997), Medina 
(2002; 2003; 2006; 2010), McDowell (1984), Michael Williams, and Meredith Williams (1999), among others. Of the 
skeptical commentators (those that do not reject the basic conceptual scaffolding of the traditional picture, and hence 
try to solve the problems presented by it, or realize their inescapability), Kripke (1982) is perhaps the most famous.  
3 This is no surprise since the entry point of Wittgenstein himself into these investigations is quite often a linguistic 
one. Thus we read in The Blue Book: “What is the meaning of a word?” (Wittgenstein 1965, 1); and we see a direct 
questioning of Augustine’s account of language learning in both The Brown Book and in the Philosophical Investigations 
(Wittgenstein 1965, 77; Wittgenstein 2009a, §1). The Last Writings begin with the author wondering about a possible 
word “to frightle oneself” or “to torture oneself with fearful thoughts” (Wittgenstein 1982, 2), and even his Remarks 
on colour open with a language-game of reporting comparisons between colors (Wittgenstein 2004, 2). 
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beliefs, or other mental objects), with the concept of truth, and with the nature and possibility of 
justification or other normative concepts, such as inference.  
In a broader epistemological spirit, one can also see Wittgenstein concerned with the 
seeming separation between the inner and the outer, and with the gulf between mind and world 
(Wittgenstein 2009, §§281-315). Hurley (1998), on the other hand, gives linguistic views a twist 
and puts Wittgenstein’s approach to practices in connection with themes in the philosophy of 
mind such as the issue of content and content’s unity, both for action and for perception (which 
one could see as mirroring the problem of reference). For Hurley, the main problem 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy illuminates is one of aboutness, namely, the possibility that we have 
targets for our actions and contents standing for the things we perceive, where perception is 
treated as dealing with a phenomenal experience (Hurley 1998, 221).  
The central idea of Wittgenstein-inspired contextualist pragmatism, according to the non-
skeptical brand of his commentators, is that the key to dissolve some traditional puzzles 
concerning meaning, truth, and normativity, consists in appealing to our epistemic and socio-
linguistic practices. Social practices are the ground on which meaning, truth, and normativity 
depend for their intelligibility and correctness, if we are to understand meaning, truth, and 
normativity as actual phenomena and not as approximations to an ideal structure.   
Skeptical views, in contrast, insist in searching for epistemological criteria in a domain 
independent from our practices, such as an autonomous grammar or the realm of logical truth. 
This route faces insurmountable obstacles in securing its epistemic privilege, and this is why 
skeptical readings find that our communicative endeavors and our lives in common are illusory, 
and we, delusional. This view dismisses the certainty and meaningfulness of everyday 
experience because it assumes that traditional theories of meaning are correct in demanding 
determinacy and immutability from out utterances and our epistemic repertoire (Medina 2006, 
3). Non-skeptical readings dismantle these traditional requirements on meaning (and truth, 
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normativity, content, etc.), by focusing on the nature of social practices, in ways that will soon 
be clear.   
The fact that these pragmatisms have arisen in the context of philosophy of language 
speaks of the pervasiveness of discursive, propositional frameworks as the default framework 
used to deal with philosophical problems in epistemology, ethics, philosophy of mind, and 
metaphysics. In this chapter I show how, notwithstanding this linguistic-turn inclination, the 
practice-based framework is the proper one to understand perception, without making 
perception a matter of our perceptual reports or our perceptual beliefs (whatever a perceptual 
belief might be).4 I aim to show that the practice-based view on epistemic practices and language 
can be transported to the domain of perception. This transposition will reveal the phenomenon 
of perception, attending to its own features, in a way worthy of consideration, that is, without 
making perception a matter of words—a matter of our smell or color vocabulary. 
This is not the place either to launch a defense of the many deep issues that support a 
pragmatic outlook on philosophy of language and epistemology. In what remains of this section, 
I will at only offer an outline of the pragmatic orientation in general, making emphasis on a few 
points that are important for my ensuing discussion on perception. In section 1.2 I will defend 
the perceptual practices account on deeper grounds.   
In the Social Enactive Theory of Perception (SEP), the appeal to practice tries to solve parallel 
problems to those present in the linguistic and epistemological discussions. Traditional theories 
of perception, mostly of representational lineage, are structured around questions concerning 
the possibility and pervasiveness of illusion, the indeterminacy of perceptual aboutness, the 
separation between mind and world, the seeming impossibility of directness in perception, the 
difficult tensions between low-level and high-level properties, and the problematic relation 
between perception and action in a framework that refuses to accept more than an instrumental 
relation between them two. Some of these issues are issues of perceptual consciousness, issues of 																																																								
4 Hurley also shows how core issues about mind are understandable in connection to Wittgensteinian themes (1998, 
221–244). 
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perceptual normativity, and issues of the phenomenal aspect of perception. In this regard, this 
chapter has a limited scope. In this chapter I won’t show how the appeal to practices 
conceptualizes and attacks philosophical problems in all those areas—that is one of the tasks of 
the entire dissertation.5 In this chapter I will offer the general outlook of perceptual practices. 
This outlook is aimed at shifting the way of conceiving perception, the way of conceiving the 
relation of perception to its objects, and the way of conceiving the relation of the perceiver, as a 
perceiver, to the social and intersubjective structures in which she lives. This chapter will at 
least start to show how and why SEP looks at perception the way it does. Borrowing an 
expression from Hurley, part of the goal now is to begin to soften our confidence on the traditional 
views, as well as to start to doubt their commonsensicality. Chapters 2 through 5 will account 
for specific aspects of perception in the framework that takes perceptual practices as its basic 
structure. 
To think of a domain of philosophical reflection from a pragmatic point of view means to 
see that its “ultimate global justification” is found “in terms of its usefulness to people” (Lance 
and O’Leary-Hawthorne 1997, 135). “What is useful to people” does not refer to a set standard 
of usefulness (utility or expediency) but should be understood as that which accords to the 
explicit or implicit goals internal to what people do, even when the goal is the inertial 
continuation of the way we do things. “What people do” is what Wittgenstein calls a “consensus 
of action” (Medina 2002, 150), and such consensus is the basis for intelligibility and normativity, 
although not merely on account of being a consensus. For Lance and O’Leary-Hawthorne, a 
social practice—“what people do”—is “the basic vehicle of understanding” (1997, 133) and is the 
structure of “social appropriatenesses” (1997, 184), that is, the space where actions and reactions 
are subject to normative assessment. Normative assessment is also present in cases of mere 
conformity to the allowed ways of doing things. Further, they argue that “we must interpret the 
																																																								
5 Chapter 3 will articulate a theoretical diagnosis of the central demands that traditional epistemology places, and 
wrongly so, upon perception—namely, the veridicality concern and the directness concern. These are demands that 
cause us to settle for theories that rob perception of its natural interactive role, in fear of conceding to skeptic worries 
about our contact with the world. For the idea of a theorical diagnosis see Medina (2006, 1–7). 
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community in terms of its practices” and the point to take from here is that there is no 
interpreting device for a specific community more basic than what the community does (Lance 
and O’Leary-Hawthorne 1997, 184). 
The consensus of action on which practices consists is not only the de facto agreement in 
behaviors and attitudes, that is, in actions, reactions, and dispositions, but a style of doing things 
that is the product of processes of acculturation and training. The normative force of social 
practices lies not in the number of practitioners but in its continued existence through time in a 
community, where skilled practitioners train others into practices, by getting them to act 
according to patterns of behaviors and within domains of moves allowed. This training does not 
occur in an abstract space. It takes place against a background that includes a constant 
environment, i.e. a stable, physically defined environment, and a certain natural set of 
dispositions and reactions—which Wittgenstein called “natural reactions”— that can 
nevertheless be shaped and developed (Medina 2002, 162; see also 136, 171).  
In relation to training, Lance and O’Leary-Hawthorne have said that “talk about meaning 
is concerned with language-learning moves, but tacitly presupposes that appropriate 
recognitional capacities and dispositions to non-linguistic behavior are already in place” (1997, 
137; Medina 2002, 162). The extension of a practice-based view to the perceptual domain will 
partly deal with those capacities and dispositions to non-linguistic behavior. These capacities 
and dispositions will be addressed not only in the sense that they are prior to linguistic learning, 
but also insofar as they are constantly present in a person’s life, not simply subordinate to, but 
coexistent with, language and other cognitive activities. 
The normative dimension of practices, issuing from the processes of acculturation by which 
novices are brought into such practices, configures a “space of attribution of commitments to 
practitioners of the practice,” that is, a space where expectations about actions, reactions, 
dispositions, attitudes, and other moves are in place, and are the basis for judgments about 
behavior and attitudes of self and others (judgments that may not even arise when things are 
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done according to the established social practice) (Lance and O’Leary-Hawthorne 1997, 174–
175).  
Social practices are characterized by contextuality, performativity, expressivity, and 
normativity.6 Practices are contextual in that determination of meanings, truth, and other 
normative aspects is only decidable by the whole concrete practices that happen over against 
specific social circumstances, including a physical environment. Practices are performative 
because they consist in actions, reactions and dispositions. Practices are expressive because they 
express the form of life of a community. Communities, in this perspective, are not aggregations 
of individuals but active groups structured by patterns of behavior (Medina 2002, 170). Lastly, 
practices are normative because they feature a dimension of correctness and intelligibility—of 
successfulness and pragmatic meaningfulness—that is exhibited in the practices themselves and 
is grounded in the processes of training by which new practitioners are brought into the 
community and by which the community continuously develops and transforms itself. 
Wittgenstein’s view on practices is holistic: these four features are highly interwoven, and each 
of them will appear in one way or another in the account of the other three. For example, there 
is no talking of contextuality that is not at the same time performative, since the context is first 
and foremost found in a normatively structured consensus of ways of doing things that express the 
forms of life of the communities that practice them.  
At the heart of the discussion on meaning, truth, and normativity is the idea that to 
understand what we say or what we do partly means that we should be able to tell when what 
we say (or do) is correct and when it is incorrect. It is also the idea that to understand what we 
say means to be able to tell the intelligible from the unintelligible. In both cases there seems to 
be an immediate appeal to a rule or norm that guides what we say or do. Counterfactually put: 
unless there is a rule, there is no telling (i.e. it remains indeterminate) whether acts or words are 
correct or intelligible. These are, at least, the terms in which the discussion has been conducted. 																																																								
6 Medina has argued for the triplet contextuality, performativity, and normativity (2003, 62ff.). To that group I add 
expressivity. 
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The pragmatic take I am articulating refuses to take a semantic requirement (the idea that ‘how 
to proceed' is fixed semantically, independently of practices), or consciousness of a semantic 
requirement (that there is always a ‘knowing how to proceed’, an interpretation of a rule) as the 
key to normativity. Does this practice-based view on rules surmount the classical problem of 
indeterminacy?  
In the practice-based view, acting according to a rule or guided by a rule is not a distinction 
that can be actually brought to decide when an action or utterance is correct or intelligible. The 
distinction is not entirely ruled out. It is kept but in a very deflated sense. The issue cannot be 
decided either by considering an act or utterance in isolation from a social practice, or by 
whether someone is consciously going by (or not going by) a rule. Rather, the primacy of 
practice means that one is situated within a normative space when one acts in accordance to a 
practice in which one is skilled, even if one doesn't know why things are done thus or so, or is 
perhaps not aware of doing things thus or so. If there is a rule—and at this point the notion of 
rule starts becoming misleading—, it is something immanent in practices. The deciding factor 
is, once again, whether the patterned behavior is the product of the technique that was acquired 
through a process of training or acculturation. And this process is the one by which novices are 
taken to self-regulate their behavior so as to be in accord to the practices embedded in the 
majority. When practices are performed by skilled practitioners, by members of a community, 
the issue of consciously or unconsciously acting guided by a somewhat explicit rule loses its 
intuitive grip as a way of demonstrating what following a rule consists in.  Furthermore, an 
action done when one is part of a social practice seems oftentimes done automatically. In this 
respect Wittgenstein has said that things done in the spirit of the practice are cases of following 
a rule blindly, and Lance and O’Leary-Hawthorne have referred to participation in unreflective 
engagements or unreflective conformities.  These engagements and conformities are a matter of 
actions, reactions, and attitudes. In acculturation processes we not only learn to react in certain 
ways upon certain occurrence but also learn to take certain occurrences as such and such, that is, 
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as having a certain significance and standing in need of a certain reaction. Perceptually, we can 
say that a sensibility is learned along perceptual behavior. And while many actions are done 
automatically, and there is a ground level of automaticity and unreflective conformity, this does 
not mean that automaticity, blindness, or unreflectiveness are necessary for actions to be done in 
the spirit of a social practice.7  
Our unreflective engagement with the different domains of our social practices seems to be 
mostly about actions, about what subjects do or don’t do. There is, however, a counterpart on 
the side of items dealt with—sentences, actions, and objects. Let me introduce Lance and 
O’Leary-Hawthorne’s notion of Quine-analytic sentences. For Lance and O’Leary-Hawthorne 
the issue of truth is tied to the issue of whether there are analytic sentences at all, even 
tautological ones. While they reject the existence of analytic sentences in themselves, much á la 
Quine, they find it necessary to postulate a quasi-analytic type of sentences, whose quasi-
analyticity depends on actual social practices. These are termed Quine-analytic sentences and are 
defined as sentences that do not admit of bare challenges, that is, they do not admit of being 
questioned lest the questioner is taken to be an outsider, a joker, or a lunatic. In the reality of 
social patterns of language use there are sentences that are taken to be analytic by speakers, and 
whose being taken to be analytic by speakers is in fact the mark of what constitutes to be a competent 
speaker, a practitioner, to be a member of the actual community of language users. The idea of 
Quine-analyticity includes the entitlements carried by them: its not admitting of bare challenges 
is a type of entitlement, and so it is, for instance, its being taken for granted in deductions or 
inferences. I will get back in section 1.2 to the issue of Quine-analytic items, where I will 
suggest that consensus about perceptual things are comparable to Quine-analytic sentences in 
that questioning certain perceptual occurrences, such as combinations of flavors or ways of 																																																								
7 The acknowledgement of this unreflective or automatic acting in a way that accords with rules should not be 
understood as an endorsement of a Dreyfus-like theory of mindless coping. Suffice it to say that, following Zahavi, the 
idea of mindlessness is very problematic since it limits the mindful to the conscious, in the sense of awareness. What 
matters, instead, is that actions that are done somewhat blindly or automatically have an experiential import that 
must be counted as mindful: “the level of absorbed coping involves a dimension of self-experience – at least in so far 
as that level is supposed to be experiential rather than simply a matter of non-conscious automaticity” (Zahavi 2013, 
5). 
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consuming food, or what counts as perceptually appropriate when it comes to touch or color in 
dressing, are entitlements carried by certainties analogous to Quine-analytic sentences, and that 
disputing or challenging them amounts to place oneself outside of the community. (I will call 
this analog the seemingly given8). One takes it for granted that loud yelling is not conducive to 
listening to a song playing softly in the background—but a child may need to learn this. One 
does not question whether one can add a sound to a cup of hot coffee—although one may 
entertain the idea of adding a color. Those possible combinations, and the things deemed 
appropriate, delightful, or disgusting, are also part of what skilled practitioners take for granted 
and follow blindly, and thus constitutes perceptual practices.  
Zooming out for a moment, the broader epistemological picture that underlies a pragmatic 
approach is aptly put by Lance and O’Leary-Hawthorne: “despite the fact that there is no 
substantive, non-circular, empirical reason to prefer [some Quine-analytic claims] to certain 
other incompatible claims, our linguistic practice involves a world-view which is a loosely 
defined set of sentences, practices, attitudes, and methodologies, each taken to be prima facie 
justified in the sense that bare challenges to them are inappropriate. That is, there is an 
arbitrarily stipulated onus of proof on anyone who would attempt to criticize these practices” 
(Lance and O’Leary-Hawthorne 1997, 111). 
By means of a reflection on the all-encompassing nature of social practices for a community 
and its practitioners, we come to see that social practices are constitutive of world-views (as 
Lance and O’Leary Hawthorne put it), or forms of life (Lebensformen, in Wittgenstein’s terms). In 
fact, we find that Husserl’s notion of lifeworld (Lebenswelt) speaks of a similar reality in pointing 
to the world that comes to be experienced in specific manners according to the practices by 
which people inhabit it. SEP’s position in this respect is that our perceptual practices constitute 
																																																								
8 I will refer to the perceptual analog of Quine-analytics sentences as seemingly given perceptual instances, since the 
idea of the given plays a self-evident justificatory role in some traditional philosophies of mind, analog to that of the 
analytic in epistemological discussions. The seemingly given is a deflated notion in the same sense that Quine-analytic 
sentences are, that is, that their seemingly givenness or seemingly analyticity is, first, forceful yet only seeming, and 
second, that it is derived from practices in which it plays somewhat of a grounding role in its, once again, forcerful yet 
seeming character. 
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forms of life, world-views, lifeworlds—that the way we interact with perceptible material, act on 
it and respond to it, is at the very core of our ways of inhabiting the world.   
 
1.2 The Perceptual Practices Approach 
In this section I present a series of arguments for the claim that a practice-based approach is 
appropriate for perception. The following sections will show how perceptual practices share the 
central characteristics of social practices previously described, namely, contextuality, 
performativity, expressivity, and normativity. Weaving all these aspects together, the specific 
definition I will propose is that perceptual practices are the enactment of socially structured and 
regulated, finely attuned, techniques of commerce of meaningful perceptible material. 
The Arguments From Seeing Aspects. In one of the preliminary studies for the 
Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein observes that the visual experience of a person who 
sees something she recognizes is not the same than that of a person who sees the same thing but 
does not recognize it (1982, §§539, 574, 575). The phenomenological evidence is at an almost 
intuitive level, but more is needed in order conceptually to ascertain the difference. But how can 
this be done? “What can be cited in support of his seeing it [a smile, in this case] differently?” 
(Wittgenstein 1982, §576). 
Wittgenstein explains that visual experience exceeds what can be accounted for by solely 
relying on sensory input, as his examples of the cube/box or the duck-rabbit show (2009b, 
§§116, 118). This is the difference between having a visual experience (Sehenerlebnis) and having 
an impression. In his view, if we relied solely on what could impact the retina, it would be 
impossible to explain why the very same visual properties—which he calls the visual impression 
(Gesichtseindruck)—are seen differently by the same person, or by two different people, one of 
which was familiar with the object. There is a different story to be told, which suggests a more 
complex conception of seeing: seeing is always seeing as or, what is the same, seeing aspects. The 
trick, as it were, is that we always see as, but the as is hidden. In other words, the argumentative 
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strategy in using two different visual experiences sharing the same visual impression is to 
highlight that while impression is necessary for visual experience to happen, it is not sufficient.  
What does the as in seeing as consist in? What does seeing aspects entail for a theory of 
seeing? One way to proceed is to investigate what makes the difference between different visual 
experiences. One possibility is that the organization of an image and the aspects that such an 
organization reveals are not a “property of the object, but an internal relation between it and 
other objects” (Wittgenstein 1982, §517; Wittgenstein 2009b, §§247–248). These relations are 
not additional to what is sensed. In this version, it is someone’s being able to grasp those 
relations, evinced for example in the ability to describe shapes in a certain way, what makes it 
possible to grasp an aspect.  
On one end, then, perception is different from having impressions, and internal relations are 
the key to explaining this difference. On the other end, we should try to clear up the relationship 
between perception, on the one hand, and thinking and knowing, on the other. Since visual 
experiences often involve familiarity with objects, which sometimes involve our having a 
concept (Wittgenstein 1982, §741), does one see an animal, or does one know that what one sees 
is an animal? Does one have to think about it before one says it is an animal? Does this mean 
that perception is a type of knowing or thinking because of common characteristics with them? 
Consider the following cases Wittgenstein examines: 
 
“I look at an animal in a cage. I am asked: ‘What do you see?’ I answer: ‘A rabbit.’ — I gaze 
into the countryside; suddenly a rabbit runs past. I exclaim: ‘A rabbit!’” (1982, §549) 
 
“I see that an animal in a picture is transfixed by an arrow. It has stuck it in the throat and it 
sticks out at the back of the neck. Imagine the picture is a silhouette. — Do you see the 
arrow — or do you merely know that these two bits are supposed to be part of an arrow?” 
(1982, §644) 
 
The first step in his reasoning is that it is wrong to try to impose a separation between 
perceiving and recognizing, or between perceiving and thinking. To this end, one must imagine 
the two-stage process that would take place if seeing were different from recognizing and from 
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thinking. What part of the experience whose exclamation was “A rabbit!” is recognition, and what 
part is seeing? There is no telling. The question is ill-posed.  
But this similarity is dubious because there are cases where there is seeing without 
recognition. Think in the case of seeing something familiar but not being able to see it right 
away as the familiar thing one soon comes to see it as—as when it takes a moment to recognize 
an old acquaintance one has not seen in years (See Wittgenstein 1982, §544). This shows that 
the recognition, or absence thereof, can lead to different visual experiences. Now, this would 
work all the same if we downshifted the recognitional level, as it were, and said that there was 
recognition—a person, a face—but not a detailed recognition—the old acquaintance. In that 
same vein, one could say that one recognizes warmth when one walks in a sauna bath, i.e. that 
one has a certain understanding of what goes on, namely, that it is a temperature, and that it is 
not cold. Notice that one does not think in that moment counterfactually, but one would agree to 
different counterfactuals: If I were wearing lots of clothing, the heat would be unbearable. Yet it 
would clearly be a stretch to say that one recognizes warmth in such situation. These two cases 
match the case of immediately seeing something, like the rabbit in the countryside in the 
quotation above, or like fear rising after suddenly noticing a lion outdoors (Wittgenstein 1982, 
§589). The common denominator in these last four cases (face, warmth, rabbit, and lion) is that 
the type of familiarity underlying the encounter with those cases is characterized by immediacy 
and bodily engagement. There is no room between seeing and recognition, but this does not 
mean that seeing is the same as thinking or knowing.  
The second example, the case of the animal transfixed by an arrow, offers a reductio 
argument. If one does not really see the arrow but knows it to be one, that is, one infers that it is 
an arrow, then one does never see any object. But we do see, or perceive, objects, events, and 
states of affairs: arrows, cars, clouds, warmth, spiciness, etc. Therefore, it is not the case that the 
familiar recognition in perception is a knowing. It is possible to motivate the conclusion in a 
different way: If in the case of the drawing of an arrow one could not see the arrow because a 
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part of it was missing, then in every pictorial representation of an object there is always 
something missing visually, for even in the most detailed two-dimensional reproduction, the 
object would be missing the perspectival variations that only real objects could offer. Thus, in 
pictorial representations one could never see objects. Furthermore, and by parity reasoning, any 
case in which the “totality” of the object is not present is a case of the perceiver completing an 
image, inferring, supplying what the visual impression offers with one’s own knowledge. Still by 
parity reasoning, it could be argued that even in the case of a real object, there is always an 
inference since no perspectival totality can be given at once, and the back side of visual objects, 
for instance, is not given.9 This would mean that we never see any objects, neither in drawing 
nor in normal interaction with objects. Yet we see objects.  
But what do we make of the fact that perception is not detachable from a certain type of 
recognition? Wittgenstein’s position is that perception is not thinking or knowing even though 
some characteristics of perception are characteristics normally associated with thinking and 
knowing. Perception shares with thinking and knowing what we can describe as the familiarity 
of an encounter. The epistemological tradition of Modern philosophy takes it to be essential to 
“familiarity” that it requires previous instances over against which a present situation is 
compared, a comparison stage, and a conclusion output. To place perception in the same 
category as thinking and knowing assumes that perception is an intellectualistic process that 
requires of concepts, probably of language, employs logic, and seems separate from emotion and 
feeling. However, perception’s familiar encounters with things perceived aren’t rational: one 
finds warmth warm, as it were. It is found as something familiar, but there are no comparisons 
made. In perception, there is a taking of things for something (Dafürhaltens). In perception, this 
familiar encounter is behaviorally significant, even if not acted upon, and has a phenomenal 
element (that may or may not be strongly felt).    
Sensory impressions do not account for perceptual experiences, but what is combined with 
sensory impressions is not a knowing or thinking process, but a type of immediate, bodily, 																																																								
9 I explore in greater detail the issue of the perspectival appearing of perceptual things in chapter 3. 
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behaviorally related encounter with things in the world. Perception is a bodily engagement with 
the world. This is why I prefer to refer to the familiarity of a perceptual encounter and not to 
the recognition of an object or event. Recognition is located in the anatomy of inputs, in the 
physiology of inferences, and using it unadvisedly becomes an obstacle to making sense of a 
view that, like SEP, disputes the input-output picture of perception and action.    
Aspects and Doings. Wittgenstein realizes that the difficulties in analyzing perception are 
associated with the many phenomena and variations at play in perceptual experience (1982, 
§§579–583). His remarks on perception in the Investigations, in the different preliminary studies 
for the Investigations, and in the Remarks on Colour, among other works, are full of fine 
distinctions involving the things we perceive, the aspects we perceive, the ways in which we 
perceive, the relation of things perceptual with words, and of things perceptual with things 
behavioral, to list only some.10 But it would be wrong to try to systematize or to offer a 
taxonomy of Wittgenstein’s treatment of perception: the interrelatedness of aspects does not 
yield that type of treatment. Once again, I want to use these distinctions as a way to weave 
through conceptual difficulties. Here I pick one more thread of Wittgenstein’s argumentation 
(1982, §§686, 728).  
Part of the problem with all the different concepts, phenomena, and variations one could 
find in live perception is not only that no one element furnishes a decisive proof of a new 
perspective. It is not evident either what concepts or phenomena are to be addressed and how.  
Next to ‘seeing aspects,’ one neighboring perceptual phenomenon is noticing the 
organization of a visual array, in which a perceiver notices the dependence of a visual experience 
on taking certain lines of a drawing to be connected in one way or another (Wittgenstein 1982, 
§511). In the duck-rabbit case, for instance, one may notice that it looks like a duck when one 
takes the lines that form the beak to be as if to the left, and not as if on top, for then one sees a 
rabbit. There is also the phenomenon of suddenly becoming able to see an aspect—the dawning 																																																								
10 These preliminary investigations include The Blue and Brown Books (Wittgenstein 1965), the Last Writing on the 
Philosophy of Psychology (Wittgenstein 1982) and fragments on the philosophy of psychology, known before as the 
second part of the Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein 2009b). 
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or lighting of an aspect—and which is the realization of a new perception, that is, of a new 
perceptual experience, oftentimes accompanied by a linguistic expression (Wittgenstein 1982, 
§§474, 495, 520). 
So, what else is needed to give an account of perceptual experience additional to the 
insufficiency of sensory input alone and the immediate comprehension of things perceived—the 
familiarity? We start by realizing that we learned about perception by looking at the things we 
do in relation to perception.  
For instance, we can ascertain that there is a difference in two visual experiences when we 
mimic things differently (Wittgenstein 1982, §575), or as we try to copy them (§598), or in the 
ways we react to them (§§601-603), or in the descriptions we offer of them, among others 
(§611). However, the perception and the accompanying action seem too close to each other, even 
entangled. Consider the two following remarks:  
“What kind of man is said to be enjoying this picture’s telling expression? Well, someone 
who looks at it this way, talks about it in such-and-such a way, and reacts to it this way.” 
(1982, §471) 
 
“I have always seen it as a rabbit could even mean: for me it always was a rabbit, I have 
always spoken to it is a rabbit. A child does this.  
It means that I have always treated it as a rabbit.” (1982, §§472) 
 
In both cases, Wittgenstein is calling into question the distance and seeming difference 
between perception and action, specifically action ensuing from perception. In the first case, 
enjoying the “picture’s telling expression” requires a recognition of such type of expression. 
Since recognition entails something other than the mere visual impression—for we can think of 
someone who does not enjoy the picture’s telling expression, perhaps because she does not see 
such telling expression—, so does the enjoyment. We then find that enjoying the picture 
amounts to a certain way of looking and talking vis-a-vis the picture. In the second case, the 
implication is clearer: to see something as something means (under certain conditions, I hurry to 
add) to treat it as something. These conditions might be those of a person who does not reflect 
upon a perception, and just keeps on going (as we do pretty much all the time) in the very way 
  26 
in which we go down the street and see many things, some of which elicit and some of which do 
not elicit a reaction. Similarly, in experiencing a change of aspect in an image (Aspektwechsel), 
Wittgenstein remarks how the change is expressed in what “I occupy myself with,” which 
makes the experience of change “similar to an action” (1982, §556).   
In similar remarks, like the following ones about hearing a melody and a spotted wall, 
Wittgenstein calls into question the distance between impression and action:  
 
“Hearing a melody and the movements that go along with the particular way someone 
interprets (auffasst) or hears (hört) it.” (1982, §584)  
“It’s as if doing and the impression didn’t happen side by side, but as if doing shaped the 
impression” (1982, §586) 
“I hear it differently, and now I can play it differently. Thus I can render (wiedergeben) it 
differently.” (1982, §587) 
 
To begin with, notice how even though the language of impressions is gestured at, the 
impression appears already in experiential tones and not in the form of a raw uptake of 
information. A decision on whether impressions are the same in aspect changes is downplayed 
by Wittgenstein, since in order to decide this matter it is difficult to find criteria other than a 
description of what is experienced (1982, §§609, 611).   
The case of the melody shows the entanglement of doing and perceiving so clearly that 
Wittgenstein asks: “Why does it seem so hard here to separate doing and experiencing?” (1982, 
§585). Sure it is the case that the doing could have shaped the impression, but there is more than 
an instrumental link between them. When dancing, a dancer’s listening to the music is modified 
by the dancing movements that put different emphases on different sections or moments that 
carry more significance for the dancing. At the same time, the dancing is modified by the music 
as it is heard. How is a melody heard in different ways? It is heard differently by the emphasis 
one puts on the melodic or rhythmic aspects, in the sounds of certain instruments, in the feeling 
conveyed by certain sections, etc. A dancer can only dance to nuances in the music he is able to 
listen to—yet not necessarily in a way that can be described or talked about. Since these 
nuances are more than isolated sounds, but rather melodic and rhythmic sequences, a dancer can 
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only relate to sequences that can be brought to have corporeal significance, including, naturally, 
stillness. The example has a counterpart in the case of a player that plays a melody they 
recognize, whom can be addressed in this way: “But surely when you play it you don’t play it 
anyhow, you play it in this particular way, making a crescendo here, a diminuendo there, a 
caesura in this place, etc.” (Wittgenstein 1965, 166; emphasis is the author’s).  
Hearing a melody is not a plain being impacted by or an absorbing of sounds, and while it 
can be shaped by dancing or moving, the taking of sounds one way or another—always a 
“taking something for something” (Dafürhaltens)—is a certain doing.11 This is a doing even if one 
is not conscious of such doing, and even if it seems to be a passive taking it all up—there is not 
absolute passivity. A similar relation is even clearer in the following remark: 
 
“A wall covered with spots: and I occupy myself by seeing faces on it: but not so that I can 
study the nature of an aspect, but because I find those shapes interesting and because of the 
destiny that leads me from one to the next.  
More and more, aspects dawn, others fade away, and sometime I ‘stare blindly’ at the wall”  
(1982 §480) 
 
In this case, the doing is the perceiving itself, and it is specified as the perception is specified. 
Her occupying herself with faces is her seeing faces. When she let herself be led by connections 
that arise on the go, there is also a doing, like when one plays to find shapes in clouds. And 
when the perceiver “stares blindly at the wall” it is because no specific aspect lights up (or what 
is the same: because the aspect consisting of “lacking aspects” lights up). It is not because at that 
moment she is merely having an impression, as opposed to moments were impressions were 
accompanied by something else. In fact, never does an impression exist apart from the being 
taken as one thing or another (Dafürhaltens), and the seeing one aspect or another is part of the 
occupying oneself with faces, or with staring blindly (See Wittgenstein 1965, 169). 																																																								
11 Consider reports made in “aesthetic observations”: “‘You have to hear these bars as an introduction,’ ‘You must 
hear it in this key,’ ‘You must phrase the theme like this’ (which can refer to hearing as well as to playing)” 
(Wittgenstein 1982, §632). A few remarks below, Wittgenstein says: “In aesthetics isn’t it essential that a picture or a 
piece of music, etc., can change its aspect for me?” (1982, §634). Part of the point here is that artistic experience 
expresses very clearly the fact that aspects are essential perception. It is evident that in a lab experiment in which the 
subject is exposed to beeps or flashes of light there may be not be much of an aspect, however significant the results 
of those experiments might be for the purposes of understanding some physiological constraints or tendencies having 
a bearing on perception. 
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Notice, however, that I have been treating all seeing the same, and all hearing the same, as if 
what we do when we hear is always the same, that is, as if hearing is only one thing. That is a 
wrong assumption. Hearing, smelling, or tasting, and other modal-specific activities, along with 
intermodal interactions, can each take different shapes so as to account for different types of 
interactions. There is, for instance, an enormous difference between hearing the sounds in the 
streets as a person walks on her way to take public transportation on her daily routine, namely, 
without paying attention, and a seasoned dancer hearing a song while he dances to that song 
(which he enjoys very much) with a partner with whom he enjoys very much to dance. These 
two situations are different as well from the novice classical music spectator, listening to a long, 
obscure symphony, attempting (naively) to catch every detail. Or take the case of looking at a 
flower without looking at the color of the flower—without being conscious of it—and suddenly 
turning one’s attention to its color (Wittgenstein 1982, §721). Those are clearly two different 
ways of seeing the flower. Notice how something would be lost from each case, were they 
reduced to a common type. These cases also reveal that perceiving, since it is a perceiving of 
aspects, can be a voluntary act (Wittgenstein 1982, §§451, 453).  
Thus, there are clear differences as to the activity of the perceiver in these cases, including 
what to focus on, how attentive the perceiver is in each case, and to what concrete end she 
perceives at the moment. But that is only one side of the story about the differences in ways of 
hearing, smelling, touching, tasting, or seeing. The analysis of contextuality and performativity 
will explore the roles different ways of doing things play in our lives.  
Perception is a bodily engagement with the world happening at the level of lived experience, 
in which the phenomenal and the responsive are indiscernible. This bodily engagement is a 
matter of degrees of engagement: “engagement that reaches its highest intensity in the original 
immediacy of the exclamation and its lowest in the silence of habit or indifference” (Krebs 2010, 
129). As Hurley argues, the conflict felt by many philosophers in putting actions and responses 
together comes from the programmatic assumption that perception and action are about inputs 
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and outputs. The fine shades of behavior and of lived experience that Wittgenstein explores and 
that phenomenology takes as the basis of its theorizing question the input assumption and 
deliver a different picture. But behind the assumption, or rather beyond it, what is at stake is a 
way of looking at ourselves—at our lives, what we are and what we do.  SEP follows 
Wittgenstein and the phenomenologists in looking for a theory of perception that explains the 
connection between the sensory and the significance of things for human existence—a theory of 
perception where we could recognize ourselves and our lives.  
The things we perceive and the ways in which we perceive matter in our lives. Smells, 
tastes, flavors, textures, melodies, and others sensory aspects, have a significance in our lives, 
which is evinced in the way we interact with them. Perception is interaction with a perceptible 
world. This is the basic insight I have been trying to motivate up to now, and this is the insight 
that I now will flesh out and develop as perceptual practices. Since ways of doing things, in the 
sense here explored, are not individual but constitute social systems of possibilities and 
appropriatenesses by which people live their lives, ways of doing things are forms of life. 
Perceptual practices, my argument runs, are forms of life.  
As I now turn to explore the four features of perceptual practices—contextuality, 
performativity, expressivity, and normativity—I would like to insist that these features are 
highly interwoven. There is no adequate discussion of each of them without reference to the 
other three.  
One of philosophy’s tasks is, Wittgenstein says, untangling knots (1982, §756). But this 
“untangling knots” cannot be the undoing of the braids of actual life because actual life only 
occurs in those richly woven braids. You can think of braided ropes with knots. It’s no problem 
to disentangle the knots, but make sure to not destroy the rope in the process, such that we end 
up with a collection of loose threads that hold or tie nothing. 
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1.2.1 Contextuality 
Social practices are contextual in that the determination of meaning, truth, and normative aspects 
(which depend on the type of practice: epistemic, moral, perceptual, emotional, etc.) is only 
decidable by the whole concrete ways of doing things that occur in specific social circumstances, 
including a physical environment.  
Perceptual practices consist of shared ways of approaching, producing, and reacting to 
perceptible material. The behavioral significance of things perceived and the perceived 
perceptual properties are dependent upon established ways of interacting with object, events, 
and states of affairs. Consensus on ways of interacting perceptually with objects influence what 
we perceive, what is appropriate to do and perceive, and what is possible to do and perceive. 
Take for instance the perceptual interaction with a beer—drinking the beer, savoring it.  
This perceptual practice consists in the custom in which a relatively bitter, low-alcoholic 
beverage is an object of enjoyment in specific modes and circumstances. The practice includes 
the “mechanical” aspect of the action (how much it is served; how it is drunk, i.e. in sips, shots, 
or with a spoon; whether it is normally drunk cold, or only ideally, or whether that is irrelevant, 
according to the community); or the social occasion, specific environment, or weather in which 
such practice is common, if those have social significance. In some parts of the world, for 
instance, beer is a common drink for hot days. A beer can be perceived in many ways and these 
many ways are partly dependent on context. It is the same beer, and it generates reactions and 
invites interactions that are roughly similar to each other in a given community. This partly 
means that it can have a different flavor depending on the context, but the rich and nuanced 
perceptual interaction with a beer is about more than the flavor.12 
																																																								
12 These considerations do not exhaust the contextual character of perception, since specific perceptual interactions 
are personal, hence involving a pragmatic dependency at the personal level, and a host of personal-level 
considerations deriving, for instance, from the perspectival properties of objects. In the case of beer, for instance, the 
illumination that paints the beer in golden or darker colors, on the degree of personal preference for beer over other 
drinks, on the freedom or lack thereof by which the person ended up drinking a beer, among others, are cases of this 
personal level-dependencies which I treat in detail in chapters 2 through 5 in different ways. In chapter 2 I will also 
explain in more detail that the perceptual experience of taste is different from the perceptual experience of flavor (cf. 
section 2.3.2). Taste is related to taste buds in the tongue, whereas the experience of flavor is linked to taste, smell 
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There is a dependence of the broad domain of taste and flavor on this practice, but this 
dependence is not an all-or-nothing thing, but it contributes to the delimitation, as it were, of a 
perceptual horizon. The contextuality of the beer-drinking perceptual practice entails that a 
certain range of taste-bilia and flavor-abilia —i.e. relatively bitter and non-dense liquid (a broad 
description only intended here for illustrative purposes)— is placed within the domain of the 
enjoyable. Since bitter flavors are not exclusive of drinks, the possibilities for consumption and 
enjoyment (or dislike) of bitter items may be influenced by the place of beer within a broader 
range of flavors. Since taste is connected to smell, and the experience of flavor is connected to 
both taste and smell (plus tact, feeling of temperature, and even vision), it is conceivable that 
attitudes towards beer may influence and be influenced by relevant configurations in other 
sensory modalities.   
To be clear, I am not saying that the sheer capacity of a human being to have a perceptual 
experience of cold things, of cold beverages, of bitter things, or of bitter beverages depend on 
there being beer-drinkers. That aspect is partly determined by anatomical and physiological 
facts. They may be present in everybody all the same, or there may be personal differences, or 
developmental differences (newborns vs. adults), or they could even get altered by experience or 
by accidents.13 Think of nuanced flavor notes that one gets used to looking for and enjoying, 
like wine connoisseurs seem to do.14 However, the perception of beer and bitter flavors—the 
perceptual experience of them—depends on beer-drinking practices. It is certainly entailed by 
SEP’s perceptual practices approach that a member of a community where no bitter beverages 
somewhat similar to beer are enjoyed in the manner beer is, would have an entirely different 
experience of a beverage like beer —a different perceptual interaction of it— than members of a 
beer-drinking group would. 																																																																																																																																																																					
(retronasal), texture (receptors in the mouth, including lips, and even perhaps in texture perception with hands), 
temperature, and even vision. 
13 In this sense, Block is wrong in “ridiculing social constructivism about phenomenal consciousness,” since it is not 
possible to isolate P-consciousness as sheer feeling, separate from aspects of the experience such as the disgust or 
delight immediately perceived with it (Block 1999). 
14 In chapter 2 I will expand on the hedonics of taste and smell, that is, the continuity between the characteristics of 
flavor and smells and the enjoyment or disgust one feels about them. 
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The presence of the flavor of beer as part of the repertoire of available flavors, and the 
constellation of possibilities that comes with it exemplifies the important sense in which 
perceptual properties—their availability and behavioral significance—are contextually 
dependent on perceptual practices. Consider the following passage, where Wittgenstein 
elaborates on the idea that one could not “normally say ‘I take that to be a knife and a fork’” 
(1982, §535):  
 
One doesn’t take what one knows as a knife and fork at a meal for a knife and a fork; any 
more than one ordinarily tries to eat as one eats, or aims to eat.  (1982, §536) 
 
These passages build upon the “as” aspect of “seeing as” that defines perception—what I 
have termed as the familiarity in perception. This familiarity, as explained before, points to our 
perceiving objects and events with a certain intrinsic significance. The point Wittgenstein 
makes here is that although we always take something for something (since not every perceiver 
sees a fork as a fork), the familiarity is oftentimes so established that one takes it for granted and 
goes unnoticed.15 
This recognitional familiarity depends on a stable world. But the world is not the 
summation of all objects, events, and states of affairs with which every perceiver interacts. The 
world of perception is brought to life by practices that reveal such world in different manners. 
Thus, the dependence of the phenomenal aspect of perceptual experience on practice partly lies 
in the things that one cannot try to take one way or another or cannot aim at doing. As explained 
in section 1.1, we find at the basis of all social practices that our interactions with the world are 
structured around our unreflective engagements or unreflective conformities, by which we take 
																																																								
15 The familiarity of an encounter —a certain “recognition” (if only the term did not have such a cognitive burden)— 
does not only operate at the level of object- or event-identification. Even an unknown object, for instance, is perceived 
as an object, or as heavy; or a liquid as dense; or a smell as a strong smell; or a sound simply as a sound. These cases are 
also instances of a familiarity in the encounter. At this basic level, perceptual practices also play a role establishing 
attitudes towards the perceptual aspect of our encounter with the world, even though the physical, material aspect of 
occurrences also plays a role and in that sense we may find a greater commonality between between members of 
different communities. While no person would try to drink a solid object, different people may see a very dense liquid 
as having different behavioral significance, based on practice. The aspect of friction with reality at the physical level 
in relation to the human body has, in one sense, no need for practice, but, on the other hand, its specific boundaries 
may need to be established by practice. 
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occurrences as such-and-such, and display certain attitudes, actions, and reactions towards those 
things.  
A central aspect of these unreflective conformities concerns the items (i.e. sentences, 
objects, or events) whose specific significance is taken for granted by competent practitioners, on 
the basis of processes of training or acculturation. I have followed Lance and O’Leary-
Hawthorne in calling these items in the linguistic domain Quine-analytic sentences, and I am now 
offering their perceptual counterpart: the seemingly given. Thus, perceptual practices contribute 
to the establishment of attitudes and reactions towards specific perceptual properties, ranges, 
domains and possible combinations. In this way, if one partakes of the practices associated with 
beer drinking, one does not take beer to be beer, and one does not question whether such a type 
of beverage is even drinkable. There are global characteristics of types of food and drinks 
belonging to groups (groups of different scope) that make up the perceptual geography of 
members of those communities.16 Cases of acquired tastes, revealed when one travels to a 
community different than one’s own, are a good illustration of what it means to have a 
background of ordinary circumstances and ordinary responses to things one perceives, in 
relation to which specific occasions acquire their significance. One does not respond to beer by 
having hot coffee along with it, although one may drink water along with it or may eat 
something along with it.  
The seemingly given are, then, the perceptual occurrences that one takes for granted as 
perceivable or enjoyable, situated here or there in a range of perceptual properties, combinable 
or not, etc.—these are the things for which “bare challenges” are not in place. Disputing or 
challenging them amounts to “declare” oneself “outside” of the community, and understanding 
them and deftly navigating them amounts to be part of the community. This experience is 
common to most people who have traveled to worlds other than one’s own, and, with great 
certainty, common to all who traveled to communities that are culturally different from one’s 																																																								
16 Personal preferences are built on top of community consensus. They are, for the most part, exceptional, and can for 
the most part be still mapped onto community preferences. Readers of affluent, industrialized, Western societies must 
not overstate personal preferences into the basic characteristics of perceptual practices. 
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own —we know, as Lugones reminded us, that oftentimes world-travelling involves no 
geographical trips (1987). The seemingly given evinces the normative dimension that perpetual 
practices establish. They are established and maintained by concrete, consensual ways of doing 
things about perceptual material. When the practices change, the things that are taken to be one 
way or another change. Except for some physical extremes (extreme temperatures for liquids or 
for surfaces; or sounds that are intolerable by the human ear), their significance is not intrinsic 
to them.  
To interact with perceptual properties in one domain of perception or another is not a 
matter of an individual being impacted by natural kinds of properties—bitter1, bitter2, bitter3, 
etc. It is rather about specific ways of interacting with objects, events, and states of affairs that 
are located within horizons of perceptual properties, which can be broader or narrower, strict or 
plastic, where several factors are interwoven. This is why I have said that in perception we are 
not simply confronted with a world open to every individual all the same, but rather, that the 
world of perception is revealed—brought to life and selected—to human beings by the practices 
through which their communities interact with the world.  
I would like to finish this section with a ground-level notion regarding the contextuality of 
perceptual practices. Perceptual practices constitute the meaningfulness of perceptual 
interactions. Perceptual interactions are not a natural kind in the sense that not every human 
being explores things perceptually in the same way. Wittgenstein says:  
 
You need to think of the role which pictures (as opposed to working drawings) play in our 
life. This role is by no means something uniform. (2009b, §195) 
 
While most humans smell, taste, hear, etc., not all of them smell their romantic partners (at 
least not in the same way), not all of them listen to very low music in surrounding silence, not 
all of them use touch to determine what constitutes a good garment. This is because not every 
perceiver uses smell as an ingredient in the dynamic of intimacy, not every perceiver uses 
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audition as a way of achieving tranquility, and not every perceiver uses touch as a variable to 
use in the process of selecting clothing for the different cultural uses of clothing.    
Let us take that last case: comparing fabrics’ textures in order to choose one—as in some 
cultures mostly maternal figures used to do, or still do, when choosing fabrics for their 
children’s special occasion’s suits and dresses. Perceiving a fabric by touch is not the same 
touching than touching the skin of a newborn.  The role of things we perceive is not uniform, 
and this is evinced in the things we do perception-wise, that is, in our perceptual practices. 
Through these differences we can offer a way of tracing the contextual aspects of perception. 
The very practices of comparing thickness and softness are activities that only make sense 
in a social context, in which thickness and softness are comparatively noticed and put in valuing 
systems. There is no comparing of fabrics but in communities in which people compare fabrics, 
following similar procedures (in a loose sense) and with similar goals in mind. Only in that 
context, someone is dextrous in comparing fabrics or in describing colors, in a sense in which 
one could be judged by others to be knowleadgeable (or not) about it.  
Perceptual practices belong to groups of practitioners or intersubjective formations, which 
can be broad or narrow. Examples of groups of practitioners can be families, generational 
groups, national cultures, and subcultures, among others. My interest here is not to offer a 
taxonomy or a set of criteria for social formations. I operate with a broad intuitive idea that 
there is an intersubjective formation wherever a group acts in a some relatively constant 
manner. A person is normally at the crossing of several intersubjective formations that influence 
their life. This belonging is not necessarily a matter of choice, and very common instances are in 
fact not a matter of choice at all—e.g. a historical belonging, as we see in our being members of 
societies for whom the 21st century is meaningful.  Thus, at whatever intersubjective formation 
level we were taught how to proceed perceptually by a group’s practices, our coming to be part 
of those groups of practitioners has formed the fundamental structure by which we make sense of 
the world. We have come to know about food and drinks—about flavors and smells—on the 
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basis of culturally inherited foods. We have come to know about clothing, home decoration, and 
visual personal appearance—about colors and shapes—on the basis of our communities’ 
practices. We have come to know about tones of voice, voice inflections, the loudness of laughter 
and crying, the music we hear, its musical scale and choice of sounds—about sounds—on the 
basis of our communities’ auditory-related practices.  
Meredith Williams says that it is wrong to think that “the idea that grammar […] sets the 
limits of sense, independently of the characterization of any actual community and actual uses of 
language” (Me. Williams 166). Since rules are interpretable in different ways, and grammar 
alone cannot individuate meaning, we need social practices. Likewise in perception. A world in 
which flavors are possible does not entail what flavors and sounds are part of a person’s 
repertoire, what things can be done with those flavors and sounds, or the relative significance of 
those flavors and sounds in people’s lives. In this way, we can also see why all things perceptual 
are contextually dependent on the things we do with them. 
1.2.2 Performativity 
Perceptual practices are performative because they consist of actions, reactions, and dispositions 
to act and react.   
Wittgenstein criticizes traditional modes of thinking about perception by reflecting on the 
interweaving of action and perception that is mutually implicated by the conception of perception 
as perceiving as. In the bodily engagement of perception, perception is itself active. As I showed 
above with the case of someone whose hearing a melody is intermingled with playing the 
melody or dancing to it, the perceptual moment is not isolated from a full-fledged interaction 
with the thing. It rather occurs in the interaction. These interactions occur in concrete contexts 
that structure them and where they have significance—practices are contextual. Practices are not 
just movements, motor performances, but socially situated ways of doing things, that is, 
techniques. We interact with the perceptible world in specific ways and the worldly richness that 
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we encounter is the product of defined, normatively structured ways of approaching, exploring, 
taking, and combining the things we perceive.  
We are experts in navigating the world of physical objects when we look for them, avoid 
them, and use them. We are skilled in our interactions with sounds and noises, with smells and 
flavors, with the soft and rough. We know when something is loud or low, the way smells and 
flavors go along, or how we should touch a certain surface in order to feel it.  
First of all, our exposure to the perceptible world is rarely, if ever, a matter of an open 
channel that receives a raw input. In our perceptual interaction with the world, we touch and 
taste in specific manners. In perception, we explore auditorily by getting closer, going silent, 
raising the volume, or paying attention to some sounds. We explore flavors by taking bigger or 
smaller bites or sips, by perhaps quickly licking something, by letting the food or drink stay 
longer in our mouth, perhaps by closing our eyes, or by combining different pieces of food. We 
explore visually by looking from different perspectives and by paying attention to certain 
aspects or visual scenes, which we may even do unconsciously as a feature of the cultures we 
belong to (Norenzayan, Choi, and Peng 2007). In all these doings, the end point is rarely the 
gathering of sensory information for the purposes of simply determining what the thing in front 
of us is or what its objective properties are. The interaction with perceptual objects is mostly 
pragmatically significant.  
Further, in our perceptual interaction with objects, events, and states of affairs, we relate to 
things having a significance—they are perceived as something—by virtue of the context in 
which we experience them, in virtue of the way we approach them, and in virtue of facts about 
its constitution and our physiological and anatomical makeup. This significance is first and 
foremost behavioral. In everyday interaction, there is no separation between our having a 
phenomenal experience of something (as something) and that thing being for us a bearer of 
possibilities or impossibilities. This may be clearer when a certain occurrence elicits an 
immediate action—as the perception of an impending direct threat is a fleeing-causing perceived 
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object. For instance, I can experience a given smell as a something desirable or as disgusting. If 
it is a pastry I really like, I may be drawn to smell it more fully, taking a big breath to enjoy the 
smell of it. My perceiving it is not my detecting a smell, but my enjoying it as I smell it. In 
contrast, when I smell something that is rotting, I act so as to stop the contact with the thing. I 
may plug my nose or walk away. The response is not the next step after perceiving, but an 
aspect of the way it is perceived (Wittgenstein 2009b, §§222ff.). Once again, there is a telling 
contrast between the perception of someone who fully recognizes something and someone who 
does not recognize it. The difference is that the one who recognizes the object or event is said to 
recognize it on the basis of the behavioral entailment that comes to life when the perceptual 
interaction takes place: “We react to a facial expression differently from someone who does not 
recognize it as timid” (Wittgenstein 2009b, §231; See also §§180ff, 222ff). 
The performativity of our perceptual practices exhibits how perception is a way of 
inhabiting the world. On the one hand, perceptual practices are built on the materiality of the 
objects at stake. The specific possibilities for perceptual exploration —e.g. with a view to mere 
discovery, usefulness, or enjoyment— depend on the physical nature of objects, events, and 
states of affairs. In regards to flavors and smells, take the cases of slurping or taking loud whiffs, 
which allow a greater engagement with the object and are a part of some practices. Likewise, 
our ways of exploring sounds and the limits of our possible interactions with sounds are greatly 
constrained by the physicality of sounds. Because sounds do not have the temporal permanence 
or clear boundaries of most visual objects, our ways of interacting with sounds—exploring 
them, dissecting them, combining them, suppressing them, etc.—are devised by communities of 
practitioners in ways that respond to these constraints. Asking someone to repeat what they 
said, or being quiet so we are able to listen to sounds that will be gone otherwise are part of our 
auditory practices. So it is our talking quietly in spaces that call for silence and whose acoustic 
conditions propagate sounds more easily than normal, like cathedrals: “The excessive 
reverberation forces the congregation into silence of hushed whispers, because otherwise speech 
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is rapidly amplified by reflections and creates and ungodly cacophony […] The acoustic has 
also influenced services, as the use of chanting and the slow liturgical voice counters the muddy 
speech in such reverberant spaces” (Cox 2014, 42).  
In this manner, we see that our perceptual practices weave characteristics belonging to the 
social domain into the material manipulation of perceptible properties. Some perceptual 
performances are taken to be socially proper or polite, while others are not. It is at least curious, 
for instance, that expert tasters (of coffee or wine, for instance) do it in ways that increase the 
grasp of flavors but are normally socially non-acceptable, like loud slurping or spitting the 
beverages after they are drunk. Our reach into the possible perceptual properties and 
combinations of perceptible objects is constrained by our practices, which are built on the 
materiality of the objects of perception. Those same practices also impose limits on what 
members of communities regularly experience on the basis of other considerations, such as 
social appropriateness. One can imagine communities whose members never explored and 
enjoyed in their own clothing or home decoration the wide range of yellow and orange colors.  
 In our lives, though, there is no one single way of using our senses or one world that 
shows up for everybody all the same. Rather, as I have been showing, there are different ways of 
interacting with perceptible things, and these different ways reveal different aspects of the 
world for different people. The variety of foods and kinds of music around the world are the 
highlighting of certain palettes of flavors and sounds that make up the perceptible world. 
Further, the symbolic richness of our living together is reflected in perceptible configurations 
and possibilities that members of communities are able to encounter in their significance.  
 Those who partake in a form of life are those who, on the basis of training and 
acculturation, are able to perform perceptual practices correctly, thus being able to act, react, be 
disposed in certain manners, and, in that way, share meanings. In those actions and reactions, 
practitioners bring to play the structure of perceptual appropriatenesses and entitlements. 
Skilled practitioners display the character of unreflective conformity and unreflective 
  40 
engagement toward seemingly given perceptual elements—from sensory properties and ranges of 
them, to harmony or disharmony relations, to possible combinations, to available moves, to 
objects and events. Practitioners experience the familiarity of these elements and are disposed to 
act in specific ways about them.17 
 Wittgenstein has called the partaking in a perceptual practice “the mastery of a 
technique” (2009b, §222). In the fact that perceptual practices are characterized by normative 
constraints they are techniques. In the fact that performances of these techniques operate within a 
normative domain they are said to require mastery.18 This is better understood by thinking in 
those who are being trained in a technique—the infant, the immigrant, perhaps even the 
convalescent—or in those who are alien to a practice—the newborn, the new immigrant.  
 This mastery goes from the type of familiarity in encountering a perceptual occurrence, to 
the capacity to alter the perceived stimulus (if possible) either by changing the source of it or 
adjusting one’s own position, to the capacity to effect changes on items on a specific modality. 
Thus, Wittgenstein says that “Only of someone who can do, has learnt, is master of, such-and-
such, does it make sense to say that he has had [a given] experience” (2009b, §224). But social 
practices also develop techniques for the manipulation of perceptual properties. This includes the 
determination of preferred conditions for consumption of drinks or foods (cold or not, in small 
portions, consumed in bits or larger chunks, more or less bitter, etc.) and the combination of 
ranges of flavors and tastes with others, such that a certain beverage may be commonly 
consumed by itself or with other foods or drinks. While the specific mastery of manipulation is a 
matter of the specific perceptual practice at stake, we are skilled at a general level to produce 
certain configurations of perceptible material for us and for others. Some may not know how to 																																																								
17 My position does not entail that some social practices simply have a perceptual element in them, such that one 
could subtract the perceptual from them and still have a practice. The perceptual aspect is barely definable 
independently of the practices in which it is woven. Conversely, the practices in question would simply disappear if a 
perceptual element were abstracted from them. The perceptual and the social are here not in a parthood relation—
rather, they are interwoven. 
18 As I will explain in section 1.2.4, the mastery of a technique and the correct application of it is not a volitional issue. 
Just as there is a learning of walking and a potential walking wrongly, it is not the case that the one who knows how 
to walk walks wrongly. The mastery, in the perceptual case too, amounts to a baseline on the basis of which 
individual perceptual interactions take place. Instead of right or wrong, this normative dimension operates in terms of 
successfulness and unsuccessfulness. 
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cook a meal successfully, but we know the effects of adding salt to our food, and we combine 
pieces of our food so at to interact with it in ways we consider appropriate. Likewise, we know 
how to modify our voices so they express what we want or how to decorate our houses so they 
will look good to us and to others. It is in this sense that I have said that perception is the site of 
commerce of perceptible material that is produced so as to be seen in a given way, and that is 
perceived as something or that elicits certain responses.19 It is in this wide-encompassing sense 
that practices are said to be forms of life (Wittgenstein 2009a, §19, 23, 241).  
 Perceptual performances play a key role in the way we inhabit the world. The behavioral 
significance that objects, events, and states of affairs carry in perception arise from the fact 
perceptible objects, events, and states of affairs are worldly things with which we interact 
bodily. In a basic sense, we are appropriately situated, like every other living being, to interact 
with the world in a way that matters for us. This mutuality between perceiver and environing 
world is at the basis of J. J. Gibson’s ecological approach to perception (Gibson 1979). While 
Gibson developed his ecological approach with a view to non-human animals, it is appropriate to 
extend his analysis and say that we are also ecologically attuned to the world we live in on the 
basis of our body, its capabilities and potentialities, and the different possible human forms of 
life.20 Our world, unlike most other animals, is not only the environing world that we shape out 
of the totality of the natural world. Our world involves the world that is transformed into 
material culture, whether in a stable manner (as in architecture) or transiently (as in food), the 
immaterial yet physical world of songs and the like, and in general all the products of social 
practices that configure our living together, and that are products of historically situated 																																																								
19 There is a certain similarity between this commerce and the way in which Putnam refers to perceptions as 
transactions (Putnam 1999). On his view, partly inspired by Wittgenstein and the classical American pragmatists, the 
picture we should get rid of, is best exemplified in the Berkeleyan case: we are never in direct contact with things. 
Putnam’s transactions also oppose versions of perception as an interface between external world and internal 
representations. Putnam’s goal is to erase the distinction inner-outer. He thinks that this separation has fatal 
consequences for our understanding of what we do and who we are. However, Putnam’s analysis is still far from 
sociality. Putnam’s transactions between subject and world do not require sociality. Transactions are available for 
individuals in their dealing with the world. My idea of commerce, instead, is thought of as suggesting a world of 
others in relation to whom things are done, even in the sense that individual performances are not truly individual—
just as there is no private language—because they are instantiations of perceptual practices. 
20 This aspect will also be explored in the Expressivity section, when an analogy is presented between perception and 
animal expressive communication. 
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communities. Likewise, our forms of life are enacted in the social worlds that we bring to life 
precisely as we live together, through social practices.   
Marx Wartofsky offers a formidable illustration of the ecological, social, and historical 
character of our perceptual practices by reflecting on hunting: "the hunter, hearing a crack of a 
branch, or seeing a sudden flight of birds, transforms the very sound and sight into an artifact 
—an instrument— of the hunt itself. But what the cracking branch is heard as is already an 
index of a social mode of praxis, —of hunting, in this case— and therefore, insofar as the hunt 
has a specific historical form or function, nature itself has become historicized and socialized, 
and has come to be a representation of a certain mode of praxis or human action" (Wartofsky 
1979b, 206).21 The human encounter with the natural world already exhibits the complexity of 
social practices in the form of a perceptual practice: the encountering the crack of a branch as 
carrying the pragmatic significance of prey. While I distance myself from the signitive and 
representational talk of Wartofsky, the perceptual practice remains. Furthermore, the case of 
hunters that are skilled at imitating the sounds of animals (or producing sounds that generate a 
reaction in animals) we see that the mastery of perpetual practices is exhibited at social and 
historical institutions, as we also saw in the case of reverberating cathedrals. 
  The mutuality between subject and environment of the ecological approach is also 
at the root of the enactive approach to perception, first presented by Varela, Thompson, and 
Rosch (1991), and then defended by Noë (2004; 2001) and others (Hurley 1998; Thompson 
																																																								
21 Despite the strong disagreement between my position and Wartofsky’s as to the representational character of 
cognition (even though he conceptualizes perception as praxis), the richness of his analyses would merit further 
study. It is noteworthy the way he brings into traditional topics of philosophy of mind categories belonging to social 
analysis. Wartofsky articulates his social take on perception through the notion of artifact. He sees social practices as 
bearing the basic characteristics of artifacts, defined as "Anything which human beings create by the transformation 
of nature and of themselves [...] thus, also language, forms of social organization and interaction, techniques of 
production, skills" (Wartofsky 1979a, xiii). They are all a making, a praxis, and as such they are forms of social 
interaction for which communication is a pre-condition. Wartofsky refers to artifacts as models, and models 
fundamentally as representations. In contrast to the mainstream views of perception that make it a matter of a 
biological, ahistorical, inner occurrence, Wartofsky will say that "Perception is a highly evolved and specific mode of 
human action and praxis" (1979b, 189). Through the notion of artifact, we arrive to perception as a form of action—
and not only as basis for it. So he says: "Extending the notion of 'artifact' as 'tool' still further, the acquisition of skills, 
in the process of production (or even at the level of foraging, scavenging or hunting, and prior to the introduction of 
agriculture and the domestication of animals) creates such skills as themselves 'artifact', even where these skills do 
not entail the use of tools in the ordinary sense, but only the mastery of the natural organs of the body, and of 
perceptual skills in pattern-or-cue-recognition" (Wartofsky 1979b, 2001). 
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2009; Hutto and Myin 2013). The enactive approach holds that cognition is a particular type of 
relation that living beings engage in with the world on the basis of a “history of structural 
coupling” and their own natural constitution. It is, therefore, something we actively do in our 
relation with the world and not something that happens in us or to us. According to the 
standard enactive approach, perception is a type of action governed by the mastery of 
sensorimotor skills, which allows the perceiver to integrate sensations into an ongoing practical 
life. Noë’s enactivism is the idea that perception available for action (perception one can 
understand) depends on a particular type of implicit understanding, namely, the dependency 
between our sensory and motor skills.  
 But just as the ecological approach needs to be supplemented by the richness of the social 
world and the complexity of human subjects in order to respond to the human forms of life, the 
enactive approach must be modified in like ways. The difference between standard sensorimotor 
enactivism and the Social Enactive Theory of Perception that I am proposing originates 
precisely in the performative aspect of perception. For SEP, perception is not only a matter of 
coupling the sensory and the motor to which each individual of the species is naturally disposed. 
For SEP, the type of things that we do in perception is far broader than sensorimotor 
dependencies. Instead of motor actions, SEP takes practices as the key concept to understand the 
way in which perception is an active engagement with a world on the basis of our senses. The 
performativity of perceptual practices is at the basis of SEP as an alternative to standard 
enactivism.22  
1.2.3 Expressivity 
The expressivity of perceptual practices has two senses. First, perceptual practices take the 
world to be expressive and make the world express itself. Perceptual practices are ways in which 
social formations inhabit a world that reveals itself in perspectival and dynamic ways, by means 
of interactions with perceivers, which interactions are the concrete displays of those practices. 																																																								
22 I offer further contrasts between SEP and sensorimotor enactivism in chapter 3 (section 3.3.1), chapter 4 (section 
4.1.1), and chapter 5 (section 5.2.2). 
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Second, perceptual practices express the form of life of the perceivers and the social groups in 
which they partake. 
I take the family of concepts expression-the expressed-to express-being expressive to refer to the 
unfolding of phenomena, such that what is expressed does not pre-exist its expression—it is not 
a plain showing or pointing to something internal—, emerges from a potentiality, and comes to 
achieve its specific form in the expression itself—it is not a translation (Merleau-Ponty 2002; 
Arango 2015).23 In expression, there is no going back from what is expressed to something 
prior, which one may think as now being made public.  
The dynamics of expression are part of the dynamics of perception.24 The type of relation 
that expression describes is precisely what we find in perception’s basic characteristic that to 
perceive is to perceive something as something (Waldenfels 2000, 93). In the “as something,” there 
is an encountering familiarly, which is a type of seizing something perceptually—the occurrence 
of a certain configuration of sense that cannot be traced back to a sensory, non-perceived 
moment. What allows this encounter—this seizing of sense and being seized by it—is the 
necessary relation between expression and perceiver. Thus, the fundamental relationality of 
meaning is evinced in expression, for expression requires someone for whom something is 
expressive (Gély, 3).25 This, in turn, entails that the nature of the perceiver (in the case of 
perception-related expression) is constitutive of what is expressed in its concreteness. This 
constitutive relation is this way partly because expression could not be beyond the limits of 
what can be meaningful for a perceiver, but also because expression, in its concrete shape within 
those limits, is also a function of who the particular perceiver is, the social groups whose 
practices she partakes of, her immediate pragmatic horizon, and her personality. Further, the 																																																								
23 Expression includes both (relatively) fixed products and ongoing processes. The product case can be a painting, or a 
political constitution that is expression of certain relations in a political community. On the other hand, processes 
(including activities), are like games (as they are played), or the courting phase of a romantic relationship. Other 
instances of expression include a poem, a facial gesture, or an interpersonal interaction. My understanding of 
expression follows the orientation given to it by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. See also Arango (2014) and Flynn 
(2009, 67). 
24 In a sense, these dynamic relations should be referred to as the aesthetics of perception, in the sense that it is the 
internal logic of the sensible—a non-cognitive logic—that pertains to embodied, animated beings.  
25 I thank Lisa Guenther for suggesting the dual possibility of “to seize” in this case. 
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concept of expression is appropriate because it is attuned to the non-input, non-inferential, 
affective, bodily engagement that characterizes Wittgenstein’s (as well as Husserl’s and 
Merleau-Ponty’s) take on perception that I explained above.   
As a fundamental characteristic of perceptual practices, expressivity further specifies the 
way the Social Enactive View is an embodied, non-cognitive, contextual, and practice-based 
theory. Defenders of representational views of perception reject the idea that perception is 
something other than input. In the economy of perceptual representationalism, representation is 
the currency that grounds (and partly defines) the activities linked to perception—identification, 
recognition, comparison, assessment of veridicality of possibly mistaken perceptions, and even 
action. To talk of perceptual familiar encounters with reality (as I have been doing) is, in the 
representational view, to talk about an enchanted nature akin to the Myth of the Given (as 
Sellars or McDowell would put it), that assumes that meaning is inherent in the outer world 
(which SEP also rejects), and does not originate on internal representations. Since in the 
representational view it is axiomatic that we only have true, rational access to the inner, the idea 
of a familiar encounter smells like magic. Representationalists do not see the denial of the inner-
outer distinction, and the rejection of mind as inner as rational alternatives. Perception is 
treated, as both Taylor and Putnam have elaborated, as a meditational or interface tool (Taylor 
2005; Putnam 1999). Whether it remains strictly meditational or is internalized in mental 
tokens, naturalizable or not, the basic point is still that “We can’t get outside” (Taylor 2005, 26). 
Chapter 3 is devoted to exploring this problem in great detail, but it is fitting to connect it here 
with expressivity at the level of practices.  
We can begin to see how this is the case if we look at expressive communication in 
perceivers that do not have the inferential and conceptual capacities that representational 
theories assume are necessary.26 What makes the case relevant for our purposes is that in these 
cases we should be able to distinguish between communication and action-reaction, and between 																																																								
26 I am not interested in reductionist theories that define every behavior in sub personal mechanisms—i.e. a matter of 
mere brain functioning—, as some brute naturalisms wish to do, because perception is a personal level phenomenon. 
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perception and action-reaction.  In the case of communication, it is normally thought that the 
distinction lies in that genuine communication employs an intentionalistic background on the 
part of speakers and inferential capacities on the side of hearers. In the case of perception, it is 
normally thought that perception requires inferential capacities on the side of perceivers, so 
recognition and like processes are possible. In both cases, it is as if we want to understand the 
difference between understanding a command and getting a sunburn, or between perceiving 
that a steamy soup is perhaps too hot to drink and, again, getting a sunburn. Thus, is it true that 
the distinction between communication and action-reaction is a matter of intentions plus 
inferences?  
   Dorit Bar-On has argued that human communication shares some features with animal 
expressive behavior—behavior that expresses pain, fear, aggressiveness, excitement, 
playfulness, etc. (2013a, 4). Instances of expressive behavior are “growls, teeth-barings, tail-
waggings, fear barks and grimaces, lip smacks, ground slaps, food-begging gestures, ‘play faces’ 
and play bows, copulation grimaces and screams, pant hoots, alarm, distress, and food calls, 
grooming grunts, open-mouth and ear-flap threats” (Bar-On 2013a, 26). In her view, treating 
these behaviors as symptoms or physiological indications begins to acknowledge their 
complexity. For instance, in the case of play fight, the same gestures that are used in a real fight 
are displayed, so understanding their playful nature is entirely a matter of the context in which 
it happens (Arango 2015). Through these behaviors, Bar-On argues, animals are able to share 
with other meanings about “how things are in the world and how things are with them” (Bar-
On 2013b, 25). What is crucial here is that the comprehension of this behavior does not make 
use of intentional, propositional, and inferential capacities on the parts of speakers and hearers. 
Rather, expressive behavior exhibits to “suitably attuned” observers something about our 
mental dispositions or attitudes about things, without necessarily assuming intentions to 
communicate something on the part of the “actor,” or an inferential process on the part of the 
observer (Bar-On 2013b, 18). The determination of a “suitable attuned observer” will naturally 
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depend, in the case of contextual and normative practices, on those who participate in the 
practices themselves. Thus, expressive communication “is a form of social, intersubjective, 
world-directed and overt communicative behavior” that shows a subject’s relation to the world 
(Bar-On 2013b, 24). Lastly, expressive communication is behaviorally meaningful—it is a bodily 
engagement—because that is, in fact, the only clue that we have to affirm that hearers 
“understand” the significance of the others’ behavior. The reason we tell that an animal has 
understood another’s signal as playful is that it has responded in a playful manner—and in fact, 
the signal is understood also as playful because it is normally taken behaviorally to be such by 
other individuals.  
This comparison allows me to articulate embodiment and expressivity, as a feature of non-
representational SEP. In contrast to representationalism, SEP argues that our perceptual 
engagement with the world is structured according to social practices and based on perceivers’ 
bodily attunement or responsiveness to worldly things. In this sense, SEP is an embodied 
theory. To understand perception as a matter of bodily engagement with the world that we 
encounter is to deny that perception occurs in an inner domain. To take embodiment as 
fundamental for perception entails that both perception and action are part of the same continuum 
of our bodily engagement with the world. If perception is not to happen internally, inferentially, 
a certain attunement with the world is required in which worldly oriented perceivers encounter 
a meaningful world—an expressive world.  Let us not forget, though, that perceptual bodily 
engagement is a matter of degrees: the stillness of the enjoyment of silence is as much a bodily 
engagement, as it is the disgust of eating some badly spoiled piece of food.    
 Perceptual practices reflect their expressive nature in their perspectival nature, both 
(intra-) modally and multi-modally. First, the world is for a perceiver a wealth of objects, events, 
and states of affairs that appears always aspectually. Due to the physical nature of the world, the 
embodied nature of perceivers, and the temporal extension of interactions, aspects are, first of 
all, perspectives—a terms which that shall refer not only, or even mainly, to spatial perspectives 
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but to the varying ways in which the same objects appear to perceivers in virtue of the 
physicality of the objects and the perceptual explorations of them. For instance, a smell reveals 
two different perspectives when it is smelled casually and when it is smelled intensely. 
Relatedly, the world is a potentiality regarding perceptual modalities. The perspectives in which 
the world reveals itself are also modally rich. The world comes to be meaningful for us in modal 
configurations and combinations: we not only see the world—perhaps not even mainly. We 
touch the world, listen to it, smell it, and taste it. We are able to discover the richness of the 
world through our different sensory organs. Each organ, Merleau-Ponty said, “interrogates” its 
objects in its own way (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 268). On top of this material and physiological 
facts constituting perceptual interactions between things and perceivers, individual perceivers 
employ their organs in specific ways, guided by social techniques.27 Our ways of looking, 
touching, and smelling are not simply biologicall fixed. In their fine granularity and fine-tuning, 
perceptual interactions enact social ways of exploring the world that allow for individual 
styles.28  
As mentioned in the performativity section, practices are adapted to the richness of the 
world. As techniques, practices are skilled ways of exploring the world in its perspectives, both 
intra-modally and inter modally. The world of food—the experiences of smell and mainly of 
flavor—is perhaps one of the best illustrations of this skilled orientation of social practices to a 
many-faceted world. Since, as said before, the experience of flavor includes smell, taste, touch, 
temperature, and even sound and vision (think of crunchy warm food sold commercially, just to 
highlight the importance of visual appearance for the experience of an edible item), 
gastronomies evince how different communities have historically devised ways of interacting 
with the world so as to interact with it in manners that are satisfying as nourishment and 
																																																								
27 This mastery of perceptual techniques is built upon natural capacities and, in this sense, part of our skillfulness lies 
in anatomical and physiological capabilities, such that we are able to perceive things within certain ranges of 
stimulation and under certain conditions. Only someone able to hear in the first place is able to explore sounds as 
such (different than sensory related phenomena, like the vibration of instruments due to the physics of sound). 
28 Chapters 2 and 3 elaborate the perspectival nature of perceptual experience in detail, and chapter 4 and 5 elaborate 
on the implications of those aspects for issues of content and the normativity of content. 
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considered enjoyable. In this sense, perceptual practices exhibit an attunement to the 
geographical world, in that those practices have been developed according to the availability of 
products and other relevant circumstances, such as cooking methods. It should not be difficult 
now to see perceptual practices as performances in expressive contexts. Due to the meaning of 
practices within people’s lives, it is now easier to see how perceptual practices configure forms of 
life, ways of inhabiting the world.  
To go back to the interdependency between the expressivity of the world and our bodily 
engagement with it, think of a plaintive melody, or of how someone’s handwriting can be 
childish, or of a timid bodily gesture (Wittgenstein 1982, §§735–776; See also §§713, 906).29 A 
person’s bodily reaction to a cry for help, a lover’s encouraging reaction to a lover’s body’s 
readiness for sex, are not separate from the perceiving of a voice’s intonation or the perceiving 
of arms’, lips’ and torsos’ intense movements. The “appropriate” response to one of these 
perceptual occurrences characterizes the perceptual occurrence as such. The caress is inviting 
because it is responded to as such. A person whose caresses were never taken to be inviting, whose 
caresses would always turn a lover away, would change their ways, realizing that the 
perceivable movement does not express what they want.30 For those who play the game of 
kisses, reacting invitingly may include the evident offering of the neck in a manner that makes 
one recall of vampires. Offering the neck is then not just a reaction but an invitation, and there 
is no clear or useful distinction anymore between actor and acted upon.31 In a perceptual 
																																																								
29 These cases show one sense in which perceptual practices are expressive, namely, in the sense that perceptual 
practices directly tell something about the people whose behavior one is acquainted with. The phenomenon of the 
perception of others adds a thick layer to perception of the world in general. The difference is that in the perception of 
others—and the argument could extend to other minded beings—the perceptual object is not simply a material object 
but a behaving body, a living body, whose activities and the domain of those activities also define the being itself. I 
somehow limit myself here to the expressivity of the world in general, with only some mentions to the perception of 
others, but I will not offer an exhaustive study of the richness of the perception of others because its complexity 
merits being treated in greater length that this work allows. 
30 This is a rich analog to having always seen the duck-rabbit as a rabbit, based on having always treated is as such 
(Wittgenstein 1982, §472). 
31 In a different key one might say that in the perceptual situation, a perceiver can modify the location of her sensory 
receptors so as to improve in one way or another the sensory aspect, eventually causing an attuned partner to modify 
the movements that were situated in a feedback loop, which in the present example would be acting as the causal side. 
Since the kisser would feel the movements of the kissed one, the kisser would also be touched, and the kissed one 
would be the one touching. 
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interaction, the interaction itself expresses something about the perceiver and the thing 
perceived, but the perception cannot be singled out as the receptive moment. 
The complexity of social relations and structures features in the suitable attunement of 
perceivers that is part of the mastery of perceptual practices. Far beyond the sensory, perceptual 
practices are expressive of complex forms of life featuring political structures, relations of 
domination, dynamics of oppression along the lines of race, ethnicity, or class, romantic 
relationships, playful encounters, etc. The perceptual is not a naturally defined domain. In its 
social nature, perception is malleable. In its everyday course, it becomes dyed by the activities in 
which it is involved. And in becoming a matter of intersubjective commerce, other social 
practices are constantly perceptualized. The romantic is perceptual, so it is the oppressive and 
the hateful.32 
To conceptualize perception in terms of socially structured practices of interactions with 
the world reflects the idea that there is no proper theory of perception that does not entail 
substantive commitments about what perceivers are and what the world is. As foreshadowed in 
the Introduction, a proper theory of perception is a partial account of what it means for 
perceivers to be in the world, and what it means for the world to be the home of perceivers. The 
characteristic of expressivity is one of the ways in which this is achieved.  
																																																								
32 I now wish to highlight a necessary characteristic of perceptual practices and their expressive feature. The 
perception of objects, events, and states of affairs is not a matter of inputs, and this means that it is not a matter of 
isolated chunks of information. Likewise, the meaningfulness of perceptual occurrences is not to be found in pieces of 
actions, or in actions disconnected from a social framework that grounds their meaningfulness and significance. We 
can see this by looking at G.H. Mead’s account of gesture. A gesture must be located within the broader framework of 
social acts of which the gesture is a part (Mead 1967, 42ff.). The ground meaning for perceptual engagements with 
the world is the “matrix or complex of attitudes and responses constituting any given social situation or act” (Mead 
1967, 72). We can see this is exemplified in the case of the type of animal social play known as play fight or sparring, 
which features complex social interactions—part of the usual repertoire of perceptible occurrences. Play fight appears 
in in pronghorns and in several other species of mammals and marsupials. It involves “the use of species-specific 
patterns of agonistic behavior in a non-serious context” and the fighting bouts are combined with non-fighting 
behavior and context-dependent signals (Pellis and Pellis 1998, 116, 122–123; Burghardt 1998, 21). It is 
characteristic of play fight that isolated actions are very often, if not always, ambiguous (Watson 1998, 69). Pellis and 
Pellis argue that threat signals are oftentimes present in play fight in most species that display this social behavior 
(1998, 122). Their ambiguity disappears in virtue of the context in which they occur. Since the same action could be 
performed by the same organism in different contexts, and the potentially dangerous reaction depends on another 
organism’s perception of a certain signal, the development of play fight as play—the perception of certain movements 
as play fight and not as fight—depends not just on what the individuals do, but on the shared meaning of certain 
actions within contexts. This is a case in which perceptual practices’ expressivity is holistic. 
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In this mutuality perceivers-world we find the form of life of perceivers, and that amounts, 
to an extent, to finding out what perceivers are. At the bottom, there are only concrete systems 
of practices or forms of life and our philosophical search for explanations ends there. Perceivers 
are not detectors of ideally univocal properties, inhabiting a world of such properties. Rather, 
perceivers are agents, inhabiting a world by means of active bodily engagement with it, in which 
perceptual possibilities continuously unfold.  It is an engagement with a world that is never 
offered in identical ways to others—sometimes in very similar ways, sometimes in different 
ways. Our world is a rich, unfinished, endless, expressive world. Our engagement is an 
engagement with a world where, by means of differences in modes of exploration, we even at 
times seem to be in contacts with different worlds. 
1.2.4 Normativity 
Practices are normative because they exhibit a dimension of successfulness and pragmatic 
significance. The normativity of perceptual practices consists in the patterns that guide a 
practitioner’s mastery of things perceptual.33 This mastery is a knowing about perceptible stuff, 
such that we are familiar with perceptual properties and their aspects and interactions (sensory 
properties, combinations of those properties, social and behavioral significance of those 
properties), we respond appropriately to them, we explore them, and we manipulate them 
skillfully. More precisely, this mastery consists in being able to situate perceptual interactions in 
relation to expectations and possibilities. Pragmatic normativity is grounded in the processes of 
training by which new practitioners are brought into the community and by which the 
community continuously develops and transforms itself (Medina 2002). This means that a social 
practice is normative in that it exhibits a consensus of actions that is transmitted to newcomers.  																																																								
33 This section only addresses one aspect of the normativity of perception, namely, the normativity of perceptual 
practices. In broader terms, both the how and the what of perception are subject to normative relations: how 
perceptual practices and individual interactions hold together (normativity of perceptual practices), how practices and 
interactions relate to thought, awareness, action and emotion (normativity of perceptual intentionality), and how the 
contents of perceptual experience hold together (normativity of perceptual content). Chapter 5 will be fully devoted 
to the last two specifications of normativity—intentionality and content. They are central in the synchronic 
treatment of perception, that is, in the treatment of perception as instantiated in individual interactions with 
perceptible stuff. Notice also that a full treatment of perceptual normativity must link normatively the what of 
perception, that is, the contents of perception, to its how. This is partly done in this section and partly in chapter 5. 
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Wittgenstein gives normativity the meaning of mastering a technique. To master a 
technique is to have a skill; it is also to be part of a community of practitioners. In a given social 
formation, there is a consensus of actions, such that members act “in the right ways under the 
appropriate circumstances” (Williams, 182). “The right ways,” “under,” and “appropriate 
circumstances” are all determined by a transmitted consensus. Now, how far does the scope of 
actions and reactions to perceptible stuff extend? What falls under the perceptual skills?  
First, it applies to the whole domain of application of the technique. The one who is a 
master in an auditory practice knows about sounds: she knows what a sound is, what loud 
sounds and low sounds are like, the meaningfulness of sounds in speech and, perhaps, in music, 
sonic dynamics—sonorous things moving away or coming towards, occurring close or far—, as 
well as how to produce a loud sound by contact with an object, and, in the case of people that are 
able to speak, how to speak loud or low. Perceptual skills can be understood as a type of baseline 
knowledge: the knowledge of things that we simply assume and operate on. This is the domain 
of the seemingly given, in relation to which we act in an unreflective conforming ways. 
Specifically, I refer here to the levels of familiarity we have with certain ranges of flavors, 
sounds, smells, and colors. Someone who partakes in a perceptual practice has a greater 
familiarity to some ranges of perceptual properties, as well as to possible combinations.  
  Notice that these skills are based on states of affairs of different kinds: physical, 
anatomical, and physiological. Since these facts are behaviorally relevant, they configure 
dispositions. On the basis of these dispositions, skills develop, and those skills acquire the 
fullness of socially structured ways of doing things. The tactile perception of a volume carries 
the expectation of regularity in the way volumes display themselves: their sides are situated 
spatially and contiguously in space and one can tactilely feel one surface before another surface 
follows. In other words, there is an enactive expectation, since some actions are part of the 
bodily engagement in which perception consists. These expectations are partly built upon the 
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stability and regularity of the world—on facts about the materiality of the world and the 
constitution of our bodies.34 
 The interactions start being more evidently multi-layered as we deal with interpersonal 
interactions. For instance, the “inspection” of a seemingly familiar face is partly a function of the 
visual nature of the object, of its sensory properties, such that one must alter a point of view in 
order to better engage with the object. This means, specifically, to move one’s head to get a 
better look at the person’s face, and perhaps come closer. Notice, however, that one cannot 
explore a person’s face the way one explores a painting in a museum, since both types of 
interactions have an element of social propriety, which a child needs to learn. One may need to 
engage with the person and see if she is who she seems to be from afar: if the gestures and her 
voice are those of an old acquaintance. Some soups, for example, require that they are served 
within a range of temperatures. The requirement of their being hot has to be squared with the 
tolerance of the human receptors and with social practices of propriety. As to the exploration, a 
hot soup requires that the person approaches the liquid in ways that allow a “diagnosis” of 
temperature while keeping in with certain norms of etiquette in which, for example, sounds are 
or not allowed. If found delicious, one may engage with it in involved ways that may include 
sounds, more intense movement of the mouth and tongue, all the while keeping with the social 
limits of what is considered acceptable (or not). If the soup is rather cold, one may have the 
chance to warm it up or have it warmed up—or would simply have it, as it is, partly disliking it.  
The normativity of perceptual practices is exhibited in the actual practices that, as just 
described, range from our encountering perceptual properties to socially rich modes of 
interaction with the perceptual world. More abstractly, practitioners are able to situate perceptual 																																																								
34 Notice however that, as animals, we have certain basic dispositions towards perceptual properties, which each form 
of life develops into specific configurations. There is nevertheless a basic level of familiarity with the perceptible 
world, with a corresponding skill, that pertains for instances to the basic phenomenal feeling of sensory properties. 
Our skilled bodily engagement with the physical world is also evinced in our knowing what a smell feels like in the 
first place. The social character of our perceptual engagement with the world extends to the the fact that other beings 
also manifest a familiarity with smells as smells, with strong smells as strong, with sweet smells as sweet. Along 
these lines we could find a commonality with seeing beings, smelling begins, tasting beings, auditory begins, 
touching beings, etc. Perception is in this sense evidence of the fact that all humans and other non-human forms of 
life inhabit the same world and have, in a significant sense, similar types of life. 
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interactions in relation to expectations and possibilities. On this basis I argue that normativity of 
perceptual practices is a matter of successfulness and significance, and not of correctness and 
intelligibility. This position entails that there are no unsuccessful perceptions, nor entirely 
meaningless ones. It also entails that our perceptual engagement with the world is a matter of 
degrees in which a notion of “best,” “normal,” or “customary” is operative.  
Expectations and possibilities are tied to our acquaintance with a stable world, which is 
stable in different degrees in its physical and social aspects. To situate an occurrence in relation 
to expectations is partly to have a sense of what has come before and what is to come, of what 
can be done, or of whether the present occurrence is normal, uncommon, or excessive. It is a 
matter of having a sense of how a situation can unfold. Think for instance of drinking a regular 
cup of coffee. All goes as expected. It may need some sugar or already have too much, it may be 
too cold for our taste or too hot—all of these, starting with the flavor of coffee, are determined 
by social perceptual practices. Now think that this cup of coffee is a prank—a bad one of 
course—and someone has put so much salt in it that the liquid is saturated. I take a big sip and I 
spit it. It is so terribly salty that I react automatically and spit it. It is not an incorrect 
perception. It is a successful perception in the sense that I am able to relate to it on the basis of a 
system of expectations: I spit it and know that I cannot (or do not want to) drink more, and that 
there is nothing to do about it. We can modify the prank. Serve an ice-cold coffee on a freezing 
evening to someone who is expecting a warm coffee. She takes a sip and laughs about it, but 
takes the coffee and warms it up—perhaps adds a little sugar before having her much-desired 
coffee. Let’s modify it again. Instead of salt, add a spice entirely unknown to the drinker. Say it 
is turmeric. The drinker is surprised, and, arguably, not positively. The flavor is probably 
disgusting, but unknown. She may not spit it for whatever reason but certainly will not drink it 
anymore. She cannot identify the flavor, but knows it is a flavor and, perhaps, that is on the 
bitter side of things. The perception is not incorrect—it is perfectly successful and pragmatically 
significant.      
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Take now the case of an avid concert-goer selecting a location at a venue where one of her 
favorite musicians will perform. They know that music is not best enjoyed behind columns that 
block the sound, nor right next to speakers or cabins, since the sound does not all come out of 
one single speaker. Suppose they pick a good location (a good location relative to their styles, 
their abilities, their preferences, etc.) and move around after one or two songs in order to better 
listen to it. Whatever the final location of the concert-goer is, the idea I want to convey is that 
expectations and possibilities govern our perceptual interacting with worldly stuff, in ways that 
involve determinations arising from contextual practices, which also provide “tacit norms (or 
normative expectations) that are exhibited in the behavior of the participants” (Medina 2003, 
262). Lastly, in a visual case where everything goes as expected—like when I look at the tree in 
front of me, and it looks nice and green and tall and moves with the wind—expectations are 
always at work. This normalcy is also an expression of the normative domain of our perceptual 
interaction with the world.     
Perceptual practices are malleable and fluid. Normatively, the expectations and possibilities 
are present and also change at all the levels of our perceptual interaction with the world—at the 
level of sensory properties, of our handling of things, and also of the characteristics that have a 
social meaning. Perceptual practices adjust continuously within the social groups that share 
them, and these adjustments can be a reflection of characteristics proper of human groups. For 
instance, traditionalistic societies may have little variation in their perceptual practices: in their 
clothing customs, in the colors they use to decorate their place of habitation, or in the food they 
eat. The cultural products of marginal groups within a society can sometimes be seen as sort of 
imitations of mainstream practices, that is, as an institution of alternative practices. Kinds of 
music and foods that once belonged to the elites are adopted and transformed by marginal 
groups—instruments and ingredients may change in order to adapt to the limited means of the 
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marginal group. In this way new practices are established, where new expectations and 
possibilities are set in place.35  
Expectations and possibilities of perceptual practices are a type of baseline knowledge. 
They make use of the notions of the “normal,” “best,” or “customary,” and these notions acquire 
their meaning in the social formations in which they are used (except, perhaps, for the notion of 
normal that depends on physical laws). Within social groups, expectations and possibilities 
change, and new groups or social formations come to life when a new way of interacting with 
perceptual stuff comes to be a way of doing things for some practitioners. On top of the 
normativity of practices, individuals in specific situations interact perceptually with the world in 
manners that also reflect their personal styles and preferences. Individuals also bring about 
changes. Personal preferences can turn into group practices. Such seems to be the simple case of 
the inventor of a recipe. 
Medina has argued, in the case of discursive practices, that “normativity is not the kind of 
thing that can be monopolized at all and, a fortiori, it cannot be monopolized either 
individualistically or socially” (2010, 2). While it cannot be monopolized, the social domain 
manifest in perceptual practices enjoys an epistemological primacy over the individual, since it 
sets the domain of the perceptible and it first brings individuals into ways of interacting 
perceptually with the world.  
Normativity does not arise out of the consensus of actions, but out of the transmission—the 
training and acculturation—by which perceivers come to be part of a social group. We learn to 
perform practices in the right contexts, in the right ways. Thus, Wittgenstein says:  “We learn 
how to arrange objects according to their colours, how to report the colours of things, how to 
produce colours, compare shapes, measure, etc., etc.” (1982, §483). Echoing Merleau-Ponty on 
truth, of perceptual practices we can say that we have learned what is it to taste, to smell, or to 
hear through socially situated practices (see also Williams 1999, 166).  
																																																								
35 I am thankful to Melinda Hall for this suggestion. 
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The whole techniques of commerce with perceptible material are not biologically fixed. 
Having a sensory apparatus that responds to a certain range of stimuli and under certain 
physiological constrains is only the basis upon which the practices are built. Consider the case of 
research in social cognition that shows that two different culturally defined groups of 
individuals see the same visual scene differently, because one group focuses on focal points of the 
scene and the other group focuses on the whole scene, as judged even by eye movement (Chua, 
Boland, and Nisbett 2005; Masuda and Nisbett 2001; this evidence will be analyzed in detail in 
section 2.3.3). The biological configuration of the eye and of the neural correlates of vision do 
not account for the actual phenomenon of visually interacting with visual scenes, even at a basic 
level.  
As explained in section 1.1 above, the view that normativity arises out of processes of 
training entails that there is no use for the distinction between acting guided by a rule and 
according to rule, because it is not possible to single out rules independently of contextual 
practices. In contrast, acting within perceptual practices is done blindly, and it is precisely the 
mark of a skilled practitioner to act correctly without engaging in inferential, cognitive 
processes that are supposed to be necessary for there being a properly “acting guided by a rule.”  
Once again, the notion of embodiment at work in SEP that takes perception to be a matter of 
bodily engagement is at odds with views that, in order to meaningfully separate causes from 
reasons, which they see necessary, require that we reason about causes—that is, that we act 
guided by rules (see Crowell 2013, 28).36 But once again, the division between causes and 
reasons, such that causes are responded to automatically whereas reasons are justifiable, is part 
of a picture that separates inner and outer and sees normativity in perception as in need of 
justification. In contrast, the primacy of practice means that one is situated within the normative 
space when one acts in accordance with a practice, even if one is not aware of why things are 
done thus or so. Practitioners rely on the seemingly given—a domain against which “bare 
challenges” are not in order. In perception, the seemingly given is the familiarity with certain 																																																								
36 Chapter 5 will elaborate on the relation of this aspect of normativity to perceptual content.  
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ranges of sensory properties, the meaningfulness of certain perceptual interactions, and the 
naturalness of certain perceptual explorations and combinations. Because of this, the “as” in the 
fundamental character of the perception of something “as something” seems hidden: it seems to us 
that we see things simply as they are in themselves and for everybody else, whereas we are 
interacting with them, in their own materiality and from a perspective that is spatial, temporal, 
and pragmatic.  
1.3 From Practices to Experience 
The extension of Wittgenstein’s account of social practices to the perceptual domain is the 
broad framework for the Social Enactive Theory of Perception. The finely grained analysis of 
perception that I began to offer with the four characteristics of perceptual practices draws from 
all sensory modalities and accounts for the diversity of objects and modes of exploration of the 
different ways of perceptual interaction. Most philosophy of perception is biased by vision, and 
wrongly so. Wittgenstein does not entirely escape this tendency, notwithstanding some 
remarks dealing with other sensory modalities.  
SEP is deployed both diachronically and synchronically, according to whether the focus is 
on social perceptual practices, or on the more shortly temporally bounded interactions of a 
perceiver with worldly things, respectively. The pragmatic is at work on two different levels. 
The distinction is between a system of social practices in which bright colors are favored in 
clothing and house decoration according to social notions of appropriateness (diachronic aspect), 
and specific interactions of a perceiver with clothing where certain shades of color are actively 
discriminated (or not) and judged as matching a different color (or not) by a perceiver (synchronic 
aspect) situated pragmatically (deciding what to wear for a social occasion). In this chapter, I 
have taken the diachronic approach to perception. 
A central implication of the main thesis of this chapter—that perception is best understood 
as a type of social practice—is that the diachronic conditions the synchronic, i.e. that social 
practices condition individual interactions. This occurs in two senses. First, it means that the 
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configuration of the activity and the ways of acting are dependent on shared ways of doing 
things (without precluding individual variations). In the second sense, even seemingly 
independent, traditional basic perceptual concepts used in the philosophical discussion, such as 
recognition and discrimination, individuation of sensory properties and phenomenal qualities, 
are constituted by social practices in relevant ways. What ranges of smells we enjoy, seek, and 
actively combine with others; what sound combinations we find harmonic and use to dance 
originates constitutively in the social practices in which those perceptual properties occur.37 In 
these two senses, practices carry over into the synchronic analysis. 
Chapter one dealt with the diachronic and social practice-level, whereas chapters two 
through five deal with synchronic and individual aspects of perception, where perceptual 
practices are instantiated in individuals’ perceptual interactions. It would be wrong to say that I 
deal first with the social and then with the individual because the individual is constituted by 
social ways of doing things, even though it features the particularity that comes from being in a 
meaningful way an individual interaction. This is why SEP is a social theory of perception.  
The reader will certainly feel a change of register, of tempo, between chapter 1 and 
chapters 2 through 5. The shift is perspectival within the theory itself. This dual perspective is a 
matter of two necessary and complementary takes on the same phenomenon. It is justified by 
the complexity of perception as to its location in the lives of communities and subjects, and, as 
to the aspects, it reveals when it is instantiated in individual interactions. The perspective of 
individual interactions allows a fruitful engagement with standard and contemporary views in 
the philosophy of perception. Specifically, chapters 2 through 5 deal with perceptual experience, 
perceptual content, perceptual recognition and discrimination, sensory properties, and primary 
and secondary qualities, among others.  
																																																								
37 There is a different type of pragmatic dependence, a non-social pragmatic dependency, which I will explore in 
chapter 3 (section 3.3.1). The latter refers to patterned links between actions and sensory stimulation, whose mastery 
is constitutive of our perceptual experiences, and that are not socially constituted but belong to the physicality of the 
interaction. 
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 I would now like to offer a coarse parallel and some links between social practices and the 
individual perceptual interactions of the following chapters. In relation to the idea that 
perception is contextual, the reader may look at the spatiotemporal and dynamic nature of 
perception (chapters 3, 4, 5). In relation to the performativity of practices, the reader may look 
at the interactional nature of perceptual experience (chapters 2, 3). In relation to the 
expressivity of perception, the reader may look at the essentially perspectival nature of the 
objects and contents of perception (chapters 2, 3, 4, 5). In relation to the normativity of 
perceptual practices, the reader may look at the normativity of perceptual consciousness and 
perceptual content of the last chapter (chapter 5). Lastly, I have begun to argue for the 
differences between standard sensorimotor enactivism and social enactivism by showing the 
distinction between motor actions and practices, that is, as a function of the performativity of 
perception. Further arguments for the differences between the Social Enactive Theory and other 
enactivisms can be found in chapters 3, 4, and 5.  
Non-skeptical readers of Wittgenstein aim at dissolving philosophical problems that arise 
from some fundamental misconceptions about the objects of inquiry. In some cases, the 
philosopher’s task is not only undoing the confusions but also showing how the phenomenon 
should be conceived. I think that perception is one of these cases. In addition to objecting to the 
representational views, I continue with the task of presenting SEP as an alternative to them, 
now by shifting gears and supplementing the practice-based perspective with the socially 
constituted individual interaction perspective.   
 
Chapter II 
 
Perceptual Experience as the Basis for Perceptual Content 
 
What do I perceive when I taste a meal, when I smell the park in the early morning as I ride my 
bicycle through it, or when I hear a car coming towards me from my left. Do I perceive the 
meal, the park, the park in the morning, the car, the car coming from my left? Do we perceive 
chemical compounds and airwaves? Or do I perceive bits of worldly events, only to be later 
connected inferentially or otherwise cognitively? Do I perceive chunks or sequences? Do I 
perceive moving and changing things? Or do I perceive static objects and some other cognitive 
processes fill in the blanks between transitions and transformations? But wouldn’t we need to be 
clear first about what it is to perceive in the first place before we talk about what we perceive? 
What is it to perceive that is common to my smelling the park in the morning and my hearing a 
car coming toward me? Is it to be impacted by sensory impulses? Is it the matching of an inner 
impression with an outer occurrence? Is it to interact with the park and the car such that in each 
case I am in contact with an aspect of the world? Or may it be the case that the nature of 
perception and the objects of perception are constitutively interrelated?  
This chapter offers a focused analysis of perception as perceptual experience and lays out 
the connections between experience and content, which will be further explored in chapters 3 
and 4. Specifically, I will argue that perceptual experience is sensory-based interaction with 
physical objects, events and states of affairs in the world.1 In this view, the world presents itself 
or is presented to the subject, or the subject makes the world present to her. It is not the case 
that the subject re-presents the world, or that the world gives rise to re-presentations of itself. 
On this basis, Social Enactive Theory of Perception (SEP) holds that perceptual experience and 
perceptual content are mutually implicated issues of aboutness. Questions about what we 																																																								
1 While all perceptual experience is socially constituted in the sense that it is dependent on perceptual practices, as 
presented in chapter 1, I will not repeat this qualification here and in the upcoming chapters.  
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perceive--questions of content--depend on what it is to perceive in the first place, and the nature 
of perception depends on the type of objects perception deals with.  
As this chapter begins to explore the connection between experience and content, I will 
situate the discussion of this chapter in relation to two broad ways of looking at perception: 
representational and non-representationalist accounts of perceptual experience and perceptual 
content.2 Representational views hold that representations are constitutive of perceptual 
experience and perceptual content. Non-representational views assert that what is fundamental 
about perceptual experiences is a specific type of direct interaction with the world such that 
perceptual experience and content are constituted by the surrounding world (Taylor 2005; 
Putnam 1999; Logue 2012, 212; Campbell 2002).  
In addition to these concerns, belonging somewhat narrowly to the philosophy of mind, I 
will also keep an eye on the epistemological concerns that McDowell has called the two 
“distinctive anxieties of modern philosophy,” and to which both representationalist and non-
representationalists try to respond (1994, xvi). McDowell’s rendering of the opposition between 
what he calls ‘bald naturalism’ (of which the Sellarsian Myth of the Given is protagonist) and 
Davidson’s ‘coherentism’ explicates the tension (akin to what Hurley has called the Myth of the 
Giving (1998)). Philosophical thinking seems torn between a pole that takes reality to be given 
unmediated to subjects and a pole that, haunted by skepticism, claims that contributions from 
reality are so raw that they every sense of reality must be entirely added by the mind. The 
																																																								
2 The representationalist side dates back to traditional accounts of mind (Descartes, Locke, Hume) and extends to 
computational models prominent in the cognitive sciences. On the non-representationalist side, we find, on the one 
hand, varieties of realism, naïve or direct, as well as some versions of intentionalism, disjunctivism about perception, 
and some relationalist (Crane 2001; Husserl 1983; Husserl 2001a; Campbell 2002; Snowdon 2008). On the other hand, 
we find a strong version of non-representationalism in the phenomenological traditions, particularly in non-idealist 
interpretations of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of perception, and some of the contemporary situated 
accounts of cognition (enactive, embedded, extended, embodied). It is important to clarify that while Phenomenology 
is an intentionalist philosophy in the sense that it takes intentionality as a central feature, it is not, in my view, a 
representationalist theory. That identification I reject because it suggests, wrongly, that any view that privileges 
‘intentional’ aspects of perceptual acts (or of mental states, as used in a different register) is committed to the 
existence of separate entities from objects called ‘representations’ of objects (Logue 2012, for example, makes this 
mistake). I do not agree that the intentional character of mental acts entails the existence of representations in any 
strong sense. I do not have the space to discuss this issue in any more detail here. (See Crane 2001, 6–33 for an 
interesting discussion.) For my purposes here I agree with Drummond in saying that all representationalism is a 
variety of intentionalism, but not all intentionalism is representational (Drummond 2012). I do not take sides on the 
details of Drummond’s proposal.  
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tension between these poles reveals the anxiety of being between the lure of each position and 
their felt dangers.  
The beginning of the solution to the epistemological concerns is that we liberate ourselves 
from the apparent demand for a decision for one or the other. In continuity with the perceptual 
practices view inspired in Wittgenstein’s non-skeptical readers, the view of experience here 
offered is doubtful of the assumptions on the skeptical side, and correlatively on the seeming 
need to move to the other extreme. If the cries of the skeptic are not really pressing, let alone 
urgent, the coherentist side is not as alluring. On the other end, we start overcoming the 
tension when we see as intellectually respectable to pause at and doubt the call of Zeitgeist’s 
scientistic intellectual climate that assumes we can find objectivity in the physical world.3 SEP 
tries to carve out a middle-way position that shares the spirit of these two rejections: the spirit 
of the skeptic’s cries and of the scientist’s belief in an objective answer to our questions about 
perception. SEP aims at reconciling and overcoming both these epistemological and philosophy 
of mind worries.  
In this chapter, I will first address the phenomenal character of perceptual experience, and 
its mutual connection to the objects of perception. I then will present the view that perceptual 
objects only present themselves to perceivers in appearances, profiles or perspectives, and that 
there is no tension between objects and appearances, as the philosophical tradition has wrongly 
thought. To this end, I find support in the simplicity of Augustine’s view of the materiality of 
perceptual objects and properties. Objects are perceived through appearances or perspectives 
that depend on the materiality of objects and the active relations with subjects. I finish the 
chapter by offering three more arguments that build on top of the appearance-based view, by 
highlighting that the perspectival appearing of objects of perception is a matter of an active 
																																																								
3 Merleau-Ponty’s attack on both ‘empiricism’ and ‘intellectualism’ (2002) offers a different perspective on the same 
tension. Other not very successful constructions of a similar kind can be found in the more recent literature. See 
(Logue 2012), who misguidedly and not so faithfully to the philosophers features ‘Kantianism’ on one side and 
‘Berkeleian realism’ on the other.     
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engagement with the world, whose everyday texture is revealed in perception—as it fits 
perceivers like us.  
Lastly, I would like to point out that methodologically I now switch from the broad, 
diachronic framework of social perceptual practices of chapter 1, to the individual, synchronic 
interaction perspective of chapters 2 through 5. Since the two perspectives are theoretically 
complementary, the discussion of this chapter follows and is compatible with the preliminary 
analysis of experience offered in chapter 1, in discussing the way Wittgenstein departs from the 
input, receiving-only conception of perception.   
 
2.1 The Felt Quality of Perceptual Experience 
In the most basic sense, perception is the fundamental form in which the world presents 
itself to a subject, as the subject is engaged with the world by means of sensory systems attuned 
to it, that is, able to relate to physical aspects of the world in ways that serve the purposes of 
living. More precisely, the world appears perceptually in spatiotemporal happenings (material, 
chemical, temperature-wise, mechanical, visual, etc.) falling within the different ranges of things 
perceivable for someone, and that are taken up by a perceiver by means of the senses of smell, 
taste, the experience of flavor, hearing, vision, and touch, as well as proprioceptive capacities, 
the ability to feel temperature, and some inter and multi-modal interactions. The world presents 
itself in particulars (objects, persons, and other living beings), events, states of affairs, some 
relations, natural and artificial kinds, as well as some of the parts and properties of all these. 
Experience has a mental connotation. Experience is usually understood as the “feeling,” the 
“phenomenal” aspect, the “what it is like” of certain interactions. Such a view has been also held 
by some phenomenologists who insist that the reality of the object does not matter for the 
relation with the object, whose essence is part of the domain of consciousness understood, again, 
as a mental entity. For SEP, experience is not the appearing of things alone, if this appearing 
means the way things look, smell, hear in my mind, in my head. For SEP, experience is a lived 
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occurrence. Perceptual experience, specifically, is a type of sensory-based occurrence in which a 
perceiver interacts with an object, event, or state of affairs. As such, experience includes the 
physical exploration of things, the actual spatiotemporal relating to things and its development 
through time. In the experience of flavor, for instance, the perceptual experience is the actual 
touching of food or drink with my tongue, in my mouth, and not just the feeling I get when 
something is in my mouth and touching my tongue. The experience of touching is, to add one 
last example, about my moving my hand over a dog’s coat, touching its hair, its thickness, and 
its direction as I move my hand, also in response to a body that is not inert. This conception of 
experience is one of the cornerstones of the Social Enactive View. In this section, I emphasize 
the felt quality of experience—which is part of experience but to which experience is not 
limited, because it is an interaction.  
Perceptual experience is characterized by originality and bodily immediacy: it is an 
originally presenting of something in the flesh [leibhaftig] (Husserl 1997, 12, <14>4). It is the 
presenting of an object or aspect of the world to a subject in immediate and absolute givenness as 
the object being there, present, in propria persona (Husserl 2001b, 137; 1983, 245, <205>). To 
say that it is an original presenting means that perception is an original way of being 
consciousness of things (Husserl 2001a, 40, <4>).5 The originality accompanying the perceived is 
best contrasted with the felt source of recollection: whereas in the reminiscence of a piece of 
food I used to eat in my childhood there is the sense that the flavor came first from a direct 
experience, perception carries with it the sense of being a direct and original acquaintance with 
																																																								
4 Given the importance and wide presence of Husserl in this dissertation, I offer pagination according to the 
Husserliana edition (save for Experience and Judgment) additional to the English edition references. Non-enclosed 
numbers correspond to the English translation cited; page numbers of the German edition are given within angle 
brackets, where available. 
5 Internalists about phenomenal character, like T. Horgan, also argue that intentionality involving phenomenal 
character –every mental state in which there is a what-it-is-like– is the only original one. On this basis, Horgan 
denies the possibility of robots of having consciousness (2013). For this original sense of perception see (Loar, n.d.; 
Mohanty 2008, 378–79; Noë 2012). For a similar implication for consciousness see loci classici for this type of claim 
(Nagel 1974; Searle 1980). Perception (“sensory-perceptual phenomenology,” in Horgan’s terminology) naturally 
counts as a paradigmatic instance of phenomenal intentionality.  
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a perceived object (Husserl 1983, 244, <210>).6 In chapter 1 I described this phenomenon of 
perceiving something as a familiar encounter. 
By means of direct contact with things in the world, we become conscious of the way 
things actually are precisely in the manner that sensory acquaintance presents things, and not in 
the manner an encyclopedia or a television news show does. Perception is consciousness of 
realities, of actual states of things (Husserl 1983, 216,220 <183,187–88>; 2005, 26,<24>). 
“Consciousness” does not mean here phenomenal awareness. Rather, things are conscious if the 
belong to the whole of our conscious life, which includes the engagement itself with things. This 
means that perceiving something comes along with the sense or “root certainty” that the 
perceived is actually there and is thus-and-so (1997, 118, <140>; See also 1983, 250, <214–
15>). In Husserl's terms, it is of the essence of perceptual experience to be incompatible with 
"disbelief and doubt" as to the manner in which things appears initially to a subject (1997, 21, 
<22>).  It may be the case that I eat greens, and am doubtful about whether it is spinach or kale. 
Although I entertain doubts about the exact nature of the object perceived, the specific character 
of my perception—its unclarity and indetermination—comes with certainty: I am eating some 
‘greens,’ with a flavor and texture that could be this or that. Perception is certain of its 
phenomenal character but implies no necessary knowledge of objects neutrally defined, and 
there is no reason to think that such knowledge makes perception less direct.  
Perception is always perception of something, and its character is partly determined by the 
type of things it is of. The archetypical ‘object’ of perception is a time-extended continuum, in 
which we might or might not find “smaller” units or aspects. When available, smaller unities 
and aspects (a leaf in a plant, a surface on a table, the red of my pants) are also objects of 
perception, but not autonomously, and only under extensive qualifications (despite the common 
usage, philosophical, scientific, and popular that takes them to be the only objects of perception). 																																																								
6 This is important because a traditional reading of Husserl’s phenomenology implies a disregard for the actuality of 
the object of a mental act when considering what is essential to the mental act. In the Husserl-inspired view I am 
proposing, the reality of the perceptual object is essential to perception. As a matter of fact, Husserl contrasts 
perception with other mental acts that may be thought to share pictorial or presentative elements with perception, 
namely memory and phantasy, in order to delimit the nature of perceptual experience (See Husserl 2005). 
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The objects of perception are objects, events, and states of affairs, and also features or aspects of 
those objects, events, and states of affairs.  
Within the perception of continua, perceptual experience grasps unities, or rather, is 
directed towards unities—the cake, this fabric, that sound, the texture of some pastry, the top of 
that tree (Husserl 1997, 28–30, <33–36>). The grasping of this unities, which I will discuss at 
length in chapter 4 (for it fits better in relation to content rather than to experience), is implied 
in some of the things we do perceptually, such as discrimination, recognition, the finding of 
similarities or differences (Husserl 1997, 29–30, <35>). However, perceptual experience is not 
limited to such grasping of unities, because perception is also about what is not yet unitary, 
about the transitions between units, or about the whole continua we are discussing.  
Thus, a total perception can be initially thought of “a chain of resting perceptions, unified by 
transitional phenomena, in which various sides and parts of the thing present themselves in a 
stable way” (1997, 83, 76, <98,89>).7 Consider the following sequence:  
 
If we observe an unchanging object at rest, for example, a tree standing before us, we 
pass over it with our eyes, now we step closer to it, now back away from it, now here, now 
there, we see it now from this, now from that side. During this process the object is 
constantly given to us unchanged, as the same: we see it as such; and yet a slight turn of 
attention teaches us that the so-called perceptual images, the modes of appearances, the 
aspects of the object constantly change. In a constant variation of modes of appearances, 
perspectives, that is, during a constant variation in the actual lived-experience of perception, 
we have a consciousness that runs through them and connects them up, a consciousness of 
the one and same object. (Husserl 2001a, 34, <374–75>) 
 
This example features variations in perceptual experience that consist in the interaction 
between subject and object. There can be changes in the object, either because of intrinsic 
changes (like a balloon as it’s inflated) or because of movement (like the sound of the ebb and 
flow of the ocean); changes in a medium on which perception depends (a silent our loud 
environment in the perception of someone’s speech, or open space that gets foggy); changes in 
the perceiver, physically speaking (sensory fatigue for someone trying several different 
																																																								
7 A full qualification of the sense in which the perceptual object is a sequence or a continuum is presented in chapter 4. 
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perfumes, a hand that grows numb, a finger that gets a bit burned but is still able to touch); 
changes in the perceiver, psychologically speaking (as mood affects perception, in a Sartre’s 
Nausea-like way, or simply as attention changes); and changes in what the perceiver does. 
The perceived object tells us something about the activity of perception. Perception is what 
it is partly because it relates to certain objects and not to others. In perceiving a given object as 
it changes, or as the relational position of perceiver and object changes, such object is placed in a 
context that partly determines what it comes to be for a perceiver. In turn, this pragmatic and 
spatiotemporal context underlies our relation with the perceptual world. For instance, the 
relationship between specific perceived objects and the total field of things perceivable at a given 
moment— the way the background colors the possibilities of perceiving those objects—must be 
thematized into perceptual experience.8 
 
2.2 Phenomenon, Appearances, and Relationality: The Real Object When Perceived 
SEP’s take on content is one piece with a perspectival understanding of the perceptual object. In 
other words, the idea of content depends on the idea of appearance. A perceptual object is an 
object of the world, which in virtue of its physicality or material-dependency, and in virtue of 																																																								
8 In talking about this relation, Husserl says that each separate, partial moment that “remains in continuity with the 
underlying total apprehension, is brought along with the latter into the synthetic unity of the consciousness of 
identity,” that is, with the conscious perception of one and the same object or unity (Husserl 1997, 77, <90>). 
Compare with Heidegger criticism of Fichte’s suggestion to “think the wall, and to think the one who thinks the 
wall.” Heidegger goes on: “In our natural comportment toward things we never think a single thing, and whenever 
we seize upon it expressly for itself we are taking it out of a contexture to which it belongs in its real content: wall, 
room, surroundings […] Sitting here in the auditorium, we do not in fact apprehend the walls—not unless we are 
getting bored.” And further along: “If we are actually thinking the wall, what is already given beforehand, even if not 
apprehended thematically, is living room, drawing room, house” (1988, 162–64).  
The ‘underlying total apprehension’ of which Husserl talks in perceptual, epistemological terms is part of what 
Heidegger calls the ontological presuppositions of handiness [Zuhandensein] and of worldliness [Weltlichkeit] 
(Heidegger 2010, 53–87). I agree with Husserl in thinking, however, that a rich lay of the perceptual land—and not 
only in the sense that we do not perceive noises but a creaking wagon (Heidegger 2010, 179), or that the farmer does 
not perceive an objective meteorological wind, but the south wind as an omen (Heidegger 2010, 79)—in perceptual 
terms must be secured.  
It seems to me that the ontological flavor Heidegger gives in Sein und Zeit (1927) (or in his Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology, from a 1927 lecture) to these themes certainly amounts to a difference between Heidegger and 
Husserl. However, Husserl addressed these themes since his Untersuchungen (1901) and more explicitly in this Ding 
und Raum lectures (1907), or later in Ideen I (1913) and Ideen II (1914).  We will encounter later in this dissertation 
more of these Heideggerian appropriations-with-a-twist of Husserlian ideas. In particular, the deeply developed 
system of indications or references [Hinweise] that forms the core of Husserl’s theory of fulfillment is later 
appropriated by Heidegger under the idea of a context of references (Verweisung) that underlies the notions of 
relevance and significance (Sein un Zeit), or the idea of functionality contexture in Basic Problems (See also Heidegger 
1988, 161–170). The pragmatic-centered reading of Husserl that I offer contains these features.  
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the modes in which a perceiver encounters it, is presented itself to a subject or a community of 
subjects in manners best referred to as ‘appearances’ or ‘aspects.’9 We could also refer to the 
manners in which the object is present as a matter of ‘perspectives’ or ‘profiles.’ This 
understanding is the coupling of two ideas: (i) the perceptual world is a materially-based reality, 
and (ii) the world presents itself to perceivers never at once, but in spatial, temporal, pragmatic 
or otherwise perspectival or aspectual configurations. 
Thus, appearance does not entail distance between object and subject. By the same token, 
appearance does not entail distortion of the object. The appearances of an object are the way the 
very object exists as a perceivable entity, in the conditions in which it appears to a thusly-
determined perceiver. This means exactly this: it is of the nature of straight sticks to appear 
crooked when they are placed in the water, and an observer sees the stick through the water. Its 
appearing crooked in the water reveals something about the world: the interaction of a medium 
like water and the visual appearing of something—the manifesting of something through 
reflected light. By the same token, it is of the nature of spatiotemporal objects placed on earth to 
grow bigger or smaller according to relative distance to subject. A spatial object is precisely the 
type of thing that presents itself to perception (that is perceived) in such variations. Were such 
variations not to take place, our confidence in the reality of the object and, with it, our 
confidence in our actions about such object would decrease. An ‘impartial’ and ‘full’ definition of 
objects, or the idea of knowledge understood as adequacy between an object impartially sizeable 
in its entirety and the seizing of such object, are unfit to understand perception. 
Most theories of perception commit a category-mistake that bears a close resemblance to 
Ryle's attack on dualism. Particularly, to insist that the perceptual object is nowhere to be seen 
if we only have appearances is like the person that visits a university and, after seeing students, 
professors, buildings, classrooms, libraries, etc.m is still looking for the university. It is about 
looking for the “wrong type of thing" (Ryle 2002, 35). 																																																								
9 Nothing at this point commits me to a description of objects in the world as natural particulars or kinds, partly 
because I do not limit ‘world’ to the sum total of naturally existing objects. I use the term “object” in a loose sense—
and include properties, events, and states of affairs. I do also consequently with the term “world.” 
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The fundamental mistake I am pointing to is that we lose perception if we focus on the 
narrowly conceived epistemological role of perception. It is an epistemologist saying: “I don’t 
care what perception is, for whatever it is, it deceives us: deception defines perception.” There is 
more to perception than knowing something adequately, and that to call perception deceitful is 
not only misleading but is also wrong. It is not even entirely clear that the accusations brought 
upon perception are not accusations about the structure of the world itself, namely, that 
vagueness and lack of certainty are a feature of the world and not of perception.  
Let me now spin this line of though in a different direction. My interest is not an ontology 
of the world—objects, events, states of affairs—but a theory of perceptual content, which 
subscribes to the presentational character of objects in a direct realist context. What I am 
interested in is this: What type of contact with the world does perception afford? How does 
perception relate us to objects and objects to us? What are worldly objects or happenings for a 
perceiver? 
A habit of thought, to borrow Hurley’s expression, about the relation between objects and 
perception is clearly captured in this passage from Hume: “The table, which we see, seems to 
diminish, as we remove farther from it: But the real table, which exists independent of us, suffers 
no alteration: It was, therefore, nothing but its image, which was present to the mind” (1977, 
104).  
From the unwarranted conclusion that only an image “can ever be present to the mind,” a 
bolder one is derived, namely, that the senses are on the hither side of a cleft between mind and 
objects. The thrust of the argument is the inadequacy between the object (which doesn’t change) 
and our perceptions (which change). Inadequacy is an objection to the natural sense of direct 
contact that perception affords, to the natural trust and confidence in our dealings with the world 
based on perception (it is not, to be sure, an objection on our trust on the ‘deliverances’ of 
perception, for this framework of perception as deliverance of the senses is already part of Hume’s 
picture). It is an objection only because adequacy or correspondence is thought of as a criterion 
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of valid acquaintance. Valid acquaintances between minds and objects are those in which strict, 
objective co-variation obtains. But where does the idea of a valid acquaintance as 
correspondence get its validity? What is it that makes so prevalent this centuries-old objection 
so that it grounds such a wide lineage of arguments from error or illusion that try to 
characterize perception’s nature from precisely this ‘defect’? More precisely: What type of thing 
is the table thought to be, so that our seeing it would only give us remote images of it? Does it 
even make sense to say that perceptions are inadequate?  
I now suggest we look at Augustine’s understanding of the materiality of the perceptual, 
which he arrives at by a comparison with the nature of truth and true knowledge.10 Although 
Augustine may sound like an unlikely choice (certainly a strange one), methodologically, there 
are two advantages that make him a useful source. First, he does not share the modern 
“commonsensical” division between the inner and the outer, and yet he allows for talk of 
subjective happenings that are not representations or intermediary images between things and 
consciousness. Augustine takes perceptual objects to be objects in the world and not images or 
individual impressions: "You would not say that what the eyes of two persons see belongs to the 
eyes of one or the other of them. It is a third thing towards which both direct their regard" 
(Augustine 1953, 156). Second, the subjective aspect of perception has a sense of interaction 
between the perceiver and the world that is not the detached view of the epistemological gaze, 
but instead is very much anchored in the transactions themselves with the world. Thematically, 
we’ll get two things from this analysis: a sense of what perceptual objects are and why their 
nature entails that their modes of appearance are essential to them, and a sense of how the idea 																																																								
10 There is a trans-historical terminological difficulty here. What is the genus of truth? Is it only a property of 
thoughts or propositions? Or is it an object-like proposition or intuition, or the set of all these thoughts? While for 
the Modern rationality truth is a property of thoughts or propositions, for some ancient philosophers (clearly the 
Platonists and friends) truth is more a type of object that one can possess, and that equips one with an understanding 
of the essential nature of things. (Notice that in a certain mindset this does not mean that the one who “possesses” 
truth actually understands things or acts accordingly, whereas in a different mindset one cannot know the truth and 
not act correctly). This ancient way of looking at things lends itself to talk about the truth as something one possesses, 
or lacks. One could give a formal account of truth in general, regardless of content. I do not have the space to expand 
on this here, nor it is relevant to the use I make of Augustine here. My purpose with Augustine is not exegetical. I 
just intend to present a contrast between two formal ontological regions: between things that are public, unitary and 
persistent (like “Truth” and true knowledge) and some that are not (like the objects of the senses), because this type of 
category mistake is at the basis of common confusions about perception. 
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of truth is so easily understood through the senses but how it dramatically departs from them. 
My goal is to suggest that we can start feeling at ease with appearances, and to elicit some 
surprise about the seeming validity of Hume’s analysis of our perception of the table, hence 
softening the confidence in that outlook.  
In De Libero Arbitrio Augustine debates over the nature wisdom and truth. He does so by 
contrasting true knowledge with the objects of the senses (1953, Book II). It can be said that 
three criteria characterize true knowledge: publicness, unitariness, and persistence. True knowledge 
has the property of being public: many can be related to it, that is, someone’s access to truth does 
not limit anyone else’s access. True knowledge is unitary in two senses: in being related to the 
(so to speak) same piece of true knowledge, the many get the same one thing; and, second, that 
to know a part of something is eo ipso to know the whole. This unity-character of true 
knowledge is unity in the archetypical sense of a geometrical point: it has no dimensions, it has 
no aspects—to get it would amount to get it all.  True knowledge is persistent: it cannot be 
changed, used up or depleted. A conjunction of the three concepts defines true knowledge: it is 
public without restrictions, unitary without restrictions, and persistent without restrictions. 
Publicness is that which the objects of touch don’t have, but that the objects of sight and 
hearing do: “But you cannot say that each of us has his own private sun or moon or stars or the 
like, though each of us sees these things with his own particular sense of sight?” (1953, 145). 
Objects of touch aren’t public in this sense (actual availability, at a given moment, for everyone 
desiring and able) for my touching something impedes others from touching it, that is, we both 
can touch the object but not the same ‘side’ at a given moment (1953, 146).  
Unitariness is a characteristic of the objects of sight and hearing, for they seem to have no 
parts—‘part’ including here parts, sides, and aspects in general—, so that if they are perceived, 
they are perceived in their totality. This is not the case for the objects of smell, taste, or touch. 
They are not unitary in the sense that parts ‘of air’ carrying a smell enter someone’s nose, but 
cannot enter simultaneously two noses. Because of this, smell is only seemingly (or potentially) 
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public: for as soon as someone draws a good breath, it restricts others’ access to smells 
associated with that air (1953, 145). This case is structurally analogous to taste. 
Persistence is predicated of objects of sight alone. It is not predicated of sounds because they 
disappear as time passes; not (generally) of smell because air (normally) takes it away; not 
always of touch, because materials normally wear out. The contrast is nicely reached through 
the objects of taste, whose associated property, the taste itself of something, depends on 
physically consuming food: “It is true that nurses give infants food which they have chewed, but 
the part which has been squeezed out and been swallowed, cannot be recalled and used to feed 
the child. When the palate tastes something pleasant it claims a part, even if only a small part, 
which it cannot give up, and does with it what is consonant with corporeal nature” (1953, 147). 
(The fact that the ‘matter’ is ‘preserved’ sets this example apart from the case of taste not being 
unitary.)  
 The idea of the palate ‘claiming’ a part of flavor underscores (i) the physicality (or material 
dependence) of the perceptual object (Augustine’s “corporeal nature,” corporalia), (ii) the 
dependence of properties perceived on such physicality, (iii) the dependence of the perceiving 
such properties on a specific interaction between perceiver and object.  
It is precisely this line of thought what gives Augustine resources to set true knowledge 
apart from sight, the only sense that from a snapshot point of view is public, unitary, and 
persistent. One can see, once again, the seduction of the visual (quite related to what Augustine 
himself called the ‘lust of the eyes,’ or what Rorty has referred to as “the Platonic quest for that 
special sort of certainty associated with visual perception” (2009, 181)).11 I want to focus on two 
arguments Augustine offers.  																																																								
11 The point is certainly epistemological and not moral, as we read in Confessions, X: “For seeing belongeth properly 
to the eyes; yet we apply this word to the other senses also, when we exercise them in the search after knowledge. For 
we do not say, Listen how it glows, smell how it glistens, taste how it shines, or feel how it flashes, since all these are 
said to be seen. And yet we say not only, See how it shineth, which the eyes alone can perceive; but also, See how it 
soundeth, see how it smelleth, see how it tasteth, see how hard it is. And thus the general experience of the senses, as 
was said before, is termed "the lust of the eyes," because the function of seeing, wherein the eyes hold the pre-
eminence, the other senses by way of similitude take possession of, whensoever they seek out any knowledge” 
(Augustine 2009, 303). The thrust of the remark applies mutatis mutandis to the bulk of contemporary philosophy of 
perception.  
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The first argument (trailing (i) above) is based on the corporeal nature of perceptual objects 
themselves and is perhaps best directed towards sight: “however small the object may be, it has 
at least a right-hand part and a left-hand part, an upper and a lower part, a further and a nearer 
part, one part at the end and another at the middle. We must admit that these parts exist in any 
body, however small, and accordingly we must agree that no corporeal object is a true and 
absolute unity” (1953, 148). The objects of sight aren’t like truth-objects (in Augustine’s 
conception), for they have parts.  
The second argument (see (ii) above) is based on the perception of perceptual objects and 
presents what appearances are: “Truth, therefore, is less like the things we touch or taste or 
smell, and more like the things we hear and see. For every word is heard as a whole by all who 
hear it and by each one at the same time. And every sight offered to the eyes is exactly the same 
for all who see it, and is seen by all at the same time. But although there is a similarity there is 
also a great difference. A whole word is not spoken all at once. It is extended over a period of 
time, one syllable being pronounced first and another after it.” And then he goes to turn things 
inside out, for it is of the nature of such objects to be encountered in precisely certain ways: 
“Every visible sight varies with the place from which it is seen, and is nowhere seen in its 
totality. And certainly all these things can be taken from us whether we will or not, and there 
are difficulties in the way of our enjoying them” (1953, 158). And what he means by “difficulties” 
is only salient over against the desire for full apprehension, as people desirous of hearing the one 
who sings “sweetly for ever” but even getting closer only affords them “transient fugitive 
sounds”; or as the one who wishes to eternally see the sun and is yet disappointed at sunset.  
In contrast, the beauty of truth and wisdom “does not pass with time or change with 
locality. It is not interrupted by night or shut off by shadow and is not subject to the bodily 
senses. To all who turn to it from the whole world, and love it, it is close at hand, everlasting, 
bound to no particular spot, never deficient” (1953, 159). Over against the background of 
publicness, which is always available depending only the an act of the will (in contrast with 
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difficulties of enjoyment derived from the bodily senses), unitariness is here spelled as the 
absence of spatiality, and persistence is tied to uninterrupted continuity, to ever-fullness, to 
everlastingness.   
Augustine’s business is not to discredit the senses. He very much values them in their 
idiosyncrasy. Furthermore, it seems to me that Augustine’s spelling out of truth’s 
characteristics in perceptual terms touches upon a deeper point, to wit: that one of our central 
ways of knowing, full stop, is perception; and that one of our central ways of understanding 
what knowledge of truth is, full stop, is based on understanding perception.12 Perception is, 
following Merleau-Ponty, the way how we learned what it was for things to be thus-and-so: to 
be thus-and-so is the type of thing you encounter when you see something, when you hear 
something, when you touch something.13  
Let us leave behind us this half-anecdotal, delightful and greatly informative episode in the 
history of Philosophy--where the love of truth has often harvested the delights of perception 
and discarded the limitations of those delights: the perspectival, temporal, spatial character of 
the objects that we perceive.14 When truth is demanded of perception, there is a disregard for 
the essential characteristics of the perceptual field: it is Hume accusing the table of being a 																																																								
12 Merleau-Ponty has said that “there is indeed one human act which at one stroke cuts through all possible doubts to 
stand in the full light of truth: this act is perception, in the wide sense of knowledge of existences” (2002, 40).  
Merleau-Ponty even defined perception as “ access to truth” (2002, xvi). There is a deep connection between this 
notion and the thick notion of ‘world’ that Husserl came to develop in his late years and which Merleau-Ponty 
elaborates in the Preface to his Phenomenology of Perception (2002).  
13 To be sure, I am not making an argument for the usefulness or uselessness of everyday visual or tactile perception 
for the purposes of developing a scientific theory of the universe, or a body of knowledge that responds to the 
scientific idea of truth.  
Those favoring the type of theories I’ve been attacking would possibly reply saying that the insistence on the 
possibility of perceptual deception is an indisputable fact. They would say they are not being ‘unfair’ to perception. 
Whatever way you define perceptual experience, they would say, the case is that we sometimes fail to see things the 
way they are: we jump as if a certain distance was shorter, we smell food at home and get excited about dinner, only 
to discover that the meal was other than we thought, we thought we heard a friend talking but it was a stranger. 
Perception can deceive us, and the more powerful we think perception to be, the greater the possibility of deception 
(See Silins 2013). 
14 Consider the following outstanding passage in Confessions, X: “But what do I love, when I love Thee? Not beauty 
of bodies, nor the fair harmony of time, nor the brightness of the light, so gladsome to our eyes, nor sweet melodies of 
varied songs, nor the fragrant smell of flowers, and ointments, and spices, not manna and honey, not limbs acceptable 
to embracements of flesh. None of these I love, when I love my God; and yet I love a kind of light, and melody, and 
fragrance, and meat, and embracement when I love my God, the light, melody, fragrance, meat, embracement of my 
inner man: where there shineth unto my soul what space cannot contain, and there soundeth what time beareth not 
away, and there smelleth what breathing disperseth not, and there tasteth what eating diminisheth not, and there 
clingeth what satiety divorceth not” (Augustine 2009, 261). In conjunction with the passages from On Free Will, we 
can now appreciate that the idea of taste such that it doesn’t diminish with eating captures the denial of the 
materiality of things, in which the idea of truth and the denial of the senses consist.  
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spatial object; it is Descartes complaining about the susceptibility to heat of wax, or about 
spatial nature of tower and large statues; it is Russell concluding that that which is not 
‘inherent’ in the table is not conducive to any kind of knowledge of the table. This has been to a 
great extent the origin of skepticism about perception, and we now start to see why it is possible 
to dismiss that skepticism: it is based on a misunderstanding about perception.15 Demanding 
truth in perception is like complaining that a visual object cannot be seen and cannot be known 
in the darkness, and criticizing perception on that basis.  
We are now in the position to see the insight in the following passage by Husserl: 
 
When we view the table, we view it from some particular side, and this side is thereby 
why is genuinely seen. Yet the table has still other sides. It has a non-visible back side, 
it has a non-visible interior; and these are actually indexes for a variety of sides, a 
variety of complexes of possible visibility […] But this thing is not [merely] the side 
genuinely seen in this moment; rather (according to the very sense of perception) the 
thing is precisely the full-thing that has still other sides, sides that are not brought to 
genuine perception in this perception, but that would be brought to genuine perception 
in other perspectives (Husserl 2001a, 40, <4>) 
 
As I read Husserl in this respect, there is a difference between (a) objects as they would be 
defined in some sort of all-encompassing abstraction and universal language, and (b) the 
perception of an object (Levinas 1963, 88; Drummond 1990, 143–44; Zahavi 2003, 59–60). The 
reason for this distinction is that perception has a perspective on the object, which is of the 
object but is not the object.16 In my Husserlian view, the status of the object as an object of 
perception is understood through the notion of appearances [Erscheinungen], that is, as that 
which presents itself in appearances. Consequently, no idea of adequacy or correspondence that 
																																																								
15 For more on the dismissal of skepticism see Snowdon (1992), who argues for a direct realism that simply does not 
answer the skeptic, and McDowell (1994) and Putnam (1999), who recommend a philosophical dismissal of skeptic 
worries. 
16 Objects are both nominatives and accusatives—prolonging a clever metaphor of Zahavi. Worldly objects and 
events are only neutral—in the nominative—when we name them and as the intentional pole of our acts—as reference 
for predication and, in a sense, for action—, but when we observe them, when we interact with them, they’re in the 
accusative. When we perceive, objects come as accusatives: they are appearances. Insofar as the world appears, we 
ourselves are “datives of manifestation, as those to whom objects appear” (Zahavi 2003, 51). Appearances would be 
genitives of the world. To put everything in the nominative (or rejecting doing otherwise), to keep the analogy, 
amounts to a stubborn flattening of the philosophical discourse. The allergy to modulation—like the modulation of 
grammatical cases—is sometimes thought of as proof of sophistication.   
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is not constrained by space, time, and the other perspectival determinants of perception could 
have any positive role to play in addressing perception.17  
We begin to be at ease with this tension between being and appearances, by insisting that the 
tension is not a contradiction fundamental to both terms. My claim is indeed that some things 
are of such a nature that their presenting themselves to perceivers is essentially a matter of 
appearances. For perception, the question about the being of objects in themselves is of little 
avail, for whatever determination is furnished there (e.g. the diameter of a planet), it is a 
determination that, if perceptually meaningful (I could see such planet), would enter into the 
perceptual field eo ipso as an appearance of the object to a perceiver situated here or there, 
perceptually constituted in this or that way. This position is both entirely realist and entirely 
perspectival, and that there is no philosophical conflict whatsoever in this pair. 
Further, there is a difference between the physical qualities of objects and a perceiver’s 
take on those qualities. A physical property, like a frequency in the electromagnetic spectrum, 
within such and such ranges, is a color only for some seeing beings. Alien non-sensitive-to-light-
at-all scientists, with a science somewhat similar to ours, would detect the range of the 
electromagnetic spectrum that is visible for us, but would not refer to colors. By means of 
advanced imaging techniques (sophisticated spectrographs), these scientists even engage in 
discriminative behavior based on the frequencies that we call colors. Although they detect such 
frequencies they don’t perceive them—it is not just that they don’t feel them, it is that they 
don’t encounter them in the immediacy and familiarity that characterizes perceptual experience. 
Along the same lines, it may very well be the case that gamma radiations or radio waves—above 
and below the range of the spectrum we call visible—have a direct perceptual payoff for a 
certain class of perceivers. This is not an ontological point about the perceived objects, but 
about the objects’ appearance in perception. 
																																																								
17 This applies directly to what were called the primary qualities: extension, shape, solidity, gravity, motion, and rest. 
However, I do not take a position about the correctness of this category, but my inclination is that it is not very 
useful anymore, since even the secondary ones can be correlated to physical concepts. 
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Individual perceptions are partial, underdetermined in relation to the objects of which they 
are appearances, and are always open-ended. There is no absolute knowledge of an object 
through perception: not only can objects and events be present to a subject in a potentially 
infinite number of ways, but those individual perceptions cannot be held at the same time by the 
same subject.  
But just as the perceptual object is the one that exists in space and time and is related to in 
perspectival determinations, it is of the essence of perception that, as a whole, we find a 
continuous “braid of partial synthesis of increase and decrease [of the relative givenness of sides 
and parts of things], in which, to be sure, the individual strands of the braid have and can have 
no autonomy” (Husserl 1997, 95, <113>).18  
We are directly acquainted with objects, events, and states of affairs in their perspectival 
appearing, because we could not be related to them otherwise. I will now offer a broad analysis of 
aspects and properties in which we perceive worldly things: as relational, as including high-level 
properties, and as pragmatically dependent. This initial analysis will be supplemented in chapter 
3 by a fuller relational account of the fundamental ways in which the appearing of things is 
conditioned by facts about the perceivers and the specific interaction in which an experience 
consists.19  
 
2.3 On Appearances, Aspects, and Properties  
All the aspects or appearances we perceive, insofar as they are the take of a perceiver on an 
object, and not simply a determination of the object in isolation from a perceiver, are a function 
of the specific relation between perceiver and object, such that the object is only presented in 
																																																								
18 This braid constitutes the whole over against which each appearance “refers to possibilities of fulfillment” of 
perceptual acts (Husserl 1997, 105, <125–26>). I referred to these possibilities in chapter 1 as playing a role in the 
field of perceptual interactions, and with specific relevance for the normativity of perceptual practices (section 1.2.4), 
and I will take them up again in chapters 4 and 5, in the discussion of perceptual content and its normativity.  
19 These are the three types of dependencies of perception, namely, idiosyncratic (facts of personal and species 
embodiment, and otherwise idiosyncratic), non-socially pragmatic, and socially pragmatic, which are discussed in 
chapter 3 (section 3.3.1). 
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appearances or aspects to a perceiver. Ontologically, appearances or aspects are not on the side 
of objects, but on the side of relations to perceivers. They are relational.  
More than offering conclusive arguments for the view that experience consists of 
interactions in which objects appear perspectivally, I have started to delineate a realist and 
relationalist way of looking at perception. The initial arguments, relying importantly on 
Augustine’s view of the materiality of perceptual objects, had the purpose of beginning to soften 
our confidence in the commonsensical incompatibility between being and appearance that is at 
the heart of the philosophical tradition.  
I examine now three specific argumentative lines that show that objects, events, and 
states of affairs are only perceived in appearances, that is, that there is no internal contradiction 
in the one-many relationship between object and its appearances. These three arguments, 
although of different in character, have something in common and fundamental for SEP: 
perception is an active engagement. These arguments are also meant as a way to populate the 
stage of perception as the scenario of rich interactions with the world that express what the 
world is and what we, worldly inhabitants, are.  
These three arguments are of different character: that some aspects we perceive depend 
on the pragmatic engagements of subjects with things perceived; that the quality of the 
perceptual world in everyday life is such that it requires that we perceive high-level properties 
attributable only to perception, which show the interaction between a contextually situated 
perceiver and the world; and that since the human perceiver is who she is and perception is what 
it is in a perceiver’s life, objects have to appear in appearances and in concrete pragmatic 
contexts.   
2.3.1 From Relationality to Activity 
Of all the aspects, properties or qualities objects, events, and states of affairs that we perceive, 
some can be predicated of spatiotemporal objects, events, and states of affairs neutrally defined, 
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but some cannot. We can attribute a texture to a surface, but we cannot attribute a reflection to 
a body of water in which the reflection occurs.  
Notice however the ambiguity we have here, which has been a source of confusion: In 
perception we are indeed acquainted with objects, but only through aspects or appearances. 
Since we are indeed acquainted with objects directly we are led into thinking that the aspects we 
perceive are features of the object. That is correct.  But we are often led into thinking, rather, 
misled into thinking, that those aspects are features of the object in an unqualified way: that they 
belong to the object, not matter who perceives, under what conditions, from what position, for 
how long, etc. That is incorrect. That is the ambiguity that makes Hume puzzled about a table 
having a size, and appearing both of size S, smaller-than-S, and larger-than-S at different times 
to a moving perceiver.  
A good deal of what we perceive depends evidently on the way a perceiver relates to what 
she perceives, that is, on the pragmatic engagements of subjects with things perceived. These 
are essential aspects of the quality of the world as we perceive it.  
I first want to put pressure on the often-implicit assumption that in perception we are 
passively impressed by the world—a perspective that is easy to fall in if one limits the perceiver 
to their perceptual organs, and which is very much reinforced when we focus excessively or 
perhaps uniquely (as most philosophers do) on vision.  
Let’s start with an argument about texture issuing from the mechanical interaction 
between a perceiver and an object. Texture requires a sort of action on the part of the skin that 
touches, that is, it requires a mechanical event (pressure, with or without movement) in order to 
make itself be felt.20 One can attempt at a physical description of the conditions that give rise, 
for instance, to a texture: the product of an object-surface topography in a mechanical relation 
with such and such sensory receptors having certain thresholds (ranges of stimulus energy) 																																																								
20 For instance, orientation- and direction-sensitive neurons  (e.g. Meissner's corpuscles) are precisely excited in the 
event of the presence of direction or orientation, which requires movement (Kandel and Schwartz 2000, 466, 432). 
Texture-sensitive neurons (Merkel disk receptors) are subject as well to a mechanical input (Kandel and Schwartz 
2000, 432–33). The case is even more clear in the face of neurons that are activated when the hand is manipulating an 
object (Kandel and Schwartz 2000, 469).  
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such that mechanical force (a specific pressure vector) is needed in order for such receptors to 
“feel” this or that texture as such. Perceiving is a matter of doing because, without the stimuli 
that come from the doing, there would be no perception—without a type of action or movement, 
there would be no touching.21  
This reference to the way touch depends on mechanic interaction is an indication of how 
many of the properties we perceive in things are not properties that could be obtained of objects 
neutrally defined, or properties that only depended on the condition of an organ (in the manner 
vision requires the capacity to ‘see’ certain frequencies of the electromagnetic spectrum).22 
There is one additional step here and that is that a specific type of interaction is needed in order 
to obtain certain tactile experiences. The sensory contact of the sense of touch requires specific 
action on the part of the perceiver to be individualized: if one touches two similar yet different 
surfaces (for example, two kinds of paper) just as gently, one may not perceive any difference 
between them. One may need to touch both papers in some detail, applying more pressure, or 
moving one’s fingers more extensively over the surface of the paper. 
Let’s now extend the argument further, in order to show how these pragmatic interactions 
are socially defined. As we just saw, a mechanical vector (combination of movement and 
pressure) is a feature of the interactions of our fingers, hands, feet—our skin and even our 
tongues—with things. But if we reflect on the type of tactile properties that we perceive, we 
would notice that many of the tactile properties we perceive in everyday life (texture, shape, 
etc.) are correlated with specific activities: with the pressing of our feet over rocks, with the 
moving of our tongues around food in quite specific ways. The movements required to feel the 
																																																								
21 A virtue of my account is that it lends itself to the idea that sensory organs are the product of biological evolution 
responding to a world of physical forces a living being needs to interact with in order to carry on with the activity of 
living. Thus, we came to be sensitive (and selectively so) to a range of, in this case, textures, that are relevant for our 
type of life.  
22 There is more to vision that the relational character of colors. One may initially think that all that there is in vision 
is a sensory contact with something visible. This is an all-or-nothing scenario, such that the seeing person’s having 
their eyes open cannot help to be presented with images. But this is incorrect. I will postpone a discussion on vision 
to section 2.3.3 below, where I will argue that vision is indeed more similar to touch as has just been described than 
to the traditional view of vision. 
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texture of objects as they are experienced and for the purposes of the activity in which they are 
immersed are defined by the practices of touching as it happens in context.  
While the idea of texture, in general, can be conveyed in physical terms (as suggested 
above: object-surface topography plus types of receptors plus a mechanical vector), the reality of 
the perceived texture—the texture of the bark of a tree, of velvet, of gravel in the ground, of a 
banana in the mouth—requires a description of a “movement” that is highly dependent on the 
specific way of touching things. Specific textures are oftentimes individuated by specific 
interactions. The perceptual experience of gravel, for example, is tied to the activity of walking 
or standing with my feet, or even perhaps sitting, over a certain terrain. While I can feel the 
texture of silk of a scarf with the skin in my neck when I wear it, I could not feel the texture of 
gravel in the way I feel the silk, and I could not feel the silk in the way I feel gravel. Ranges of 
movement and intensities of pressure are a function of an activity happening at the pragmatic 
level.  
The fineness of grain of our tactile contact with the world is dependent on specific tactile 
interactions. It is properly specified by reference to interactions that are pragmatic in kind, of 
which their physical description is only an incomplete description. A beginner tailor that learns 
about fabrics and textures learns how to touch, that is, learns what movements to make and 
what pressure to apply. So does the beginner printer that learns how to compare papers and 
decide which one is best for a given job. Thus, there are aspects of the action that exceed this 
physical description: what the tailor does when he compares two fabrics. We can see here an 
individual interaction that instantiates a social practice: the mere mechanical interaction lacks the 
determination that the practice offers, and lacks the normative social aspect that determines the 
correct modes of exploration, as well as the possibilities and expectations that are in place when 
encountering the world haptically.23 Certain practices—certain surfaces and certain textures—
are more defined than others, like the textures encountered in the verification of softness needed 																																																								
23 This argument here is a specification of my argument for perceptual practices of my first chapter, where the 
primacy of practice was established.  
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in some wooden-crafted pieces such as in the craft of the highly sophisticated luthier, whose 
violins or guitars are subject to the standard of the learned touch.  
The experience of texture often requires a combination of movement and pressure (a 
mechanical vector), which consists not on a passive perceiving but on an engagement between 
subject and object, in ways that are not fully defined by a physical description of a mechanical 
interaction (however informative those can be), but to a practice-based engagement with things. 
By suitable modifications of the type of activity or interaction that is required in the sensory 
acquaintance with perceptible objects, according to each sense, it is possible to see how this 
argument applies to other modalities. The argument has been here defended for the case of 
touch, but situations that fall within this framework have been offered in chapter 1 (the section 
on performativity featured cases in the auditory and olfactory modalities) and will appear 
continuously all throughout this dissertation (section 2.3.3 will present a case for vision where 
the characteristics just exposed can be found).  
2.3.2 High-Level Properties  
The question about high and low-level properties is about how rich our perceptions are. On 
SEP’s view, we do not only perceive low-level properties (shape, color, size, hardness, 
illumination, motion, depth, location sound) but also high-level properties (particulars, natural 
kinds, defined objects, agents performing actions, processes, relations like harmoniousness or 
causation, among others).24 Other cases of high-level perception include emotionally loaded 
situations like seeing someone is angry or hearing someone’s cry as urgent, or more basic cases 
like perceiving speech and written language immediately as meaningful linguistic expressions.25 
This means, for instance, that when I interact with another person perceptually, I am actually 
perceiving a person, say, a woman, and not just a volume, surfaces, movements, and colors. Do I 
perceive a person in the person, a woman in the person? Do I hear meaningful words? 																																																								
24 I do not put much weight in a technical definition of properties. I rather take a minimal, nominalist approach: 
property is a placeholder for the things that can be said are proper of an object.   
25 So far I am casting my discussion in terms of objects, see also (Hopp 2011, 60). My discussion in the next chapter 
makes clear why this talk of objects fits with talk of content.  
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In what follows, I provide phenomenological evidence for high-level properties, backed by 
research in other social cognition, social psychology, and cognitive anthropology. While it 
seems to me that the way things appear (this is what some people call “the phenomenology of 
x”) provides evidence enough to establish the higher-level content positions, the illustrations 
that follow are meant to be compelling in an additional sense, namely, that what is perceived 
cannot be adjudicated to something else than perception, i.e. that it cannot be conceived as 
issuing from inference, judgment, or other cognitive processing. 
The view of perceptual experience I have been presenting has as an essential component 
the direct perception of more-than-low-level-properties. The quality of the perceived world 
requires it. To hold, as I do, that in perception we are directly related to worldly stuff, means, 
among other things, that the texture, the flavor, the specific tone of the world as we perceive it 
is partly constituted by the world itself. Thus, the properties we perceive are at least partly 
constituted by the world as it appears perspectivally to perceivers suitably ‘situated,’ and this 
means situated spatially, here or there, or enactively, that is, perceivers interacting in this or that 
way with the world.26   
The chemical senses count perhaps among the clearest evidence that perception is of more 
than low-level properties. Specifically, the experience of the two senses of smell and taste, along 
with the combined experience of flavor (which stands experientially on its own), include as 
intrinsic to them the phenomenon known as hedonics. Smells or flavors are experienced not only 
as sensory qualities (bitter, sweet) but in terms of an affect that accompanies them, a liking or 
disliking (Barthosuk 1991; Stevenson 2009, 159–161).27 Hedonics are thought to be present at 
birth in the case of taste but not in the case of smell, and to be subject to change in both cases 
depending on biological development, behavioral history, and physiological specific states. As a 																																																								
26 It is possible to read this section as an entailment of the relational view I backed before (Campbell 2002, 116), or as 
a corollary of disjunctivism about experience (Haddock and Macpherson 2008b; Byrne and Logue 2008; Logue 2012). 
27 A difference is made between liking and preference. Preference is referred to intake (which features other evolution-
based nutritional aspects, as well as perhaps some cognitive conscious operations, as in the case of a person that 
wishes to lose weight), while liking refers to a positive (or negative) affect accompanying the sensory quality, which 
may be related to a desire for it or an aversion to it (Zellner 1991). For the topic of hedonics, the collection of studies 
in (Bolles 1991) features a wide array of studies surrounding the phenomenon.  
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matter of fact, previous theories of hedonics tried to place the ‘liking’ factor in the object itself—
in the case of food, its orosensory properties. Further studies showed that the phenomenon can 
only be explained by recourse to a “dynamic interaction” between properties of the food (its 
sensible properties and its nutritional ones) and attributes (historical and contextual) of the 
perceiver (Sclafani 1991, 60). Further, it is worth noticing that the phenomenon of hedonics of 
taste, smell, and flavor features a neural counterpart that even features separate systems for 
approach and acceptance and for avoidance and rejection (Schulkin 1991, 98–99).   
Along similar lines, the experience of creaminess in food points in the direction of a high-
level property. For one, creaminess, like the experience of flavor in general, is understood as a 
“preservative emergent property” (Stevenson 2009) that only takes place as it is experienced in 
the mouth, even though visual influence sometimes occurs. 28 Now, creaminess is interesting 
because unlike several other specific flavors, it cannot be neatly analyzed into a specific sensory 
interaction—different senses can contribute to it. Also, creaminess is a good case of  
“information redundancy,” a type of multiple realizability for flavors: the presence of the 
property is perceived even with variation in “single or multiple physical features of the stimulus” 
(Stevenson 2009, 70). What makes it special, and the reason why it is a great example for a 
high-level property, is that these two features make the experience of creaminess immediate 
available for identification, detection or appropriate response in the moment (Stevenson 2009, 4, 
69–72).  
Object recognition seems to imply that we are immediate and directly acquainted with 
specific objects (my desk) or kinds of objects (a desk). Haptic object recognition is everywhere: 
“When we dress, we do not have to fixate on buttons to fasten them; we can find the button and 
buttonhole by touch. When we drive a car, we can shift gears and adjust knobs without 
bothering to look” (Klatzky and Lederman 2003, 106). In the perceiving of an object, several 
material properties of objects (texture, shape, temperature, surface (dis)continuities) can lead to 																																																								
28 The phenomenal experience of flavor includes sensation in the olfactory, gustatory, somatosensory modalities 
(tactile and chemaesthetic aspects, i.e. chemical stimulation plus temperature) —the interoceptive flavor senses— and 
in the exteroceptive senses of vision, audition, and (orthonasal) olfaction (Stevenson 2009).  
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recognition (Klatzky and Lederman 2003). Similarly, visual object recognition seems to be able 
to be singularized into a single neurophysiological system, which would further support the 
point that not only low-level properties are perceived (Tarr and Cheng 2003; Logothetis 2000). 
Further, recognition of objects is also dependent on task, experience and feedback (Tarr and 
Cheng 2003, 29), such that these extra-perceptual factors influence the tuning of object 
recognition capacities.   
The case of speech perception is quite telling. Evidence to the effect that we perceive speech 
as meaningful from the beginning is abundant. In the auditory experience of a language we 
know, we perceive the meaningfulness of words and utterances (Butterfill 2011; Smith 2010; 
Mole 2010; O’Callaghan 2007; Heidegger 2010, 158; Husserl 2005, 26,<25>). In speech 
perception, we perceive rhythms in languages familiar to us, and this phenomenon is crucial for 
hearers to understand speech (Cutler 1994).29 Regardless of whether the motor theory or 
another theory about how of speech perception takes place, the what seems clearly established: 
we perceive words and not sounds.  
We visually perceive words as wholes (of languages we know) and not just ink or chalk 
traces later to be inferred to be words. Further, there has been identified a specialized ‘visual 
word form area’ in the visual cortex, specifically in the fusiform gyrus (McCandliss, Cohen, and 
Dehaene 2003). The fact that changes in size or shape of letter or some changes in orientation in 
written text do not affect visual word recognition offer additional support for a form of high-
level content. 
Both speech perception and visual perception of words furnish a great case for the idea that 
we directly perceive things in the world. Many philosophers find unpalatable the idea that 																																																								
29 Seen from the point of view of a theory of sensible qualities, which in the case of sounds are pitch, loudness, and 
timbre, it seems unlikely that an objective physicalist account of such qualities is possible: “contemporary 
psychoacoustics researchers commonly reject the identification of pitch with frequency or periodicity. The received 
scientific view thus holds that pitch is a subjective or psychological quality that is no more than correlated with 
objective frequency (see, e.g. Gelfand 2004, Houtsma 1995)” (O’Callaghan 2009, 33; O’Callaghan 2007). It is common 
among philosophers to take some scientific bits of information and develop wrong folk-educated-scientific views 
about, for example, sensory qualities. Many philosophers take the uninformed, pseudo-scientific view that for every 
sensory quality that is theorized, there has to be ex hypothesi, a physical configuration independent of perceivers that 
allows for such quality to exist. Somewhat careful examination in olfactory, gustatory, or auditory perception, among 
others, dispels those common views.  
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meaningful speech is in the world and not projected or inferred by hearers. While I have no time 
to discuss the issue in length, the contours of the debate are quite those of the polemic on 
appearances in general. The traditional view thinks that, either, properties are in the objects 
themselves, neutrally described, or they are a subjective construction of perceivers. As I have incessantly 
remarked, the dilemma is to be rejected. Things can be in the world itself and yet specific 
properties may not be there independently of a perceiver’s interacting with them. Once the 
perceiver (and in the case of speech, the producer of the sounds as well) is such that the 
interactions with the world are culturally informed, the world itself is able to present itself in 
ways that are precisely dependent on such interactions. To say that in a person’s utterance 
meaning is in the utterance itself is not to say that those sounds are ‘intrinsically’ meaningful as 
if their meaningfulness didn’t depend on a language. But they are not merely a projection of the 
hearer on the sounds. It is the interaction of a suitably situated (not spatially but culturally) 
hearer with sounds that become words. I treat the case of illusions as in the case of visual 
illusions, that is, like the disjunctivist does: real utterances constitute perceived speech, whereas 
the illusion of speech is not constituted by real utterances. There is no common core between 
them. The treatment is similar to accidental shapes that may resemble words. The opposite 
views seem fated to take a good deal of the intersubjective quality of the perceived world to be a 
massive illusion, and to reduce the perceptual to the sensory, in a way that, if pursued carefully, 
will make the sensory a mere brute impingement on sensory endings that can do nothing alone. 
These past four cases (visual and haptic object recognition, and visual words and speech) 
have in common the influence of familiarity or background knowledge. We can derive from this 
a further argument. In that respect, both Peacocke (1992) (although in a strictly conceptual 
fashion) and Siegel (2006, 490) have argued that the fact that an experience’s phenomenal 
character changes before and after acquaintance or knowledge entails that there is something 
that is new in what is perceived. The difference between the before and the after cases has then 
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an unmistakable perceptual payoff. This differential also shows that such high-level contents are 
part of perceptual experience.  
There is another case that I will treat in some detail in the next two chapters, and which 
suggests as well that perception is of high-level properties. This is the case of sensorimotor-
dependent aspects, which I will put in the broader category of non-socially pragmatic 
dependencies. Some properties we perceive are not properties of the objects by themselves, but 
properties of the objects or situations as they can be acted upon. For example: when riding a 
bicycle, a curve is perceived as a curve that requires a certain turn (of the handle bars); a soccer 
ball in movement towards oneself is perceived as a ball that calls for a certain kick; and touching 
a knife’s blade in order to check for sharpness is not only a detection of a material feature but 
also a behavioral implication, namely, the limit at which one would cut oneself if too much 
pressure is applied. In these cases, it is the immediacy, automatic, and continuous/feedback-loop 
character of the action-perception interaction that makes the case for such aspects being 
perceptual and for being not just aspects of the objects (hence, not a low-level property).30 
Lastly, I would like to briefly mention the visual perception of causation relations between 
objects.31 At least in some cases, it can be argued that we perceive causal relations between 
objects, e.g. when a billiards ball hits another, the movement of the second one is percevied as 
caused by the first one. We also perceive things like a bird making a branch bend by descending 
on it (Butterfill 2011; Siegel 2011b). Considerations of space prevent me from examining these 
aspects in more detail. I am here however only interested in reviewing illustrations of high-level 
content.  
																																																								
30 This interactive intuition is compatible with Gibson-style ecological formulations (see Gibson 1979), as well as 
enactive insights particularly akin to Hurley’s (1998; 2006). 
31 Inter- and multi-modal interactions furnish plenty of cases of high-level aspects that are perceived, as in the 
perception of music aspects like duration are products of visual plus auditory clues. I have not time to discuss these 
cases at this point, but a full theory of perception must be sensitive to the idea that perception is not only an intra-
modal affair.  
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2.3.3 Pragmatic Dependence 
I have been urging a relationalist, realist understanding of perceptual objects, events, and states 
of affairs in which appearances or aspects are essential to perception. I have offered a few initial 
arguments for these appearances to be understood as correlative to specific sensory-based 
interactions between perceivers and objects. I have also argued that high-level properties are 
appearances or aspects of objects, events, and states of affairs. Perceptual interactions between 
objects of the world and subjects do not happen statically, but in the nuanced interactions 
between worldly occurrences (temporally extended continua) and perceivers, which interactions 
are constituted, for the most part, by socially constituted practices.  
 A central aspect of the arguments so far deployed is the view that in perceptual 
experience we are presented with objects belonging to our everyday world, or as Husserl had it, 
belonging “to the sphere of culture, the sphere of actual life” (Husserl 1989, 243–59,<231–47>). 
We smell colognes as we walk by someone, we hear cars as they pass by, and we see animals and 
plants. We also see an angry friend as he evades us, or our pet in distress when treated by a vet. 
The world of experience is the scenario “which furnishes the ground for all cognitive 
performance,” in which perception is linked to action and judgment. In the case of perception, 
individuation of perceived objects, events, and states of affairs “can take place only in practical 
activity itself” (Husserl 1973, 41; see also 65).  
In this section I offer a philosophical anthropological account, in the spirit of second nature 
naturalism of the fact that the objects, events, and states of affairs that we perceive appear in 
configurations pertaining to persons in their everyday pragmatic engagements with the world.32 
This explanandum involves higher-level properties, for which a different argument has already 
been offered, but the scope of pragmatic determination goes beyond: it includes the 
individuation of objects, events, and states of affairs. To talk about the individuation of, say, a 
perceived tree, is not to talk about what makes the tree a tree in itself, but about the way in 
which the tree is presented to me in perception as I relate to it in determinate pragmatic 																																																								
32 For an extended and more specific treatment of the second naturalism position see Arango (2014). 
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dispositions: as I climb it, or as I contemplate it, or as I feel its trunk’s bark). The argument is 
philosophical anthropological because it articulates the notion of person and the structure of 
perceptual experience through the idea that a person is essentially, in part, a perceiver.33 In order 
to understand what a perceiver is is essential to understand what it is to perceive, and in order 
to understand what to perceive is, it is essential to understand what a perceiver is.  
This argument is phenomenological. It is an articulation of Husserl’s treatment of the idea 
of person in his Ideas II. Because of this origin and style, the argument comes with 
methodological and content commitments that many readers may find difficult to accept 
without further explanation, or simply not at all. SEP does not depend on this section’s 
argument. It is one more argument among the many that I have already offered and others that 
will come in following chapters. 
Further, I think that the connections between a pragmatic orientation in the world, on the 
one hand, and higher-level properties and object individuations, on the other, holds good 
independently of the ontological account of “persons.” In that sense, the interpretation I offer in 
this section of social cognition research (i) debunking the Müller-Lyer “illusion” and (ii) 
showing that seeing in terms of attention and eye movement can be culturally constituted, 
should be of interest for any reader. This section can be read in a fuller or in a deflated manner: 
as arguing for the pragmatic dependence of perception with or wihout considering it a matter of 
a phenomenological conception of person.  
The Husserlian Argument. I follow somewhat closely one of the ways Husserl thinks 
about the relation between perception and everyday life. I purport to offer a deeper grounded 
argument—an argument cast in a philosophical anthropology key, that is, an argument that 
takes perception to be a basic component of (and grounds perception in) the life of a person. The 																																																								
33 Interestingly, a similar type of strategy has been recently utilized in contemporary contributions to the way 
traditional philosophical debates can inform contemporary discussions on cognition. Patricia Kitcher’s Kant’s Thinker 
(2011) purports to examine Kant’s theory of the cognitive subject by reflecting on what type of subject Kant’s is, 
namely, a thinker (Kitcher 2013). Ginsborg has recently offered a compelling reply, entitled Kant’s Perceiver. In 
Ginsborg’s view, “we cannot understand Kant’s thinker without considering her also as a perceiver, given that 
thought, for Kant, is operative not only in self-consciously rational judgment but also in perceptual experience” 
(Ginsborg 2013, 222).  
  91 
experiencing subject is a being that is a perceiver, a thinker, an emotional being, as well as a 
social, historical and biological being. The Husserlian line of argumentation I will follow is that 
of Husserl’s Ideas II (1989). The central idea is that perception is to be understood as a function 
of a more basic category, position-taking [Stellungsnahme] and its related comportment 
[Verhaltung]. This line of thought proves to be compatible with recent research in social 
psychology and cultural anthropology on the nature of cognition and perception.  
In order to investigate the lived experiences of a subject, we start with an inquiry into the 
constitution of the experiencing subject—this is the thrust of Husserl’s theory of constitution. 
For Husserl, the subject is constituted by multiple ‘levels’ (or ‘dimensions,’ if the reader so 
wishes to read) which are different Ego-formations, ranging from, roughly, a mostly bodily 
level, to the theoretical-transcendental pure Ego, to the empirical, intersubjective Ego of 
everyday life (Husserl 1989).34 All these abstract formations (which to be sure do not ‘act’ 
isolatedly or modularly) are Ego-like in that they carry with them or entail a sense of mineness 
or for-me-ness—whether it is the actional affirmation of a bodily contact with the world (i.e. 
avoiding fire) or whether it is the pure transcendental Ego performing a thought experiment of 
doubt, or whether it is the social empirical subject, feeling compelled to make a value-loaded 
decision. This concept of mineness (a certain sense of the first person) at work here is not plain 
awareness. It is a sense of things pertaining to one’s self, or being about oneself, that is not only 
revealed in waking awareness, but also in the structure of experience itself.35  
Of special interest for us is the case of the basic dimension of the sensory body, which 
Husserl calls the aesthetic body. The sensory body is a system of psychophysical conditionalities 
																																																								
34 For the purposes of this section I do not pay much attention to the details of the different subject-formations (pure 
Ego, Ego, empirical Ego, and subject) that Husserl conceptualizes. In the present case, the level of the empirical Ego 
is the appropriate one to bring on for a discussion on the dependence of perception on the pragmatic. It is important 
to bear in mind that the empirical Ego —the subject, as we normally understand it—is a formation with a thick 
underlying multi-level basis always operating in it, and not a given, ready-made singular independent stratum. 
35 In this, as in other places, are the differences between phenomenology in the phenomenological tradition sense, and 
‘the phenomenology of X,’ in the sense of descriptions of lists of appearances. By investigating the structure of 
experience itself, a thicker account of the first-person domain is available, one that belongs to the structure of 
experience (a variety of the conditions for the possibility of experience) in manners other than awareness, and is 
either revealed in another phenomenon like attention or by means of phenomenological analyses of phenomena. 
Considerations of space prevent me from expanding on this issue.   
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that pairs sensory occurrences (or objects understood thereof) with subjective occurrences in the 
body. The body determines in an important sense "what it is that, as world, stands over and 
against the subject" (Husserl 1989, 70–80, <65–75>). For one, this purely sensory sense of the 
body, the corporeal self [Ichleib] has the particularity of being a center of reference in relation to 
which perceptual happenings take place: perceived things are above, to the left, or near; they are 
disgusting or agreeable; actable upon or not, etc. (1989, 61, <56>; 1997, 124). In fact, every 
experience of a perceived object or event, in its being perceived as a spatial one, carries with it a 
sense of mineness in the sense that it is indexically situated in relation to me.  
Further, the very possibility of coherent perceptions lies in the sense of normality intrinsic 
to the experience of one’s own body, and its contrastive abnormalities. Husserl proposes the 
following example: “touching something with a blister on my finger, or if my hand has been 
abraded […] all the tactual properties of the thing are given differently” (1989, 66, <61>). And 
yet, in many such cases, it is possible to navigate the world and use a burned finger, being able 
to successfully deal with the way things feel. The point is that the mere sensory system, not 
getting yet to higher-level objects and events, configures a domain in which it has authority by 
virtue of being the sensory body.  
There is certain continuity between this line of thought and the analysis offered above 
about the nature of haptic mechano-receptors. While the previous section examined how the 
nature of the sensory organ determines part of what can be perceived, Husserl’s reflection adds 
to it the element of mineness that makes part of the corporeal self [Ichleib]. The sensation of 
pain through specialized receptors—e.g. thermal nociceptors that excite fiber groups Aδ and C 
(Kandel and Schwartz 2000, 432, 442)—is often invoked as primal evidence of what it is like to 
have a first-person perspective. Keeping up with the tactile case I’ve offered before, it is plain 
that whatever sensory configurations a person has, they determine the range of possibilities for 
a perceiver, and such ranges feature in more nuanced activities: this is why sensory practical 
expertise is obviously partly an exercise of the basic level of sensory thresholds coupled with 
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“efferent signals that contribute to motor control,” which in turn constitutes a feedback loop 
between action and perception (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, 133). Thus, the skilled tailoring 
activity of comparing fabrics is partly constituted by the more basic bodily dimension of feeling 
the fabrics’ thickness. In sum, the workings of the simpler, more basic bodily dimension are 
constitutive of the activities of 'higher,' more comprehensive levels (Husserl 1989, 70–71, 269, 
292–293 <66, 257, 280>). 
It is fundamental to notice that I am not claiming that the perceptual is only the bodily 
dimension. Instead, the point, so far, is that the perceptual is partly constituted by the sensory, 
bodily level. The perceptual is, in general, determined by the pragmatic level, in which it is 
nested. For the tailor sensing a piece of fabric, the perceptual element is guided by the pragmatic 
activity of precisely evaluating a fabric, which is more than a mere touching of a surface. 36  
Nor do I claim, that the sensory or bodily is only biological or physiological. In the 
perceptual interaction with the fabric, there are at work determinations belonging to the 
sensory aspects of touch. But they are not limited to the physiology of touch, for personal or 
cultural constraints also shape a person’s sensitivity or a person’s way of using the sensory 
apparatuses. Notice, however, that to invoke intersubjective (cultural and otherwise) influences 
in the use of the sense of touch, as belonging to the sensory, bodily level (sensitivity, modes of 
touching, that is, of applying pressure to the skin), while at the same time claiming that the 
pragmatic domain (the domain where the subject acts, perceives, values, judges, etc., and which 
is evidently intersubjectively constituted) determines the workings of perception, makes difficult 
to regiment what belongs where. What this difficulty shows is precisely the mutually 
constitutive relation between perceptual and non-perceptual pragmatic aspects. 																																																								
36 Studies in cognitive anthropology, such as Lave and Wenger on learning (1991), or Lave on apprenticeship (2011), 
are geared towards a different level of analysis: the social organization of the learning process, which includes the 
activities apprentices are put to as they learn a craft or occupation. Particularly, Jean Lave has studied the case of Vai 
and Gola tailors in Liberia. In Lave and Wegner we see how apprentices start observing masters do their job and are 
progressively given tasks, from sewing a button, hemming a cuff or pressing clothes, to more complex activities like 
cutting and sewing entire garments. While the authors do not speak of the processes of sensory learning, we can 
safely assume that part of what apprentices learn is a perceptual expertise that becomes one with a social, productive 
one (1991, 69–72). I regard the continuity of my view with socially rich processes as a strong advantage of it, for it 
shows the relevance and relatedness of philosophical reflection to sociological and anthropological concerns. I have 
also shown how my approach is entirely compatible with biological and psychological studies of perception.  
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Take the Müller-Lyer (so-called) illusion. To this day, the Müller-Lyer case is taken by 
most philosophers of mind as a proof of the representational character of perception and of its 
modular character (one can’t see the lines of equal length despite knowing they are so). As some 
social psychologists have shown, however, there is nothing universal or necessary about the 
perception of the drawing. Some people, the San foragers of the Kalahari, do not see the illusion. 
Further, the differences in perceived length between the two lines varies, with American and 
South African-European populations occupying one extreme of the distribution (Henrich, Heine, 
and Norenzayan 2010, 62). The results are explained thus: 
[…] these findings suggest that visual exposure during ontogeny to factors such as the 
“carpentered corners” of modern environments may favor certain optical calibrations 
and visual habits that create and perpetuate this illusion. That is, the visual system 
ontogenetically adapts to the presence of recurrent features in the local visual 
environment. Because elements such as carpentered corners are products of particular 
cultural evolutionary trajectories, and were not part of most environments for most of 
human history, the Müller-Lyer illusion is a kind of culturally evolved by-product 
(Henrich 2008) […] this work suggests that even a process as apparently basic as 
visual perception can show substantial variation across populations. If visual perception 
can vary, what kind of psychological processes can we be (Henrich, Heine, and 
Norenzayan 2010, 62).37 
 
Whether it is specifically the exposure to carpentered corners or other complex social 
influences, what is key here is the illustration of Husserl’s claim that the bodily dimension, 
however important it is, can be influenced by intersubjective constraints. The perceptual 
element is not simply about what sensations follow what sensory worldly occurrences. It is 
about ways of encountering, taking in, and relating to worldly occurrences. As this interaction 
is pragmatic I now turn to the pragmatic experiencing subject who is the perceiver.  
																																																								
37 As scientists start to recognize the possibility of skewed results based on methodological problems, namely, on the 
fact that brain imaging and psychological experiments are done in more than 90% of the cases on WEIRD 
populations (Western, educated, industrialized, rich and democratic), the explanatory seeming scientific uniqueness of 
the biological is rightly called into question (See also Jones 2010). It is impressively telling, to say the least, to see the 
wide agreement across disciplines that followed Heinrich et al.’s The WEIRDest people in the World? in Brain and 
Behavioral Sciences. Commentaries (published in the same issue) by Astuti and Bloch, Boesch, Ceci et al., Chiao and 
Cheon, Fernald, Fessler, Gächter, Karasit et al., Khemlani et al., Kesebir et al., Konečni, Lancy, among others 
researchers in social psychology, cognitive anthropology and other behavioral sciences, provides scientific support to 
the idea of cultural variability in broadly speaking cognitive processes. Particularly for my purposes, the seeming 
ultimate status of the biological and physiological in discussions of perception seems quite dubious and considerable 
support is found for the type of mutual constitutive relation between the pragmatic and the perceptual I am arguing 
for. 
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a. The subject is an active position-taking. The subject, for Husserl, is not a substance but rather 
an active being in which a complex underlying basis is in action and is made manifest in the 
way things are dealt with, and even in the things that are dealt with. The subject takes position 
in relation to things, goals, persons or situations, and exercises faculties and habits that 
determine relational stances regarding things (Husserl 1989, 265, <253>). This position-
taking of the person is the pragmatic, actional ‘thematization’ of a relation of the subject 
with aspects the world—themata are posited and acted upon them (Husserl 1989, 119–120, 
<112–113> See also 265ff., <253ff.>).  
b. The subject’s being in her position-takings is at the level of the full person. This notion of subject is 
one that we find in the “fullness of the person,” i.e. concrete human beings in their 
idiosyncrasies. This is why what is proper of the subject, its business, or what it has a stake 
in, is to take position according to motivations. Motivations, which Husserl call the 
“lawfulness of the life of the spirit,” are like reasons, and are opposed to causes. (Husserl 
1989, 231, <220>). Thus he says: 
[The fullness of the person is] the Ego as human, the 'I take a position,' the I think, I 
value, I act, I complete works, etc. Then there also belongs to me a basis of lived 
experiences and a basis of nature (“my nature”) that is manifest in the play of lived 
experiences. This nature is the lower psychic layer, but it extends even into the sphere 
of position taking: the position-taking Ego is dependent on its substratum insofar as I, 
in order to be motivated in my position taking, must have precisely the motivating lived 
experiences, which stand in an associative nexus and under rules of associative 
dispositions. (Husserl 1989, 293, <280>) 
 
c. The identity that can be accorded to full person is a function of the consistency evinced in her position-
takings and comportments.  It is part of the idea of a subject that the subject is the same in all 
her position-takings, and that in all her position-takings the subject is the same: “As long as 
I am the one I am, then the position-taking cannot but ‘persist,’ and I cannot but persist in 
it” (Hua IV, 118–119, <111–112>).  
This is an identity thesis between the subject and its activities, that is, between the subject 
and its positioning itself pragmatically over against things and events: “My thesis, my position-
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taking, my deciding from motives […] is something I have a stake in” (Husserl 1989, 119, 
<122>).38  
The identity of the subject is presupposed conventionally but never fully actually 
determined. Constitution is an ongoing business, which reveals itself in continuous position-
takings and comportments of the subject. Thus, we must rather speak of an interactive 
correlation between a subject and the activities (and objects and situations proper of such 
activities) pertaining to it, such that the subject determines the character of those activities and 
is at the same time influenced and further shaped by those activities themselves (see Husserl 
1989, Supplements VII, X). In this correlation we find an explanation of a more general idea 
according to which "the subject develops by living" (Husserl 1989, 264, <252>).  
Summarizing, the person as an active, position-taking is “expression” or the “blooming” of 
lower levels always acting “in” it. We find in person a style of being, a mode of acting, a manner 
in which things are done, a host of tendencies and preferences, of likings and dislikings. Because 
of this, it is possible to say that individual positionings and ensuing perceptions or actions are 
gathered together under the idea of comportment [Verhaltung] (Husserl 1989, 226-238, <215–
226>). The perceiver that we are trying to understand in order to understand her perceiving life 
is or has a mode of comporting herself in the world—which is really nothing other than saying 
that she has—that she is—a way of regarding, relating to, an acting upon realities.  
Let’s us now focus back on the perceptual aspects of pragmatically informed interactions 
with the world, so as to illustrate and provide some additional arguments for the dependence of 
the perceptual on the pragmatic that I have been arguing for.  
In the view I have been advancing, the ‘workings’ of perception are not only the contact 
with already individualized objects, events or state of affairs. The reason is that the focusing on 
a given particular, with such and such spatial and temporal boundaries, is itself a perceptual 
happening. When listening to a favorite song, listeners may find themselves paying more 																																																								
38 “Meine Thesis, meine Stellungnahme, mein auf die Motive hin Mich-entscheiden […] ist meine Sache” (Hua IV 
1989, 119, <122>).   
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attention to the voice or to the drums, or to the melody itself. This focusing on a specific aspect 
or unity is already perceptual and naturally underlies the more specific perceptually interacting 
with it. Let me illustrate this. 
Research in social cognition has shown differences between the way some Americans 
visually perceive and the way some East Asians do. Measurements of eye movements when 
confronted with a visual scene in which focal objects and background can be distinguished yield 
differential results. “Americans fixated more on focal objects than did the Chinese, and the 
Americans tended to look at the focal object more quickly. In addition, the Chinese made more 
saccades to the background than did the Americans” (Chua, Boland, and Nisbett 2005, 12629). 
Another study by Masuda and Nisbett (2001) presented American and Japanese subjects with a 
drawing of an aquarium, which included focal objects (mainly fish) and background objects (a 
section of ground and water bubbles). As reported by Winerman, “Americans were more likely 
to begin by recalling the focal fish, while Japanese were more likely to describe the whole scene, 
saying something like "it was a lake or pond." Later, the Japanese participants also recalled 
more details about the background objects than the Americans did” (Winerman 2006; Masuda 
and Nisbett 2001; See also Watters 2013). What these scientific studies show is that basic 
aspects of visual experience can be culturally constituted, and can’t hence be assumed to be 
universal: “eye movements can differ as a function of culture” (Chua, Boland, and Nisbett 2005, 
12631).  
Thus, the subject plays a role in the specific thematization of objects and events she faces—
whether in observing a copper bowl it is the entire bowl that is the object of perception, or 
rather parts of it, or even the scene in which the bowl is placed (Husserl 1973, 117). Not only 
the singling out of objects and events is the product of a position-taking of the subject; both the 
span in which attention is paid to things, and the specific interaction between perception and 
action are also influenced by the positioning of the subject vis-à-vis aspects of reality. Chua et al. 
conclude also that “Easterners and Westerners allocated attentional resources differently as 
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they viewed the scenes” (2005, 12631). Well-known change-blindness cases well illustrate that 
perception is not about the passive receiving of ‘the way the world is,’ but is rather a take on the 
way the world is. As a matter of fact, one thing in common to the experiments I just reviewed 
and to the view that links perception and attention is that they entail the falsity of the claim that 
perception is a one-one reproduction of sensory impulses.39  
Further, in Husserl’s view, we perceive unities (objects, events, states of affairs) and not 
isolated properties of mere bundles of them. Oftentimes, though, unities are perceived as also 
having other aspects or properties of different sorts (importantly parts), which allows for 
switching of attention between aspects (Husserl 1997, 28–30, <33–36>; Husserl 2001b, 116–
119).40 For Husserl, unities are not simply grasped, but rather 'posited,' that is, objectivated or 
individualized in the very grasping of them. It is not that we create the unities that we perceive. 
Rather, in our perceiving determinate unities, we are active in focusing on such unities: “The 
activity of perception, the perceptive orientation toward particular objects […] is already an 
active performance of the ego” (1973, 71–72).41   
																																																								
39 Cognitive anthropology research is a burgeoning area of research in which evidence for the pragmatic-dependence 
of perception can be found, but only after such research is subject to critical analysis. Part of this research program 
focuses on inference-based reasoning in decision-making contexts, and on categorization and conceptualization 
between different communities shows such cognitive processes vary across cultures, depending on a variety of factors 
(See Atran et al. 2002; Atran, Medin, and Ross 2005). These researchers mostly work within theoretical frameworks 
of modularized minds with impenetrable perceptual modules (Medin and Atran 2004, 963). However, the findings of 
their research, when subject to a careful conceptual analysis partly using the view of perception I have been putting 
forth, would instead imply that perception does not only feed cognitive processes but that such cognitive processes 
influence perception. Upon careful analysis, it seems difficult to hold that communities that are more aware of 
ecological relations between living beings are only conceptually and inferentially aware, and not that part of their 
awareness has to do with a perceptual sensitivity, perhaps similar to the structure of vision of East Asians and 
Japanese people I reviewed above. As Bang et al. note “Recent research, however, shows that content and process 
cannot be neatly segregated, because cultural differences in what people think affect how people think. To achieve a 
deeper understanding of the relation between process and content, research must integrate the methodological 
insights from both anthropology and psychology” (Bang, Medin, and Atran 2007, 13868). A somewhat close reading 
shows that their research is not only about what we think, but about what we deal with, that is, with pragmatic 
objects in which perception occupies a central role. And, in fact, philosophy can also contribute to such deeper 
understanding.  
40 Affordances, that is, opportunities or impediments for action afforded by the object-in-context to the individual, are 
also part of these perceived unities. They will be treated in terms of content in the next chapter. I urge the reader to 
not yield to the temptation to equal the talk of unities or objects with talk of content. A clear construction of the idea 
of content requires a different strategy that I do not employ yet.  
41 One last piece of evidence for the pragmatic dependence of perception on research on what’s called the cognitive 
penetrability of perception, namely, that perceptual experience is can be affected by other cognitive, extra-perceptual 
aspects of the actions one is involved in. For a related discussion see (Deroy 2012). A recently published study, Rituals 
Enhance Consumption, found that participants that engaged in “ritualized behavior” regarding consumption of 
chocolate, experienced chocolate much more positively than those that didn’t engage in such behavior (Vohs et al. 
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Think of a tree. Looking at the tree as a whole or focusing on one branch of it is not a 
process that depends exclusively on the nature of an external reality—as if to one scene only 
one perception could belong. Rather, the grasping of the tree, or of a branch of it (or even of the 
landscape of which the tree is a part) is an accomplishment of perception, which is properly 
described as a ‘positing’ or establishing of unities (Husserl 1983, 278–282, <241–245>).42 To 
put it in terms of appearances, each of these cases is about taking in one or another of the many 
ways in which the tree appears. And this is, I have been urging, entirely direct and realist. The 
tree is just as real as the branch. Perceiving on one or the other, or switching between them is 
clearly our doing, but is not an invention—it is a take on reality. Lastly, as I have been arguing 
in this section, this focusing on different aspects that are perceived as unities is dependent on the 
pragmatic level. The possibilities for attentional and actional changes over time (in the 
temporally extended perceptual nexus we have been focusing on, instead of snapshot perceptual 
instants) are also pragmatically delineated depending on what I want to do with something, 
even if I just want to contemplate an object.43 
SEP holds that the right account of perceptual content must accurately reflect the 
complexity of our perceptual experience, their dynamism, and their objects’ nature. We also 
want a theory of content that helps us understand how all these elements hang together, from 
basic sensory contacts in with the world to higher-level perceptions—chapters 3, 4, and 5 will 
deal with these desiderata. Thus, on the basis of this account of perceptual experience, I now 
turn to the relation between experience and content. In the following chapter, I will look at how 
a conception of experience entails requirements and desiderata for a theory of content. I will 
																																																																																																																																																																					
2013, 1714). In this case, researchers highlight that ritualized behavior increases engagement in the action, hence 
causing a heightened, and more pleasant, perceptual experience.  
42 For Husserl, any intentional act whatever “even emotional and volitional acts—are objectivating, constituting 
objects originally [and are thus] necessary sources of different regions of being [Seinsregionen] and (with them) their 
belonging ontologies” (1983, 282, <242>). Perception is one instantiation of this ‘archontic’ character of intentional 
acts.  
43 In chapters 4 and 5, I will have occasion to flesh out this idea. Specifically, I will show how focusing on certain 
objects in specific ways is intrinsically structured in terms of content, both self-referentially and in relation to other 
relevant aspects of the environment. This means that internal and external horizons of possible fulfillments are 
already at work in the objects we perceive, such that they determine the possibilities and impossibilities of perceptual 
nexuses (See 1973, 103–106, 122; Husserl 1970, 165; Husserl 1983, 322–23, <279>; Drummond 1990, 150–151).  
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analyze the representationalist take on that connection and will articulate the way the Social 
Enactive View deals with that problem.  
 
Chapter III 
 
Perceptual Experience and Perceptual Content 
 
An important difficulty for theories of perceptual content issues from the multiplicity of 
discussions in which perceptual content is invoked, dealt with, used for or against. It has a place 
in theories about the nature of perception and perceptual experience (Husserl 2001b; Husserl 
1983; Merleau-Ponty 2002; Snowdon 1992; Logue 2012; Schellenberg Forthcoming), the 
relation between perception and action (Hurley 1998; Noë 2004; Hutto and Myin 2013; 
Schellenberg 2007; Thompson 2009), the relation between perception and environment (Gibson 
1979; Almäng 2008; Heidegger 2010; Hurley 1998), in discussion about the use and need (or 
lack thereof) of concepts in perception (Tye 2005; Bermúdez 2007; Toribio 2007), and, 
prominently, in discussions about the connection between perceptions and epistemological 
justification, that is, about the specific justificatory role perceptions ought to have in regards to 
belief and action, mostly in conceptualist frameworks (McDowell 1994; Peacocke 1992; Hopp 
2011; Brewer 2005; Schellenberg 2011). This diversity seems to pull the concept in every 
direction, making it difficult to offer a comprehensive, stable account of it.  
Let’s start off with a common (but useless) definition of content: perceptual content is what is 
contained in the perceptual act. This is far from clear, for, what would it mean for the objects of 
perception to be contained in such container? If what is at stake, as I have been arguing, is the 
general question of what perception is about, i.e. it is not clear what and how should be contained 
in the mind, and not at all clear that, as to their content (not to mention others aspects), 
perception’s contents are common factors with other mental states such as beliefs or 
hallucinations. If perception is about the direct acquaintance with sequences and transitions, and 
not just with static objects, how would exactly the container metaphor work? Does the mind 
contain the world? Or is it perhaps a replica?  
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I propose that instead we begin with a minimal idea linking content with aboutness: 
content is that which the perceptual experience is about—the what of the perceptual aboutness 
relation.1 We start with perceptual experience as I have described in the previous chapter.  
The previous chapter’ account of perceptual experience makes some headway in treating 
the problem of content. Perceptual experience, I argued, is not an inner occurrence, product of 
external interaction, although it is ‘accompanied’ and partly characterized by the phenomenal 
character or ‘what-it-is-like’ of a thing perceived. Perceptual experience is of spatial and 
temporal extended occurrences in the world—objects, events, and states of affairs, each of which 
I referred to as perceptual continua. I argued too that each of these continua can be understood 
as “a chain of resting perceptions, unified by transitional phenomena, in which various sides and 
parts of the thing present themselves in a stable way” (1997, 83, 76, <98,89>).2 I have proposed 
to understand these “sides and parts” of things according to the basic insight that, in perception, 
perceivers are presented with aspects or appearances (perspectives or profiles) of real objects; 
such appearances being the way in which physical occurrences are presented, and can only be 
presented, in perception. Physical occurrences—material objects but also smells—cannot be 
experienced by perceivers but in perspectival sequences: not even a God, Husserl has said, 
would perceive material objects in their fullness (and unless God enjoyed an embodied existence 
it would not perceive at all) (Pietersma 2000, 62); the idea of a full, immediate, total grasp of a 
spatiotemporal event is a misleading fiction. Lastly, I argued that the aspects we perceive in 
things are dependent on interaction with perceivers—they are relational properties; perceivers 
are situated over against things not only temporally and spatially but also pragmatically.  
The account I propose conceives of content as constituted by, and methodologically derived 
from, perceptual experience. Experience is the actuality of the aboutness of mind of minded 																																																								
1 I follow Husserl in the basic definition of intentionality that puts it at the core of our mental life—which is not the 
same as “inner” life. “Every conscious process is, in itself, consciousness of such and such […] intentionality signifies 
nothing else than this universal fundamental property of consciousness: to be consciousness of something” (Husserl 
1999, 33, <71–71>, emphasis is Husserl’s; See also Husserl 1983, 73, <64>). Although Brentano can be credited with 
bringing the notion of intentionality into philosophical psychology, I follow, though critically, Husserl’s treatment of 
it. Husserl was a student of Brentano. 
2 A full qualification of the sense in which the perceptual objects is a sequence or a continuum (already mentioned in 
chapter 2) is presented in chapter 4, section 1.  
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beings and content is a type of specification of aboutness, thus, content is constituted by the 
actual experience of things. For SEP, content is partly constituted by, not just supervenes on, 
perceptual experience. 3  
I will thus start clean of a commitment to perceptual contents as inner structures. This can 
be called a version of intentionalism without representationalism. It could also be referred to as 
a type of externalist relationalism that conceives of relations as practical engagements, as 
interactions, instead of the more general relation. In particular, it is a type of externalism as to the 
contents of intentions that could be called interactive externalism. I prefer, however, the 
denomination enactivism, because of the explicit emphasis on the active aspect of perception and 
its positioning in contrast to the orthodoxy in philosophy of mind. Because of the constitutive 
role I assign to intersubjectivity at multiple levels of analysis (practices, experiences, properties, 
and contents), the appropriate label is social enactivism (that would be a social interactive 
externalism).  
In this chapter, I develop an account of the constitutive relation between experience and 
content. Whatever roles content may play in relation to a theory of perception overall—to the 
relation between perception and action and behavior, to the role of the environment, to the need 
for concepts, or to epistemological justification—it depends on what perceptual experience is. 
While in this chapter I will talk some more about experience and will start discussing content in 
particular, but my focus is on the relation between these two concepts.  
I situate my positive account over against representationalism, the main and longest-
standing line of thought in the literature. This view keeps mind and world separate, mind inner, 
and perception mostly a matter of a detached acquaintance of a mind with a world, in which 
reason is called to sort out the contingent results of perception. These elements resonate at the 
level of perceptual content in the shape of an intellectualistic concern for ‘veridicality’ that 
operates in the distinction inner/outer, in the role of reason, inference and judgment in 																																																								
3 It is worth noting already that on this view, the objects of perception are also contents, pace (Hopp 2011), but not 
every aspect, part or property that counts as content is an object. 
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perception, and in the extension of linguistic analysis of content to analysis of perceptual 
content.  
I take Chalmers (2006) to be a representative example of standard theories of perception. 
The way of thinking he represents takes the notion of veridicality (roughly understood as 
correspondence) to be central to perceptual experience and to perceptual content. I attempt to 
reveal how this concern for veridicality synthesizes a wrong way of addressing perception. 
Continuing the line of thinking I began to craft in chapter 2, I will offer further arguments 
against the supposed epistemological incompatibility between the reality of perceptual objects 
and the multiplicity of their appearances on which the central concern for veridicality depends.  
As I will show in chapter 5, SEP has a proposal to offer regarding the narrow concern for 
veridicality of representational theories. Normativity in SEP is not about confirming whether 
our perceptions correspond to the world but about the placement of perceptual things in the 
system of possibilities and expectations that I first presented in chapter 1. This account is not 
intra-perceptual but rather pragmatically nested, and sensitive to intra-modal and multi-modal 
relations. 
This conception of the relation between experience and content furnishes one more element 
for the social enactive theory of perception I am building—a conception of perception that feels 
at home in the actual world. SEP is a theory that finds our contact with the world neither 
mysterious nor deficient, as Chalmers does, and thus need not resort to extra-perceptual inferences 
from appearances to reality in order to get by, or to hypothetical perfect worlds to understand 
the intrinsic consistency of the world.4 
  																																																								
4 This social enactive account of perception aims at dealing with not only technical aspects of the philosophy of 
perception but with key epistemological issues regarding the relation between mind and world—it is not only about 
the details of our perceptual engagement with stuff in the world, but also about the way in which our perceptual 
engagement with the world constitutes the basis of our knowing, full stop, and of our knowing the world. In this way, 
I express the belief that a philosopher’s theory of perception certainly marks her epistemology. This is undoubtedly 
the case in Husserl, and in Merleau-Ponty as well, who have been a great influence on the account I offer. The social 
enactive view of experience I am arguing for is sympathetic to realist (naïve and direct), relationalist, and disjunctivist 
views of perception (Sellars (2000), McDowell (1994), Cussins (1992), Snowdon (1992; 2008), Martin and Campbell 
(2002), among others). 
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3.1. The Relation between Perceptual Experience and Perceptual Content 
Experience constitutes itself the ground on which perceivers are able to be in perceptual relation 
with the world, and which explains the diverse connections between world and subjects in terms 
of perception, action, and thought. The dependent relation between experience and content also 
justifies my constant looking at experience in order to derive insights about content. Experience 
determines the content of our perceptions, both thematically and phenomenally. It is not 
possible to talk about perceptual content without deriving it from the specificity of perception as 
experienced. 
It is hard to overestimate what is entailed by the conception of experience as interaction I 
am offering and its relation to content, for it stands in a diametric contrast with standard 
theories of perception. It is an extended view among philosophers, both classical modern and 
contemporary, that experience in general —not just perceptual—is an inner occurrence 
endowed with content. Content is thought of as abstractly detachable from the experience, 
propositional in structure (even if not always conceptual (See e.g. Tye 2005)), and accompanied 
by (perhaps sometimes constituted by) a certain what-it-is-like to be in such state, what-it-is-
like to possess such content (possessing such content being determined by being in such state). 
The experiences themselves are mental, inner states—to experience something is to be in a 
mental state—, and the contents themselves are abstract entities—propositions—essentially 
modeled after the manner of beliefs, indicated in that-clauses. Because of their propositional 
nature, contents are in a way common currency for different types of mental states. On this 
view, experiences of different kinds are (at least partly) individuated according to their contents, 
and perceptions, memories, or desires may have common content.   
In representationalist views about perception, to perceive an object is thought to be having 
an inner experience that is caused in a sensory appropriate way by the object perceived. The 
perceptual experience itself is a mental state with content, composed of representational and 
phenomenal aspects. Representational content represents the world to be a certain way; and 
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some take it that the phenomenal content is representational content that is determined by 
phenomenal character (Chalmers 2006, 50–51). Content is a “condition of satisfaction of the 
experience,” and philosophers hold different opinions about the details of these contents: they 
feature objects and properties (Russellian content) or modes of presentation of objects and of 
properties (Fregean content), or mixes thereof. The content is a ‘condition of satisfaction’ in that 
it can render the experience veridical, in case it corresponds to the world, or non-veridical, if it 
doesn’t. In other words, contents are partly derived from their inferential role in the life of a 
rational subject (See Chalmers 2006, 100). A perceiver is guided, on this view, by rational 
patterns of judgment about what they seem to perceive. 
The representationalist view requires a greater analysis, to which I now turn. I will use 
Chalmers’ Perception and the Fall from Eden as a foil. I do find Chalmers’s account of content to 
be profoundly illuminating in a number of ways—albeit illuminating in virtue of the ways in 
which it is wrong. I can anticipate two reasons why I chose Chalmers. The first one is that, 
while he tries to sort out different representational views, he is still committed to the general 
tenets of representationalism. The second reason is that he does not simply assume the truth of 
such a view (which he does). He also tries to account for its main features, by mean of the 
rhetorical strategy of a myth. In my view, this mythologizing strategy allows us to lay bare the 
ideal character of representationalism about perception, especially as seen in the concern for 
veridicality.5 
 
3.2 The Polemics with Chalmers: Visiting the Garden of Eden for The First Time 
I am going to be using Chalmers’s account as a foil, thus, let’s state in a few lines the main 
theses of his account of perceptual content (2006). Chalmers’s position is that the content of 
perception is a propositionally structured content, satisfying two central desiderata, namely, 
veridicality and presentational phenomenal character. Following these two desiderata, Chalmers 																																																								
5 In this sense SEP is a non-ideal theory of perception since it does not idealize its objects, or its modes of exploration, 
or its goals. The engagement with Augustine in the analysis of the materiality of the perceptual object done in 
chapter 2 also has the purposes of showing this contrast between ideality and non-ideality.  
  107 
concludes that content should be understood as a combination of Fregean content and of Edenic 
content. Edenic content (featuring perfect instantiation of ideal perfect properties) deals with 
the phenomenological adequacy desideratum, or presentational desideratum, that is, with the idea that 
perceptual content must account for the presentational sense in which objects and properties 
look to us.6 Edenic content carries the idea of perfect veridicality: an experience is perfectly 
veridical when it instantiates a perfect property in a perfect world: “The perfect veridicality of 
color experience would require that our world is an Edenic world, in which objects instantiate 
primitive color properties” (2006, 69). Fregean content (featuring ways of presentation of 
objects and properties) deals with the veridicality desideratum, that is, with content being a 
condition of experience, such that the experience is veridical iff the world turns out to be the 
way perceptual experience (re)presents it to be. Fregean content veridicality, though, is 
imperfect veridicality: “it is plausible that imperfect veridicality is the property that our ordinary 
term ‘veridicality’ denotes. We speak truly when we say that a phenomenally red experience of 
an ordinary red object is veridical. It is just that the experience is not perfectly veridical” (2006, 
70). The idea is that the veridical aspect of an experience is determined by content that needs 
only to match perfect properties, that is, “to play the role that perfect redness [properties] plays 
in Eden” which is to normally bring about red (property-specific) experiences (2006, 72). The 
content of the veridicality desideratum is an (imperfect) veridicality derivative of a true 
veridicality, which is captured Edenic content captures. On Chalmers’s view, only one type of 
content is unable to explain both salient aspects of perceptual content, so we need to be 
‘pluralists’ about content. Chalmers’s investigation, to be sure, centers on visual perception, with 
a special focus on color perception. Despite this narrow focus, he contends that this model can, 
without substantial modifications, be extended to all other perceptual modalities.  
																																																								
6 Chalmers rules out Russellian content (featuring objects and properties) as phenomenal content, on the grounds 
that it would treat identical phenomenal experiences as having different contents, that is, there would be, for instance, 
“no Russellian content that is shared by all phenomenally red experiences” (2006, 57), which seems to Chalmers an 
intuitive must-have of phenomenal content. Edenic content though would be a pseudo-Russellian content that takes 
perfect properties as the properties it is associated with. Siegel (2011a, 29–30)  reads Chalmers’s Edenic content 
plainly as another type of Russellian content.  
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But what exactly, and how, is wrong with the view that I take him to represent? And why 
is it incompatible with the view I propose? I want to explore some fundamental aspects of the 
standard way of looking at perceptual experience and perceptual content, which I find quite 
clearly exhibited in Chalmers.   
Chalmers articulates his position through a myth of a perceptual Eden. Chalmers thinks 
this myth helps us make sense of our perceptual situation, by understanding ourselves as being 
engaged in a perceptually deficient manner with the world. Chalmers says that our perceptual 
predicament is that of beings that were once in a Garden of Eden, directly perceiving object of 
the world and perfect properties. We were acquainted with objects directly, and directly 
perceived “gloriously, perfectly, and primitively” their perfect properties, the roundness and 
redness of round, red apples. “Objects were presented to us without causal mediation, and 
properties were revealed to us in their true intrinsic glory” (Chalmers 2006, 49. Emphasis mine). 
Then we ate the fruits of two trees, the tree of illusion and the tree of science.7  
We ate of the Tree of Illusion. After that, objects and their properties, which before 
appeared as they were, now appeared with “different colors and shapes at different times.” 
Perspectival differences in shapes or loudness of sounds, for instance, are to be sure a product of 
our eating of this tree. After this change “we could no longer accept that visual experience 
always revealed the world exactly as it is” (Chalmers 2006, 49). 
We ate of the Tree of Science. After that, direct perception was not possible anymore, for 
there was a “long causal chain,” from the microphysical structure of objects responsible for the 
physical occurrences that affect our sensory endings, through a medium (e.g. air for sound or for 
light on earth), to the anatomical and physiological structure on our part that ‘mediates’ the 																																																								
7 Carefully observed these are the two strategies belonging to the well-known argument from illusion, called the 
phenomenological argument (corresponding to Chalmers’s tree of Illusion) and the causal argument (corresponding 
to Chalmers’s tree of Science), with which H.H. Price objects to naïve realism, in his classic Perception (1950). It is 
notable as well that while sense-data theory has long been discredited, the two varieties of arguments that were there 
actually heavily argued for, are now presented in this mythical way that requires of no justification. On the argument 
from illusion see (Price 1950 ch. 2; see also Ayer 1947 esp. ch. 1). For a contemporaneous critique to that view see 
(Austin 1962). As a matter of fact, the natural opposition between the argument from illusion and naïve realism in 
which Price frames his theory mirrors very closely in the contemporary discussion, for instance, in Chalmers and in 
Siegel (Siegel 2010, 28–29). 
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nerve stimulations ‘before’ we ‘experience’ the ‘qualities’ of objects and their properties. These 
facts make the connection between our ‘experience’ and objects merely contingent, and motivate 
the reasoning according to which “there was [is] no good reason to believe that objects in the 
world had [have] these properties at all” (2006, 50) 
The upshot of the narrative is that tree-eating gives us reasons to be worried about the 
veridicality of our perceptions but still gives a sense to what it is like to perceive. Edenic pre-
tree-eating states provide notwithstanding philosophical substance to what we should rationally 
expect from the contents of perception, as well as an account of the feeling that we have when 
we perceive: they should satisfy a presentational and a veridicality desiderata. Eden is the 
standard for both desiderata. Perception of the perfection of objects and properties gives content 
to the idea that there is something like a veridical perceiving of things (of which our illusions 
are but defects)—a veridicality desideratum; and the perfect, non-causal type of acquaintance with 
objects in Eden gives content to the idea that in perception things are directly presented to us—
a presentational desideratum. Chalmers’s account will be a two-stage one: “experiences have two 
layers of content, an Edenic content that reflects their phenomenology and a Fregean content 
that determines their veridicality”  (2006, 93).  
Chalmers’s rationale connects ideality and veridicality and is specified in his case in terms 
of both the presentational and the veridicality desiderata depending on the ideal of Eden. This 
ideal presentation is as a matter of fact derived from the actual presentation of the world, but 
idealized and then turned back against the real world and the perception of it, which are then 
both labeled as lacking. Chalmers’s characterization the situation of perception is erroneous and 
his use of this myth makes it easier for us to see how and why this philosophical outlook is 
basically at odds with perception, both conceptually and in the everyday workings of perception.  
If my argument is sound is should serve as a rejection of Fregean accounts of content, first, 
but also of other specification of content, i.e. Russellian, that operates on the idea of a 
veridicality desideratum. The reason is that I not only attack the specification of content but 
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mainly its original epistemological motivation. While Chalmers’s attempt at accommodating the 
presentational character of experience is far better than Fregean-content-only accounts it is still 
dependent on a conception of perfection with an epistemological aim, in the sense of a narrow 
concern for things telling the truth. Thus, my objections are fundamentally against views that 
articulate perception as lacking in relation to an ideal perception, perfect acquaintance with 
objects or properties, or truthful knowledge of things. Most representational theories are of this 
kind and so my objections extend to them.  
 
3.3 Eating from The Tree of Science and The Presentational Desideratum 
According to Chalmers, the presentational character of a perception, namely, that objects and 
properties of objects appear as if they were presented to us “directly and immediately” must be 
accounted for in a theory of content (2006, 65). This entails that we perceive things as if they 
were in Eden: “the phenomenology of visual experience is the same in our world and in Eden” 
(2006, 98). Lastly, in this ideal place, “visual experience presents a world where perfect redness 
and perfect blueness are instantiated on the surface of objects, as they were in Eden” (2006, 66).  
The seeming clarity in Chalmers’ claim that perception in Eden was direct masks a deep 
confusion. Austin has rightfully noted that ‘directly’ is “one of the less conspicuous snakes in the 
linguistic grass” (15). According to Austin, ‘directly’ only operates in contrast with ‘indirectly,’ 
both at home in the visual perception case. In vision, indirectly would mean, for instance, seeing 
something with a periscope or a mirror. If this is the case, then the confusion is easily dispelled: 
we are directly looking at the reflection and ‘indirectly’ only signals a certain strangeness about 
the situation. Or it can be an extreme case we may not be perceiving at all as with the case of 
someone that ‘hears indirectly’ could only be the case of that person being told something 
(Austin 1962, 15–19). 
Chalmers define directness first, and he does in reference to an ideal world: as lack of 
mediation and as contact with perfect properties—which would allow for “appearance of directness,” 
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which we witness. In the analysis I am about to provide, I will argue that such a notion is 
empty, because there is nothing that can back it up—it is the typical type of rationalistic notion 
to which Berkeley’s Hylas would object. I will also show that the characterization of directness 
in Chalmers’ terms is only compatible with the metaphysics of gardens of Eden, but not with the 
structure of the material world as we know it.  
In contrast, SEP begins with the phenomenological idea that for something to be direct is 
to be experienced. Or as Husserl puts it: “Experience in the first and most pregnant sense is 
[…] defined as a direct relation to the individual” (1973, 27), where relation is not simply an 
inner occurrence. Although the burden of the proof is in the view that insists on indirectness, I 
will show that the constraints Chalmers’ imposes on “directness” do not make sense in relation 
to the sensory-based interaction between perceivers and world that we call perception. In 
keeping with the theory of appearances I have been developing, we will be able to see that actual 
perception is nothing but direct.  
The burden of the proof lies in those that deny directness, for surely in their objection, to 
borrow Austin expression, “perceiving indirectly wears the trousers” (Austin 1962, 15). So, can 
Chalmers make a plausible positive case for what he thinks is real perceptual directness? Thus, 
These are two points mixed up in Chalmers’s notion of the presentational desideratum and the 
fruit of the tree of science, namely: one point (A) is about the idea that to directly perceive objects 
and properties is incompatible with any form of mediation, and the second (B) is about a (confused) 
notion of an ideal of the perception of objects and properties, embodied in the idea that to directly 
perceive objects and properties is to perceive perfect properties, and that to actually perceive objects and 
properties is to be understood in contrast to that ideal. 
I start with the first point (A), namely, that directness is incompatible with mediation. The 
rationale is that direct perception is not possible after the fall, for there is now a “long causal 
chain” from the microphysical structure in objects responsible for the physical occurrences that 
affect our sensory endings, through a medium (e.g. air for sound or for light on earth), to the 
  112 
anatomical and physiological structure on our part that ‘mediates’ the nerve stimulations 
‘before’ we ‘experience’ the ‘qualities’ of objects and their properties, to the actual experience of 
those qualities. This is, in other words, that microphysical structure is not transparent, as it 
were, and needs a decoding or deciphering, an anatomical and physiological structure on our 
part that ‘mediates’ the nerve stimulations ‘before’ we ‘experience’ the ‘qualities’ of objects and 
their properties, and a processing that underlies out actually perceiving.  
In order to conclude from the existence of the causal chain that direct perception is not the 
case for perception, Chalmers needs to have in mind something that does count as direct, 
immediate perception, i.e. that which was the case in Eden. Roughly, it has to be something like 
this: perception is the revelation to a subject of objects and objects’ intrinsic properties. These 
objects and properties must be some non-reducible properties on the part of the object—let’s 
call it a one-dimensional-property—that coupled with a one-dimensional-property-feeler (on the 
part of the subject), ‘excitable’ in an all-or-nothing way by the presence, period (no intensities or 
thresholds allowed), of the one-dimensional property. Such ‘excitation’ itself constitutes the 
revelation-like acquaintance that Chalmers wants to refer to as direct, immediate perception in 
Eden.  
I object to the first point with two arguments: the first one (i) is about what it is to perceive 
physical, spatiotemporally characterized realities—a more exclusively metaphysical argument, 
although not exempt from epistemological implications—, and the second one (ii) is about the 
phenomenal aspect of perception—also metaphysical but with more evident epistemological 
implications.  
My first argument (i) is about the most basic structure of this particular type of active 
engagement with things in the world that we call perception. What idea of one-dimensional 
property and its relative ‘feeler’ Chalmers had in mind? This notion may be found in something 
as basic as the repulsive force of a negative and a positive electrically charged particles, one of 
them taking the hypothetical place of the property and the other of the feeler, and their 
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perceptual interaction being simply the reacting to each other unqualifiedly in virtue of nothing 
else than their nature, no process mediating, where the feeler is not only excited but where 
there’s something that it is like to feel that property. Does this model apply somehow to 
perception?  
The closer we can get to such a revelation-like acquaintance with things would be 
something defined as a case of one-dimensional signaling. Let’s consider the case of a tick, 
studied by von Uexküll and reported by Clark, “which is sensitive to butyric acid found in the 
mammalian skin. Butyric acid, when detected, induces the tick to lose its hold on a branch and to 
fall on the animal” (Clark 1998, 24). While it is fairly clear that the tick is not able to entertain a 
phenomenal experience so that we are actually witnessing mere behavioral response, let’s 
imagine for a moment that there is something for the tick that it is like to detect, to perceive, 
butyric acid. Details aside, Chalmers’s argument is that by definition not even this supposed 
one-to-one matching of acid and detection can amount to direct perception because butyric acid 
has a chemical composition (in this case micro-chemical, not microphysical, structure) and 
certainly the tick possesses a detector-reactor system, a system that biochemically processes or 
interprets the impulse at stake.  
First, I just don’t see an argument for the presence of a structure or composition in both 
objects of perception and the perceiver as a requirement on direct perception. If one understands 
the world as perceivable in virtue of being a material world made of physicochemical stuff—as I 
think we should conceive of it—, and observes that some living beings take heed of that world 
in the manner that we call perception, which is precisely their being able to take up such 
physicochemical reality, in ways that are idiosyncratic to them and indescribable outside the 
perceiving relation, then we can only say that the perceivers’ experiences are constituted by both 
object and subject sides and are the only possible way of defining what it is like to perceive 
something. And this is the case because there are conceptual reasons to suppose, for instance, 
that the stuff that we humans perceive as colors is not necessarily something that must be 
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perceived visually by every perceiver able to discriminate or react to that specific range of the 
electromagnetic spectrum. By the same token, in the case of visual perceivers I see no obstacle 
to the effect that two subjects, or communities, will experience, for instance, the same physical 
reality in different ways. Inverted spectrum scenarios pose no problem to my view, as I hold 
that perceiving a certain property is not only a matter of the physical existence of the thing but 
about the interaction between perceiver and thing, provided a constitution is present on both 
sides.  Additional considerations of intersubjective coherence and consistency in ranges of 
properties (in the case of systematic inversion) still at work in inverted communities (which I 
have no space to touch upon here), rule out plain exceptional misperceptions. And yet, only a 
full view of the way I conceive of the domain of normativity in perception as opposed to the 
narrow concern for veridicality, which shall wait until the next chapter, will allow me to offer a 
positive account of ‘misperceptions.’ These considerations should suffice for the moment to 
explain my position regarding inverted spectrum-like worries.  
And yet, for those perceivers equipped like humans in regards to this range of the 
spectrum, to perceive frequencies within that range means to see them: seeing not having other 
definition than that which is felt or perceived when we use our visual system and direct it, in the 
broader context of our perceived world, to what is usable under it, that is, to reflected light, to 
visibilia8—a domain physically described as a range of frequencies of electromagnetic radiation, 
all of which is not visible; and some of which could be, for other living perceivers, perceivable in 
manners that would be impossible for us to feel or describe.  
Chalmers may object that I have not refuted the idea that the perceptual causal chain 
forbids directness, which rests on a description of such causal chain that goes like this: emission 
of physical events that would count as stimuli precedes their transmission through a medium, 
which is prior to the arrival of such stimuli to sensory receptors, and the excitation of sensory 
receptors is temporally previous to processing in the brain and its final perceptual output (which 
																																																								
8 For a view along these basic conceptual lines see (Aristotle 2001, 100 (418a25-418a30)). 
  115 
may in itself feature a certain temporal sequence, say between centers processing the sensory 
modal-specific information and centers enabling the awareness of such information in sensory-
specific manner). My answer to this is that, first, arguing that pre-neural temporal sequence 
amounts to lack of directness is question-begging, for it is like saying that I don’t directly see 
the paper in front of me because the light takes time, however infinitesimal, from its surface to 
my retina, or that I don’t directly smell the freshly-baked bread in the bakery because smell is 
transmitted through the air. Whatever the details we find in these pictures of perceptual contact 
with the world, situations like those just described are what we in the first place call direct. This 
physical aspect of the perception of things in the world is not what is philosophically relevant as 
to the directness (or lack thereof) of perception. Mediation is not a sufficient condition for the 
denial of directness, insofar as the presence of a medium for light or sound cannot be interpreted 
in any important sense as preventing directness.  
Further, there is a more significant answer, one dealing with the neurological aspect of it. 
My answer to the possible objection that causality finds support in object temporality—that 
there is a percept that is the end-product of a chain of events preceding it--is that while there is 
an objective time dimension involved in the neurological processing that is a necessary 
condition for perception to occur, this means neither that the temporality of perceptual 
experience is that of objective time (so that the ‘final product’ is to be taken as ‘final’), nor that 
objective time sequences of neural events somehow proves that experience is an inner event, in 
this case identified with a brain event (so that we can speak of one perception finishing with a 
mental event, i.e. a mental image, conceptually isolated from the next ‘perception’ or image). To 
deny the identification between experience and brain event is not to deny that the brain event is 
a necessary condition of having a perceptual experience.  
For one, the point is definitional: that there is a set of neural events necessary for a complex 
perceiver to have perceptual experience is not identical with saying that having a perceptual 
experience is to be in one of those neurological states. As the discussion in chapter 5 about a 
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possible common factor between hallucinations and perception will make clear, perception 
cannot be defined independently of the environment, and so, brain processes are rather “a kind 
of complex adjustment that the brain has to undergo, in each context, in order that you can be 
visually related to the things around you; so that you can see them, in other words” (Campbell 
2002, 119, 131). To perceive, then, is not to be in a certain mental but to be perceptually related 
to the environment, which brain activity partly enables a perceiver to do.  
The point is not to deny that there is a causal aspect to perception. What I deny is the 
characterization of this causal aspect as a sequence that starts with objects emitting impulses 
and finishes with a mental, inner event identified with the experience of the property associated 
with the objective impulse, that is, a representation in the classical sense. The causal aspect of 
perception includes physical configuration on the part of the object as well as physical 
configuration on the part of the perceiver, but this causal aspect—not perception itself—is a 
confluence of causal-sensitive aspects rather than a matter of a linear chain ending with a mental 
event.  
A proper understanding of the causal aspect involved in perception does, in fact, contribute 
to undermining the claim that there is a conceivable ideal of perception in contrast to which 
perception involving a causal aspect is deficient, indirect, or otherwise distorting. Further, the 
causal aspect is only necessary but not sufficient, for concrete perceptual experience requires 
grounding in terms of the unity of consciousness that is necessitated by the idea of experience 
itself, which we may call perceptual consciousness, and this consciousness is not to be found in 
the causal sequence we’ve been discussing. These causal events enable perception to take place, 
but what they enable is not a representation but a direct relation with object, events, or states of 
affairs. Such relation or engagement, which we refer to as experience and that as such entails an 
underlying structure of experiential consciousness, is what perception consists in.  
This connection between experience and consciousness is supported when we look at the 
issue from the point of view of the temporality of experience, that is, to the temporal structure 
  117 
belonging to our consciousness of our experience. The main contention here, as it pertains to 
our topic, is that the temporal structure of experience is not the objective temporality of linear, 
sequential “punctual or instantaneous nows” (Thompson 2009, 318; See also Gallagher and 
Zahavi 2008). In other words, the idea of a subject able to engage with the world in perceptual 
experience requires a temporality that is not that of objective time. The issue of perceptual 
consciousness temporality would be a matter of an entire book, so I will limit myself to outline a 
couple of relevant considerations.9  
As I have argued in the previous chapter, perception does not occur in static isolation, but 
in enactive dynamic sequences of perceptual continua: to perceive an object is not to entertain 
isolated snapshots (which in itself would not either speak necessarily in favor of inner 
representations as their end-product) but a continuously perceiving oneself the same object over 
time, either as one simply observes it (which in this view is still active) or as one more actively 
interacts with it (Gallagher 2005, 173–205). This continuity is mutually implied with a 																																																								
9 Kant’s Transcendental Deduction is an obliged reference in this issue, namely, the issue of the unity of 
consciousness that makes possible our cognition of objects—the transcendental unity of apperception—, and the 
question of whether such unity can be presupposed as existing independently from the activity of the understanding 
in which it is involved, or it only becomes the unity it is when it takes in such activity, or whether its structure 
features both aspects. Husserl, and specifically his philosophy of perception, makes the relationship between 
consciousness and experience a central concern of its philosophical project. Particularly, his “Lectures on Thing and 
Space”, the Studies on Constitution (partly of the subject), the analyses on active and passive synthesis and on the 
consciousness of internal time exhibit a careful treatment of the way in which an account of the idea of a 
consciousness is correlative with, and necessary to, an account of the idea of experience and its associated notion of 
meaning. It is worth also mentioning that this type of inquiry into the very possibility of knowledge of the world is 
for Husserl tried to a critique of reason. The issue appears as well in more contemporary literature such as (Hurley 
1998, esp. Ch.2,3, and 6; Gallagher 2005, esp. Ch. 8; Gallagher and Zahavi 2008; Thompson 2007, Ch. 9 and 11). I 
agree with Hurley that working through issues of consciousness in relation to perception and action can actually 
challenge the traditional distinctions inner/outer or mind/word, perception/action, input/output that leave us 
estranged from the world, incessantly puzzled by perception. This agreement reappears here and there in my work 
and partly motivates the social enactivism of the theory of perception I am putting forward. 
While the topic of the unity of consciousness and perceptual consciousness calls for an extensive treatment, I 
would like at least to insists that a careful treatment of the problems of perception cannot afford to pay no attention 
to it, and that, contrary to this, a good deal of contemporary philosophizing on perception is wrongly comfortable in 
dealing with perception and its conceptual associates (experience, content) somehow oblivious to the deep 
philosophical significance of the problems surrounding our being perceptually conscious of a world. Without this 
sensitivity, the ingrained tendencies of thought of Modern and Contemporary philosophy that I have arguing against, 
find support in popular scientific understandings of physical properties and brains, and unquestioned assumptions 
about what is conceivable and rational to expect in mind matters, take the place of serious epistemological reflection 
about the complex relations between perceivers and world. It is high time for a synthetic awareness of the broad 
philosophical significance of our questions and of the constraints such broad views place on us. The social enactive 
view of perception I am offering in this work intends to be well anchored in such traditional discussions, albeit with 
an eye to the intersubjective dimension of our lives—a dimension that has been latent in the tradition and must now 
be explored in disciplined ways able to grant it a status in discussions where a wrong-headed psychological 
individualism cum propositional rationality prevails. It is my contention that this shift is philosophically warranted, 
and much needed for the wider purposes of philosophy as a discipline with a responsibility to humankind. 
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perceptual experiential temporality that is not explained by recourse to objective temporality. 
For perception to be continuous, and as such to account for object-continuity and for self-
consciousness continuity (as it takes place in our actual, pragmatic involvement with objects and 
events in which perception consists), the temporal structure of perception requires that initial 
impressions do not disappear immediately and are ‘active’ in the following ‘snapshot’ impression, 
or in other words, that there is a lingering impression turned into anticipation towards 
continuous perception of objects, for otherwise it would not be possible to experience objects as 
continuous, and that we do and is at the very basis of a perceiver’s capacity to relate to the 
world. This is what Husserl calls the temporal structure of inner consciousness—impression-
retention-protention— which is constitutive of our consciousness, not only of ourselves but also of 
our being conscious of objects perceptually (and otherwise psychologically).10 In other words, 
the way in which perception is original consciousness of objects and events is incompatible with 
the absence of an extended temporality, where objects just-perceived do not base the now-
perception of the same object.  
Husserl illustrates the retention-protention model with the case of the perception of a 
melody, where the initial impression ‘stays’ as the basis on which following notes are to take 
place. This puts the perception of the melody at the level of the constant interaction, and not 
just as a matter of the initial moment and its simply following sounds. The temporality of 
perception does not lie in primal impression but extends over time, into the sequence itself of 
ongoing perceptions, and that is why perception is not experienced “as having a subject-object 
structure, but instead as an immediate coupling or dynamic attunement to our environment” 
(Thompson 2009, 326).  
Chalmers has characterized Edenic perception as direct and immediate. The presence of a 
causal chain is a charge against directness, and the temporality intrinsic to the causal chain is a 
charge against immediacy. Insofar, however, as this extended temporality of perceptual 																																																								
10 This is arguably part of what is at stake when Kant refers to the syntheses of “apprehension in the intuition,” “of 
reproduction in the imagination,” (these two being from him “inseparably combined” ) and of “recognition in the 
concept” (Kant 1998, 228–231 (A100–103)).  
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consciousness involves what we can still call a causal element, for it is built upon the continuous 
existence of the world that is constantly anticipated and fed back, Chalmers’s ruling out 
directness on the basis of causality (even if it was the wrong idea of causality), which involved 
an element of temporal mediacy, entails the impossibility of perceptual consciousness itself in 
the Edenic world. But given that what it is to perceive in the first place is impossible without 
perceptual consciousness, Chalmers’s theory entails that the very idea of perception is not true, 
Edenic perception—the true state we are to understand ourselves over against. Not only is then 
actual perception deemed illusory, but it is deemed so on the basis of a state of affairs that 
cannot be recognized as perceptual. 
My second argument (ii) addresses the point of the upshot of knowing by revelation, by 
asking how we would know or be acquainted with perceptual stuff in this ideal of revelation. It 
seems that to know something by revelation is to know it in an intellectual or spiritual manner, 
where the thing revealed appears in one’s mind with no relevant causal reason. For Chalmers, 
only something like a hypothetical mode of knowledge by revelation would be able to present 
objects and properties without causal mediation and “in their intrinsic glory” (2006, 49; see also 
p.94). But it seems to me that every instance of perceptual experience of the world is unlike 
revelation: surely I can close my eyes, turn my head, open my eyes again, and a scene is 
presented there. But to the extent that I know full well that I can see the scene because I am 
directed towards it and that it would not be there if I close my eyes, etc. it seems that the sense in 
which it is presented to me is not like that of a revelation. The possibility of entertaining 
counterfactuals evinces the causal dependence of the experience. What good does revelation do 
for us when trying to understand perception then?  
Chalmers may object that his point is about property qualia: that in perceiving, say, a 
thing’s smell the thing’s smell itself is revealed to us, and not that what we call the thing’s smell is 
just our take on the thing’s smell. I must confess I am at a loss about what to do with this idea. It 
seems to me, though, that this revelation hypothesis is a sleight of hand devised to posit, at the 
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level of the phenomenal character of perception, the idea that there is a contrast between 
perceiving the thing’s smell itself and just our take on the thing’s smell, and that the correct 
description is one that fixes the referent at the thing’s smell itself. To put it in simpler words: 
hypothetical revelation carries with it an objectivist idea about the existence of perceived 
properties in the world.  
But to the extent that this strategy carries substantial entailments for the presentational 
character of experience, it is fair to demand a justification for the methodological device. So I 
ask: what would it be for a phenomenal feeling of a property to be non-causally linked to the 
property? What would it be for a perceiver to have a phenomenal experience that in its 
phenomenality is directly related to the property perceived? There is no positive notion that 
could support the complaint, and this makes the complaint and the revelation hypothesis empty 
in the sense of the classical empiricists. 
When I examine the presentational character of a thing’s smell, I talk about the thing’s 
smell, but I talk about it insofar as it is the thing I smell. There is no reason to suppose that the 
ideal construction of this presentation is to say that in perceiving a thing’s smell, there is a 
thing’s smell that I just witness—that is, that I am affected by a smell without me bringing the 
phenomenal character to it, but only encountering it. The reason why this is not the preferred 
ideal description is because one can just as well describe the situation as one in which I smell the 
smell of the thing. Notice that there is a contrast here between a way of looking at the 
interaction as a matter of a given, fully pre-defined world, which in perception I come only to 
witness, and a way of looking at the interaction as an interaction in which the subjective side 
cannot be absent. The undecidability of these ideal scenarios, on the grounds of these “ideal” 
constructions alone, points, I think, to two ways of radically conceiving the relation with the 
world, which some may describe as a difference in “intuitions.” Insofar as the relation at stake is 
a real one—that of beings perceiving things in the world—the right characterization depends 
on taking a broader view and observing perception as it takes place and not just as a concept, 
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which on conceptual-only grounds, can be treated no differently than revelation. Such further 
evidence, I will be arguing, takes us in the direction of conceiving perception as a taking up of 
physical reality, such taking up defined at the level of experience, not at the level of object 
property or sensible quality with independent existence, where causality has an essential role in 
perception and revelation is empty concept. 
Further, if revelation actually provided us with a notion useful for understanding 
perception, one would have no more reason to call an actual perception perception than one 
would have to call it distortion. As I said above, visible properties cannot be made sense outside 
of seeing. This means that the perceived property cannot be made sense of, in its phenomenal 
character, outside of the world of perceptual relations. This seems to block the road for 
Chalmers’s view to maintain that a non-relational property behind the appearances of perception 
is the true content of phenomenal presentation. Unless Chalmers is able to provide a satisfactory 
account of such perceivable property as a perceivable property, and yet arrived at by extra-perceptual 
means and conveyable in non-perceptual terms, then there is no reason to assume that we ate of a 
tree of Science—that our perceptual situation is rather a predicament, to be understood in 
contradistinction to an ideal that leaves our contact with worldly objects, events, and states of 
affairs lacking. Science speaks in quite the opposite direction than Chalmers hears it speaking. He 
may be, unbeknownst to him, hearing an echo or looking at a reflection.  
3.3.1 Directness and The Three Dependencies of Perception  
Chalmers’s myth of the knowledge acquired through the fruit of the tree of science is a way of 
saying that such conception of perception is built upon a contrast with an ideal state of affairs. 
Mysteriously that ideal state of affairs has normative force in his conception, and, for the present 
case, it consists in the conception of ideal perception as direct and unmediated, in contrast to 
actual perception as indirect and mediated. But as I have been arguing, it does not seem that 
Chalmers’s mythologizing as a device to express conceivability about directness has enough 
traction on reality. He has just assumed that the present state of affairs is indirect because it is 
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mediated, entailing that perception does not put us in true contact with the world, and so its 
deliverances are always doubtful. The idea is that no mediation can be innocent. If there is 
mediation we must be suspicious of what it has changes has the original reality undergone. If we 
go back to the tick mentioned above we’ll see that even in this very simple case of detecting a 
substance (butyric acid) and acting upon such input event (release from the branch) there is a 
processing—a biochemical one in this case. By the argument that a process amounts to non-
directness, the tick’s relation to the mammal secreting butyric acid is not direct. If this is not 
direct, then not even the tanning of our skin in the sun is direct, and I am at a loss at to what 
interaction, if any, can be direct. This trouble in finding cases of directness, understood as 
causally unmediated, points to the real, deeper problem for Chalmers’s account, namely, the 
inability to give the idea of directness-in-perception content. Without such content, to say that 
perception is indirect is an empty assertion.  
There is one more conceptual point that troubles Chalmers’s picture of direct perception. 
One might think that Chalmers’s denial of directness must have been about what he calls 
nonrelational properties, that is, properties supposed to exist independent of the perceptual 
relation; category where he places color. My objections up to this point have been about such 
supposedly nonrelational properties. But even if I granted those nonrelational properties 
existence, my objections would have massive consequence in regards to relational properties 
(comparative properties as in a sound that is too loud, or in the size of objects relative to each 
other in a regular visual scene), hence to perception in general.  
Suppose we accept Chalmers’s characterization of directness. If Edenic content is correct, 
how could we account for properties whose essence and description only make sense when 
perceived from a specific point of view of a specific being? (Would there be one Garden of Eden 
per species?) How would a touching being behave in relation to a coarse or smooth surface—
that is, on the tactile nature of this surface as it reveals itself to touch—without that behaving 
depending on the nature of the touching being, on the sensitivity of its skin? How about 
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perceiving something as big or small? What would it be (except for synesthetic subjects) to 
taste drink or food, such that this tasting would not depend on the specific interaction of the 
mouth cavity with objects? Would relational properties be of a type that never occurs in Eden, 
since they depend on the relation between perceiver and perceived as a matter of their essential 
nature and can only be indirectly perceived? And if they do not figure in Edenic content, which 
explains presentational character, does relational properties’ presentational character go 
unaccounted? If all these gamuts of ‘properties’ are not Edenic but plain worldly, their 
presentational character cannot be thought of as contrasted with some confused ideal of direct 
perception, and the content associated with them cannot be Edenic content, for no Eden ever 
was a possible home for them.11 And could a theory unable to account for relational properties 
be properly called a theory of perception? 
In this section, I will expand my argument that perception is a matter of normatively 
structured appearances, by presenting the three constitutive mediations that determine our 
concrete contact with perceivable realities. I will add that, by appealing to the constitutive ways 
in which perception is dependent upon different facts and interactions, appearances are 
explicated and more easily understood in their systematic, normative structure, and the question 
of a threat to directness does not even arise. It is not that in perceiving a color we do not 
experience a feature of physical objects relatable to a certain physical description. Rather, in 
perceiving a thing’s color we are interacting with an object placed in determinate environmental 																																																								
11 The physically and chemically defined aspects of the physical world that stimulate our sensory nerve endings are 
also causal determinants of perception, in relation to both the specific objects we perceive and to the environmental 
conditions in which we experience those objects. These material aspects determine perceptual objects in the most 
basic of senses. For example, only that which is able to reflect or interfere with light might be an object of vision, but 
also only on the condition that there is light.  Chapter 4 will offers an account of this relation between perceptual 
intentionality and the specific materiality of the object. By a similar token, the use of capacities depends on context, so 
it must be stipulated that I am assuming standard environmental conditions. Take the case of audition. The presence 
of a certain level of background noise is part of the normal ecology of audition. This is clearly revealed by anechoic 
chambers, noise-insulated spaces designed to eliminate all echo (which normally contributes to a normal soundscape). 
(See the anechoic chamber at Binghamton University, 360-degree view:  
http://www.youvisit.com/360fullscreen.php?college=79868&pano=8404&&vhost=1&pl=v&inst=59850).  In silent 
places like these, “auditory neurons in the brain stem increase the amplification of signals from the auditory nerve to 
compensate for the lack of external sound” (Cox 2014, 209). In very quiet places, a person would start to hear bodily 
noises such as the sound of circulating blood. Reportedly, it was after a visit to one of this chambers and the 
experience of sounds of his own body in that context, that John Cage composed his 4’33”, which, among other things, 
is ineluctably accompanied by some noise (Cox 2014, 212–213). By a similar token, continued patterns of low levels of 
sensory stimulation affect the stability and consistency of otherwise normally perceived objects, as Guenther shows in 
the case of solitary confinement prisoners (2011, 258–259).  
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conditions, such as surroundings colors and ambient illumination, and in a certain position 
relative to a subject that is configured thus and so, and is moving in determinate ways, 
directions, and speeds, and performing specific movements guided by pragmatic goals (Varela, 
Thompson, and Rosch 1991, 161–162; Noë 2004, 125–132; O’Regan and Noë 2001, 952). This 
example is still somewhat inappropriate because, as I have been arguing, there are properties 
that we perceive that are not relatable to physical properties of objects. These mediations are 
what I will refer to as the dependencies of perception: idiosyncratic, non-socially pragmatic, and 
socially pragmatic. The specific objects we perceive, the specific ways in which we perceive 
them, the sensory properties we perceive in them (including the length and intensity of our 
perception of them, where applicable), and the possibilities of sequences, combinations with 
other sensory properties—these aspects, among others, are constituted by these dependencies. 
Counterfactually put, to say that these dependencies are constitutive of our perceptual 
experiences means that such experiences’ phenomenal character, objects, contents, perceived 
properties, concrete appearances and the structure of those appearances would not be what they 
specifically are, weren’t we perceptually related to reality in the form specified by the 
dependencies. While I have been talking at times about mediations, I will now exclusively refer 
to them as dependencies in order to keep with the Enactive literature and to underscore that 
these dependencies are constitutive of perception, i.e. that perception constitutively depends on 
these mediations.12  
a. Idiosyncratic Dependencies  
By idiosyncratic dependencies I refer to the person’s concrete configuration, at the moment of the 
perceptual interaction, of biologically based capabilities and dispositions and psychological 
characteristics such as deep-seated attentional habits or habitual associations about things 
																																																								
12 Notice also that referring to these dependencies as mediations carries a sense of intervention, and that contrasts 
with things unmediated as to something without any intervention. It is a short distance between unmediated and pure 
or original. Perception being mediated sounds negative (as representationalism has always had it) and not positive (as 
Social Enactivism, realisms, relationalisms have it). In contrast, dependence is the opposite of independence. In the 
framework of SEP, independence is not desirable, for there is no way to account for interactions to be independent.  
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perceptual, that are constitutive of our perceptual experiences.13 These biologically based 
capacities and dispositions such as the basic structure of our bodies, the structure of our sensory 
apparatuses and their range of sensitivity develop and otherwise change in different ways, in 
varying degrees, and through different influences. It is possible that someone’s olfactory 
sensitiveness becomes overly sensitive to certain stimuli, due to psychological associations, but 
it is not likely that the range of the visual spectrum expands, for reasons due to the cellular 
structure of rods and cones. Other facts of embodiment are, for instance, the temporality with 
which our nervous system is able to process continuous stimulation in different sensory 
modalities, the thresholds for sensory overstimulation or sensory fatigue, personal sensitivities 
or insensitivities to sensory stimulations, etc. Part of what distinguishes the everyday 
experience of a florist’s smelling a flower from the random experience of a non-florist’s smelling 
a flower, I categorize as an idiosyncratic dependency. The reason for this is that there are 
habituations and relatively stable levels of sensory tolerance and fatigue that can be counted as 
part of the workings of the olfactory apparatus. Idiosyncratic dependencies are constitutive of what 
we perceive and the way we perceive it, not only in relation to specific perceived objects but also 
in the possibilities of contextual relations with the same object over time and with others 
objects.  
Idiosyncratic dependencies are at work both in perceivers with average capacities 
relative to the group to which they belong—those with, say, “good” hearing—, as well as in 
perceivers with capacities lower or higher than average, by reasons natural or even artificial.14  
The clarification of “good” hearing conditions is conceptually arbitrary, although statistically 
significant, and it is only meant as a way of making clear that the average person in the average 																																																								
13 Embodied accounts of cognition (Husserl 1989; Merleau-Ponty 2002; Gallagher 2005; Gallagher and Zahavi 2008) 
or some enactivist accounts examine in detail the dependence of perceptual experience on “the structure of our 
biological embodiment” in detail (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991, 147–150). I initially categorize body schema 
and body image (Gallagher 2005) under idiosyncratic dependencies, but leave open the details of this categorization 
as well as the possibility of both schema and image to partake in non-socially pragmatic or socially pragmatic 
dependencies.  
14 It remains undetermined to what extent prosthetic-like devices are still within the parameters or normal 
perception. It seems that a pair of glasses does not change the nature of perception, and it would seem to follow that 
neither would a microscope nor a telescope that rely on visual stimulation that the subjects report seeing. 
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situation also experiences things auditorially (or otherwise perceptually) in a way that is 
mediated by personal physiological configuration and standard environmental conditions. But 
for perceptual experience, the average way of perceiving the world has no intrinsic normative 
value. Every type of perceptual experience has the same existential value, and each set of 
idiosyncratic dependencies is constitutive of experience. In commenting on how El Greco’s 
astigmatism was part of a lived world expressed in painting, Merleau-Ponty notes: “When 
irremediable bodily particularities are integrated into the whole of our experience, they stop 
having the dignity of a cause” (1942, 219; the translation is mine). This integration of perception 
with experience is integration with our “way of thinking and being” such that it expresses a 
necessary aspect of our nature, and not “a particularity imposed from the outside” (Merleau-
Ponty 1942, 219). This is why the way our physical and psychological idiosyncrasies relate to 
our perception is in the form of a dependency of experience and not of a cause for sensory stimulation. 
Since experience is fundamentally lived-experience, the significance of the perceptual is at the 
personal, existential level, and should not be understood as a mere conditioning—a path that 
was already precluded, though, since perception is not sensory input.  
When these idiosyncratic dependencies are culturally influenced, what tells these 
dependencies apart from the socially pragmatic ones is that these can be referred to the person’s 
regular workings of their sensory apparatuses. Further, I do not assume that specific aspects of 
perceptual experience can only be tied to one dependency. It is often the case, that experience 
features influences from all three dependencies and that it may be impossible to tell the 
contributing factors apart from one another.  
In relation to the issue of directness, it is clear that the same object does not necessarily 
appear the same to different perceivers, but this type of differences does not entail indirectness. 
It would be wrong to say that a cave wall is indirectly perceived by a human and by a bat simply 
because each perceiver is acquainted with it in a different way.  
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b. Non-Socially Pragmatic Dependencies  
By non-socially pragmatic dependencies I refer to patterned links between actions and sensory 
stimulation, whose mastery is constitutive of our perceptual experiences. These dependencies 
include part of the traditional Enactive idea of sensorimotor dependencies, which is the idea that 
we perceive they way we do because of the significance of our movements for sensory 
stimulation (O’Regan and Noë 2001; Noë 2004). Of all sensorimotor dependencies, I put on the 
non-socially pragmatic side, those dependencies that are cast essentially on spatial properties, 
because only in relation to space it makes sense to talk of motor variations. These are non-
socially pragmatic, I contend, because the properties they are related to are perspectival 
properties—P-properties—that could be objectively defined, in the following spirit: “P-
properties--the apparent shape and size of objects—are perfectly ‘real’ or ‘objective.’ Indeed, the 
relation of P-shape and P-size to shape and size can be given by precise mathematical laws (e.g., 
the laws of linear perspective). Importantly, in order to characterize P-properties, there is no 
need to refer to sensations or feelings. P-properties are objective in the sense that they are 
determinate and that they do not depend on sensations or feelings” (Noë 2004, 83).  
If we extend this relative objectivity argument to other actions, not just motor related, in 
the sense that it is the change in location that determines the change in sensory stimulation, we 
find that there are other sensory relations that hold a similar structure. It is the case, for 
example, of the fact that the temperature of one’s hands influences the experience of temperature 
of a thing touched. Relations of taste (eating a very sweet solid followed by a sweet beverage) 
are of a similar kind: they hold a certain objectivity not in virtue of social habituation, but in 
virtue of actions or manipulations on them or in relation to them, according to the modality. A 
non-socially pragmatic dependency (that happens to be sensorimotor in kind) is at play in the 
case of like looking at a pond.15 One can see through the pond when standing close to it but as 																																																								
15 The sensory and the motor are here not only a matter of causal input and output at the subpersonal level but also 
feature in dynamic feedback relationships at the personal level (Hurley 1998; see chapters 7 and 8). Even then, it is 
important to notice that the perceptual is not identified with the causal sensory. Pragmatic dependencies (both 
socially and non-socially constituted) are built upon structural aspects of the embodiment of perceivers, so partly 
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one walks away from it, the surface may start reflecting the scene opposite to one, i.e. as one 
reduces the angle of one’s line of vision relative to the surface of the water, allowing oneself to 
‘encounter’ light reflected on the surface.16  
It is important in SEP’s account to see that the split is not between sensorimotor and 
other dependencies, but between non-socially pragmatic and socially pragmatic dependencies. It 
is irrelevant for my thesis whether Noë’s Enactivism is strongly committed to the thesis that (i) 
all P-properties are objective and definable regardless of sensations or feelings, as he claims P-
shape or P-size are, or whether his Enactivism claims that (ii) not all P-properties are real and 
objective in the way P-shape and P-size are. It is clear that (i) would make his Enactivism 
weaker, for reasons I explained in length at the end of chapter 2 and will expand on in chapter 4 
(section 4.1.1). On this point, it is still the case that SEP offers a more comprehensive theory 
than Sensorimotor Enactivisms since SEP identifies both non-socially pragmatic dependencies 
that go unaccounted for in the Sensorimotor view, and socially pragmatic dependencies that 
exceed what the Sensorimotor view accounts for. I have exemplified the first kind with the 
dependency between some interactions between skin (or mouth) temperature and objects of 
touch. Some socially-constituted attentional variations are of the second kind because they are 
not sensorimotor. By the same token, sensorimotor dependencies do not cover either lawful 
variations in smells and tastes, such as those a person brings about by customarily adding salt 
to food. There is nothing sensorimotor in the common phenomenon that a certain dish tastes 
better or that flavors are more noticeable if I add salt to it.  
																																																																																																																																																																					
upon the facts figuring in idiosyncratic dependencies. In fact, autopoietic enactivists such as Varela, Thompson and 
Rosch (1991), and Thompson (2007) straddle the embodiments aspects of idiosyncratic dependencies with 
sensorimotor dependencies. But these dependencies are also built upon a history of perceptual interactions (Hutto and 
Myin 2013, 17). It is not only that we become skillful in certain pre-existing sensorimotor potentialities of human 
bodies and environment, but that we come to have the specific sensorimotor skills based on our own history of 
interacting, in sensorimotor terms, with the environment.  
16 Similar analyses could be extended to the cases of reflection and refraction (including double vision illusions) that 
both Price and Ayer consider so telling as to the non-direct character of perception (Price 1950, 28–29; Ayer 1947, 3–
4). 
  129 
c. Socially Pragmatic Dependencies 
By socially pragmatic dependencies I refer to the social practices and aspects of them that are 
constitutive of our perceptual experiences, which I have called perceptual practices. As 
accounted in chapter 1, perceptual practices are the finely attuned, contextual and normative 
system of commerce of—production of and response to—meaningful perceptible material. These 
are dependencies of perception because our perceptual experience of specific objects and the 
properties we get acquainted with, etc. depends on socially constituted ways of taking in or 
manipulating perceptible materials. For example, heating up or cooling down foods or 
beverages according to uses (which de facto include preferences, tendencies, and dislikes) makes 
the specific object of our interaction depend on something we do. As in the case of some foods 
we heat up in order to eat, these interactions may even affect the perceptual object itself, its 
specific perceptual properties (shape, texture, consistency, flavor, smell, among others) may 
change along with temperature changes.  
Some socially pragmatic dependencies consist also in very basic ways of ‘using’ the 
sensory apparatus. For example, sniffing strongly or softly may be very specific ways in which 
some people simply smell something, or in the way they enjoy a pleasant smell. We can also see 
socially pragmatic dependencies in the absence of the distinction between blue and green in 
some languages, such as Tarahumara (under a framework that links this absence of a difference 
with actual discriminative and otherwise perceptual practices) (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 
1991, 171). Some socially pragmatic dependencies are sensorimotor.  
Consider the following case: In looking for a dark grey sweater, which suits the 
occasion, I may turn on the light, knowing that with poor lighting dark grey and navy blue may 
look the same to me. In doing so, the interplay of light and color kicks in, as well as the spatial 
disposition of visual non-transparent objects and my ability to sort those colors out. All aspects 
are relevant here, and yet, in a governing sense, the intention to find a certain colored-piece 
guides the process. All dependencies are in place. Chapter 4 will provide the opportunity for 
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further examination of the interplay of the three dependencies within the structure of content 
(cf. section 4.1 and the Ambulance Siren case). It sufficed for the purposes of this chapter to have 
explained the way in which these dependencies or mediations are understood not as a cleavage 
between appearances and reality, but actually as the very way in which physical realities present 
themselves and are perceived, in a way that cannot be called but direct. 
3.3.2 Are There Perfect Sensory Properties? 
The second point (B) in Chalmers’s conception of the presentational aspect of perceptual content 
is the perspectiveless ideal of perception, such that to directly perceive objects and properties is 
to perceive perfect properties, which are part of the Edenic content.  
In Chalmers’s view, perceptual experiences have the phenomenology they do by virtue of 
having Edenic content, that is, by virtue of having experiences that seem to present us with 
perfect properties. “If we were to take our experience completely at face value” (2006, 70) it would 
not seem that we were presented with perfect properties but we would actually be presented 
with them. Presentationally, however, the distinction between being presented with and seeming to 
be presented with perfect properties is self-effaced: ‘the phenomenology,’ Chalmers would say, 
presents as with properties as if they were perfect properties, so the content that accounts for 
‘the phenomenology’ is constructed in terms of the ideal garden of Eden where such properties 
were real and we were really presented with them, directly, immediately, and unmediatedly, that 
is, where such properties were revealed to us.17   
Let us get some clarity here. Chalmers says “Eden sets the standard, and our imperfect 
world can only match it” (Chalmers 2006, 111). On his two-stage view of content, while Eden 
plays the strongest role, Fregean content only represents perfect properties imperfectly—it 
matches them, that is, it picks up imperfectly instantiated properties and objects that normally 																																																								
17 It is not altogether clear that debates in philosophy of perception have decidedly moved forward. Certain 
discussions seem just to have been repackaged and some distinctions rehashed according to the fancy of the moment. 
Here it is as if Rorty, in commenting on Ayer’s formulation of the argument from illusion (of which Chalmers’s tree of 
Science is a piece), were actually commenting on Chalmers’s strategy as the “sketching an Ideal Language whose 
undefined descriptive predicates would refer to directly apprehended characteristics of postulated entities called 
‘sense-data’” (1992, 13). This impression brings a positive point, though, a certain unspoken reliance of Chalmers on a 
sense-data background, which the substantial proximity of Chalmers’s and Price’s accounts seems to support.  
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cause the experience that perfect properties and objects would cause in Eden. Our standards are 
not those belonging to a perfect world, for “after the fall, we have learned to live with the 
imperfection of perception” (2006, 95). And yet, our standards derive from the perfect 
phenomenal veridicality of Eden and this is why the presentational content of our perception is 
Edenic: it resembles imperfectly yet closely the perfection of Eden, which we can’t help to feel. 
However ad hoc its role is, Chalmers is committed to perfect properties, even if all we have is as-
if perfect properties. I shall then take Chalmers at face value and argue against the idea that 
there is such a thing as Edenic content in perceptual experience and that this content fulfills the 
presentational desideratum.  
So here is a point where Edenic content puts itself to the test of coherence and shows itself 
to be self-contradictory and self-defeating: there are perceptual experiences in which we are 
presented with non-perfect properties. All cases of finely grained perceived properties belong to 
this category (unless Chalmers were to take the even more implausible view that every finely 
grained property is itself a perfect property). These cases include the lack of definition of the 
property perceived when an object is clearly perceived as not having a definite, sharply defined 
property (like a mix of songs, voices, sounds, and conversations at a loud bazaar, or a complex, 
new flavor for which we have no name yet), in both the situations in which properties presented 
could be sharply acquired or in which they are not ameliorable; cases of transitions between 
more defined states (like the sequence of perceived colors as it gets darker), and cases of 
nonconceptual perceptual content that are not included in the previous categories, such as 
perceptions of things as harmonious. As a matter of fact I hold that no perceptual experiences 
present us with perfect properties, for they are all always, as Husserl has defended, 
fundamentally indeterminate (both as the nature of the properties we perceive and as the 
continuous, always-changing nature of its objects). My specific argument here, though, only 
needs that some perceptual experiences have no Edenic content. (These problems will soon 
reappear under the veridicality desideratum, and with a reason: if Fregean content derives from 
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Edenic content, it only makes sense that the problems of indetermination that we find at the 
sensory properties level will mutate correspondingly into the representational level.) 
The question is: Is Chalmers’s account of the presentational desideratum through Edenic 
content able to handle cases like those described above, featuring indeterminate, finely grained, 
and transitional perceptions? Naturally, an answer to this question entails an answer to a more 
fundamental question, namely, whether Edenic content captures appropriately the 
presentational desideratum. I will argue that the answer to both questions is no; we can safely 
derive a negative answer to the latter question on the basis of a negative answer to the former 
question. I want to examine the following specific case: How would Chalmers analyze finely 
grained or transitional perceptual experiences, such changes in the property itself, for example, in 
a surface due to illumination changes, or in shape due to our location in relation to the object? 
Imagine you are looking at a tree at dusk, when it’s getting darker. Suppose sunset is at 
6:17 p.m., and it gets darker from 5:53 p.m. to 6:41 p.m. Add a heavily clouded day, new moon. 
A correct description of color behavior when darkening would be to say something like this. 
Color X is visible at 100% of its ‘intensity’ at 5:52 p.m., at 75% at 6:05 p.m., at 50% at 6:17 p.m., 
at 25% at 6:29 p.m., and at 1% at 6:40 p.m. (X1, X2, X3, X4, and X5). At 6:40 p.m., I contend, color 
X5  (say the brown of a tree trunk) would not appear to be the same color it was at 5:52 p.m., and 
would seem to be the same as other colors, X4 and X6 (imagine a brown chocolate and a brown 
mocha as ‘contiguous’ or close shades of brown). Both phenomena—at some point color X5 does 
not look the same (color constancy breaks down), and color X5 is mistaken for X4 or X6—
suggests that there cannot be an instantiation of perfect colors at 6:40 p.m. In other words: to 
say that the presentational aspect of the content of a perception of color X at 6:40 p.m. is 
explainable as a perfect instantiation of it, the same that is instantiated, for example, at 6:05 
p.m., seem not to speak of the what-it-is-like to have that color. Chalmers would agree that for 
content capturing the way things look, to be unable to capture this difference is not plausible 
(See 2006, 84–89 when talking about a shadowed white surface and a gray unshadowed surface).   
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Chalmers has suggested treating cases like this either as a conjunction of perfect properties 
or as another sort of intrinsic property. While the case of a shadowed surface allows for the talk 
of color+shadow, it is not clear what conjunction works for the ‘getting darker’ moment: how 
would we factor the darkening aspect? As to the other type of intrinsic property, Chalmers talks 
of a specific “mode” of brown that is instantiated when ambient light is such and such. The 
problem with this last proposal is that it posits yet another perfect color property. It would start 
resembling mere speculation to posit a perfect color for every shade that there is or there could 
be. Extended to other sensory modalities, my point here is that it is not only implausible but 
empty to try to capture presentational content as a matter of ideal perfect properties that are 
just as finely grained as actual properties we perceive in the world. The appeal here is not only 
to simplicity, but to the fact that the finely grained character of perceived properties derives 
from the actual dynamic interactions of worldly, environmentally-situated objects, events and 
states of affairs, with perceivers who are not just revealed the physical aspect of objects, but who 
perceive them on the basis, partly, of their physical structure.    
Let us insist for a moment in the case of color. Standard talk of color is sometimes too 
fruity, too cartoonish—some apples are red, some apples are green, limes are green, and lemons 
are yellow. Philosophers have rightly wondered about things such as the sky’s color. How about 
the color of a water pond? One wonders, naturally, whether a water pond (or its surface) has a 
color in Chalmers’s sense (although it, of course, does for all intersubjective perceptual intents), 
that is, as a sensory quality that could perfectly be instantiated in Eden without being 
experienced. The case is interesting because it paradigmatically shows how its color is very 
much dependent on surrounding conditions (in this case, illumination and surrounding scene) 
and on its position relative to the observer.18 The perceived color of a water pond depends on 
the water itself, what is underwater, what is around the water, specific illumination (whether 
cloudy or sunny), and one’s own position relative to the water (subtending angles, etc.), that is, 																																																								
18 For a more detailed exploration of the metaphysics of colors in classic studies in the enactive literature see (Varela, 
Thompson, and Rosch 1991, 157–171; O’Regan and Noë 2001, 951–952; Noë 2004, 123–161). 
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to different ‘sections’ of water in the water pond: so that some sections reflect the surroundings, 
some sections allow for seeing through, and some sections seem simply look to be of a certain 
color, on which one could get a relative, satisfying-enough, interpersonal agreement with other 
viewers. The difficulty for Edenic content to account for the color of a water pond depends on 
the impossibility to single out one color that would belong to the pond, for in virtue of the 
nature of the object at stake, any color would depend on a series of relations of which the 
position of the observer is one, which entails that the color could not be perfectly instantiated, in 
Chalmers’s sense.  
Back to the case of getting darker, Chalmers is unable to provide an analysis of colors as it 
gets darker. “Objects do not seem to change their colors, exactly, although the representation of 
their colors may become much less specific, and it eventually becomes absent altogether (as does 
the representation of objects, in pitch blackness)” (2006, 89). This is self-contradictory, for this 
talk of “becoming less specific” is incompatible with perfect colors. They could become less 
specific as to their imperfect veridical content—Fregean content, answering to the veridicality 
desideratum—but not as to their perfect veridical content: the one that Edenic content is 
supposed to capture. To say that in Eden things are presented in their perfection means to say 
that presentation is an all-or-nothing affair. This is why the closest Chalmers gets to the issue 
of darkness is with substitution: “in Eden, when things become dark, perfect darkness is present 
throughout the relevant volume: of space, intrinsically altering that volume, although it need 
not alter objects' colors. In Eden, when darkness falls, perfect darkness pervades” (2006, 89). But 
perceptual transitions are not substitutions. In Chalmers’s Eden, there is darkness, but it doesn’t 
get dark.  
It should be clear by now that Eden is a non-starter. Either in Eden it doesn’t get darker, 
moment by moment, although it is dark at times (at some point lights are just turned off), or 
colors do not have the same lawful behavior they do on earth. The former option has no room 
for perceptual transitions that abound in the perceptual world, perhaps more than perceptual 
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fixities do, and which are essential to perception; the latter option takes colors for what they are 
not, making it impossible, once again, to account for perceptual transitions.  
The consequence for Chalmers’s account is fatal: Edenic content is a poor account of the 
presentational content of perceptual experience. Would not there be something wrong if colored 
objects did not look differently (and yet the same) as it gets darker—particularly when it’s about 
to get pitch-dark? Or if colored objects didn’t look differently depending on illumination 
conditions? To make the point more basic: Consider an object whose size and shape does not 
perceptually change while we move away from it, or about a sound that does not fade away as 
we move away from it. What is wrong with these cases is that the continuous variations of 
perceptual continua and the consistency of such variations are essential to what it means to 
perceive objects, events, and states of affairs. If the perceptual world were like Eden, I contend, 
we would not know how to act upon perceived objects that do not behave as worldly objects do. 
Even more basically: in Eden we would not have the feeling of perceiving things, as things would 
not change as we relate perceptually to them, and such changes are at the very heart of 
perception. The perceptual Garden of Eden is just a wayward, wrong, fruitless view. 
While talk of perfect properties offers Chalmers a way to theoretically accommodate 
changes in the objects, the subject, or the medium that make for a change in what is perceived, 
this happens only under quite artificial and implausible circumstances. Not only is the 
adaptation to the specific case problematic, but there is an arbitrary reference to a supposed ideal 
presentation of such property. However, insofar as perceived properties are essentially 
perspectival, it is simply nonsense to say that there is such a thing as a perfect instance of the 
property such that it is revealed in “all its glory” and that is independent of the experience of it.  
A perfect presentation is an oxymoron, for perfect means perspectiveless and presentation is 
essentially experiential and essentially perspectival. 
For Chalmers, the ideal perfect perceivable property is one that exists independently of 
perceivers experiencing it. In contrast, I have argued that the very idea of a perceived property 
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is such that its existence, as perceived, is indescribable and not-thoroughly-conceivable outside 
of the perceiving relation. Just to make clear my position vis-à-vis the traditionally called 
primary properties, my claim is that while things have a shape independent of the perceiver, the 
perceived shape as perceived is not independent of the perceiver. That which is perceived, in the 
case of shape, is not the shape as objectively defined by, say, a measurement, but the way such 
shape looks from different points of view. To look at a square tower from afar and see it round is 
to say that I am seeing a square tower from afar and it looks round because square objects like 
towers look round when looked from afar.  
Chalmers would object that there is no reason to think that properties are essentially 
perspectival. As a matter of fact, the idea of perfect property he has in mind is a property that in 
its perfect instantiation is independent of an experience of it: “we have no trouble conceiving of 
an object being perfectly colored even though no one ever experiences its color” (Chalmers 
2006, 114). The view I have been proposing is able to accommodate part of this state of affairs: 
the idea of a colored object that no one sees. I am not saying that objects are only colored when 
I look at them, but that to speak of their colors depends on our being able to look at them—at 
least in the sense that we experientially know the domain of visibilia. What I am unable to 
accommodate is the talk of the object being “perfectly colored.”  
The notion of an ideal perfect perceivable property, let us recall, is one that exists 
independently of perceivers experiencing it. When discussing in some more detail the possibility 
of perceiving perfect colors, ‘representing’ perfect colors, as he’d have it, Chalmers resorts to 
cases in which we actually represent uninstantiated properties (like perfect redness, or perfect 
bitterness) in order to dispel our worries. He says that we can represent “the property of being 
phlogistonated” or of “being a round square” (Chalmers 2006, 83). These examples are of no 
avail at all in a discussion about the possibility of ‘representing’ or perceiving things with the 
presentational character of perception. These cases are not real, they may be impossible, and it is 
doubtful they are truly conceivable.  
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Chalmers says that he has no good theory of “how our mental states represent any 
properties at all” (2006, 84). And yet, he concedes that the way we represent “requires a theory 
of the roots of intentionality,” an understanding of which “will be closely tied to understanding 
the metaphysics of phenomenology” (2006, 84). He further says: “I am inclined to think that 
Edenic content may also give us an entry point for understanding the metaphysics of 
experience. […]  It may be that perceptual experience is fundamentally equivalent to the 
presentation of an Edenic world. If so, then if we can understand how the presentation of an 
Edenic world is possible, then we will understand perceptual phenomenology” (Chalmers 2006, 
117). So here we have that we go from understanding the Edenic content to “the 
phenomenology.” But if the Edenic world were about properties that may go uninstantiated, 
such as “being phlogistonated,” our prospects for understanding perceptual experience and the 
phenomenal character of perception would be dim if they depended on Chalmers’s theory.  
And now things go in the reverse direction: from understanding “the phenomenology” to 
Edenic content (75), for in a somewhat similar confused line of though he says: “A world with 
respect to which our visual experience is perfectly veridical is an Edenic world. […] It is 
natural to ask: what is the character of an Edenic world? A full answer to this question depends 
on a full analysis of the phenomenology of visual experience, which cannot be given here” (2006, 
75). Here we are told that understanding a non-existent world depends on an analysis of the 
way things appear, but even Chalmers’s ‘phenomenology,’ we have seen, is quite distorted, for it 
relies on a view of presentation that doesn’t allow for transitions and finely grained perceptions: 
“Edenic content […]  directly reflects the experience's phenomenology” (2006, 73). It does not 
seem that we can rely on a ‘phenomenology’ about the way things actually appear and yet 
structured in terms of perfect properties revealed in perfection. So what is the direction of 
inquiry and of explanation? What is original, basic level of analysis? 
And yet, Chalmers comes a bit closer to the idea of a perceptual property, when he 
considers the case of pain. Pain cannot be perfectly instantiated because it cannot occur without 
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a subject experiencing it, and the notion of a perfect property is a radical mind-independent 
existence. Yet he holds that pain exists as a property, even if cannot be instantiated in Eden, like 
a round square, because “one has a grip on the property of perfect pain, based on one’s 
experience” (2006, 114). My conception of a perceived property seems to be akin to what 
Chalmers imagines pain to be. As with Chalmers’s pain, I hold that there cannot be a perfect 
instantiation of a perceived property, if perfection entials the exclusion of experience. Whatever 
notion we have of a like-perfect property, which I think we can talk meaningfully about, is 
derived from one’s own experience.  
Chalmers says his two-stage view of content is supposed to be strong in the account of 
phenomenal character through Edenic content, and in the idea that even the Fregean, 
representational content is grounded also in “the phenomenology of experience” (2006, 73). If I 
am right in pointing to the fundamental confusion in the notion of a perfect property, seemingly 
the basis of the ‘phenomenology’, then Chalmers’s Edenic content is, in fact, wrong and his 
Fregean content does not have the good grounding it supposedly does. Chalmers’s attempt to 
find phenomenological adequacy in a hypothetical world shows two things: that he is mistaken 
about what it is for spatiotemporal objects to be perceived by beings capable of perception and 
that he is hence not accounting for this-worldly perception, but for other-worldly perception. 
Chalmers retains the feeling of presentation and explains perceptual changes as deficiencies in 
relation to an ideal. It is mistaken to say that such hypothetical world can stand for what is 
phenomenologically adequate, for precisely such deficiencies are the positive sources of the 
actual characteristic ways of perception. In this connection one sees that an intellectualistic 
conception of real objects, that is, of real objects modeled after an ideal world, tokened in perfect 
properties that can never be instantiated, and which are thought to be analogous to being 
phlogistonated or being a round square, are evidence of a profound disorientation in standard 
philosophy of perception. 
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To actually perceive objects, events, and states of affairs directly and immediately means to 
be engaged in coherent, systematic yet always-varying spatial, temporal, and pragmatic 
interactions with objects, states of affairs, and properties, according to the materiality of objects 
and the triple dependency of perception. The theory I have been accounting for does exactly 
this. It goes to the roots of intentionality in general, and to the roots of perception as a specific 
type of intentionality in particular. In the face of the foregoing objections and having in sight a 
positive rich theory of appearances which offers a much thicker and richer phenomenology of 
perceptual experience, backed up by and built upon the metaphysics of perceptual experience, 
Chalmers account of the presentational aspect of perception should be rejected, along with the 
associated structure of content it proposes.  
Sensory Properties in SEP. I would like to finish this section by stating my take on 
sensory properties, making emphasis on the interactionalist aspect of SEP. The position I have 
been articulating is that the properties we perceive are appearances or aspects of things, such 
that there is no distance—yet a perspective—between perceived thing and perceivable thing, 
because for objects, events, and states of affairs there is no other way to appear perceptually 
than to present themselves in appearances to perceivers. There is, however, a one-many 
correlation, structured along the lines of the three dependencies explained above.  
The interactionalism of SEP is also predicated of phenomenal character. Even though I 
hold that perceptual experience of perceived properties is indeed partly characterized by 
phenomenal character, this character is not a mental event but a characteristic of the interaction, 
in which an aspect of the world is presented in such-and-such ways to a perceiver. This 
presentation in the form of an appearance is not just a feeling, a ‘seeming.’ I here echo 
Wittgenstein’s idea that the feeling in perception is not an inner experience or a private event 
but rather a bodily engagement with the world, in which the we respond bodily “both physically 
and verbally to […] perceptions” (Krebs 2010, 131). The phenomenal character of a perception 
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is woven into lived-experience in a responsive manner, and not merely in a receptive way, as if it 
were “the last stop” on the input side of things, as Hurley would have put it (1998, 249).  
I have argued that sensory and perceived properties are not intrinsic properties of objects, 
which is what it is supposed under the idea that an object has a certain color and to perceive that 
color means to perceive exactly the way such color is ideally thought to exist in the object itself. 
On that view, perceived properties are merely contingent, supervenient aspects of real 
properties existing in objects. This position can take the shape that perceived properties are 
qualia alone. But this is to be rejected on the basis of the metaphysics of experience I endorsed, 
for it entails an untenable projectivism in that the felt quality of the world becomes dissociated 
from it.  
So as to the intrinsic properties view I grant that it makes sense to talk of nonrelational 
perceivable properties, that is, that it, of course, makes sense to say that there is such a thing as 
a color in the things out there, and a certain texture. But the property that we could 
linguistically fix as the color or the texture of an object, for communicative purposes, is not to be 
expected to figure in our perceptions of it, strictly speaking. The color and the texture that we 
perceive is always interactional: it is always a look or an appearance of the one reality that is out 
there, but which cannot be described in its perceptual, sensible lingo outside of the perceptual 
interaction with it.19 The linguistically fixed property does not really pick a finely grained 
phenomenal appearance, that is, as it is lived in experience.  
Shoemaker’s (2006) position on sensory properties allows me to underscore a key aspect of 
SEP. For Shoemaker, perceived properties are not sensible qualities (physical properties of 
objects). Perceived properties are qualitative characters of qualities, but are themselves no 
properties of external objects or objects’ properties. Neither are they the ways of presentation of 
objects and those objects’ properties, that is, they are not only different in the how of the 
presentation but in the what of it (2006, 472). Qualitative characters, in Shoemaker’s 																																																								
19 Even Ayer’s argument for the definition of the “real qualities of a material thing” is unable to escape this intra-
perceptual dependence, as he tries to fix perceptual reality in terms of “privileged appearances” (1947, 31). I will 
explore this in some more detail in the next section.  
  141 
terminology, are aspects of external properties; as such, they are ways subjects represent objects as 
having. To perceive a certain qualitative character an object to have is to have an experience 
whose phenomenal character is based on the representation a subject has of the object.  
The fundamental disagreement in our positions is that Shoemaker is a representationalist, 
unlike SEP, which is best characterized as interactionalist. Interactionalism can countenance key 
tenets of the relationalism proposed by Campbell but it goes further. Let me illustrate it in the 
following way.  
It is unclear whether Shoemaker gets the relationalist wrong when he takes her to be 
saying that on the relationalist view of experience that holds objects themselves to be 
constitutive of experience, “the experience inherits the qualitative character by including an 
instantiation of the color that has it” and that each color has only one qualitative character 
(2006, 472–473). It woud follow from here that for the relationalist there is no way to account 
for differences in perceptual experience of the same object, and such differences are—not only 
under inverted spectrum scenarios—central to the way perceptual objects present themselves to 
subjects. Shoemaker reasons that the idea of phenomenal character being inherited from the 
object that is constitutive of the experience commits the relationalist to there being only one 
“qualitative character.” The problem here seems to be with Shoemaker pressing too hard (and 
mistakenly) on the idea of inheritance: one speaks of inheritance when a thing is transferred to 
another, so there is a strong notion of continuity in the thing inherited.  
To counter this view we would need a notion of perceptual relation that has objects as 
constitutive of experiences, and where the nature of the relation itself is other than the passing 
down of an object. Some relations, however, stand in a one-one structure between subject and 
object. This is the case, for instance, of the relation between a viewer and a mirror, such that 
given the angle at which the viewer’s eyes are in relation to the mirror, there is only one set of 
objects reflected in the mirror that is accessible to the viewer.  
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On SEP’s view, we rather talk about a perceptual interaction. The reason for this is that the 
relationship is conceived as one in which things and their sensory properties appear differently 
to subjects (same or different subjects) depending on considerations pragmatic and 
environmental factors as well as considerations about the constitution of the perceivers. While 
inheritance is a somewhat apt analogy for a source-product relation, it is limited. Not every such 
relationship is one of inheritance. In our case, the guiding sense in perceptual relation cannot be 
pinned down by the inheritance model. In contrast, I hold that the phenomenal character of 
objects and their properties is grounded on the “qualitative character of things” such that they 
are shown in one-many or undefined-many relation between objects, events, states of affairs and 
appearances or properties. These relations are best specified through the triple dependency of 
perception, the two-fold structure of content, and the pragmatic account of perceptual 
normativity.  
 
3.4 Eating from the Tree of Illusion and the Veridicality Desideratum 
Chalmers mythologizes that we ate of the tree of Illusion and that thereafter things did not 
appear exactly as they were but rather with “different colors and shapes at different times.” Our 
trust was broken. At pain of irresponsibility, we were then motivated to doubt whether things 
are as they appear. Philosophers helped us began to realize and fulfill our duty to ever demand 
from our perceptions whether they are true. Ever since, our relation with the perceptual world 
is a rational contestation of perceptual evidence, at times yielding positive verdicts.   
But things are sadder, now we know, for true veridicality is to us but a chimera. We would 
never be actually presented with things in their pure glory. Our representations of things can 
only imperfectly, and only sometimes, match what must ideally be the case in Eden: “Eden sets the 
standard, and our imperfect world can only match it” (Chalmers 2006, 111). Whether or not an 
experience is (imperfectly) veridical is determined by content that needs only to match perfect 
properties, that is, “to play the role that perfect redness [properties] plays in Eden” (2006, 72). 
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Fregean content is an (imperfect) condition of satisfaction of our experience: the experience is 
(imperfectly) veridical iff the world turns out to be the way perceptual experience (re)presents it 
to be. The world turns out to be the way experience represents it if we have experience of 
properties that normally cause the experience that perfect properties and objects would cause in 
Eden. And ‘normally’ is enough for us because our standards are not those belonging to a 
perfect world, for “after the fall, we have learned to live with the imperfection of perception” 
(2006, 95). 
In other words, the argument is that we can only get an imperfect idea of the world by 
means of perception, and that even this imperfect idea is never secured, and that in order for it 
to be secured, perceptual resources alone won’t do and extra-perceptual means must be put to 
work. In this section I take up issue with this argument, as it is deployed around the tree of 
Illusion (only one aspect of the more famous argument from illusion), and deal with it by 
exposing the unspoken argument on which it is built and that such unspoken argument, dressed 
of a strong ‘intuition,’ is faulty, and must then be rejected.   
A concern for veridicality is the rule rather than the exception in the philosophical work on 
perceptual experience or on the epistemology of perception. Theories of perceptual content 
normally take for granted that the guiding issue about content is that perception has the 
epistemological role of justifying beliefs arising from those experiences’ content (Byrne 2005; 
Peacocke 1992; Siegel 2011a, 3–4; Siegel 2010, chap. 2; Toribio 2007). Experiences represent the 
world to be a certain way—they have a content that shows the world to be a certain way—, and 
because appearances are, by definition, taken to be only contingently corresponding with the 
world, a “strong intuition” holds experiences “assessable for accuracy”—the veridicality 
desideratum (Chalmers 2006, 50).20  																																																								
20 One quick note: my taking the issue of content as a matter of the aboutness of perceptual experience implies that I 
do not take content to be ex hypothesi a piece of a representational framework on which the content of perception are 
“things conveyed by sources of information (as when we speak of the contents of a newspaper story)” (Siegel 2010, 28) 
that are truth-functional via correspondence (i.e. veridicality). On this view, ‘content’ lives in the veridicality 
neighborhood, and this is more patent when we touch upon the idea that perception is representational. Given that I 
dispute this notion, some might think I should just give up on using ‘content’ as a way of conceptualizing perceptual 
aboutness. It seems perfectly fine to me to offer an interpretation of content that is not definitionally linked to 
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The views that theorize from veridicality assume that the truth-functional behavior of the 
concept ‘content’ in relation to the related ideas ‘perception,’ ‘belief,’ ‘object,’ ‘property,’ etc. 
reveals something central about the philosophical interesting aspects of perception, guided by 
some (never-all-too-clear) ‘intuitions’ and constrained by the extra-linguistic ‘phenomenology’ 
of things, i.e. a list of flat, isolated ways things look. Partly what is at work here is a 
commitment to perception having an intrinsic inferential character. Such inferential or pseudo-
inferential character of perception is at work in beings like us, able to compare perceptual 
experiences with idealized perfect objects and properties possibly instantiated in experience 
(2006, 102). It goes without saying that in such views perception in non-human animals remains 
a mystery.  
The concern for veridicality is the flip side of a worry about deception. One can look at 
someone’s theory of perception by looking at their conception and use of perceptual error, 
deception, perceptual illusions, and hallucinations. The early deployment of the argument from 
illusion in Price (1950) and Ayer (1947) is telling in this respect; and Austin thought in fact that 
the faulty cases actually take the lead and are the levelers of the field (1962, 44). That this is the 
modern attitude towards perception should by now be clear—down the line, philosophers think, 
the task of philosophy is to see how everything stands in relation to, or on our way to, truth. 
The nature of perception ends up being the distilled product of a reduction-to-truth, regardless 
of whether perception is the type of thing that aims at truth. Chalmers’s is a clear case of this 
view that takes, directly and indirectly, a certain conception of what counts as an illusion as 
definitional of perception. An idea that certain perceptions count as an error is assumed before 
the investigation about perception. As a matter of fact, there is not much argumentation for the 
consequences of our eating the tree of illusion. This explains why my arguments are oftentimes 
directed against other philosophers who actually argued for it, such as Price and Ayer. 																																																																																																																																																																					
veridicality, thereby allowing the position I am arguing to contribute in the important debates about perception on 
which content is invoked. This move entails saying that the ground level is that of aboutness. The content-
veridicality defender should not have problems explaining why she takes content to be the correct take on aboutness, 
or why content is, regardless of the metaphysics of experience or aboutness, the right level of analysis in the problems 
of perception. 
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In this same vein, we find Chalmers just assuming that hallucinations can have the same 
“phenomenology” as perceptions—the root of the Tree of Illusion.21 Chalmers “discusses” this 
aspect in a footnote, as if it were inconsequential, or at least greatly downplaying its importance; 
yet the discussion is simply a declaration of allegiances. For to be sure, what is contained in such 
an assumption is that perceptual resources aren’t able to say much, with certainty, beyond a 
report of a collection of rather isolated appearances that are only contingently linked to reality.  
What makes the issue more problematic, it seems to me, is not that we hold different 
positions. What is problematic is the way the issue itself is sidelined, not realizing the 
fundamental aspect of some of the assumptions at play—such attitude simply renders the view’s 
problematic aspects invisible to its defenders. Or better, in not realizing the definitional 
character of the foundations to their approach, the standard view cannot treat but as off-topic 
several well-based criticisms that do not share its language. 
In this context, I hold, in contrast to the standard theory of perception, that there are 
perhaps no heftier issues in the metaphysics of perception than the relationship between objects 
in the world and our perception of them, between objects and their appearances. To claim that 
the connection between perception and world is to be established beyond appearances and with 
the aid of extra-perceptual contributions because appearances can be deceitful is a petitio 
principii. It is to say that the connection between perception and world is contingent, i.e. that we 
can’t be sure we’re not being deceived because we can be sometimes deceived by perception.  
It may sound heavily counterintuitive that I call the possibility of perception to be deceitful 
into question. Who has not believed a surface to be of a different color it turned out to be? Who 
has not seen an object of a certain size to change its apparent size as one moves away from it? 
Who has not seen circle look elliptical? When we come to see the reasons underlying this 																																																								
21 Chalmers rejects the disjunctivist insight according to which a veridical perception and a perfect hallucination do 
not have a common ‘phenomenology’ (i.e. he denies disjunctivism about phenomenology). In other words, he affirms 
that there is a common factor between (paradigmatic cases of) a hallucination and a perception. He claims to be 
neutral on what he calls disjunctivism about metaphysics (whether experiencing and hallucinating are metaphysically 
different), a point on which we radically disagree, and on disjunctivism about content (whether the experience case 
and the hallucination case share content, partly or not at all), a point on which we partly agree but for quite different 
reasons.  
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‘intuitional’ understanding of perception, we will see why such ‘intuition’ not only need not be, 
but must not be, and should instead be replaced by an understanding that rejects any idea to the 
effect that the senses deceive and theorizes these cases as a function of appearances, in an 
entirely positive way.  
The idea that perceptions can be deceitful is evident to most philosophers of perception, in 
a way they qualify as a strong ‘intuition.’ This seemingly naïve view brings along an entire 
conceptual world with it. But should it be held as self-evident intuition, and not as an argument 
that can be attacked? Let us revisit the initial framework and see if I can offer an interpretation 
of the issue of deception that speaks in favor of my ‘looking at perception in its own terms’ and 
against their framework.  
Consider a bona fide or minimal good case of visual perception. It need not even be a ‘perfect’ 
perception (whatever that could exactly mean). You can even consider a case of what is 
normally referred to as perceptual error or illusion. Just your regular perception of something 
you look at. Consider that you look at a table, just like Hume did (1977, 104–105). Let’s call each 
specific perception P1, P2, P3, and so on. There is a perfectly meaningful claim to the effect that 
there are differences in the way the table looks as you move in relation to it, not only in size but 
also in shape, or in the way its colors looks (which Russell keenly noted). This much is true. The 
question is how far can one go with this cursory description of the phenomenon, and how much 
one can derive from it.  
Philosophers of different sensibilities might cash out this phenomenon in the following 
way: that these differences mean that our perception of objects may or may not correspond to the 
way things are. The inference-based claim (normally sold as an intuition) is that perception is 
not necessarily faithful to the way the world is. I now want to make clear some of the 
assumptions that are operative in the articulation of the intuition and call them into question. I 
want to dispel the idea that the ‘intuition’ at stake here is theoretically noncommittal, but rather 
a conclusion with loaded and doubtful premises, and should thus be rejected.   
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A central reason why one could cash out the phenomena in these terms relies on operating 
on binary and atomistic terms. Either we perceive the thing as it is, or as having a quality it 
has—unchanged—or we don’t. If we do, our perception is veridical; if not, our perception is 
non-veridical. Second, on the standard view, the right interpretation when we say we perceive 
something over time is to say that we rather see a sequence of individual perceptions. Or at 
least, that on the right analysis we should find no contradiction with a scenario described as a 
sequence. Hume’s position is certainly extreme in this sense, but its spirit remains on the 
standard view (or even necessitated by such view): “[Our senses] convey to us nothing but a 
single perception, and never gives us the least intimation of any thing beyond”  (2000, 126).  
Now, the object looked to us in more than one way when we compared P1, P2, and P3. 
Only provided, as Ayer would insist, the identity and permanence of the object, states P1, P2, 
and P3 claiming to be based on the object, i.e. deriving its intrinsic character on the object, 
would not be warranted in claiming being so grounded, for if that were the case, P1, P2, and P3 
would be the same. From this one concludes that perception is not a necessarily getting in touch 
with the way things are. We cannot rule out that an exclusive disjunct of P1, P2, and P3 could 
be true, so that one of them would be veridical, but we must rule out that an inclusive 
disjunction of the three, or a conjunction of at least two differing (in the same respect) single 
perception could come out true.  
What we get is that in our perceptions of the world, veridical perception is only 
contingently veridical. The reasons for its veridicality cannot be only perceptually warranted, 
but need inferential backing-up—a thesis Hume explicitly states and Kant criticizes in the 
paralogisms. Perceptually alone we can’t assess the exclusive disjunction P1, P2, P3 to be true 
or false. Lack of sameness in a sequence of perceptions is interpreted negatively, for in this 
frame of mind what I have called a sequence of perceptions is a sequence happening in us, but 
not a sequence grounded on the thing perceived. From here on the standard framework for 
perception may take different shapes, but it keeps the desideratum of veridicality understood in 
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binary terms and operating upon discrete perceptions, and puts perception and perceptual 
powers on the negative side of the veridicality desideratum’s ledger book.  
But let’s step back and see the basic phenomenon and the purported implication. Is the 
implication warranted in the phenomenon as described? The answer is no. 
Being warranted or not in saying that the differences between moments of the perception 
of a thing entail that perception does not necessarily tell the veridical story about reality hinges, 
conceptually, on the truth of the conjunction of two premises,  (1) and (2):  
A distinction appearances/reality:  
 
(1) Same-aspect perceptual variations in the perception of a thing are incompatible with 
the reality of that aspect of the thing, such that they can’t be predicated without 
mistake of the same real object (only as-if of the same object).  
 
A thesis about the persistence of real objects of a mind-independent world and their 
properties:  
 
(2) Objects and their properties (objects, events, and states of affairs) are mind-
independent realities. 
 
Thesis (2) is underdetermined, though. Let us consider two big-stroke variants, as they 
pertain to the issue of perception.  
 
(21) Objects and their properties (objects, events, and states of affairs) are mind-
independent realities and their properties and they are defined from an objective point of 
view, intellectual or scientific.22  
 
(22) Objects and their properties (objects, events, and states of affairs) are mind-
independent realities and yet it is not the case that they can be entirely defined from an 
objective point of view; the actual perceptual engagement of perceivers and communities 
of perceivers with worldly objects (perceptions that involve a vantage point of view, not 
only spatial but also temporal and pragmatic, plus situational features) are necessary for 
a full definition of worldly objects and their properties in their being perceived.   
 
It is important to note that the viability of (1) may set constraints on (2) (a version of which 
I accept), for if differences in appearance are intrinsically, non-inferentially compatible with true 																																																								
22 Although Chalmers’s framework is basically the same as (21), he may need to add to it either that such objects and 
properties are thought of as perfect objects and properties instantiated in them, or even that they are perfect objects and 
properties of a metaphysically possible world with normative import. 
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being, then the reality of a mind-independent reality, as to its perceivable nature, cannot be 
known in independence from the way it appears, which is my claim. If (1) were true, only (21) 
would be compatible with it. The conjunction of (1) and (22) would be false by means of mutual 
contradiction. If (1) were false, (22) can still be the case. I will be claiming that (1) is false, (21) is 
false, and (22) is true.  
Let’s look at (1). Substantively, the issue of the compatibility between appearances and 
reality is, I claim, a thesis about the nature of perceivable things and the nature of the perceiving 
of those things.23  
As to the nature of perceivable things it is important to note that (1) entails that the 
qualifications of objects can be defined in a fixed way, such that an object or property can only 
be characterized in one way in a given respect, which it is referred to as the reality of the object 
or property. In this framework, for appearances of object or properties to be actually revealing 
of the nature of the real object, they must be able to be predicated in the same way objects and 
properties themselves are. This naturally entails that multiplicity in a given respect is thought 
of as not revealing of the real nature of an object or property.   
Being able to meaningfully refer to a definition of the nature of the real objects and 
properties is a necessary condition to pronounce appearances incompatible with it. But when we 
analyze the nature of that definition of real being we run into a series of problems.  
The true description of the real objects and its properties must be perceptually meaningful 
in order to be relevant as a standard for comparison of perceptual appearances. This means that 
the aspects that figure in the definition must be cashed out perceptually: this beverage is bitter, 
this smell is sweet, the object is this big, and this coin is round. At the same time, the definition 																																																								
23 Let’s restrict our domain to the domain of actual experiences. First, I am interested in objects perceivable by 
perceivers, for I define perception by what the type of actual sensory-mediated interaction with a world of objects, 
events and states of affairs that occur for animal perceivers on Earth, and, by extension, in a universe with the laws 
we know, as they apply to perceivers our relative size—and not, say, to microscopic beings. I am interested in the way 
objects, events, and states of affairs are actually perceivable, and not in the way in another metaphysically possible 
world things of who-knows-what nature would be ‘perceivable’ for subjects constituted who-knows-how, for that’s as 
if in studying the nature of empathy considering telepathy is considered helpful. I see no way of guaranteeing truths about 
perception that are not based on actual perceptions. Instead, I offer a rich theory of (this-world) perception and a 
theory of (this-world) appearances and of the experience of the objects that present themselves in appearances. 
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purports to be mainly non-perspectival, non-perceptually based. In other words, that the nature 
of its reality is such that it is of such a shape, taste, smell, or size regardless of the position or 
circumstances it is looked at from or in. Sure it is possible to give an objective description of 
some perceptually related states of affairs, such that, for example, a table is square iff it is a four-
sided equilateral polygon. But this description, being perceptually relevant—that is, reflective of 
at least a veridical perception, according to the standard framework—, is one that coincides or is 
instantiated in one (or several), but not all, of the possible ways perspectives from which an 
object appears. But then there is a claim that the right perspective is no perspective, that is, that is 
not just one among many perspectives but the right one. The problem is: Where does the right 
perspective derive its right character so it can claim to be more than a perspective? And the 
problem again is that for it to be perceptually meaningful it must be something cashed out in 
terms one can understand perceptually, and not, for example, in geometrical analysis or 
scientific terms.   
Ayer bites the bullet and says that the reality of the object is actually one appearance yet a 
‘privileged appearance’. The case of color or shape seems to lend itself more easily to the 
solution Ayer proposes. Some appearances (sense-data, in Ayers’ and Price’s framework), say 
appearance K, are related to the rest of the appearances of a thing in a way that has more 
predictive power, in the sense, that having sense-appearance K is more telling of the rest of 
appearance possibilities of the object than other appearances (Ayer 1947, 263–274). It is not 
difficult to think this is right considering certain shapes or colors, for it seems natural to talk 
about a red-colored surface that is perceived more clearly red in one position and in broad 
daylight, or a round figure that would look from certain points of view really round and not 
elliptical, as when one looks at a coin in a way that the plane of one’s line of vision is 
perpendicular to the plane of the surface of the coin.  
I am not convinced that these two cases settle the matter, for the variety of appearances 
provide only relative support to each other, as that one that attains the privileged appearance 
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status would not do so in the absence of the range of possibilities, and in that sense it is difficult 
to see how this privileged appearance would count as the ‘reality’ of the object or property in 
comparison to which other appearances derive their ‘mere appearance’ status.24 In other words, 
it’s not clear to me that relative predictive power of one appearance in relation to a gamut of 
other appearances can furnish that appearance the epistemological status it supposedly does. 
The perspectival status of the privileged appearance, though privileged, prevents the definition 
of the reality of objects or properties derived from it to acquire the strong status it is supposed 
to possess, for it is based on this definition that differing appearances of the same object or 
property are treated as not revealing of such true reality. In this sense the privileged appearance 
strategy is self-effacing.  
This is in fact connected to my agreement with a version of disjunctivism. The baseline for 
SEP is only a minimal ‘good case’: that a perceiver actually interacts with an external object. 
Cases of hallucination plus coincidence (the subject hallucinates “correctly” what is 
coincidentally perceptually available to them) are ruled out because they are not perceptual. In 
order to understand the significance of this minimal good case as a requirement it is appropriate 
to compare it to what looks like a more stringent requirement but which falls prey to the 
preconceptions derived from veridicality. This is what Siegel calls the superstrongly veridical 
case: a certain property is perceived accurately in this case: “seeing o when o looks F, o is F, and 
o’s looking F is due to o’s F-ness” (Siegel 2010, 37). I dispute this seemingly clear statement. 
First, F is not necessarily predicable of o in the absence of the perceptual interaction (think of 
the color of a pond as one walks around it), even if it is meaningful to talk in such terms. We 
need a conception of (2) the F that belongs to the object is not the F that appears in the specific 
profiles or perspectives that are presented in perception. Actually, in perception there are Fs—
F’, F’’, F’’’, etc.—, so the relation between F and F’,F’’,F’’’ is a one-many relation. These are the 
properties I referred to earlier as perspectival properties or P-properties (Noë 2004, 82–83).  																																																								
24 I endorse a positive sense of something like ‘privileged appearances,’ provided its status is correlative to the totality 
of appearances and the normativity that belongs to them, as I will touch upon in chapter 5 but elaborate in more 
detail in chapter 5. 
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The difference between P-properties and properties of the objects, events, and states of 
affairs can further be specified thus: objects, events, states of affairs and their properties are 
presented perspectivally in perception and can only do so. We are acquainted with F but only 
via F’, F’’, F’’’, etc.25 If a perceptual presentation is only perspectival, a perfect presentation (F 
as F) is an impossibility. Physical occurrences—e.g. material objects in their visual aspect but 
also in their olfactory aspect—cannot be experienced by perceivers but in perspectival 
sequences. To put in a somewhat counterfactual way: unless gods enjoyed an embodied 
existence they would not perceive at all (Pietersma 2000, 62).  
Further, there is a stronger objection to the idea of a privileged appearance standing for 
reality. The objection is that it can’t stand a careful perceptual analysis in the cases of size or 
complex shapes. It is also an objection to another argument against the direct perception of 
objects and their properties, namely, the argument of the continuous series in which delusional 
and veridical appearances take place (Ayer 1947, 8–9; Price 1950, 32). Consider a cow. “If I 
gradually approach an object from a distance I may begin by having a series of perceptions 
which are delusive in the sense that the object appears to be smaller than it really is” (Ayer 
1947, 8). Suppose I am situated at 100 meters, 50 meters… 3 meters, 1 meter away from the 
cow. At which one of those distances does the cow look as big as ‘it really is’? To ask that is foolish, and 
extreme cases—looking at the cow at 1-millimeter distance from it or at a million kilometers 
from it—cut no conceptual ice. And it is mistaken to assert then that there is such a thing as the 
cow appearing or smaller or bigger than it is, for the cow appears always as big as it is relative to 
my distance from it. Naturally the cow has certain dimensions (although for exact dimensions a 
living being of this kind is not the best choice), but those dimensions, say height, cannot play 
out perceptually in the manner needed for it to be a standard for reality. The cow having the 
																																																								
25 This is another way to make sense of the rejection of the traditional commitment to veridicality understood along 
binary lines (objects are presented as they are or they are not) and in discrete terms (at each moment it is possible to 
assess whether appearances match reality or not. Thus, 1) Both F’ and F’’ are Fs, in the sense that perceptual profiles 
actually reveal how things are, and 2) an F’, F’’, F’’’, etc. could not be assessed in isolation, but only as a part of a 
sequence, where F* is deviant, but only in relation to F’, F’’, F’’’, etc. A discussion of P-properties and their normative 
relation to the social and the pragmatic is undertaken in chapter 5.  
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dimensions it has is not incompatible with its looking of varying dimensions depending on the 
location of the subject from it, so the appearances cannot be called incompatible according to a 
standard of reality, as it is needed for the tree of illusion to have any purchase in this respect. 
But insofar as the tree of Illusion was intended as a general objection to all varying appearances, 
this counterexample works as an objection against the broader case.    
An even stronger objection is this: What is the shape or figure of the cow, in terms of 
privileged appearances? While the dimensions of the cow, say its height, were something we 
could make sense as a potential standard (one that fails to be such for it cannot play out 
perceptually but without perspective), I don’t think it possible to define the privileged 
appearance or appearances of the shape of the cow. The issue seems to me intractable were we 
discussing the shape of the cow in tactile terms: what would even count as a differing 
appearance of the shape of the cow if I were to perceive its shape by touch, that is, by 
movements of my arms and hands over the body of the cow?  
It starts looking as if that the philosophical articulation of the distinction appearance-
reality is based on something analogous to a snapshot visual comparator, in which perspective is 
built-into but managed to seem absent, thus making it ‘intuitive’ to say what corresponds to a 
standard and what doesn’t. But even in a visual mode, it is impossible to make clear what a 
privileged appearance capable of becoming a standard of reality —able to ban differing 
appearances from intrinsically counting as actual perceptions of the thing—in the case of the 
shape of a cow. Clearly one shot won’t do—neither two would. So a set of privileged 
appearances would stand for the real shape qualities of the cow: are we to suppose that a set of 
images of the cow, taken from different perspectives, won’t overlap in the way a part of the 
animal’s body appears, thereby allowing in the ideal set conflicting appearances? It may be 
argued at this point that the general point is rather theoretical and that no one is claiming that 
‘privileged appearances’ are supposed to be potential real appearances of objects: real visual 
perceptions, real touch perceptions, real smell perceptions. But if this is not the case, if the 
  154 
standard for reality is not one that can be rendered in perceptually meaningful terms, on what 
material basis can actual perceptions be deemed as non-veridical? They can’t, and the issue is 
then that there are no reasons to think the required standard exempt from a careful 
phenomenological, perceptually based analysis.  
The shape of the cow, then, is such that it is perceived in varying appearances which the 
concern for veridicality insists on considering merely contingent, for it counts with the 
possibility of having a standard of reality that is fundamentally non-perspectival. But the non-
perspectival cow’s shape is impossible to conceive. Some might think that the idea is not of a 
view from nowhere, but a view from everywhere: this is the sense in which Merleau-Ponty says 
that the full object may be thought of as seen from everywhere: “the house itself is not the house 
seen from nowhere, but the house seen from everywhere” (2002, 69). One may think that he 
grants the house itself the status of an ideal object, composed of all perspectives, existing at 
once. However, he insists on the spatial and temporal nature of the different perspectives, from 
which we can conclude that a unity of spatial perspectives at one moment is impossible to 
actually be the case. The idea of a house seen from everywhere brings to light the fact that to 
conceive of the reality of an object in perceptually meaningful terms, e.g. as a perceptible 
material object, is epistemologically dependent on perceptual categories. Merleau-Ponty has 
also spoken of the perceptual field as a multiplicity of perspectives where things show 
themselves to others (2002, 68–70). Only metaphorically inert things show themselves to 
others; what the point brings to light is the dependence on the idea of an observer, for only an 
observer has a point of view from where things are perceived. To speak again of our cow, the 
idea is that truly to conceive of the cow as a totality would be to think of all the possible 
perspectives from where all parts, sides, and aspects of the cow would appear.  
Let me try to take this line of thinking one step further. If it is the case that all perceptions 
are essentially incomplete, or in other words, that all perceptual relating to objects is never fully 
achieved because there are always perspectives we have not taken, in which objects and their 
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properties would appear in ever so slightly differing ways (colors, forms, etc.), then we are 
always fundamentally related perceptually to things as to things that are never given 
completely and in which their potentialities are on the horizon, even if they are never fulfilled or 
explored. This line of thinking is at the basis of the account of normativity I will be offering in 
chapter 5.  
Going back to the need for a standard of reality as necessary to the argument from illusion, 
the point I want to highlight from Merleau-Ponty’s argument is the impossibility of conceiving 
of a standard of reality that is perceptually meaningful (and to which individual appearances can 
be compared to in order to be deemed veridical or delusional) and that does not have the 
limitations and indeterminations proper of the appearances it is to be compared with, namely, 
the “problem” of having, in Chalmers terms, “different colors and shapes at different times.” This 
being the case, it does not seem that Ayer, Price, and Chalmers can really offer the type of 
standard of reality needed to make the concern for veridicality take off. This point just reached, 
by reduction, is paralleled, and more succinctly expressed, in Husserl’s idea that even a God 
would see things in perspectives—where the absence of varying perspective amounts to the 
absence of perceptions.  
What looks seemingly neat in the case of a coin starts looking foolish when compared with 
more real cases. The real world is more like cows than it is like coins in a two-dimensional 
space. This argument aims at saying that the idea that the reality of an object or property can be 
defined in terms of privileged appearances is inconsistent with a metaphysics of the material 
world involving the spatiotemporal determination of occurrences. I can’t imagine what peculiar 
metaphysics may render such a view not inconsistent.  
A less conspicuous point relates to the status of our perceiving the different appearance 
variations of one thing, to wit: the issue of compatibility between appearances (in the plural) and 
reality (in the singular) only arises because a gulf is supposed between them as if they were two 
different domains. This is why in such a view the direct objects of perception must be an inner 
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occurrence call them sense-data, sense-impressions, mental images, Fregean Sinne, or any other 
name for traditionally conceived representations, detached from the world they arise from. This 
implies that the mental representations stand in need of further confirmation, so that our 
perception of the world is understood as a double process: a sensory input followed by a 
judgment or inference.  
 
For example, when one has a phenomenally red experience as of an object in one's 
environment, this can be used as grounds for accepting a belief that there is a red object 
in front of one. One would not normally call this relation between experience and belief 
an "inference," but it can be seen as a sort of quasi-inferential relation. Just as with 
belief, the inferential role of a perceptual experience can be analyzed in part by asking: 
when given information about how things are in the world, will a subject accept or 
reject the perceptual experience? (Chalmers 2006, 98–99)  
 
This is a good illustration of the way of looking at perception based on veridicality. It is 
natural in this framework to require an inferential step that brings together different, 
intrinsically incompatible, appearances. Also important is the conception of the perceiver behind 
this theory, namely, the idea of a thinker. I have no space to expand it here, but what is worth 
noting here is the erroneous idea that in relating perceptually to things one is always rationally 
active and in control, always comparing, inferring, deducing. It is Ayer’s idea that while in 
perception there is no deduction for no specific instances can count as a universal, we must be 
engaged in induction, still reaching conclusions but not of the kind that provides certainty 
(1947, 39–40). In contrast, I have in mind a perceiver that is engaged with the world, not in the 
mode of judging, but in the manner that pertains specifically to perception: an engagement with 
the world that is immersed in the world, takes implicitly its structure for granted, and actively 
relates to it in a very immediate and involved way. While I do not intend this last line of 
thought as an argument against (1), it seems to me rather clear that such a notion is at work in 
our conceptualization of perception, and that this image of us is erroneous.    
This way of looking at our perceptual involvement with the world has some problems. One 
of them is that it over-intellectualizes the perceptual process, making it more mysterious the 
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cognitive continuity between non-human animals and humans, distinctions between fully-abled 
and disabled human beings (extending to issues such as the relation between perceivers and the 
world, and, ultimately, deep issues about our nature as perceivers, thinkers and emotional 
beings). On the other hand, it removes the sense of immediacy that we find in perception and 
which is central to sequential, instantaneous activities, such as the acrobat in the circus.  
3.4.1 In Virtue of Appearances, Not In Spite of Them 
I have been arguing that (1) is false, namely, that it is not the case that differing same-aspect 
appearances are incompatible with the reality of real objects and their properties. I have been 
also taking a position regarding (2) the mind-independent status of objects, events, and states of 
affairs and their properties in relation to perception. I have rejected the interpretation of it 
according to which such realities, if perceptually meaningful, can be objectively defined (21). I 
defend interpretation (22). Thus, I hold that the mind-independent objects and their properties, 
as perceived, cannot be fully defined in an objective manner alone, but that the actual perceptual 
engagement of perceivers with them furnishes part of their full definition.  
There is a world independent of us and we perceive it.  I do not claim that there is no fixed 
reality that we perceive. There is such a thing as ‘the way things are.’ There is more to what 
there is than the way things are. Even more, all that there is about things is not limited to the 
way things are by themselves. From the get-go, for an object, event or state of affairs to be 
perceivable means to stand in one-many relation to the appearances in which it appears to 
subjects specifically configured and situated. There is no leaving out “reference to properties” 
for a view like mine in order to oppose the veridicality-structure notion of content, as Siegel 
implies (Siegel 2010, 29). 
I do not question then the possibility of being mistaken about something, like when it’s dark 
and one sees a dark brown object that turns out to be a dark blue navy object. Or like when a 
voice sounds like our friend’s but turns out to be a stranger’s. It makes sense to say ‘it turns out 
to be X, not Y.’ By the same token, I hold that it is often the case that one is unsure about the 
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exact characteristics of the perceptual object in a given aspect, for the aspect appears unclear to 
one, like when Descartes refers to a square tower that sort of looks rounds in the distance. But 
these cases are properly interpreted not as incompatible between appearances and reality, hence 
not as being veridical or nonveridical. I instead interpret these as occurrences in the complex 
warp of normativity that constitutes perception.  
What others call fallibility, or what they express as perception being deceitful, I interpret 
and articulate in terms of degrees of fulfillment of perceptual expectations and of pragmatic 
significance that is a function of the actual relation or interaction between perceivers and a rich 
theory of appearances—not as a separation between perception and world. This notion of 
normativity is not about bridging a gulf, for such a gulf does not exist, but about making 
explicit many ways in which appearances can vary consistently and along several dimensions, 
such as indeterminations on the part of the object, situational/environmental features, the 
relative object-perceiver location (spatially, temporally, and pragmatically) the constitution of 
the perceiver at the moment, and the specific nature of the perceptual engagement. The product 
will be a theory in the spirit of a radically positive, affirmative theory of perception and 
appearances. 
The idea of an appearance or profile is the idea of a partial manner in which worldly 
perceivable objects, events, and states of affairs can only present themselves directly, in their 
being physically constituted, for spatiotemporally and pragmatically situated perceivers. To 
perceive an object or being directly acquainted with it means to perceive or be directly 
acquainted with ‘one’ appearance or profile, or with a ‘sequence’ or ‘system’ of the appearances 
or profiles that are possible for that object, in manners that are holistically coherent in regards to 
the intrinsic configuration of the object (from micro to macrophysical structure), the specific 
disposition of the object in its environment, and to the modes of perceptual acquaintance (i.e. 
roughly sensory modalities plus modes of interaction) that pertain to the object and to the 
interaction object-perceiver, as reflected in specific configurations of contents, structure in the 
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manner that the present chapter suggests. In this framework there is absolute no conflict in 
saying that seeing in this moment a by-now-disappeared star is the only way for that star to be 
seen, in its existence at moment t1, by a perceiver situated so far away that she sees at t1+n 
years.  
We perceive objects, events, and states of affairs in the world not despite the differences in 
specific appearances but thanks to them. The absence of factual variations, which the standard 
theory would require for a series of perception to be necessarily of the same object, would, in 
fact, be a counterfactual confirmation of the view I am endorsing. If the habitual variations in 
the perception of a physical occurrence would not take place, according to the modality in which 
it occurs, would be evidence that we do not actually perceive the object we perceive. This view 
somehow begins with the idea that “the same unchanged Objects appear, according to the 
changing circumstances, now in this way, now in another way” (Husserl 1989, 64, <58>), and 
the whole gamut of ways in which the same object can appear carries normative force.  
On this view, hallucination is cut out from the beginning. Illusion, as I will explain later, 
will be treated not truth-functionally but re-described as a type of perceptual contingency that 
carries no threat, and that is subsumable under the epistemic purview of experience itself, as it 
follows from the theory of appearances that I started developing in the previous chapter.26   
																																																								
26 I said that Chalmers denies disjunctivism about phenomenology, and claims to be neutral on what he calls 
disjunctivism about metaphysics, and on disjunctivism about content. I hold that disjunctivism about metaphysics is 
true by definition, and is also confirmed by both hallucinatory and perceptual experiences, insofar as these aren’t 
experiences isolated from the totality of our experiential life. I hold that to deny “disjunctivism about 
phenomenology” is underdetermined because the standard conception of “the phenomenology of x” is too thin to 
capture the way things look. A proper definition of the way things look—as I started accounting for in the previous 
chapter—implies that while hallucinations and illusions may have the same character as to an aspect of an object or 
its properties in a momentary abstraction, the temporally extended, contextually-dependent, internally-coherent 
structure of appearances in which ‘phenomenology’ consists cannot be common to a hallucination and a perception. In 
other words, it is only trivially true there is something in common in the color of trees when I see them than when I 
dream of them—namely, that I can answer ‘green’ to question ‘What color are the trees?’ and also pick an object of 
the same color in the environment (engage in discriminatory behavior)—, but this ‘commonality’ does not translate in 
any serious sense in the nature of perception. I take disjunctivism about content to be true in the relevant sense, for 
the objects and its aspects are constitutional of the experience, therefore of content. I add that disjunctivism about 
content is false in the same rather trivial sense that dreamt of and perceived trees ‘are’ green.  
One reason that makes disjunctivism both about content and about phenomenology true in my view is that I 
deny that there is a real distinction between them. In my theory both (‘content’ and ‘phenomenology’) are grouped 
under the same heading: perceptual content, which is a specification of the nature of objects perceived as they are 
perceived and of the ways in which such objects are presented to a perceiver.  
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In mainstream views, talk of content simply supervenes on experience (Chalmers 2006, 65). 
In my view, experience is constitutive of content. To hold philosophically the ontological 
priority of experience is to say not only that perceptual experience explains our thinking about 
the world; rather, that it is that that it partly constitutes our thinking about the world. Further, it 
is not only that perceptual experience constitutes perception itself and is, when suitable, 
constitutive of our thinking about the world, but that it also partly constitutes our acting upon the 
world. In these cases, I mean constitutive in the sense that what is explained is not only how 
something came to be, but what it is or came to be.  
Let us go back to Eden and look at it as one looks at a mirage that one knows it is so.  
Chalmers’s strategy was to contrast the actual world with a hypothetical perfect world, in 
which the actual world appears deficient, in order to render this world deficient in virtue 
precisely of not being like the hypothetical perfect world.  
My own strategy takes the perceptual world as it appears in perceptual experience and 
investigates the conditions and structure of precisely our perceiving the world. Insofar as I need 
no hypothetical world to make sense of the actual, neither the actual world is not a deficiency 
nor am I itching for a fix that would take my perceptions and turn them into some alien 
standard of perfection.27  
The desideratum for veridicality understood as a demand for ideality is dropped and 
replaced by a broader notion of normativity. In SEP’s view, perceivers are able to situate 
perceptual interactions in relation to expectations and possibilities. Perceptual normativity is about 
situating perceptual occurrences in terms of their pragmatic significance and of degrees of 
fulfillment of expectations, as I started to elaborate in chapter 1 (section 1.2.4). This move is in 
keeping with my examination, in the last chapter, of Augustine’s strategy, where I showed in a 
slightly different way how an ideal notion—truth, in that case—is an idealization of what 
perception actually presents us with. I have intended to build a strong case for an account that 																																																								
27 The narrative I’ve offered is quite analogous to Nietzsche’s How the Real World at last Became a Myth in his Twilight 
of the Idols; a piece of his antiplatonic reaction to the idea that this world is not the real world. 
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takes perception for what it is, and not for what it supposedly lacks. The desideratum 
concerning the presentational character of appearances is re-interpreted, not as a desideratum 
anymore, but as the actuality of perception and in terms of a thoroughly positive, this-worldly 
theory of appearances. In this context the presentational character of perception is properly 
explained by a social enactive theory of perception, that shares some elements with relational, 
directly realist views.28  
Lastly, it may be objected that I am taking the idea of Eden too far: that clearly Chalmers 
does not think that there was an Eden and we fell from it. That much is clear, though. Critics 
might say that in refuting Chalmers I have, at best, only made implausible the use of the myth, 
but not the deep philosophical reasons to hold perception accountable to a non-perceptual 
standard of veridicality. But my critique has been about the rationale that moves his little myth. 
If Chalmers has provided an ad hoc way of understanding perceptual content—if it is just an 
ideal language to talk about perception (very much in the way Ayer saw his own sense-data 
project) in order to account for the features that need accounting—my critique stands. In 
objecting to the motivations underlying the desiderata about content, and in showing the 
tensions in this account regarding the real world, I have provided reasons to reject his full 
account of content.  
The set of objections I have offered in this chapter shows the characterization of Eden to be 
mistaken and concludes that the upshot of the Fall is not a rational one. In the crafting of Eden, 
																																																								
28 Schellenberg (Forthcoming; 2011) has recently argued that the perception is both relationalist and 
representationalist. I do not rule out the possibility of granting perceptual representations an ad hoc sense, as a way in 
which we could refer to what we perceive for instrumental purposes. Strictly speaking, representations must 
ultimately be entirely deflated. I say deflated and not eliminated, for the project of modeling the mind and modeling 
perceptual systems for instance for AI purposes may require such language. Recent developments in AI show that 
relationalist concepts are much needed for a robot that is able to dynamically perceive. Simaan and others have been 
working on ‘complementary situational awareness’: “the robot’s ability to gather sensory information as it works and 
to use this information to guide its actions” (Simaan, quoted by Salisbury 2013). In my framework, however, the 
instrumental, not constitutive, character of this situational awareness is tied to its representational basis 
(understandably so) and is linked to the fact that only original perceivers—living beings—are capable of having the 
original intentionality present in perceptual consciousness.  
Further, as I will be arguing in this and the next two chapters, the casting of content constitutively (and not 
just instrumentally) in pragmatic terms is at odds with representational tenets. My rejection of the fundamental 
character of representations, which the entire project supports, allows me further to distinguish my view from 
Schellenberg’s (with whom I agree on several interesting points, albeit for different reasons), as well as from other 
relationalists, like Campbell, and other enactivists, like Noë (or even Schellenberg’s enactive ‘capacities’ approach). 
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a notion of perfection is embedded in the actual workings of perception and deemed deficient. In 
accepting Eden as it is presented, one is already accepting the diagnosis of the Fall, for they are 
correlative notions. Having showed that we have every reason to reject the idea of the Eden, I 
have in the same way showed that we have every reason to reject any view that shares the axis 
ideality-illusion-veridicality as the underlying understanding of the perceptual world. 
Chalmers’s account of perception is of no use in trying to advance our understanding of 
perception, except, and this becomes its virtue, as a way of looking at what perception is not and 
at the way philosophy of perception should not proceed.  
 
Chapter IV 
 
Dynamic Content in The Social Enactive View 
 
In the Social Enactive view, perceptual content is the notion subordinate to perceptual 
experience that specifies that which perceptual experiences are about. I use experience and content 
to refer to perceptual experience and perceptual content, unless noted. In this chapter, I build what I 
call a dynamic account of content on top of the work of the previous two chapters, where I dealt 
with the notion of experience (chapter 2) and with the relation between experience and content 
(chapter 3). I departed from representational views on content and argued that content refers to 
that which experience is about: it is an issue of the aboutness of experience. I proposed that 
content derives from, or is ‘molded’ by experience. Putting experience-content in a model-mold 
relation is meant as a way of signaling that to understand what an experience is about amounts to 
a great extent to understand what to experience perceptually is in the first place, and as a 
methodological device in the sense that content allows us to see things about experience that 
aren’t observable from the point of view of experience alone. Because of this relationship, the 
scaffolding for the conception of content I am to articulate more precisely in this chapter 
consists in the argumentation about experience offered in the previous two chapters. In 
particular, it should be noted that my full-fledged argument about veridicality in relation to 
experience and content—an argument against the concern for veridicality—appears in chapters 
2 and 3. The task I take up in this chapter is to distil the lessons from chapters 2 and 3 to make 
the central constraints on the idea of content explicit and offer a parsing of content that honors 
the account of experience already offered. The next chapter will be devoted to an account of the 
normativity of perceptual experience and content.  
In the view I am presenting, experience defines what aboutness is: aboutness is the relation 
between an experiencing subject and the experienced object, such that the subject’s experience is 
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about the object, and in the concrete way in which it is experienced. Perceptual content is a 
specification of what is experienced, in the way it is experienced.1  
Within the social enactive theory of perception I am proposing—a relational, or rather 
interactive social externalism—the notion of content should satisfy some desiderata. The first 
one is a desideratum about phenomenology—understood in the thick sense I use. Since in my 
view perceptual experiences are about temporally extended continua, this specification of 
contents, which I term dynamic, explains the transitions and other relations among moments of 
such perceptual continua, as well as the relations of those sequences with the objects, events, 
and states of affairs that we experience perceptually, including the high-level, pragmatic-based 
properties that we find in them.2  
Second, perceptual experience constitutes the ground of our being conscious of things 
phenomenally, both terms of action and, sometimes, predicatively (propositionally) and 
emotionally. Perceptual content, then, must provide partial explanations and justifications of 
what in each case is the object of our perceptions and actions, of our thoughts and emotions. 
Thus, content as specification of aboutness also has an explanatory and justificatory role, which 
in general follows this formula: we are perceptually aware of things (we act on things, we think 
of things, we feel in relation to things) partly because we perceive things in specific manners; so 
the way perceive them explains and justifies the ways we are aware of them, act upon them, 
think of them, and feel about them.3  
																																																								
1 In not using the intentionality idiom, I am purposefully setting aside traditional understandings of what intentions 
and intentional objects are and what theoretical roles they are expected to perform. Particularly, I am not buying into 
the idea that all intentional objects play the same role, for that disregards specific types of intentionality and their 
objects.  
2 See chapter 2 for an argument for high-level properties. In relation to properties in general, there can be a further 
metaphysical question about whether events are basic or only a construction on properties of objects, hence whether 
perception of events is of the event or of properties of objects: “the noisy police car coming towards me now” or “there 
is something about the noisy police car and that is that it’s coming towards me now.” My suggestion, following my 
argument on the pragmatic dependence of objectivities and properties at the end of chapter 2, is for the interests of 
theorizing about perception, there is no fact of the matter, and the specification of objects or events and their 
properties highly depends on the way in which the subject takes position about a worldly reality. In the next section, 
I touch upon this issue when I talk about perceptual intentionality and its particular variations and the way they 
partly determine the object-as-perceived.  
3 I do not include a constraint of reasonability in this desideratum: the idea that perception grounds what it is 
‘reasonable’ to believe, to do, or to feel, as Siegel does (as well as several standard takes on perception) (2010, 9). This 
and related issue are pursued in greater detail in chapter 5. 
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In section 1, I sift the account of experience and the account of the relation between 
experience and contents of chapters 2 and 3 in order to draw general constraints on content. 
This taking of stock allows me, first, to make the case for taking a perceptual continuum or 
perceptual sequence, and not a static object, as the paradigm of the perceptual object; and 
second, to account for the distinction between perceptual object and perceptual content in terms 
of the perceptual object and the object-as-perceived. Note that in the expressions perceptual object and 
object-as-perceived I use ‘object’ as a placeholder for objects (proper), events, and states of affairs 
to which we are perceptually related. I then provide an argument for the perceptual 
intentionality at work in object-as-perceived and finish the section by highlighting the non-
detachable, world-involving character of perceptual content in the Social Enactive View.  
Section 2 is the core of this chapter, where I proceed to offer a parsing of perceptual 
content. Perceptual content must reflect, on the one hand, the stability (and at times unity) of 
perceived objects, events, and states of affairs; on the other, it must reflect the dynamism of 
perception, in which unities are embedded. This makes up for an account of dynamic content 
that is multilayered and pragmatically dependent, and structurally four-fold. As as to its nature 
(1), content is constituted by the real, worldly objects and the object-as-perceived, the latter 
being the main specification of content; as to its structure, content is parsed into (2) core-content 
and (3) environing-content; and (4) environing-content extends all the way down to the very 
moment of acquaintance or contact of a perceiver with properties of the physical world.  
In section 3 I discuss an objection raised by Drummond to the effect that a view of content 
that takes perceptual continua as perceptual objects is committed to phenomenalism. I reply to 
this objection arguing that the parsing of content proposed (full=core+environing) is not 
committed to a part-whole structure and can hence guarantee the reality and stability of the 
world.  
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4.1 Object and Content: The Relation Between Perceptual  Object  and Object-As-
Perceived  
In this section I would like to take stock from the accounts of perceptual experience and its 
relation to chapters 2 and 3, hence also offering an argument for the distinction between 
perceptual object and object-as-perceived. 
To perceptually experience temporally extended continua featuring external objects, 
events, and states of affairs is to engage in a sensory-based active manner with worldly objects, 
as they come, are available for interaction, and go; in their coming, being available for 
interaction, and going away.4 This spatially and temporally extended interaction with objects is 
pragmatically constituted in ways that are more often than not socially constituted. Perception 
takes places in practices, as chapter 1 accounted for, so perception appears in the richly defined 
description of situations like tasting a meal or visually following a soccer ball as it comes 
towards me and I prepare to kick it, and not properly about ‘detecting’ the shape of the spherical 
volume. SEP follows Hurley (1998) in rejecting the input-output picture, that is, the view that 
perception equals causal sensory input, upstream of motor output. I will explore these aspects in 
chapter 5 where this argument will be linked to the broader idea that perceptual interaction 
grounds other types of engagement with the world, such as action (not motor output), thought, 
and emotion.  
 In this conception perception is direct and is also mediated by three main different types of 
dependencies that I introduced in chapter 3: idiosyncratic (facts of personal and species 
embodiment, and otherwise idiosyncratic), socially pragmatic, and non-socially pragmatic.5 
Hence, the social enactive view is entirely at odds with the notion that there can be an 
unmediated contact between subject and objects. More specifically, the Social Enactive view is 
committed to a distinction between object properties and perceived properties: objects, events, 
																																																								
4 Unless explicitly stated, ‘object’ is used as a placeholder for objects, events, and states of affairs. When talking about 
actual objects (the ambulance siren, the car), I will talk of ‘physical object.’ 
5 Cf. chapter 3, section 3.3.1.  
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states of affairs and their properties are presented perspectivally in perception and can only do 
so. The mediation of these dependencies plays a role in the appearing of objects. 
External objects, events, and states of affairs cannot be experienced by perceivers but in 
perspectival sequences, according to the perception-relative dependencies. Thus, in perception, 
we are acquainted with pragmatically governed temporally extended continua.  
Take the Bicycle Ride example. When I ride my bicycle to work, there is a sense in which 
the perceptual object is the whole continuum made up by the changing road, the many cars 
parked and moving, the building, signs, and people I pass by, the different thermic sensations in 
my skin, my touching the wind, and the smells around me. Granted, if the ride lasts for 25 
minutes, we are less inclined to talk about the whole ride as one continuum, but at least when I 
am going down a two-block long slope, the whole perception of things through the two-block 
distance can be confidently pronounced one continuum. So as I ride, I perceive people and 
objects around me. I can, for instance, move so as to avoid another cyclist.6 I truly perceive 
them, but there is also a sense in which the object of, say, my visual perception is not just one 
object and then another and then another. Rather, the object of my perception can be the 
sequence itself in which objects present themselves, as they succeed one another, and as I feel 
the crisp cold air and the smell of a rainy early morning. I often remember rides precisely in 
terms of the moving sequence. It would be contrary to my experience to say that I never 
experienced the sequence for all there was was a sequence of static moments.   
In chapters 2 and 3 I approvingly quoted Husserl saying that perceptual continua could be 
thought of as chains of “resting perceptions, unified by transitional phenomena, in which various 
sides and parts of the thing present themselves in a stable way” (1997, 83, 76, <98,89>). I must 
make that assertion more precise: while we can think of perceptual continua as made of resting 
parts and sides, these parts and sides are not accurately characterized as static either. On the 
one hand, they are embedded in pragmatically governed continua and contexts, so their status 																																																								
6 Chapter 5 will revisit the Bicycle Ride example, but with an emphasis on the “systematic dynamic interdependence 
of perception and action, with multiple channels of motor-to-sensory feedback” (Hurley 1998, 302) at play, for 
example, in avoiding another cyclist or taking a curve by a turn of the handle bars. 
  168 
as independent entities is contingent upon the perceptual relation. It was in this sense that in I 
elaborated, in chapter 2, upon Husserl’s insight that perceptual unities are not simply detected, 
but rather 'posited,' that is, objectivated or individualized as they are grasped.7 The thought that 
must warded off is the following: that the objects of perception can be individualized and defined 
before the perceptual relation takes place, and that it is proper to define them (including their 
parts, sides, and aspects) in the terms we normally refer to them, as when we talk of a building’s 
façade and its sides and roof. Whether those objects of the world are the objects of our 
perception, and whether their architecturally or otherwise defined sides or parts feature in our 
perception, it is all a matter of the perceptual activity itself that may or may not focus on them, 
defined this way, in their ‘worldly’ independence. On the other hand, it is sometimes the case 
that there are no parts or sides that we can categorically pinpoint (or at least not in a way that 
can categorically refer to a pre-existing static configuration of things), as is the case of the 
inattentive onlooker, the person that inattentively watches the country passing by while riding a 
car or a train.   
When I listen to a song in order to enjoy it, or to someone speaking so as to understand 
what she is saying, the object of my perception is the song or the conversation, coupled with 
whatever background noise there is, but both song and conversation are continua of sounds—
and it would be a confusion to say that the actual perceptual objects are isolated sounds—even if 
there is a level of subpersonal processing that takes up sounds in chunks (as in vision, as we 
know because of motion pictures). Even when we contemplate an object, say, for aesthetic 
enjoyment, the object is present to us in an extended manner. First, eyes explore objects in fast 
movements known as saccades, placed inside a head that moves, and atop a body that moves too. 
But also, the specific shifts in attention that make up for the contemplation of the objects are not 
random but guided by the (in this case) contemplative intention and the object itself. In the case 
of taste, liquids or solids move inside the mouth, and these movements may matter or not, and it 
is standard practice to take the time to enjoy a piece of chocolate by letting it slowly melt in 																																																								
7 Cf. chapter, 2, section 2.3.3. 
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one’s mouth, for the experience is different than that of a fast biting the chocolate. In olfaction, 
we sniff and take in waves of air, and it is a learned practice to sniff something intently yet softly 
to be delighted by it: one does not typically explore the faulty trash can in that way.  These 
observations are available to any perceiver, reflecting on her perceptual experience as it occurs 
in everyday life. They illustrate that the natural objects of perception are continua, embedded in 
pragmatic interactions, which guide perceptual attention and perceptual awareness (and, as 
chapter 5 will show, also the connections between perception and action, thought, and emotion).  
These two commitments, (1) perspectival appearing and (2) the temporal extendedness of 
perceptual objects, further buttress the claim that to perceive something is to perceive it as 
something. It is a take on reality since reality is perceived in a particular manner or aspect. If the 
perspectival appearing of things allows for the same object to appear to the same or different 
perceivers in various manners, the difference in each perceptual take would not be due to the 
intrinsic materiality of the object (or event or state of affairs), but would belong to the 
perspectival appearing. Noë is right in remarking that we generally don’t put much attention to 
perspectival properties and variations in them, but that once we turn our attention to them, it is 
plain to every perceiver that there are differences in different perceptions of the same object, and 
that other perceivers may have slightly (or significantly) different takes on same objects (2004, 
83). If we focus on the temporally extended aspect of the way things appear it is even clearer 
that our contact with things is not just an impression of an object itself, but a take on it.  
On the one hand, then, we agree that there exist differences in the particular ways in which 
things are presented to us, as a function of perceptual dependencies and expressed in 
perspectival properties and perceptual continua. On the other, it is part of the perception of 
things that in each case we are acquainted with the external object, event, or state of affairs. As 
different philosophers in the phenomenological tradition have insisted on, it would be a mistake 
to say we are only acquainted with the individual perspectives in which objects are presented.8  
																																																								
8 See also (Noë 2004, 76). 
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In both cases, we are dealing with the direct perception of an object. The difference I would 
like to introduce now, following these distinctions, is that what we perceive, that is, the content of 
perception is two-fold: on the one hand, the external object that we perceive is an aspect of 
perceptual content, which I will call the perceptual object; on the other, the specific way in which the 
object is presented to us—which I will call the object-as-perceived—is also an aspect of perceptual 
content. Perceptual content then is composed of both the perceptual object and by the object-as-
perceived. This point is about the nature of perceptual content, which only partly maps onto the 
discussion on the structure of perceptual content that I address in section 4.2 below.  
The Ambulance Siren. I work near a hospital, and it is quite common to see ambulances 
going by with their sirens on. When I hear an ambulance siren getting closer to where I am and 
then going away, it is the ambulance siren itself that I hear, and as such it is part of the content 
of my perception. The perceptual object can be thought of as an answer to a what question. But it 
is also true that I hear the siren in specific ways and that those ways are also part of the content 
of my perception. For instance, the sound gets louder (and seemingly higher in pitch, due to the 
Doppler effect) if the ambulance is coming towards me, but becomes lower (and seemingly lower 
in pitch) and fades away if it’s going away. Those are two different ways of hearing the same 
ambulance siren. The object-as-perceived can be thought of as an answer to a how question, 
because, once again, I do not only hear the siren: I hear the siren of an ambulance, as it goes 
away, and in that going away there are specific characteristics that I am aware of (or can be if I 
turn my attention to them), and also characteristics that are linked with other aspects (actional, 
propositional, emotional) of my perceptual interaction with my surroundings.  
In fact, I am not a passive receiver vis-a-vis the ambulance siren. My perceptual relation to 
it is best described as an interaction. There is much more about my perceptual experience of the 
siren than my location relative to it. In order to understand the siren as an object-as-perceived 
we need to account more fully for my interaction with it. I now bring to the fore the three 
constitutive dependencies of perception presented in chapter 3 (cf. section 3.3.1). 
  171 
I am interacting with the ambulance siren even though I do not act in a very hands-on way, 
as I acted towards the cyclist I was avoiding in the Bicycle Ride case. But this also makes it a 
good example: it will give me a chance to signal that perceptual interaction is not only a direct 
manipulation, but it is the form of every sensory-based experience of the world. Because sirens 
are loud and unpleasant to hear, it is common for a person to avoid somehow or try to minimize 
the exposure to the sound, for example, by covering their ears or even slightly turning the head. 
But a case of a more evident perceptual interaction with the siren is not difficult to find. Suppose 
I am walking down the street with a friend of mine, and we are talking about something 
important; perhaps I was confiding something to him. Although I don’t see people I know 
around us, I lower my voice a bit—it’s not just caution, fearing someone would hear the 
confidence, and we both understand that a piece of sensitive information is coming. That is the 
moment when the ambulance siren comes towards us. Surprised at first, we see where the 
ambulance is coming from and then hear it getting increasingly louder, and apparently higher in 
pitch. I stop telling my story, waiting for the ambulance to pass. I stop in the middle of the 
sentence, prompted by a subtle gesture in his face that I interpreted as “I can’t hear you very 
well” and wait until the noise has gone considerably low before I resume. My friend understood 
my pausing and waiting; there is no surprise in him. I also noticed that when the siren started to 
get closer I could no longer hear the noise of the other cars and the voices of few people around 
us, but now that the siren goes away, I can hear that background noise again. Let’s finish the 
case by adding three more characters, a runner coming from behind us, and an arguing couple, 
across the street but 50 meters behind my friend and me, which we noticed as we were walking. 
They were arguing very loudly. When the siren came towards them, they didn’t stop but kept 
yelling at each other, now at the top of their lungs, evidently upset and careless about what 
other people could have thought. Of course, they did notice the ambulance because they had to 
yell louder and louder, and their yelling seemed even louder after the ambulance had gone away. 
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What the Ambulance Siren case illustrates is, first, as I have already said, that the siren 
itself is a perceptual object for my friend and me, the runner, and the arguing couple. The 
perceptual object can be the same for people situated very differently, as in this case. Let us now 
look at the differences in the object-as-perceived. The configuration of the object-as-perceived 
varies according to the three constitutive dependencies of perception: the idiosyncratic 
dependencies, the non-socially pragmatic dependencies, and the socially pragmatic dependencies.  
For instance, the tone and loudness of the siren are mediated by the idiosyncratic 
dependencies, that is, facts of the embodiment of each of the listeners and deep-seated personal 
sensory-specific attentional habits or associations. Suppose that my friend experiences mild 
hearing loss. For him, the siren is not as loud as it is for the others—and this he “knows” and is 
part of his way of navigating the world (in taking clues from running cars, in setting music at a 
higher volume). But by the same token, the moment at which he is unable to hear my soft-voiced 
confidence comes sooner than it would for another person. That explains that although I was 
cognizant of the ambulance siren and knew that I had to stop at some point, I didn’t think it was 
so soon and it was a gesture of his that clued me to pause. In this sense, the perceptual 
experience of the ambulance siren is mediated by an idiosyncratic dependency for my friend. For 
the runner, listening to music through regular earphones (not the noise-cancelling type), would 
also experience the noise of the ambulance siren—its unpleasantness, getting louder, and going 
away--mediated by what would count as an idiosyncratic dependency because it affects her 
initial sensory acquaintance with physical properties of the world. In this case, the idiosyncratic 
dependency (additional to facts about her hearing system) is also partly formed by the way the 
earphones and the music affect her listening to the siren. The idiosyncratic dependency, it must 
be said, is also at work in the case of a person with average audition capacities and “good” 
hearing conditions.9 
																																																								
9 As I noted in section 3.1, the average way of perceiving the world, as in “good” hearing, has no intrinsic normative 
value. It is conceptually arbitrary, although statistically significant. 
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The non-socially pragmatic dependencies refer to patterned links between actions and sensory 
stimulation that do not belong to the socially constituted aspects of pragmatic interactions. In 
the case of the ambulance siren, this type of dependency refers to variations in the way the 
object is perceived due to environmental conditions product of the sensorimotor relations 
between subject and object. In the ambulance siren case, the Doppler effect (that pitch seems to 
get higher when the siren approaches one, and lower when the siren is going away) is a non-
socially pragmatic dependence, because it depends on the pragmatic relation between subject 
and object. 
Lastly, the perceptual experience of the ambulance siren is social-pragmatically mediated or 
dependent in several ways. First of all, it is mediated in the fact that this perceptible object is, in 
some social contexts, a siren. Societies have developed this loud object and positioned it on top 
of certain vehicles so it emits noises configured thus-and-so, in intensity and frequency, to 
ensure awareness of such vehicles in a relatively broad radium, on account of a socially accepted 
urgency. A siren is a siren because it is loud and (for most) unpleasant—it is impossible not to 
notice it in this negative way. In this sense, some gestures that can be seen as non-socially 
pragmatic dependencies such as the so to speak instinctive reaction in relation to this sound 
becomes a social mediation when my conversation with my friend is interrupted by it and a 
gesture of his lets me know that the noise is now too loud for him to hear me.   
It is appropriate to recall a central aspect a theory of perception must explain. A theory of 
perception should not only explain the way things look in terms of some basic sensory 
properties such as loudness or pitch—which are often reduced, but wrongly so, to the 
perceptible side of a physical property of objects. As Krebs analysis of Wittgenstein’s take on 
perception, a theory of perception must explain the connection between the sensory and the 
significance of things for human existence: the fact that perceptible things are meaningful 
aspects of  “the world in its sensuous richness”, that is, in the way they appear to us, within 
systems of references, of personal and communal histories that become rooted in the body 
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(Krebs 2010, 134). It is this domain of meaning that more often than not remains out of the 
radar of ‘epistemizing’ or ‘scientist’ views, as Krebs puts it, reflecting on Wittgenstein’s lessons 
on the perceptual.10 Such was also the view of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, and it is one to 
which the social enactive view fully subscribes.  
Back to objects, notice however that the perceptual object is part of perceptual content in a 
very general sense: when I hear the ambulance siren coming towards me, I hear the ambulance 
siren. Period. By contrast, if we are to specify how the siren sounds to me I need to recur to the 
siren-as-heard. For specifying the perceptual object, the object-as-perceived is the appropriate 
notion and not the perceptual object. The notion of perceptual object simply points to that which I 
perceive, without much ado. And yet, it is central to the Social Enactive view I am putting 
forward (as well as to other enactivist, relationalist, and realist views), that the perceptual object 
features squarely in a description of the perceptual content of an experience.11 I hear the 
ambulance siren and I see another cyclist on the road—even though I cannot give any details 
about the siren or the cyclist unless I talk about the way I hear the siren and see the cyclist.   
4.1.1 Perceptual Intentional Relation and Object-As-Perceived 
The reader may have noticed that the question “How do you perceive what you perceive?” is an 
ambiguous one. Rather, it admits of two types of complementary answers. One refers to the 
particular qualities with which the thing is presented: I perceive the ambulance siren as going 
away, sound getting lower and fading in intensity. This I have captured under the heading 
content, specifically under the rubric object-as-perceived.  																																																								
10 Such is also a pragmatist view of James, Dewey, and Austin (and connected to the views of Wittgenstein) that 
Putnam echoes in saying that “if there was one great insight in pragmatism, it was the insistence that what has 
weight in our lives should also have weight in philosophy” (1999, 70). 
11 Counterfactually put: to perceive a table does not mean to be acquainted with every aspect of the table. Not being 
perceptually acquainted with every aspect of the table does not mean not directly to perceive a table. Being 
perceptually acquainted with changing aspects of the table (due to environmental conditions, changes in the object, or 
in the relative perspective of the perceiver), even somewhat conflicting between them, does not mean not directly and 
truly to perceive the table. Perceptual object and object-as-perceived are distinct yet correlated notions, and both 
coexist in perception. Also, the somewhat simplicity of this commitment is thus expressed: “I perceive the physical 
thing, the Object belonging to nature, the tree there in the garden; that and nothing else is the actual object of the 
perceptual intention. A second immanental tree, or even an ‘internal image’ of the actual tree standing out there 
before me, is in no way given, and to suppose that hypothetically leads to an absurdity” (Husserl 1983, 219, <186>). 
One possible absurdity, relevant for the present purposes, is that several of the perceptually specific possible 
predicates of the actual perceptual object do not apply to an internal representation.  
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But logically prior to this answer, there is a more immediate one: I perceive the ambulance 
siren auditorily, or visually. More abstractly, we can say that there is an adverbial or intentional 
qualification at stake, one that is first of all sensory-modal (even multi-modal, like when I am 
taking to someone, hence hearing and seeing), but one that can secondarily include emotional 
and pragmatic aspects. For example, I thermally perceive how hot a hot beverage is, as I am 
about to drink of it, in order to not burn myself; or I olfactorily perceive the old house, as I long 
for the times I spent there several years back—in longing, I pause over specific smells, and 
perhaps connect them with others or with memories, and may even try to find past sensations.  
The Husserlian-inspired insight I am underscoring here—and the ground I want to secure 
for the discussion to come in this chapter and the next--is that the specificity of content is also 
partly arrived at through an analysis of the type of perceptually based intentional relation in 
which it takes place. This account of perceptual content would in fact not be complete without 
placing it within this broader perceptual intentional framework—which, to be sure, belongs to 
the theory of experience I have endorsed. Descriptions of objects-as-perceived are ‘soaked’ with 
specific perceptually based intentionalities: to speak of a seen object is grounded on what it is to 
see: to relate to things using one’s own eyes, which pick things on the basis of light, reflectance, 
that is, to be acquainted with visibilia. The linguistic point carries with it a deeper element: the 
specificity of object-as-perceived derives substantively from the type of relation in which it is 
perceived.  
The object is singled out by the perceptual intention, but it is not just singled out: it is held 
in a particular way, it is engaged under certain determinations, and it is taken up in specific 
manners. In a broad intentional sense, Husserl refers to the object-as-intended as the noema of 
an intentional relation; and to the type of relationship with the noema, he refers to as the noesis. 12 
																																																								
12 Intentional analysis takes many shapes. I think that the best intentional analysis so far originates from the work of 
Husserl, and is suitable for modifications and improvements. The reader may want to take a look at other intentional 
analyses, of which (Crane 2001) is a good introductory example. For the purposes of this paper, however, I wish to 
indicate that where other intentional analyses speak of aspectual shape as a way of accounting for the fact that things 
are for us in a certain way, Husserl’s phenomenology treats this aspectual shape as a very extended feature that 
allows and requires of much more analysis. The distinction between noesis and noema (as well as the further 
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Each ‘object’ of consciousness is made conscious in a specific way, of which perception, memory, 
object-to-be-avoided, regret, and expectation are examples. Hearing the orchestra playing a 
song is not the same as remembering the song played by the orchestra—and this not only 
because the recollection cannot match the richness of the actual listening situation, but, for our 
present purposes, because hearing something is different than remembering sounds in that in 
hearing we are related to an occurrence of the world whereas in remembering we are related to 
a memory. We know that to stop a sound from being heard we can plug our ears, but that is not 
what we do when we want to stop remembering a sound.13  
Let us now focus on perceptual intentionality. The analysis of concrete perceptual experiences 
gains in depth from the idea that perceptual intentionality and object-as-perceived are not only 
moments of the relation, but are structured in connection with each other in strict parallelism, 
so that the nature of each co-determines the other, and second, that variations in one are causally 
concomitant with variations in the other. This parallelism means that they mutually influence or 
co-vary with each other. In other words, that there is an interpenetration or interweaving 
between the intentionality and object-as-perceived—between noema and noesis. What does this 
constitutive mutual interpenetration consist of? 
First, the perceptual object insofar as it is perceived has, even is a ‘sense’ or a ‘meaning’ for 
us (Husserl 1983, 214, <182>). There is here a twofold relation: the perceptual intentionality—
to smell—and the phenomenal character, the sense the perceptual object has for me—a smell.   
Second, and in clearer interactional way, I related auditorily only to audibilia, to sonic 
occurrences, and in a way audibilia determines that I relate auditorily to it.14 Multimodally, for 																																																																																																																																																																					
distinctions I am to examine in this paper in connection with the issue of content) purports to investigate ways in 
which aspectuality can be accurately specified in the case of perceptual experience.  
13 Unlike other intentional relations, perceptual intentionality requires that the perceptual object exists. I won’t 
pursue here the differences with other types of intentionality. I am aware that my commitment to the actual existence 
of the perceptual object is at odds with strands of phenomenological philosophy, and I hold that my position is both 
correct and defensible as a position Husserl himself held. I have visited this issue in different fashions in chapters 2 
and 3.  
14 I do not deal here with synesthesia. Noetic and noematic adjustments would be needed to accommodate to subjects 
that relate modally to objects or events that are usually thought to be perceived in other modalities. I do not foresee 
that these adjustments jeopardize any of the central tenets of the social enactive view of perception. The same applies 
to other perceivers, e.g. non-human, and their abilities to engage perceptually with otherworldly reality, as bats do 
with echolocation or some fish by a type of magnetic/electric type of perception.   
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example, I relate to someone speaking to me in a concrete way that includes both audition and 
vision (evinced in phenomena such as the McGurk effect). At the same time, the fact that 
someone addresses me verbally calls for my engaging with this occurrence in precisely the 
appropriate multimodal interaction.  
A virtue of the social enactive account is that it corrects the far-too-common habit in the 
philosophy of perception of treating all perceptual intentionality the same, and this means 
mostly to treat it as a type of vision, or secondarily as a kind of touch—in any case dealing 
primarily with spatially related properties such as size and shape.15 The relation between 
perceptual intentionality and object-as-perceived is an antidote to the idea that perception, as to the 
object and as to the subject, is a one-currency thing for the objects of perception.16  
Different versions of Enactivism have committed this mistake as well.17 Varela, Thompson, 
and Rosch’s influential Enactivism (Autopoietic Enactivism, as Hutto calls it) defines perception 
as “perceptually guided action” and defines action in motor terms (Varela, Thompson, and 
Rosch 1991, 173). Perhaps even clearer is the case of Noë’s Sensorimotor Enactivism, a 
refinement of some aspects of Varela et al.’s. Noë also defines perception is sensorimotor terms, 
but he goes one step further. It is not, he says, that perception is for action (as one could perhaps 
interpret from the Varela et al.’s), but that perceiving is constituted “by the exercise of a range of 
sensorimotor skills” (Noë 2004, 90). From another point of view, our capacity to perceive is 
constituted by sensorimotor knowledge. This exercise is not only the possibility of executing 
certain movements on the basis of what is sensed but rather in being able “to draw on one’s 
appreciation of the sensorimotor patterns mediating […] your relation to it” (2004, 90). This 
appreciation grounds movement made on the basis of things perceived, even in terms of 																																																								
15 Furthermore, the framework of veridicality, as I have been discussing it, seems to be built upon and depending on 
visibilia and sight: stable objects, clear boundaries, occlusion, geometrizable perspectival relations, and a relatively 
clear physics lingo. How different are things when we start thinking in the sense of smell: no stability, not much of a 
boundary there, no clear occlusions, no mathematizable relation, not easy and still not clear physics lingo. This 
should raise all sorts of concerns for philosophers of perception.    
16 Somehow relatedly, although from a non-perceptual field, Husserl explains that in the case of an object we value, 
the noema is the valued object, already valued, and not the valuable object, to which a valuing (the noesis) would be 
added (1983, 232, <198>). 
17 Others enactivists like Hurley and Hutto have not made this mistake.  
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affordances, but it also grounds the understanding, we might say the phenomenal character, of 
what is perceived. That is for sure an important precision, for it deals with the oft forgotten 
issue of the original consciousness of perception.   
The point that concerns me now, though, is Noë’s claim that the exercise of sensorimotor 
knowledge or skills allows “my perceptual experience to acquire full-blown perceptual content” 
(2004, 90).18 While Noë at times qualifies content as visual or spatial, his position does seem to 
be that all perceptual content is mediated in a sensorimotor way.  For instance, when discussing 
the possibility of individuating sensory modalities by reference to their objects, he says: “at the 
ground of our encounter with these different objects—appearances in one modality or another—
is sensorimotor skill” (2004, 107). He attributes to sensorimotor dependency the “suitable 
generality to play a basic role in an account of the nature of sensory modalities” (2004, 109). 
Inter-modal differences belong, in Noë’s view, not to a different kind of dependency but to 
different patterns of the sensorimotor type (2004, 109).19  
I contend that sensorimotor skills do not exhaust the ways in which perceptual content is 
mediated. Modalities other than vision provide evidence that (i) some perceptual content is not 
mediated by sensorimotor dependencies, and that (ii) intra-modal content, even if partly 
sensorimotor, cannot be all acquired in such way. Take the case of the bitter flavor of a 
																																																								
18 Sensorimotor skills and sensorimotor knowledge are for Noë the same. This is problematic despite his insistence 
that this type of knowledge is implicit, practical, and non-propositional. Daniel Hutto has charged Noë of proposing a 
conservative enactivism, and his criticism is based mostly off of this point: “Ultimately, the problem is that SMC 
[sensorimotor contingency] theorists fail to be radical enough. For, if we give up on the idea of experience as a static 
inner representation and truly think of perception as a kind of exploratory activity, extended over time, then there is 
no need to introduce ‘knowledge’ as a kind of bond that holds together various percepts in order to explain 
phenomena such as perceptual presence” (2006, 399–400). While Noë takes precautions in order to fend off precisely 
this type of objection, Hutto’s criticism succeeds, I think, in that knowledge is too rigid to capture the plasticity and 
the tacitness of the type of ability involved in sensorimotor dependencies. Enactivist views are better off not using the 
talk of knowledge in explaining what is grounded in action or practice, as I have shown in chapter 1. While I can’t 
discuss it here for reasons of thematic focus, I’d like to note that this mistake of Noë is linked to his position on (non-
)conceptualism, namely, that all perceptual content is conceptual. If, as he says, “concepts are practical skills, and 
some practical skills—some sensorimotor skills—are simple concepts” (2004, 199), first, we would be missing a 
concept for propositionally structured concepts, and second, we’d be running into familiar problems about dealing 
with experiential novelty.  
19 Although Thompson’s own work on mind and cognition is thorough in a number of ways, rich in nuances, and 
philosophically and phenomenology rigorous, his account of perception, mainly drawing from Noë’s Enactivism (and 
some of Noë’s collaborations with O’Regan and Hurley), suffers, for that reason, from the same drawback I have been 
addressing (2007). Intersubjectivity figures in his account of the mental as a mode of embodied activity, but not in 
perceptual terms. I do not have a position on Thompson’s take on cognition overall, but only on his position on 
perception. 
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sweetened beverage, coffee or tea, after you’ve eaten something very sweet. Or take, for 
instance, the perception of ambient temperature on a hot day. In these cases, there is nothing 
properly sensorimotor in perceptual content intrinsically, or in terms of the perspectival or 
motor potentialities of objects to be seen in different perspectives. Meaningful possible actions 
in these cases are not motor, yet they are actional, as the socially pragmatic dependencies 
illustrate. For the second variation, take the case of a deafening space. There are aspects of the 
auditory content that are spatial, such that I know that turning my head to one side seems to 
decrease the intensity of some sounds, or that in walking in a particular direction I may be 
getting out of the noisy area. Yet, concrete audible properties such as pitch or timbre, while can 
be affected by distance, are not perceived in terms of knowledge or a mastery of sensorimotor 
skills such that they are perceived insofar as I am able to perform movements that affect the 
perception or that make the perception meaningful.20  
I, however, would not dispute that spatial content is mediated, in its spatiality, by 
sensorimotor contingencies, as Noë defends. The mistake, once again, is in supposing that all 
perceptual content is spatial, or even that all content is not exclusively but at least 
fundamentally spatial, as for example Peacocke (though not an enactivist) has argued, by saying 
that spatiality is presupposed by "representational properties of all other types" and constitutes 
part of the "objective content of an experience" (Peacocke 1992, 61, 67). 
One case that disproves this claim is retronasal olfaction, which is, roughly speaking, 
smelling things in the mouth via the throat. Orthonasal olfaction happens through the nose, 
making even possible to find spatial information according to the smells coming in from the left 
and right nostrils (similar to interaural cues in the case of audition, or binocular comparisons, in 
the case of vision) (Gottfried 2005; Porter et al. 2005). Retronasal olfaction, in contrast, happens 
via the nasopharynx and is normally associated with the experience of flavor, when smell works 
																																																								
20 Further, a correct account of the nature of auditory content is based on time, rather than on space. Sounds do not 
have spatial boundaries: they are not experienced as starting here and finishing there. They are however experienced 
as having temporal boundaries, and it is precisely the succession of 'boundaries' what allows in many occasions to 
distinguish some sounds from others, in a manner structurally similar to a distinction figure-ground.  
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"in tandem" with the sense of taste (Porter et al. 2005; Stevenson 2009, 11; Gottfried 2005). In 
the case of retronasal olfaction of food or beverages in the mouth, subjects assign the position of 
the object of smell to the mouth (Small et al. 2005). An olfactory stimulus may be mistakenly be 
experienced as flavor when is in the mouth, and in other cases the relatively simultaneity of 
taste and smell makes it also difficult but not always impossible to parse out between tasting or 
smelling. Since the olfactory epithelium is located in the nose, there is no distinguishing of the 
part of the oral cavity where the molecules that reached the epithelium through the retronasal 
passage were released. Thus, the establishment of a point of origin located somewhere in the 
mouth and of a system of axes operating from that index (as when eyes are the point zero of 
observation of a cube in front of me) is an idle exercise for retronasal olfaction. There is no gain 
in such description: a system that would yield exact positions of odors in the mouth would yield 
information that is altogether irrelevant for the characterization of olfactory content acquired 
retronasally. While, lastly, intensity of smells may change with location, and dependent on the 
type of food or beverage at stake, it seems that such changes inside the oral cavity are 
negligible, if not altogether irrelevant, for a characterization of olfactory content, since 
differences of location inside the mouth do not contribute to differentiating smells from one 
another. Be it a feature common to all representationalisms or not, to affirm that perceptual 
content is always spatial (whether only, mostly, or fundamentally spatial) is incorrect, for it 
leaves out, for example, most experiences of flavor and some cases in the experience of smell. 
Back to the mutual constitutive interweaving of perceptual intentionality and object-as-
perceived, Husserl refers to the very concrete nature of the perceptual experience as one in which 
the perceptual object, as it is perceived (or in general meant) must be seen in a double specificity: 
in the how of its determinations, and in the how of its manner of givenness. The object in the how of its 
determinations (1983, 314, <272>) corresponds to determinations pertaining to the object, in its 
noematic aspect; the object in the how of its manner of givenness (1983, 228, 316, <194, 273>) 
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corresponds precisely to the way in which it is perceived, its noetic aspect. It is, in sum, “the 
sense of the object itself in its [double] how” (Micali 2012, 154; the translation is mine). 
To bring this series of reflections up a notch, let us consider a case involving emotional, 
socially rich interaction that includes a qualification of a sensory modal intentionality. For 
example, I can look at a tree somehow disinterestedly, but also look at it melancholically. In 
both cases, I am looking at the tree, but there is a difference, which in this case is a 
compositionality on the side of the intentional act, for my two ‘seeings’ of the tree are more 
complex than a simple seeing the tree ‘neutrally.’ They can be so different that unattended 
features of the physical tree can be made conscious in virtue of the attitude: perhaps soft colors 
or shapes capture our attention when we look at the tree melancholically, in contrast to those 
details being absent when we look at the tree customarily. Think of epochs, cultures, and artistic 
movements that developed and increased sensitivity or disinterest for certain sensual aspects of 
reality, due to artistic sensibilities or to vital needs, as it can be the case of a culture in which 
people rarely stop to see the soft tones of things, or as in the case of Eskimos, reportedly being 
able to make very subtle distinctions in ‘shades’ of white. 
We can think of a similar case in a different sensory modality by contrasting the customary 
perceptual exploration of an object and a careful exploration set in motion by a change in 
attention. Think for example of a known rock song, and in the contrast between the generic 
listening of it, where no change in pace and no virtuousity display call my attention at all, and 
when, for example, a guitar solo catches one’s attention.21 This attention shift may lead to 
increased attention to other features of the song. The fact that details raise to the surface in the 
careful exploration mode entails a variation on the side of the object-as-perceived (Husserl 1983, 
222–26, <189–92>). These attentional modifications of the object-as-perceived constitute further 
evidence of the dependence of perceptual content (specifiable in terms of the object-as-perceived) 
on the pragmatic component (Husserl 1983, 225, <192>). 																																																								
21 Notice that I use ‘object’ is a generic sense, but that is inadequate when applied to audible things. Following 
O’Callaghan, the case of auditory experience shows that the objects of sound are not object but events, chiefly because 
they do not have spatial but temporal boundaries (O’Callaghan 2007; O’Callaghan 2009). 
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4.1.2 Perceptual Intentionality, Detachability, High-Level Properties, and Perceptual 
Practices 
One of the central characteristics of the conception of perceptual content in the social enactive 
view is that it is a peculiar type of content externalism: content is dependent on the intentional 
relation and is non-detachable from experience because it is world-engaging. Simply put: the 
social enactive view never treats the contents of perception in detachment from experience, that 
is, from the relation in which they come to be and persist as contents, and this relation is an 
interaction with the world.  
A legitimate question is whether the distinction between perceptual object and object-as-
perceived is metaphysical or epistemological. The distinction is better conceived of as 
epistemological, for the following reason: no new entity is created when I perceive something. 
Certainly, the intentional act or relation is metaphysically different from the object it is about. 
But the object-as-perceived is the very same object but as it is in the relation, from a perspective. 
In other words: the object as a part of physical nature, described in a scientific-like manner, 
cannot capture the way in which it is taken up. The object as taken up can only be described 
within the relation or interaction that is established between perceiver and object. It seems 
plausible to offer an argument to make this very distinction between perceptual object and 
object-as-perceived into a metaphysical one. But accepting the distinction does not require that 
step; as a matter of theoretical parsimony, there is no need to encumber the theory with a 
metaphysical distinction, when an epistemological one suffices.  
At the core of the theory I am proposing, there is a rejection of the concern for veridicality 
that is at the heart of standard theories of perception (most of which are representationalists). 
As chapter 3 showed, the concern for veridicality is a piece of a conception of experience that 
entails detachability for contents. Criticisms of representational views on content are often 
directed, and not without reason, to a propositional construct of contents, that is, where 
contents are propositional attitudes. Standard views deal with this issue assuming that 
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perceptual experience and its contents are structured propositionally, mostly as beliefs, which 
makes individuation of content a truth-functional semantic matter. Siegel terms this view the 
Strong Content View, and argues that the representational view of content (that contents are 
truth-functional aspects of experiences that render them veridical or not) is not committed to 
the Strong Content View, that is, to the propositional construct (Siegel 2010, 73–74).  
But since both views treat content as detachable from experience (so an accuracy or 
veridicality verification can be performed), showing that content must be treated as non-
detachable works as an argument against both views, whether contents are cashed out in terms 
of propositions or not. As I have argued, the theoretical commitment to the perspectival 
appearing of things, as a function of the system of dependencies previously accounted for 
(idiosyncratic, socially and non-socially pragmatic) bars us from conceiving of content in 
independence from the perceptual interaction. And since it is in the nature of the conception of 
perceptual experience as interaction that perception is of the world, then it follows that there is 
no conceiving of perceptual content as non-world-involving. Since both the “[Representational] 
Content View” and the Strong Content View conceive of content as detachable they are on the 
wrong track.   
But there is something more substantive at stake here. The conception of content of the 
social enactive view, insofar as it is non-detachable from experience (meaning that it is non-
detachable from perceptual intentionality and from the world that is engaged in precisely the 
type of experience issuing from such intentionality), guarantees that if it is the case that in 
perception we are acquainted with high-level properties, there must be a perceptual intentional 
counterpart to those properties. This entails, for one, that perceptual intentionality—or 
intentionality in general—is not simply a type of mental state, narrowly (internally) 
individuated. To be in an intentional relation with something is then not simply a matter of a 
mental regard upon something, but a being related to things that is grounded in practice, and is 
hence embedded in an environment and a context, and embodied. Further, this argument makes 
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it all the more feasible that perceptual intentionality is also extended. Moreover, this reasoning 
furnishes another argument for the suitability of the perceptual practices accounted for in 
chapter 1 that constitute the ground level for our perceptual engagement with the world.  
 
4.2 Full Content Is Core Content plus Environing Content 
The central (albeit general) distinction between perceptual object and object-as-perceived touched 
upon the nature of content, but not upon its structure. This section takes up such task and offers a 
parsing of content as an account of its structure.22 I take heed of the fact that the worldly object is 
part of content, but put that aspect to rest. If raised again, the question about the real objetc can 
always be answered along the lines already presented. I now change gears.  
The structure of perceptual content must reflect three key elements. First, it is the holistic 
character of perceptual contents, in the sense that no isolated sensations or objects are ever 
present in perception, but always in a figure-context configuration.23 Each moment of a 
perception is concrete and unique in the very specificity of its determinations in its extended 
temporality. In each moment, a specific configuration of objects and surroundings takes place. 
Second, it must reflect a difference in the phenomenological structure of perceptual experience, 
namely, the coexistence of change and identity. This is the idea that perceptually, “a “continuous 
‘multiplicity’ is related to a ‘unity’” (Husserl 1983, 87, 237–238, <75–76, 203>). The case of a 
melody is immediately telling: the melody is itself perceived as a unity despite its continuous 
changes and yet the continuous changes can be perceived.24 Perceptions ‘keep’ their object in the 																																																								
22 This account began following broad distinctions Husserl used in the Logical Investigations, descriptive content and 
intentional content, intentional aspects and reel aspects, quality and matter of the act, etc. and the analysis later done 
by him in his Ideas I. It is not possible now to draw a clear line separating Husserl’s specific influences from this final 
account. I can say that a lot has remained, in terms of the spirit and mode of analysis—notwithstanding that spirit 
and mode come not only from the Investigations but also particularly from the Lectures on Thing and Space and the Ideas 
I, esp. §§128-135. I can only declare the Husserlian inspiration of this account.  
23 Agreeing with the key tenets of Gestalt theory, Merleau-Ponty says that the perceptual object is always in the 
midst of a field (2002). Merleau-Ponty’s attitude (and Husserl’s to an extent) was both sympathetic and critical 
towards Gestalt theory, which they refined and embraced. I do not offer an exegesis of their takes on Gestalt theory, 
nor on the way my my account of the structure of perceptual content differs from them or the original Gestalt 
theorists. My intent here is only to recognize the affinity.  
24 I grant that the case of a melody goes one step further than the mere stability within change, in the sense that the 
stability at stake can be said to be an emergent property. My argument here does not depend on the case of a melody, 
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face of changes in the subject, in the object, or in relational aspects (Husserl 1983, 313, <271>  
§§130-131).25 Furthermore, it is central that perception is able to withstand the fluid reality of 
perceptual sequences, for that enables us to establish relations with objects or events in the 
world, despite their being extended in time. Third, since content is a specification of aboutness, 
an account of content must provide us with conceptual and lexical resources to refer to the 
object of our perceptions, no matter how dynamic and ephemeral it might be.  
If we reflect for a moment on observing a tree as its branches move with the wind, or in the 
flavor experience of eating a piece of sushi, or in hearing an ambulance siren coming towards us, 
we will notice the following structural features: (1) the perceived totality is (2)-plus-(3) (full);  (2) 
that an object or situation (and its properties as well) remains as a referent (core); (3) that there 
is more than the intended object or situation as intended, such as the context environing the 
intended object or aspects of the object that were not intended (environing). While (2) is a 
holding of an object that carries a certain intentional permanence, the object is stable in the 
variations featured in the perceptual sequences (3).  The variations are not threats to the permanence 
of the object but the concrete manifestation of what permanence means for real objects. Further, my use 
of permanence should not be overstated, because objects may not be stable and can radically 
change or disappear, but for as long as a perceiver is able to identify actionally, predicatively, or 
																																																																																																																																																																					
and holds well for the case of my perception of a squirrel running up a tree. However, the case of the melody 
highlights a central commitment of the Social Enactive View, very much derived from the work of Merleau-Ponty, 
presented in chapter 2 when I introduced high-level properties in perception, and rehearsed above when perception 
was qualified as always perception of something as something, to wit: if I were to encounter a 'melody' as a mere 
sequence of notes without an internal configuration holding them together, giving it its sense of melody, then that 
would not be a melody. I would not be encountering a melody but a sequence of notes. It is, once more, the coming 
across something as a totality, that is, as a unity that overrides a hypothetical perception of just the parts (Merleau-
Ponty 1942, 93–94).  
25 A cursory taxonomy of possible changes in the perceptual relation may include: kinetic changes in object, subject, 
or both (the latter entails perspectival changes); changes in the object; bodily based changes in the subject, which, 
excluding those merely kinetic, can be interactional beyond movement (pressure put upon something, or more 
carefully exploring something—that is, a more narrowly defined physical interaction, and a more pragmatic 
component); psychological changes in the subject (such as attentional shifts); or changes in the environment, such as 
illumination, background noise, and other modal-specific environment-like variations, e.g. antecedent flavors or 
smells) (Husserl 1997, 75–76, <87–88>; §26; Drummond 1990, 146).  
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even imaginatively the object as the same in a sense, then there is a sense in which permanence 
applies to that which has remained throughout the changes.26 
(1) Core content + Environing content = Full content. Correlatively, we hereby have another 
equation: full – core = environing. This last one is particularly useful to reflect on aspects of our 
perception of things that often go unnoticed. Relatedly, this tool can help examine other sensory 
modalities and, if I am correct in identifying environing content as nonconceptual, also as a tool 
for analyzing nonconceptual content. 
(2) Core content. It is central to most perceptual experiences to focus on an object or event 
that remains a continuous referent throughout the perception (Husserl 1983, 224, <191>; §90–
99). Core content refers to the concrete objects (events or states of affairs) that guide or receive 
our attention, that is, the object on which we act and about which we predicate. In looking at a 
tree, even if I am walking past it while having it in my line of vision, it is undeniable that specific 
moments of the tree are different from each other in several respects, only one of which is the 
difference in the perspective from which I see the tree. And yet, it is undeniable that I perceive 
the tree at all time and can refer to it as the same tree. The analog analysis for the Ambulance 
Siren case should be clear.  
Core content is an abstractum that, so to speak, hovers over objects and environing 
changes—in the way a center of gravity of an object is abstract yet very real. What SEP 
accounts through the notion of core content is a desideratum of a theory of perceptual experience. 
Representationalism and other theories may have notions that attempt to respond to a similarly 
construed desideratum, e.g. perceptual object representation. SEP’s account is superior on 
account of the nature of content of which it is a specification and of the relation with environing 
content.  
																																																								
26 The connection between nature and structure is explored at length in the following chapter, where the chief claim 
is that perceptual content is pragmatically individuated. Both if we take the perceptual sequence as the model of 
perception, and the core content as an admissible pole in the description of content, we find that it is exactly the 
placement of events and aspects in a coherent sequence what characterizes perceptual experience. What type of 
coherence is this perceptual coherence? How does that apply to both the extended sequence and the singularized 
moments? These aspects are explored in the next chapter.  
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The Case of the Parked Car. What counts as a core content, as explained before, depends on 
the specific pragmatically guided perceptual intention at stake in each case. Say I am walking 
down the street and there is a car parked near me. I may notice the car or not. I may only notice 
the presence of a big object without thematizing it as a car. If I notice it, I may notice it in many 
ways: noticing its color or not, noticing where it is exactly parked, etc. My way of noticing it or 
not somehow depends on what I am doing: perhaps I am rushing to get somewhere and my 
surroundings are not something I have an interest in, except for efficiency. My level of 
awareness of the car is also related to my pragmatic engagement with it: if I barely notice the 
bulk I may be able to avoid it (and vice versa too), and my noticing it without awareness of 
model or color may be enough for a more involved pragmatic relation, such as intently standing 
behind it while another car goes by. In all these cases, I take a position about the car, which 
affects what perceptual properties I notice. Thus, when I am in the vicinity of a car, it is not the 
case that I always encounter a car as such, with its many characteristics, and that my perceptions, 
actions and reactions about it can be defined objectively.  
Perceptual intentionality relates to ‘core contents’ depending on our pragmatic relation to 
things. This intentionality can take the shape of a clear intently intending the object, but it can 
also lack this heightened purposeful awareness of an object. The first situation is the case of an 
intently listening to a mosquito flying around me to avoid it or catch it, where other objects or 
events surrounding me may move, as it were, to the background. The second situation is one in 
which my attention may be wandering and only transitorily focusing on things. This can be 
illustrated by a person suffering a poor weather’s day. She may not be intently looking at the 
cloudy sky, or concsciously feeling a very cold temperature, or intently listening to a noisy 
street where she is waiting for the bus. And yet, as she waits for the bus, her attention may fall 
upon the low light that makes objects look unattractive. Her attention may be momentarily 
taken by a cold wind reminding her, as it were, of how cold it is. It seems still that a minimal 
awareness, not necessarily an intently focusing on things, is necessary for there being a 
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perceptual experience with its corresponding perceptual content. In all these cases, however, 
core content is not specified in advance on the side of the world, because the same world full of 
objects and situations, may be taken differently at different moments. In the case of the car 
parked on the street, the core content, the referent of my perception could be the bulky object 
that I avoid or the brand-XYZ yellow car of beautiful lines and bold color I am admiring. In the 
case of the street where a woman waits for the bus, a specific building across the street can 
feature as core content, but core content could also be the collection of building and objects 
looking unattractive under the dark cloudy sky.  
Further, there is the explicit singling out of the object as it occurs in verbalization: we refer 
to objects of the world as stable objects. This element underlies a deeper, stronger point: we 
experience objects of the world as stable and unitary, or conversely, we experience the world as 
comprised of objects that we see or hear, of which we speak, upon which we act. This is core 
content of, and, as this type of isolated entity, it constitutes a layer of perceptual content. 
(3) Environing content. The perceptual sequence in which the object or situation is presented 
as the same does not only consists of the object at stake. It also comprises (i) objectual, 
unintended aspects, and (ii) extra-objectual (hence unintended) aspects and properties, extended 
temporally, (at times) spatially, and modally, reaching all the way down to the moment of initial 
contact with physical aspects of the world. Environing content is a specification of the 
perceptually relevant ‘environings’ of more keen perceptions.   
Just as the perceptual object is the one that exists in space and time and the one that we 
relate to (act upon, refer to, think about) in its perspectival determinations, it is of the essence of 
perception that, as a whole, we find a continuous “braid of partial synthesis of increase and 
decrease [of the relative givenness of sides and parts of things], in which, to be sure, the 
individual strands of the braid have and can have no autonomy” (Husserl 1997, 95, <113>). 
Each same object is presented in a series of changing aspects or perspectives (Husserl 1983, 87, 
<75>), some of which belong to the focal object and some others to context. But whether they 
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belong to the same object (the swirling colors of a colorful kite), or to the extra-intentional 
aspects of the object (the changing illumination of an object in a case in which I am not 
concerned with lighting) or to context, they do not affect the sameness of core content. Hence, 
these variations are thought of as belonging to environing content, and environing content can 
be said to be an ever-flowing multiplicity of moments.  
The unintended aspects of the intended object ((i) above) are, for example, the colors in 
colored things when my intending has nothing to do with color. For instance, in tasting a piece 
of sushi I do not normally intend its color (or its shape), and it yet makes part of the experience. 
To use an example of Husserl’s, this is the way the whiteness of a piece of white paper is part a 
visually based interaction with the paper (e.g. I want to grab it). It is the same for feelings 
accompanying the objects that are felt in a given way, as with the melancholy that may 
accompany my smelling an old house full of memories for me. These aspects are extra-
intentional because I do not intend those aspects and they still accompany the whole and are part 
of content (Husserl 1983, 75, <65>).  
There is another fashion that this still objectual yet unintended environing content can 
take. This is the case of heavily amalgamated habitual associations and entrenched ‘known 
connections’ related to an object—possibilities or properties—that may present themselves 
when the object is intended in certain manners (Husserl 2001b, 113). A piece of china porcelain 
may, for instance, be intended as a piece of decoration on a mantel, and yet, its fragile character 
is perceptually presented with it, although perhaps only explicitly in the face of impending 
danger (for the china piece’s integrity).  
Besides the aspects still belonging to the object but that are unintended in core content (i), 
environing content refers to the surroundings of the core (ii). These surroundings are, first, 
temporal, as a function of the dynamic nature of perceptual experience in the Social Enactive 
View. For instance, in my tasting a food item over the course of a meal, what I ate right before 
such item is part of the full content of the tasting of that food item, for it can be the case that the 
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previous flavor influences the new one. A sip of wine immediately before a bite of brie cheese 
will somehow affect the flavor of the cheese, and the flavor of the wine plus cheese lingering in 
my mouth has the potential of influencing the flavor of yet another piece of cheese, this time 
perhaps a camembert cheese. Or following an example of William James’s, hearing thunder 
must be specified at times as thunder-after-silence (or thunder-after-thunder), for the 
phenomenal character of the experience changes in one case or the other. Another useful 
example is that of dipping both hands into lukewarm water after dipping one hand into warm 
water and the other into cold water. The lukewarm water feels as if with two different 
temperatures. The hand that was initially in the warm water container will feel the lukewarm 
water colder than the other hand would, and vice versa, because the second hand was dipped 
first in cold water. When hands are in the last (lukewarm) container, that water there is the core 
content, and the two previous buckets, one warm, one cold, are the environing content. 
Relevant environings can also be, in several but not all modalities, spatial. In my perception 
of a colorful house, for example, the colors of the surroundings matter, for colors are context-
sensitive. As the artist and educator Josef Albers put it in his famous Interaction of Color, “a 
color has many faces” (Albers 2006, 77).  
Also on the normative side, we have that all the concrete aspects of perceptual sequences—
of those braids just mentioned— refer to “possibilities of fulfillment” (Husserl 1997, 105, <125–
26>) and the pragmatic possibilities of perceptual acts, which I will explore in chapter 5. 
As to its normative and explanatory work, environing content accounts for the relations 
between the sides, parts, elements, and transitions that form perceptual continua. To specify the 
color of the surroundings of a yellow house entails that surrounding colors are part of an 
explanation of the color of the core content, and would also be part of the explanation of another 
color interaction occurring there, as it could be the perceived color of the clothing and umbrella 
of another person passing by. In the context of a meal, to say that part of the content of a 
specific perception includes the flavor of item eaten or drank right before means that within the 
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proper zoom level, those previous flavors partly explain the current flavor, as well as other 
aspects of the whole perceptual interaction.  
4.2.1 Lowest-Level Interpretive Take on Physical Reality: The Roots of Normativity 
A theory of perception should have something robust to say about the sense in which there 
is in perception a contact with a physically defined reality. The Social Enactive view has a 
position about this, and it is spelled in terms of perceptual content: perception starts to be 
contentful at the very moment of acquaintance of a perceiver with sensible physical and 
chemical properties of the external world. Since perception is a pragmatically guided normative 
field, to say that there is content at such basic level means that the explanatory desideratum of 
content—that content as an explanation of the internal transitions and transformation of the 
way the world is presented in perceptual interaction—finds there a partial answer. In other 
words, understanding how and in what sense aspects of the physical world come to be 
perceptual is necessary to understand what it is for perceptual content to be content. Also, this 
discussion bears weight in accounting for the modal (also inter- and multi-modal) component of 
our taking up aspects of the world in perception. 
This topic requires a much longer account than what I can offer here but my purpose at 
this stage is simply to situate the content of this basic contact with the world within the 
taxonomy of content provided and to articulate the fundamental rationale under which it is 
considered as content. This rationale is also as able to give normativity some anchoring in the 
physical reality and its interaction with perceivers. The details of the psychological mechanisms 
by which this takes place or the specific constraints, derived for instance from scientific accounts 
of neural networks of multisensory integration or about the physiology of sensory receptors are 
not addressed here, but they do not affect the conceptual point I am making.  
To start off, within the parsing of content proposed, the content of perception at the 
moment of contact with the world belongs to environing content. It is useful to notice that this 
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moment embodies the nature of the fundamental distinction between the perceptual objects and 
the object-as-perceived.  
On the one hand, there is a physical world whose physical characteristics (reflecting light, 
having a particular kinetic molecular energy, having a precise material composition, the 
vibrations of airwaves at certain frequencies, etc.) make it possible for a being like me to 
perceive it, that is, for me to take heed of it in the manner in which I do (as being visible, as 
having a temperature, as telling of shape, as opposing resistance, as being audible, etc.). On the 
other hand, it is the fact that I can engage in perceptual relation with those aspects of the 
physical world, that is, that I am able to be about them in the way that the different sensory 
modalities and inter and multimodal interactions are about things. Through the sense of smell, 
for instance, we are acquainted with things in their smelling. But in things’ smelling we are also 
about smells’ connections with flavors, with past experiences, with hedonics, and with the ability 
to think and talk about the things we smell. It is not only that there is a what-it-is-like about 
them at a given moment, but more generally that they come to be for us in a sense that exceeds 
our phenomenal consciousness of them.  
This general perspective according to which we can entertain in specific perceptual ways 
characteristics, aspects, or events of the world translate, at the present level, in the following 
insight: there are aspects of the world that are seen from a subjective standpoint when both parts, 
perceiver and worldly aspect, enter in a relationship. It is not possible for those physical aspects 
of the world to remain merely objective when they enter into a relation with a subjectivity. Once 
they are made conscious, they are not anymore perspective-less, neutral. Thus, physically 
defined things of the world are always taken up by consciousness in a particular way: they are 
animated—minded—, they come to be as a sense.  
But, what does it mean for physical aspects of the world to be animated, to become minded, 
or to be taken up perceptually?  
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In this analysis I somewhat follow Husserl' referred to this moment as the apprehension of 
hyletic stuff—also translated as hyletic stock or hyletic data.27 This is in no way sense data. The 
term hyletic points to the idea that there is a sense, acknowledged above, in which we become 
acquainted with stuff. Although we must acknowledge the existence of this vaguely qualified 
stuff, it is not quite ‘something’ yet, and we can’t speak of them in precise terms. This stuff is 
perceptual, yet barely so. It’s a limit notion than can’t yet be jettisoned, for it is part of the 
causal determinants of perception.28  
So we have, on the side of the world physical properties. We don’t talk about these 
properties from the point of view of experience, but sideways, from the point of view of a 
physical description of the world. In turn, such physical description is itself part of an experience 
and cannot claim to reach things themselves. For someone concerned with the description of 
that matter as physics or chemistry does, another phenomenological analysis of such scientific 
acquaintance with stuff is appropriate—and would indeed be necessary in a project that wanted 
to account for our contact with the world in all domains and not just perceptually. That is not 
my task here.29  
The taking up (or ‘apprehending’) of sensory material in perception is an interpretive act. 
The taking up of physical stuff in experience refers, at a basic level, to the very experiencing of 																																																								
27 Husserl began this discussion in the Investigations and continued and nuanced it later in his Ideas I (Husserl 2001b, 
§§20, 22–31; Husserl 1983, §§85–86, 97). Welton and others hold that this framework was abandoned by Husserl in 
the years leading up to Ideas I, and replaced by the noetic-noematic correlation, and later on by a construction in 
terms of perceptual sense (Wahrnehmungssinn or Auffassungssinn) (Welton 2000, 183; See also Crowell 2013, 130–131). 
The reason for that appraisal seems to be that Husserl must have abandoned a simplistic matter/form or 
content/schema view in which we could separate data from the interpretation of data. Reasons of space prevent me 
from exploring this issue in detail, but for the present purposes it will suffice to say that, while I agree that a 
simplistic division is untenable, in my view a data element and an interpretive element are still necessary in order to 
understand the constitution of objects for perception—and so Husserl thought as the passages from Ideas I attest to. 
The difference is the way I think the hyletic data should be treated. The view I propose can reconcile the 
Auffassung/hyletic data, with noetic-noema, and with perceptual sense (Wahrnehmungssinn). 
28 The causal aspect of perception is here understood as a confluence of causal-sensitive aspects rather than a matter 
of a linear chain ending with a mental event. The causal relation is not a sequence that starts with objects emitting 
impulses and finishes with a mental, inner event identified with the experience of the property associated with the 
objective impulse, that is, a representation in the classical sense. Actually, the causal antecedent of perception is a 
physical occurrence of the world not intrinsically understood as an object. Perception begins once this hyletic stuff is 
taken up as a perceptual-meaningful something. That something may or may not be an already defined object. 
29 Yet in order to block the objection that this position leads to an endless regress, I hold that since we can never get 
out of every relationship we have with stuff—so we never achieve a position from where ultimate foundations can be 
laid or assessed—, in dealing with basic questions we are in many-legged situation, where one or more legs must stay 
in the ground in order to move the others, and all can’t be up at the same time. The foundational dream of a complete 
revision—or a complete foundation—is wishful thinking.  
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physical realities in a phenomenal way, such that, for example, a particular range of the 
electromagnetic spectrum is taken up as colored stuff by seeing beings. This colored stuff—an 
initial perceptual determination—would be what Husserl called hyletic stuff (Drummond 1990, 
144). Notice that the former is part of the perceptual, while the latter is part of the as-perceived 
aspects of things, as understood in 4.1 above.30 This type of interpretation depends indeed on 
the type of beings we are, and it also evinces pragmatic dependencies (both socially and non-
socially constituted) for it situates sensory-based occurrences in a system of perceptual 
references that forms a horizon that is open for action in certain ways and not in others.31 
Not only do I relate auditorily to sonic stuff, but also sonic stuff constraints my relating to 
it: it picks, as it were, my auditory relating to it. In somewhat a related fashion Husserl says: “I 
cannot rejoice in anything unless what I rejoice in stands before me in the hues of existence ” 
(2001b, 137). By extension, I can’t hear what does not present itself sonically, and I can’t feel as 
slimmy what I can’t touch one way or another. I can’t say it’s acrid what only presents itself 
auditorily, and I can’t say it’s glossy or mate what is not in the first place visible.32  
By the same token, this interpretive taking up of physical realities bears a connection with 
other senses in which things appear, for example, whether something appears as familiar or 
exceptional, as melodic or harmonic with other parts, and others similar categories. We have 
																																																								
30 I offered an initial discussion of the temporality of perception in connection to experience and consciousness in 
chapter 3, section 3. I was there concerned for the first time with a proper understanding of the causal element in 
perception. It is important to acknowledge that there is at this level a question about temporality, particularly as to 
how the temporal aspect of this initial contact with stuff connects with the temporal sequence of experience. The 
temporal structure of perception requires that initial ‘impressions’ do not disappear immediately and are ‘active’ in the 
following ‘impression,’ or in other words, that there is a lingering impression turned into anticipation towards 
continuous perception of objects, for otherwise it would not be possible to experience objects as continuous, and that 
we do and is at the very basis of a perceiver’s capacity to relate to the world. This is what Husserl calls the temporal 
structure of inner consciousness—impression-retention-protention.  Now, this structure must have a counterpart at the 
level of the taking up of hyletic stuff. I cannot undertake that analysis at any length here. 
31 We find here the idiosyncratic, socially pragmatic and non-socially constituted pragmatic dependencies I have 
proposed above. Following the argument about the intentional structure of position-taking of section 2.3.3 above, the 
perceiver is a pragmatic position-taker, so there are reasons to think that connection between the pragmatic and the 
interpretive taking-up of stuff reaches all the way down to the basic level of contact with reality. Further, internal and 
external horizons of possible fulfillments are already at work in the objects we perceive and determine the 
possibilities and impossibilities for perceptual nexuses (Husserl 1973, 103–106, 122; Husserl 1970, 165; Husserl 1983, 
322–23, <279>; Drummond 1990, 150–151). 
32 An analysis of sensory modal predicates—acrid, tart, bitter, rough, brilliant, etc.—, and the connections between 
sensory related uses and their metaphorical uses can shed interesting light on the philosophy of perception, 
traditionally limited to shape, size, and color.  
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here the case of a sensation being taken up, which means that it stands in definite relations to 
others and to perceptual fields.  
While I do not do the fine-grained work here, a further development would contribute to 
an account of sensory modalization (in one modality, intermodally, or multimodally), that is, 
what counts as a modality, as combinations of modalities in one, or even regarding modal 
compatibility. This may have a bearing on cases like the case (presented in section 2.3.3) of 
research in social cognition showing differences between the way some Americans visually 
perceive scenes and the way some East Asians do. The fact that the same “patch of light” is 
taken up by some as independent or as standing in relation to nearing patches is not a feature of 
the physical occurrence, but a function of the pragmatic intentionality at stake.  
Because the Social Enactive View sees the perceptual relation as an interactive coupling, 
this basic acquaintance level is in no need of a decision as to what comes first, whether it is the 
interacting subject or a radiating world. Since perception is subject to pragmatic dependencies, 
there is no question of physical aspects in a sort of void and (in place of a real perceiver) a 
sensor. This means, among other things, that no useful or interesting definition of the physical 
occurrence of perception belongs to the physical occurrence itself. The physical event is nothing 
without the interpretive taking up of it. Unlike Berkeleian idealism, for which that which is 
perceived is that which is, in this account there is a distinction between “qualities of objects and 
hyletic data” (Lévinas 1995, 40). The distinction, though, is not ontological but epistemological, 
in keeping with the analysis of the perceptual object and the object-as-perceived (Drummond 
1990, 142). 
By way of conclusion, a few clear points. I do not mean that airwaves of such and such 
frequency and wavelength, or chemical compounds in the air of such and such molecular weight, 
or rays of light of such and such frequency are part of the contents of perception. The reason is 
not, as one may think, a supposed lack of certainty about physico-chemical configurations being 
the correlates of perceived properties. The reason is that, as physical properties, they are no 
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content of perception yet—no matter how close the correlation between physical properties and 
perceived properties, there is an irreducible (yet somewhat bridgeable) between them. What is 
part of environing content are the perceptually meaningful aspects once the physical stuff is 
taken up, as I have been illustrating.  
The moment physico-chemical aspects of the world become perceptual matter they are 
specified in perceptual ways: they are sonorous, smell-like, colored, etc. Often, those aspects 
feature in distinct objectualities: in the loud ambulance siren, in the smelly trash can I walk by, 
in the sweet hot chocolate I drink. It is plain that the sonorous nature of what I perceive as a 
loud ambulance siren is closely related to the core content. What makes it environing content 
still is that when I focus on the ambulance siren, I do not focus on the sonority of the ambulance 
siren. Likewise, when I walk by a smelly trash can my attention is directed to the disgusting 
smell as disgusting and not to its olfactive nature, as a philosopher of perception in investigative 
mode would.   
The question gets tougher in the case where I focus on the sensory nature itself of 
something. As I write these words, I decide to play music and to focus on the music. But I 
attempt to focus on it as it is something I can hear, as sonorous or audible, and not as it being 
the sound of a guitar, or it being a voice, loud or not, high-pitched or low-pitched. Merely as 
something I can hear. I think I can do this, but it takes a very particular turn of attention—I 
easily slip into the form sound takes, or in general into musical categories. So the question is: 
when I focus on the sonorous nature of the occurrence, following the characterizations I have 
offered, is the sonorous nature of the sonorous occurrence core content or environing content? 
My take is that what in this case figures as core content is a sophisticated abstraction but not 
the sonorous nature in which airwaves come to be sound for me. Once I can focus on the 
sonority of sounds, sounds are already sonorous. Hence, the sonorous nature of sonorous 
occurrences, in the sense that they initially are taken us by the embodied perceiver I am, is 
environing content.   
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There is another case. Basic perceptually meaningful aspects are often not part of 
objectualities: they can be vague, foggy or hazy.33 Let me say a word about cases like the latter.   
The totality of environing content also includes marginal aspects that may or may never 
saturate or become features of core content (or even of featuring in more central (less marginal) 
aspects of environing content). We can characterize this aspect of environing content as 
potentiality, indication, symptom, hint, clue, trace, or inkling---all of them related somehow to 
clear perceptual formations, which they may never come to be.34 Part of the difficulty in 
pointing to these unsaturated, low-intensity aspects of perception is precisely that they are not a 
concrete thing yet but they are not nothing.35 In a fuller account of the transition from the 
unsaturated to the saturated talk of intensities and magnitudes will be needed.  While I don’t 
offer here a full-fledged account of these aspects, the initial indications provided left the domain 
almost readied for further development. The framework of pragmatic individuation of content 
and the discussion of normativity, both coming up in chapter 5, will make it clearer how a full 
account of the perceptual unsatured—indicios perceptuales—plays an irreducible role in 
perception.36  																																																								
33 Upon further examination, which I cannot offer here, nonconceptual content considerations would play a central 
role in favor of individuation of perceived properties at the experiential level itself, as it is the case with rather 
capricious perceptual continua such as the interplay of colors due to the play of light and tree leaves or as random 
reflections of things in water. 
34 A very precise term for what I am aiming at is the Spanish word indicio. In English, I settle with inkling.  
35 A similar, and connected, difficulty is faced by theorization of nonconceptual content, for it requires putting in 
words in somewhat clear terms what is hazy and non-concrete. 
36 A basic puzzle on the theory of the unsaturated has to do with the status of environing content as unconscious 
perceptions (in the sense of lack of awareness) or implicit aspects of perception. Thompson (2007, 262–266) offers the 
following diagnosis: Block, for instance, would accept these implicit aspects as a case of access-consciousness without 
phenomenal-consciousness. The problem there is that not every aspect that figures implicitly in perception, in the 
Social Enactive view, is characterized by its availability for rational decision and control of action. On the other hand, 
Thompson says, Noë and O’Regan object to Block, and hold the position that perceptions without awareness are no 
perceptions. Thompson’s outlining of a solution to this puzzle is compatible with the Social Enactive View. Three 
aspects are to be retained from Thompson’s (and used in further developments of the issue of the perceptual inklings). 
(1) Within the framework of “temporal extended dynamics” there is room for both implicit and explicit aspects (I 
think that the formulation according to which “there is no differentiation” between them is wrong (2007, 263)). He is 
right, though, in pointing to “moments of comparatively weak and strong affective force” in what he calls intrinsic 
aspects. I cast these differences in terms of intensities and magnitudes, correlated with marginality or centrality 
within environing content. (2) Activity and passivity play a definitive role here, which in my taxonomy of content are 
somewhat mirrored by core-content and environing-content. Pragmatic individuation of full content is central here. 
(3) Affectivity and receptivity are at play in perception in the sense that one is receptive to what has already affected 
oneself, and affectivity refers to what has “a kind of affective force or allure, or affective ‘grabbiness,’ in relation to 
one’s attention” (2007, 263). Spelling out the interplay between affectivity and receptivity, Thompson says: 
“something becomes noticeable, at whatever level, owing to the strength of its allure or grabbiness, emerging into 
affective prominence or salience, or relief, while other things become less noticeable owing to the comparative 
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4.3 The Charge of Phenomenalism 
The account of content of the Social Enactive view is so closely linked to its conception of 
perceptual experience that several of the objections against the parsing of content just offered 
are actually objections against the conception of experience at stake: questions about the 
autonomous nature of content and the directness of perception, about the centrality of 
veridicality, and about the issue of high-level perceptual properties. Those have been addressed 
in previous chapters, and answering again to them in content-specific terms would require a 
rehearsal of the same arguments. That, I won’t do here. 
There is another important objection against this view on content that pertains, not to the 
structure of content, which this chapter focuses on, but to the normativity internal to the 
dynamic account of content. A strong version of that objection has been put forth by Siegel, and 
it consists in the claim that to the extent the Social Enactive View allows for perceptual 
comparisons, then it is committed to a representationalist, autonomous view of content, 
entailing a concern for veridicality. It will be taken up in chapter 5. I will answer to this 
objection once the social enactive take on normativity has been established.  
There is, however, an objection that applies directly to the nature and structure of content 
I have offered. This objection has been raised by John Drummond, initially in response to 
Gurwitsch’s reading of Husserl’s concept of noema, or object-as-perceived.37 Succinctly, the 
charge is that a view that takes the perceptual object (and in consequence, the object-as-
perceived) as perceptual continuum is committed to phenomenalism, because a whole like a 
continuum cannot be but understood as a whole composed of parts, and whole-parts conceptual 
framework betrays the extended temporality it was aiming at, rendering us unable to account 
for the real world.  																																																																																																																																																																					
weakness of their allure” (2007, 263–264). There is a significant agreement between the Social Enactive View and 
Thompson’s Autopoietic Enactivism.  
37 In personal communication, Drummond has also raised this criticism against my view that the perceptual object is 
a perceptual continuum.  
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At a deeper level, the problem with phenomenalism is that it has the impossibility to affirm 
categorically that in perception we perceive the real world, that is, real object, events, and states 
of affairs. At most, the objection goes, perception gets acquainted with parts of the world, but 
the holding together of those parts and its product, the whole of perceptual experiences of 
objects, has the status of a mental construction. For phenomenalism, the world is only made of 
contingent appearances—mind-made reifications of a world that is separate from us. To be sure, 
phenomenalism has been around for centuries, has been espoused by several philosophical 
schools, and been challenged by philosophers of different persuasions (Cf. Noë 2004, 79ff.). 
Austin, for instance, engaged with Ayer and Price—I examined others facets of that debate in 
chapter 3. I focus on the Gurwitsch-Drummond debate because I take the decisive issue to be 
one that is at the very center of the Social Enactive View; an issue that comes from the 
phenomenological tradition. The issue is that in perception we deal with a temporally extended 
world, and perceptual object and perceptual content are constrained to this dynamism.    
I contend, contra Drummond that the perceptual object—in the broad sense I have been 
using, i.e. as a placeholder for objects, states, and states of affairs—and its correlative content is 
normally a perceptual sequence or continua, and that this is possible without falling into 
phenomenalism. It follows from the Social Enactive account of content structure that specific 
objects are, even in cases of continua, fully accounted for in their being objects of phenomenal 
awareness, thought, predication, and action. 
In the perceptual discussion on phenomenalism, the key is the status of the relation 
between real object and object-as-perceived. It is, in other words, the problem of content, or what 
is the same, of the perceptual object as it presents itself in perception. Is the object-as-it-is-presented-
in-perception/as-it-features-in-perceptual-interaction (perceptual content) a composition of 
parts in a mind-projected unity, hence necessarily separated from the world and only 
contingently matching it at times? Or is the unity and reality of the object-as-it-appears-in-
perception such that the familiar problems associated with a gulf separating mind and world do 
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not appear? And in relation to the Social Enactive View: Do the nature and structure of content 
presented (perceptual object/object-as-perceived and full=core+environing), which responds to the 
constraint that the objects of perception are temporally extended continua, entail either phenomenalism 
or the type of realism that the Social Enactive View espouses? 
Let’s look more closely to the problematic alternative Gurwitsch proposed. Drummond 
diagnoses the problem with Gurwitsch in the whole-part model, to wit: “On Gurwitsch’s view, 
that an identical thing appears in each of its appearances is a consequence of [a] whole-part 
structure, for in grasping the appearance (the part), we grasp a part which has a functional and 
systematic significance for the whole and, hence, we grasp, albeit imperfectly, the whole itself” 
(Drummond 1990, 96). On such view, the real object is a “system of appearances,” or a system of 
a totality of adumbrations or presentations (Mohanty 2008, 382; Drummond 1990, 150).38  
But what is the nature of this system? Is the system given, or is it idealized? On 
Gurwitsch’s view, the system is ideal: “[such] Gestalt-whole is an ideal object” (Drummond 
1990, 97). Drummond says, is that since Gurwitsch only allows for the grasping of parts, the 
whole is never given—rather it is posited as an ideal, and it does not matter that it is qualified as 
a system of adumbrations with functional and systematic significance. Functional qualifications 
notwithstanding, the whole is an ideal.  
This type of analysis reduces each appearance to a moment of a whole that is never given 
and only theorized as a Kantian regulative idea (Mohanty 2008, 394). This path invites idealistic 
interpretations that counter the realist spirit that I am articulating, for it declares the 
impossibility of real contact with objects in the world. The object is thought of as a transcendent 
unachievable infinity, yet rationally present and regulative. While I do not think that Mohanty 
thinks of the system of appearances, of the perceptual content, in a way that makes of it an 																																																								
38 By way of illustration, let us recall what Merleau-Ponty says of a visually perceived house: “the house itself is not 
the house seen from nowhere, but the house seen from everywhere” (2002, 69). Notice though that the house is never 
seen from every angle. From the point of view of the actual perspective we have each time, based on sensory stimuli, 
the system of appearances Mohanty and Gurwitsch talks about is never actually given. Further, Merleau-Ponty’s 
dictum entails that the house itself is never experienced. I do not think that Merleau-Ponty falls into phenomenalism, 
but this affirmation—aided with a bit of decontextualization—allows us to see how attempting to escape one type of 
intellectualizing illusion—the house itself as an unanalyzed house seen from nowhere—may lead to another 
illusion—that the feeling of presence of the whole house in perception means that the house is seen from everywhere.  
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entity separate from the real object, which Gurwitsch does, I regard his interpretations as 
providing at least too weak of a bridge between appearances and object. It must be noted, 
however, that with this rejection not every teleological account of the perceptual object is ruled 
out.  
This conception regarding parts and whole “raises problems concerning how to understand 
the categorial differences between senses (or perceptual appearances) and the object itself and 
how to understand the possibility of perceiving things themselves” (1990, 98). In other words: 
by using the categories of part and whole in analyzing the conjunction of identity and change 
that characterizes perceptual experience, and which has animated the parsing of content I have 
offered, we are unable to properly understand the relations between change and identity, or 
between, as Husserl put it, a “continuous multiplicity” and a “unity,” which I set out to account 
for in the first place (Husserl 1983, 87, 237–238, <75–76, 203>).   
The reason of this categorial incongruence, in Drummond’s view, is that when only 
individual appearances are given real status, they are treated statically, and the whole is posited 
as ideal. This type of analysis “abstracts from the temporal process of the perception as a whole. 
Whole/part analysis […] is essentially static analysis and cannot be employed in the analysis of 
the perceptual process as a process” (Drummond 1990, 151; Emphases in the original).  
On the Social Enactive View, as well as for Husserl, these three constraints are honored: 
the perceptual object is a perceptual continuum, not necessarily but possibly identified with a 
physical, unitary object; whatever is presented in perception is presented with a sense of 
wholeness that belongs to perceptual experience (despite the fact that the object as a whole can 
never be present to sensory receptors).  
Let me now elaborate the point where I think the Social Enactive View and Drummond’s 
view differ. This will show why, first, the Social Enactive View is not subject to the 
phenomenalism objection, and why the Social Enactive View, while incorporating several 
features of Drummond’s analysis, is an improvement upon it.  
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For Drummond, the way to think of the perceptual object is not in a whole-part model, but 
rather in terms of identity and manifolds. The idea is that the identity of the object is taken as a 
given, which is presented in a temporally extended manner in “a manifold of appeareances.” He 
adds: “The identical is that which is given in and through a manifold; hence one of its sides or 
aspects is present whereas others are absent, although they can in time be brought to presence” 
(1990, 151).  
In Drummond’s view, the object is a unitary object and it is the focus of perception. The 
object is certainly given in a temporally extended manner but it is always a unitary object. This 
is what I think distinguishes our positions: I do not think it is necessarily an issue of identity-in-
manifolds, but identities-and-manifolds.  
Drummond focuses on unitary objects and theorizes content as the object as it is presented. 
Manifolds are for him the appearances in which and through which an object itself is presented. 
But there is no clear room for what surrounds “the” object.   
Drummond is moved in these considerations by a concern for the stability of the object. 
The way he proposes to ensure such stability is to analyze the perceptual relation as always 
having a definite object that is unitary and stable. Not having a defined object as the perceptual 
object jeopardizes the stability of the object, hence, the certainty that perception is of real 
objects, and not the mind-projected unity that we fear in phenomenalism.  
Contrariwise, I have insisted that I used “perceptual object” to mean objects, events, and 
states of affairs. I have also said that I understand the perceptual object to be a perceptual 
continuum or sequence. Notice, furthermore, that I take content to be the addition of both core 
and environing content and not just core content. Further, I have clarified that core is not 
always highly defined and that whatever count as a core is not predefined by worldly objects, 
but is defined by perceptual intentionality. In perceptually interacting with the world, I do not 
only interact with (physical) ‘objects’ with precise spatio-temporal boundaries. I used examples 
in the experience of flavor and audition to illustrate this point.   
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The Bicycle Ride case features a good example of a perceptual continuum. Drummond has 
responded saying that we should distinguish between the phases in “seeing the road as the 
bicycle moves along it” and the concrete object-as-perceived, namely, “the road as perceived 
over the entire, temporally extended perception. The road perceived is a stable object, even 
though it is disclosed only in its salient features and even thought it is disclosed in a multiplicity 
of noematic phases. The dynamism is at the level of the multiplicity of experiences and the 
noematic phases, the stability is found in the temporally extended unified experience and its 
object” (Drummond 2014).   
My qualification of the road lends itself to the criticism, but I contend that Drummond 
would be at a loss if the perceptual object (in my broad sense) were more complex, dynamic and 
plastic. For instance, I hold that a perceptual object can be defined this way: while riding my 
bike, the perceptual object is the whole continuum made up by the changing road, the number of 
cars, building, signs, and people I pass by, the different thermic sensations in my skin, my 
touching the wind, the smells around me. Perception often occurs in this way, and not directed 
to specific physical objects. 
At that point, the route that defines the stable object at the “world pole” in terms of worldly 
objects is at a loss, unless it wants to define the object as the overall disposition of the world, 
locally defined spatio-temporally. But that is clearly no definition in the sense of stability 
desired.  
So when I say that it is more appropriate to define the framework as one of identities-and-
manifolds, I mean that the plasticity of the contents of perception, featuring core and 
environings (which accepts of gradations or levels of marginality or centrality), is better 
understood as a plurality. This plurality occurs not only on the side of the perspectives or 
appearances (manifolds) but also on the side of the identities since they can vary in their 
configuration (objects, events, states of affairs). Core content can pick a wide perceptual 
continuum. There is nothing in the notion of core content that limits it to ‘stable’ objects.  
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In the framework proposed, what guarantees the reality of the perceptual object (in my 
broad sense) is the fact that it definitionally belongs to the world. And the world, as the home of 
endless possibilities for perceptual interaction, does not seem to hold stability in the manner 
that physical objects do. As a matter of fact, the world may be a very unstable place in that 
sense. I think it is more appropriate to perceptual interactions to think of the world as plastic.  
There is one last element that also serves as a door into the next chapter: the pragmatic 
normativity of perception does not make our perception of the world be of the world, but it 
reflects that they are so. This issue, the pragmatic horizons in which perception is embedded 
buttresses the claim that the perceptual continuum view does not fall into phenomenalism.  
We know already that the perceptual object—the world that presents itself in temporally 
extended sequences—is present in appearances, in perspectives, i.e. in “successive and adjoining” 
perspectives of the object. The perceptual presenting of an object is the type of thing by which 
an object presents itself in successive appearances or perspectives that are interrelated in the 
feature of perceptual consciuousness of presenting the objects perceived in their wholeness, and 
in pragmatic horizons or pragmatic systems of reference (Drummond 1990, 150–51).  
The peculiarity of perception lies partly in this dual character: it allows perceivers to 
engage with objects in a way that such object are fully given to perceivers—they do not feel 
they are acquainted with sides or parts—, and at the same time, in such a way that a horizon of 
possibilities of givenness is open. As elaborated above, the temporally extended perspectival 
appearing of things in perception is the enveloping characteristic of the perceptual phenomenon: 
perception happens from point of view—a temporal, spatial and pragmatic positionality of a 
subject over against an ever-shifting and changing world.  
This takes us to state once more that moments of perception do not exist in isolation, in the 
manner that touching the side of a book as a side is a holistic performance, for realizing it as a 
side is bound with the whole of which it is a side. (Husserl 1997, 66–69, <80–84>). And yet, 
those never-isolated moments of perception point to the radical open-endedness of perception, 
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to the fact, that the ideal of perception of an object in its entirety, so it is adequate to the way the 
world, both at rest and in gradual development, is but a myth (Husserl 1997, 96, <114>).  
The fact that the Social Enactive View escapes the charge of phenomenalism does not mean 
that teleological thinking is entirely debunked from a consideration of the perceptual object. 
The idea of a total perception of the object can be perfectly entertained in imagination/phantasy 
as what would be the result of all possible experiences of the object: my, or our, experiencing the 
object from every possible point of view. This is the proper understanding of Merleau-Ponty’s 
dictum seen above. For example, I have really seen my desk, and perceived my pillow by touch, 
and yet I understand that there may be perspectives or perspectival configurations that I have 
not occupied yet, and that may give me a different, however slight, perception of the object. 
There is even no conflict in saying that the perspectives are infinite and I may never see or 
touch familiar object in every way that it is possible to see them—yet, I have truly seen them. 
Imagination or phantasy exercises may, among other things, underscore the radical perspectival 
character of actual perception.  
Further, the real object is related to the possible perspective that other members of the 
same, common world would have of that object (Zahavi 2003; Micali 2012, 156). The object, the 
real one, which presents itself in different perspectives, not only presents itself to me, but to 
others as well. In the development of this idea lies part of the genius of Husserl’s approach to 
intersubjectivity: the ‘object’ is always fully achieved in the phenomenal sense and yet, given in a 
limited, open-ended way. It is a totality that is not exhausted in what is given at each moment, 
but not because it is not exhausted it stops being a fully achieve totality. The object’s open-
endedness serves as a horizon of the perceptual interaction in an intersubjective context, as an 
“index of a subjective [perceptual, in this case] system of correlations” (Husserl 1970, 165; 
Husserl 1983, 322–23, <279>). 
Chapter V 
 
The Normativity of Perceptual Experience and of Dynamic Content 
 
Perception is normatively structured. The how, when, where, why, and what of perception are 
subject to normative relations. In its pragmatic aspect, perception is normative because it 
features a dimension of successfulness and pragmatic significance that is exhibited in social practices 
and the individual interactions that based on those practices. To inquire about the normativity 
of perception means, on the one hand, to inquire about how perceptual practices and individual 
interactions hold together, that is, about the origins of our being able to situate perceptual 
interactions in relation to expectations and possibilities. This sense belongs to the normativity of 
perceptual practices and it is cast in terms of the mastery of a technique by which we are 
familiar with perceptual properties and their aspects and interactions, we respond appropriately 
to them, we explore them, and we manipulate them skillfully. This subset of perceptual 
normativity was addressed in section 1.2.4. 
On the other hand, there is also a normative dimension to perceptual intentionality and to 
perceptual content. There is normativity in how the different aspects of perception hold together 
with other aspects of our (so-called) mental life such as thought, awareness, action and emotion, 
and in how the contents of perceptual experience hold together. This chapter focuses on the 
normativity of perceptual intentionality and perceptual content.  
The normativity of perceptual intentionality deals with the role of perception in the 
economy of our mental life. The general perspective of the social enactive view in this respect is 
that our mental life is part of our pragmatic engagement with the world, and our pragmatic 
engagement gives perception a central place in that engagement. In this chapter, I will offer 
arguments for the perceptual application of this general thesis. 
Specifically, in the first section of this chapter, I will take up the issue of the relation, 
justificatory and otherwise, between perception and the other central aspects of our mental life. 
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In this regard, I argue that perception as perceptual experience is a form of original intentionality 
that grounds awareness (or phenomenal consciousness), thought (including belief, desire, and 
predication in general), action (beyond the scope of perceptual practices), and emotion. As a type 
of original intentionality, perception can be said to be a type of consciousness, in the sense of 
being an original way of making things available for consciousness. The extended argument is 
that since our pragmatic engagement with the world encompasses not only what we do, but also 
what we are aware of, the things we think about and what we think about them (predication and 
belief), and what we feel, it is important to spell out the way in which the perceptual aspect of 
that pragmatic engagement stands in relation to these aspects. I will have something to say 
about the way these dimensions are interrelated.  
This grounding connection issues, first, from the nature of perceptual experience (chapters 
2 and 3). Second, since I intend to maintain a continuity with the literature, and the relationship 
between perception and other aspects of our mental life —whether they are mental states or a 
different kind—is addressed in the literature as part and parcel of the normativity of perception, 
I will address that desideratum in terms that are somewhat close to that discussion.  
The second part of this chapter is about the normativity of perceptual content, namely, how 
the contents of perceptual experience hold together. What these aspects are is normatively 
implicated in this how. In this sense, to ask for the normativity of perception means to ask, at the 
level of content, how simultaneous and consecutive experiences hold together, what governs 
intra, inter and multi-modal perceptions, what are the relations between parts (properties, 
perspectives, etc.) and wholes in perception, what are the transitions between liminal 
experiences and fully saturated ones, and so on. As a matter of fact, one of the raison d’être of an 
account of content is the instrumental role it plays in helping us spell perceptual normativity.  
Lastly in section 3, I take up two important objections to SEP’s view on perceptual content 
and its normativity. The first one is Stephen Crowell's view entailing that there is no place for 
the sensory and the undetermined in perception since normativity arises only from the 
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conceptual or from quite determinate norms, as in the case of bodily action aiming at clear 
successful, optimal grasp of something.   The second objection will be Susanna Siegel’s 
argument about the two-fold entailment from properties to content: (1) that accepting that 
properties are presented in experience entails the (representationalist) Content View (2010, 29), 
and (2) that using properties in perceptual comparisons, which SEP does, commits one to a 
content view, for those properties would be, as it were, isolated in order to then be compared to 
others, and this isolation would entail detachability, a sufficient condition for the 
representationalist view of content. 
 
5.1 Perceptual Experience as Original Intentionality 
The issue of perceptual intentionality falls under the general problem of the possibility of being 
conscious of things at all. To be conscious of something is a relation of conscious being (in this 
case a human being) to things other than herself in which things are something for herself. This 
relationsgip is specified according to some essential modes in which things are given, that is, are 
to be something for consciousness, e.g. perceptual, predicative, actional, emotional, cognitive, 
etc. (2001b, 126). Perception is one of the original ways in which this happens. On the issue of 
consciousness, I follow in general Husserl’s phenomenological orientation.  
 So what does it mean to say that we are conscious of objects we perceive? What does it 
mean to say that when we interact with a thing in a sensory-based way, which we’ve called 
perceptual experience, that thing is something for us, and on that very basis, we are able to 
construct memories of it, say things about it, think possibilities for it, make judgement about it, 
or act upon it? The answer to this question is partly to be found in the accounts of practices, 
experience, and contents. Let me offer a recap of those aspects.     
To talk about perception is to talk about interacting with worldly things in a sensory-based 
manner. As I have been arguing in the previous chapters, perceptual experience is interaction 
with the real world, in which a spatial, temporal, and pragmatic situated perceiver relates in a 
  209 
sensory-based manner to physically-based objects, events, and states of affairs in the world, 
which are not—are never—given in absolute ways to perceivers, but always presented in the 
appearances in which they can only occur in their being perceivable. Real objects are 
experienced as they are referred to and acted upon by people in their everyday lives (and by 
scientists in their theoretical endeavors) (Husserl 1997, 3, <6>).1  
Further, perceptually experiencing (or just perceiving) worldly objects is an original way of 
being intentionally related to these objects. This means that perceiving objects is one of the 
original ways in which we, as conscious beings, are able to relate to an object, or to be about an 
object—in contrast, for example, to the way in which we, as living beings, relate to nutrients 
found in food. More precisely, to be acquainted with the world perceptually, that is, to experience 
it perceptually, is to be in interaction with things that are presented to a subject in-the-flesh, 
that is, with a sense of bodily immediacy and evidence that is incompatible with the actual 
doubting of their being so presented. To perceive an object, event, or state of affairs of the world 
is to be in such a relation to the world that “one is in touch with a spatiotemporal entity that is 
real in the sense of not being either an inference drawn from earlier beliefs or in some other way 
a product of a belief” (Pietersma 2000, 61). In perceptual intentionality, the subject who is 
sensory acquainted with objects—the one who interacts with objects—is thereby also able to 
entertain further thoughts, to act upon them, and to have emotions about them (Husserl 1997, 
123,<147>; 2001, 40, <4>).2  
In one sense, the accounts of practices, experience, and contents of previous chapters are 
themselves an explication of the idea that perceptual interaction with the world is one of the 
original modes of being conscious of things. Several arguments in those chapters located 
perception in an explanatory relation to predication, thought, action, and emotion.  
																																																								
1 While I take my theory to be compatible with much less complex forms of life, I limit myself to the case of the 
human being. I do not think that perception requires awareness in every case, although it sometimes does in the case 
of the human being. I won’t pursue this topic here. 
2 This description offers a robust answer to the two questions Price poses in Perception, about the status of that which 
gives rise to our perceptions (for him, sense-data), which he referred to, following Moore, as a ‘belonging to’, and to 
the question of the nature of ‘perceiving’ or ‘perceptual consciousness’ (See Price 1950 esp. Ch.2). 
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A few examples may illustrate this triple entailment. From the account of practices we 
gathered, for instance, that the precise fineness of grain that matters to us when we experience 
things is often defined by the socially constituted practices of which they are part (e.g. that a 
food item like a potato chip is supposed to be crispy). Our experience of aspects of reality 
featuring perceptual properties is often an experience of high-level properties. We become 
acquainted with those aspects of reality through perception and not through inferential 
processes. Regarding experience, I also argued that the type of interaction we see in perception 
is properly understood as direct, and is characterized by the mediations of perception 
(idiosyncratic, non-socially pragmatical, and socially pragmatic). Concerning content, I argued 
that there is not even a sensory basic aspect of reality that does not come to be what it is for us 
if not in a concrete perceptual relation, characterized by specific perceptual modalities. These 
examples, among others, have already shown how SEP accounts for the fundamental role of 
perception in our conscious acquaintance with things.  
Someone might say that these are only indirect accounts that do not demonstrate that 
perception is a type of original intentionality. It is difficult to make sense of this objection since 
it seems to call for a direct account. It’s hard to see what an account would be since chapter 3 
rejected the usual candidates. As a matter of fact, one position or the other seem to operate at 
the level of fundamental assumptions about the workings of the mind, not susceptible of judged 
directly. It appears that an indirect strategy is necessary. I have offered several indirect routes, 
and will in a moment add one indirect route, proposed by Campbell.   
Someone might also say that the problem is that this view does not solve the problem of 
the consciousness of perceptual objects any more than representations do. On this objection, it is 
not any less clear why acquaintance with real objects would be originally situated, so to speak, 
in the economy of consciousness. Why would direct acquaintance be more in the clear than the 
acquaintance with ideas? SEP opposes Fregean and Russellian ways of going about experience 
and content that take inner experiences and their contents (abstract mental entities) as what 
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constitutes our basic being conscious of objects. It is in fact characteristic of the standard view 
that it takes its assumptions as if they are natural, and the only conceivable way of looking at 
issues. In this case, the problem with mental representations is that they are taken eo ipso to 
stand in just such conscious relations to a subject (Campbell 2002, 121).    
 To be sure, I agree with Husserl when he says that theories that posit internal 
representations as the ground-level entity on which consciousness takes place leave the 
phenomenon unaccounted for, because the mere having of a representation does not explain that 
the object is meant or taken by a subject and in a certain way (Husserl 2001b, 125–127). The 
explanandum remains unexplained, and we see intellectualist tendencies turned philosophical 
intuitions find solace in retreating to the inner.  
Two further arguments in this respect. First, an indirect argument. It is plain that “being 
conscious of objects” must be established somewhere. This is, once again, an issue lying at the 
very basic level of the ontology of mind and consciousness. The question is whether we are 
going to take real objects as the objects of perceptual consciousness or will jump, in a potential 
endless regression, to mental entities, which, in any case, at some point would need to be 
declared conscious. If this is the case, I see no principled reason to reject taking external objects 
themselves as that which we are conscious of. Notice two parallels. First, to take representations 
as the object of perceptual consciousness is like the perceptual object analog of the homunculus 
fallacy: We are perceptually aware of objects because we are perceptually aware of objects in our 
heads. It is not difficult to see that the issue of perceptual awareness is not really explicated by 
that reasoning. Couple it with the homunculus fallacy itself, and we have a clearer picture of 
how we are in the presence of a regress: I don’t see objects in the world; a little man in my head 
sees little things in my head. How does the little man see things he sees? Inside his head? 
The second line of argumentation is about the internal 'coherence' of perceptual objects and 
their continuous existence. In this respect, there are several reasons why external objects are 
the very objects of perceptual consciousness, and why not doing so—and instead relying on 
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abstract entities as the objects of our perception—leads us to all kinds of problems, particularly 
the epistemological bias that treats perception as intellection, and the objects of perception not 
in their own terms but under the alien concept of truth. These reasons are that in matters of 
perception only a realist, relationalist position can account for the dynamic, perspectival, high-
level content workings of perception, and for the continuity and “coherence” of objects in 
consciousness. The temporally extended, multiple, finely grained perspectives that feature in 
our perception of objects are best explained by assuming that we are in contact with those 
objects in temporally-extended sequences, in which different perspectives are explored, in finely 
grained ways, in sensory based interactions. The best way of talking about the external world is 
to be directly realists about it. 
 This issue has been importantly argued by Campbell, one of the chief proponents of 
relationalism, with which SEP is in partial agreement.  
The problems with the representational view are well treated by Campbell in a critique of 
the “common factor” view (also “highest common factor”), exploited by both disjunctivists and 
relationalists. The common factor view states that what makes a person conscious of something 
is its being related to a representation of the thing, which would be common between the actual 
experience of the thing in the world and a perfect hallucination of the thing (See also Snowdon 
2008; Martin 2008; Haddock and Macpherson 2008a). The representationalist endorsing the 
common factor view is committed to the view that both experiences are the same, despite one 
being caused by a real object and the other not, for in both cases a mental representation 
obtains, and it is mental representations, not real relations to objects that individuates the 
awareness of objects.  
Relatedly, as McDowell has elaborated, this is all we must concede to a massive skepticism. 
All we could aspire to, regarding perception, is the type of content that could belong either to a 
real perception of objects or to hallucinations of them. Epistemically we can in principle never 
be confident that we perceive the world (McDowell 2008).  
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There are several problems with this view, but I can only review a few of them. Let me 
highlight Campbell’s strategy to derive some conclusions precisely from the indistinguishability 
on which the common factor view preys. If, as the representationalist says, there is a common 
factor between hallucinations and real perceptions, because they seem indistinguishable to the 
philosopher upon cursory examination, then it would appear that the representationalist has no 
resources to posit the continuity of objects as they exist in time and space. As Campbell notes, 
experience is what makes it transparent to the subject that objects are the same “across time, or 
across sensory  modality,” or as a basis for inferences (e.g. predicate attribution) based on the 
identity of perceived objects (Campbell 2002, 130). But if experience is only defined by mental 
representations bearing no necessary connection to a mind-independent world, an experience 
thus conceived cannot provide the needed warrant.  
Instead, a conception of experience that makes it a direct contact with objects in the world 
is able to warrant the identity in question. To be sure, this conception of experience takes 
reliable syntheses (cognitive processing) to enable the subject to have precisely that type of 
interaction with the objects that constitute it. Brain, cognitive processing is taken to be a 
necessary condition for a perceiver to have experiences, but it does not entail that the real 
outcome of such processing is a mental representation: “It is not that the brain is constructing a 
conscious inner representation whose intrinsic character is independent of the environment. It 
is, rather, that there is a kind of complex adjustment that the brain has to undergo, in each 
context, so that you can be visually related to the things around you; so that you can see them, 
in other words” (Campbell 2002, 119, 131).3 
																																																								
3 A further problem is that hallucination talk is simply overrated. It is not the case that we are actually deceived by 
hallucinations, although it is quite true that perception is ‘fallible.’ Specifically, when snapshot hallucinations are 
pressed to fit into the flow of continuous perceptions and their continuous coherent relation to action, they lose their 
grip because no people are tricked this way. Some may argue that illusions would further the common factor view, as 
in the case of phantom limb phenomenon. Upon close examination, though, it is clear that this type of illusion does 
not have the consistence and coherence that would make it indistinguishable from a real limb. Not only the 
phenomenon is not coherent across cognitive capacities—the phantom limb patient recognizes there is no limb—, but 
it also does not behave in strict concomitant variation with changes in the environment. Sensations in the phantom 
limb do not feature the proprioceptive and kinaesthetic continuous feedback that real limbs have. 
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Further, if the identity of objects over time is a puzzling issue for the representationalist, it 
follows that she doesn’t have the resources to justify the perceptual sequences in which identical 
objects feature along with other objects, for the problem just multiplies. What this objection 
amounts to is that when the representationalist is pressed about real time, spatially extended 
perceptual sequences, there is simply no warrant for our actual engagement with the world. 
 We find in Campbell an argument for the identity of perceptual objects. As I have had 
occasion to argue in chapter 4, specifically in regards to the variations of perceptual objects that 
core plus environing content can explain, SEP goes beyond relationalism: it is interactionalist. In 
this sense, there is no commitment to perceptual objects being identical with themselves, 
although they can be. Not every perceptual object remains identical during a dynamic 
interaction. Perceptual objects are in a certain way continuous while we perceive them, but they 
frequently change. What I want to retain for the time being is this continuous existence of 
objects, to which different properties apply over time. SEP is well suited to account for this 
vague sameness of the dynamic object. Since this dynamic object is an object of the world, in our 
interaction with them, we are acquainted with finely grained objects, even as they change. This 
fineness of grain is also better account for by SEP than representationalism.  
 This dynamism is, once again, best explained by a theory that takes the external objects 
themselves as the site of aboutness, since mental copies would lack the detail that only reality 
can offer.  
Let us now move on to exploring perceptual intentionality and its connections with three 
central aspects of our mental life: phenomenal consciousness or awareness, action, and emotion. 
My goal here is not to present conclusive arguments barring representationalism but rather to 
articulate a coherent framework in which perceptual experience plays a grounding role in 
relation to a vast reaching range of our world interactions. This grounding role, which I will 
specify in terms of awareness, judgment, action, and emotion, is one which representationalist 
views assign to detachable contents and understand as justifications.   
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5.1.1 Perceptual Experience Grounds Awareness 
The term consciousness also has a narrower meaning than the one just presented. In this 
narrower sense, consciousness as awareness or phenomenal consciousness is characterized by a 
reckoning of a what-it-is-likeness, that is, the fact there is something is experienced as 
happening to one, or felt as belonging to one. Perceptual intentionality grounds this sense of 
consciousness as awareness. However, awareness is not thought to be definitional of every step 
and aspect of perceptual intentionality and perceptual content. This is because there are aspects 
of what we perceive that we are not conscious of directly, but only, for example, as possibilities 
for future engagement. Still, most perceptual experiences exhibit this aspect.  
It is a central tenet of SEP that experience is not solely the feeling or awareness of having a 
sensory-based acquaintance with an object. That view, which SEP opposes, is the modern idea 
that experience is an inner issue, a mental issue, something we feel. This position has become in 
many ways the natural way of thinking about mental phenomena. In the case of perception, this 
view is coupled with the input thesis, that is, the idea that perception is the subjective end point 
of sensory input: seemings. In that version, to perceive something is to have a subjective 
impression that things both have the perceptible properties they are perceived as having and are 
that way. Since, in that view, things might turn out to be, or not be, the way they seem to us, 
they are just seemings.4 SEP disputes this view. SEP holds that perception is the actual contact 
with actual objects—qualified in dynamic, perspectival terms and so on—, and that seemings 
accompany parts of these interactions, but are not what defines them.5 However, I would like to 
be careful in the following: I do not take awareness to be the same as belief.  
5.1.2 Perceptual Experience Grounds Thought, Judgment, and Inference  
In addition to phenomenal awareness, perceptual experience directly grounds judgment, and by 
judgment I mean to refer to thought, judgment, and inference.   																																																								
4 This applies to both low-level-only and high-level theories. The representational view is independent of a 
commitment to low-level or high-level perceptual properties theories. 
5 That only some aspects of our perceptions or perceptual experiences are accompanied by the feeling of awareness is 
best understood through the account of content as full=core+environing, of which the pragmatic background that 
individuates them is a central part. 
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As to belief formation, in particular, since I do not take content to be detachable from 
experience nor consisting of conditions of satisfaction of experience (accuracy conditions), for 
reasons explained at length in chapter 3, contents do not form beliefs. Rather, because 
perception is an original way of being conscious of things, perceptual experience and its 
contents (here understood as a specification of aboutness) carry with them an intrinsic certainty 
of things being as they are presented—in their dynamism and perspectival context—, 
incompatible with disbelief and doubt. It is an intellectualization of perception to argue, 
upstream experience, that perception forms belief because when I want to know whether X is 
the case, I go see X. Rather, it is because when I see X and have the immediate certainty that X 
is as it is presented in experience, that I can reflect on the fact or verbalize it. It would be more 
appropriate to say not that perceptual content justifies belief, but, rather, that the belief consists 
of having a perceptual experience with a particular perceptual content.   
Naturally, this does not mean that I can’t ask whether the object I perceive is as I perceive 
it. And still, it is because I immediately “believe” it to be so, that I go on and ask: “Is it so?” This 
question operates on an already existing belief. There is no initial impression that doesn’t come 
with a sense of reality, which amounts to the “belief” element. We must not forget that the 
perceptual interaction, and the awareness, and the eventual wondering are all contextually and 
pragmatically dependent.    
Further, I wish to make clear that being able to ask a clarifying question about the 
relationship between the independent structure of a physical object and the way it appears to me 
in a concrete perspectival and pragmatic situation, does not entail that the question itself 
somewhat represents or carries a standard of accuracy applicable to perception itself. Nor does 
the questioning mean that perception does not as a matter of fact come with the sense of 
immediate certainty I’ve been claiming it does. The difference lies mainly in the fact that the 
double-checking question is derivative upon an initial acceptance. But the language-game of 
asking whether things are as they appear is only one fueled by thought experiments— a game 
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that is not part of everyday experience, since even when an initial doubt appears it is only 
further perceptual experience that confirms, as it were, that initial doubt. But this doubt needs 
to be taken as doubt in the sense the skeptic wants. The same situation occurs when one is 
exploring an object or a situation that requires further exploration due to its spatial or temporal 
extension or configuration. In such a case, one may wonder whether the object will be, in its 
totality, as one foresees it to be, and so the exploration goes on. Although this partial result 
could be construed as a doubt on whether the object is as it seems to be at a certain moment in 
time, it would be wrong to apply to model of reality as a standard against which to judge 
experience’s contents, as it were, where further contents are conditions of satisfaction of an 
experience.   
We know is that different perspectives or appearances of a thing can be compared 
meaningfully—and with good reason: they belong to the same environment and interactive 
perceptual context. And we also know that being aware, as we are, about the perspectival 
character of perception, it is normal that we wonder about the status of our perceptions in the 
midst of dynamic, extended perceptual interactions. This is why sometimes, for instance, in 
double checking something like a reflection on a piece of glass, reflection which ‘covers’ the 
objects behind the glass, we move so as to alter the reflection and prove to ourselves that the 
reflection we saw is such, and is not the object, or vice versa. But, once again, individual 
perspectives can’t be compared to an extra-perceptual, extra-perspectival reality able to deliver 
a final verdict. Rather, experiences’ contents stand in more or less coherent and stable relations 
with their own milieu. The radically incoherent, wild case is the one that makes us pause. Even 
in those cases, we try to find an irregularity in nature that explains the irregularity in 
experience, which still comes to us with a sense incompatible with belief.  
 In a line of thought that goes as far back as Aristotle, perceptual experience constitutively 
entails a basic coming-to-be-present-for-the-experiencer of a thing present to the senses, such 
that it is the basis for being conscious of the way things feel, for my being able to think of or 
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imaginatively play with them in the manners pertaining to the specific perceptual modality, and for 
being able to relate consciously to them as possibilities for action, as in a decision-making process, and 
even as a basis to entertain imaginary possibilities for action.6 Campbell is right in echoing this line 
of thought: “Experience of objects has to be something more primitive than the ability to think 
about objects” (Campbell 2002, 122).  
Allow me to illustrate this array of possibilities. To perceive auditorily an automobile 
coming towards me is not only to be conscious of it sonically, so to speak, but also as something 
that is not a smell, as something that is amenable to carrying certain perceptual-related 
predicates (such as ‘getting closer’ and even perhaps ‘bigger’), as something that I can classify 
(e.g. “this must be a high-cylinder car”) and, further, as something that I can act upon. Further, 
auditorily to perceive a car also encompasses the possibility of hearing a rhythm in the rumbling 
of the car, such that a memory of an old similar-rumbling car may come to mind—or even to 
discover rhythms of songs in the rumbling of the car, like we can play finding shapes of animals 
in the clouds. Let us not lose sight of the fact that in all these cases, as in the Parked Car 
examples, there is normally a pragmatic setting that defines expectations and possibilities. Even 
surprising events are located in relations to expectations and possibilities.  
There are, in the domain of possibilities that come with a perceptual experience, 
experiences that can be rightfully called judgments and inferences, or are bases for judgments 
and inferences. Such is the case of perceiving a given color as familiar, which is a type of 
judgment and yet is entirely perceptual. Similarly, and somehow between judgment and 
inference, is the case of a man that having chosen a suit in the morning, goes to a drawer and 
picks matching socks pair. There is in seeing the right pair a certain judgment of match about the 
socks, and an inference of socks-and-suit match. As to inferences, it is like the case of someone 
that probes with her foot the bottom of a river in order to walk without falling, and adjusts, so 
to speak, tactile expectations to the way things feel in the water. Or like the person driving in 
heavy, thick fog, that awaits for objects closer to him. In this case, this person adjusts the 																																																								
6 See Aristotle’s On The Soul, especially books II and III (Aristotle 2001). 
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inferences made to a perceptual situation, or, in other words, the inferences made are heavily 
based on the perceptual experience, which in this case is affected by visual conditions. Lastly, it 
is the same case, in the modality of touch, of the person that just went to the dentist, and still 
with a numb lip, is able to use a straw, putting to use the “knowledge” that the edges of a straw 
would be easier to feel than the surface of the glass.  
5.1.3 Perceptual Experience Grounds Perceptual-Related Action 
Perceptual experience’s grounding of action is part of the engagement with the world that 
implicitly takes the world’s structure for granted, and not in a judgment-mediated way. As I 
have explained in the previous chapter, the implicit acceptance of the world and of perceptual 
experience is better explained by a theory that denies that a perceiver is sensory-awareness-
guided-by-rational-patterns-of-judgment about what they seem to perceive.  
One obvious sense in which perception grounds action is as part of perceptual practices, as 
I have defined them before, as intersubjectively constituted and sensory-based practices of 
interaction with worldly objects, and defined socially in a way that picks out objects such as 
food, dance, and dress and activities related to them. It is of the nature of practices to be 
intrinsically normative in a way that chapter 1 explored. I won’t spend any time on those 
arguments.  
The sense that I explore here is different from the sense in which perceptual is found 
woven into perceptual practices. Rather, it is more basic than perceptual practices, and, in a 
sense, it encompasses them. The idea here is that perceptual experience is at the basis of our 
acting in the world in terms of movement and explicit interactions with and upon objects and 
persons. Since perceptual practices include interactions with people and objects—yet specified in 
particular ways—the type of grounding of action on perception I will explore here grounds 
perceptual practices as well. 
Snowdon has argued that to be perceptually related to an object entails that one can 
entertain demonstrative thoughts about the object (2008, 67; see also Snowdon 1992). It is 
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possible to extend this rationale to intentional agency. If perceptually experiencing an object 
entails that one can think about that object and to think about it in the ways in which it presents 
itself, it must also be the case that perceptually experiencing an object entails that one is able to 
interact with the object in sensory and sensorimotor ways, accounting of course for the 
possibilities of action holding between subject and object (distance between one another, type of 
object perceived, physical and cognitive capabilities of subject, etc.).  
In SEP, the fact that perception is an original way of being related to worldly objects 
themselves means that perceptual experience partly constitutes our being related to the world, 
not only phenomenally but also in terms of action.7 We perceive the world in action-related 
terms, and not in mere appearing manners to which possible actions are added by judgment.   
Of the ways in which perception is constitutively grounding of action, we can divide into 
personal and subpersonal levels. At the personal level, we have perceptual practices, treated 
extensively in chapter 1, as well as the action-meaningfulness of perception and the perceptible 
character of action-possibilities.8 At the sub-personal level, we have what systematic 
interdependencies between sensory impulses and motor significance, part of which I have 
captured before, in chapters 3 and 4, under the heading “non-social pragmatic dependencies.” 
Straddling both personal and sub personal we find that perception grounds action on the 
basis of the temporal dynamism of perception, on which a sense of the timeliness of actions 
clearly rests. Temporal relations between “moments” of perceptual continua ground our reasons 
for action, since action is temporally-bounded and, for the most part, has a timeliness 
requirement.   
At the personal level, say that perception grounds action partly means that we act in a 
certain way upon an object partly because we perceive it as we do: as having a certain location 																																																								
7 Certainly it is in this line that we should understand Kant’s idea of “the primitive character of perception relative to 
thought and judgment” (Ginsborg 2013, 210). 
8 To the objection that action-meaningfulness is a type of instrumental dependence, Social Enactive Perception 
answers by noting that instantiations of this case are indeed instrumental, but the fact that perception is structured in 
this way, that is, that perception has this significance in the intentional interaction with a world is an ontological fact 
that emphasizes the interdependency between the two domains—of which, once again, specific cases are instantiations 
that can be interpreted as instrumental. 
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within reach or without reach, as being of a liftable weight, and so on. I kick the football in a 
given way because I perceive it is in such and such location and moving in such and such 
direction and I want it to move in direction X at speed Y, etc. I think of objects in the way I do 
partly because I perceive them in certain ways.  
A good deal of what is involved in this case is instrumental dependence, and this one is 
uncontroversial. Philosophers of perception of all persuasions accept this is the case. But to say 
that we perceive the world in action-related terms has a deeper, constitutive sense. Our 
perceiving the world is inseparable from our acting in the world, and our acting in the world in 
inseparable from our perceiving it. In what sense? In my everyday perception of the world, 
objects are continuously experienced as affording action possibilities. This means that that it is 
constitutive of perception to be action-meaningful, and for action-possibilities to be perceptible. 
This does not mean that some action-possibilities are not perceptible or require an active 
judgment or inference, but it means a) that some are not in need of judgment, and b) that it is 
possible that in the inference-requiring cases, perception affords a series of horizons on which 
specific action-oriented inferences could me made, but in a way that is dependent upon the 
horizon of concrete perceptual interactions.9  
There is a second constitutive sense that tracks the personal to the idea of intentional 
agency, that is, of what it means for a subject to be an agent. Hurley has argued that the 
interdependency, and for my purposes the constitutive dependency of, action and perception is 
part of what makes the notion of an agent capable of motor action.  For one, the notion of being 
able to act (but not simply in the manner of automatic response) allows for a “normative space” 
between stimulus-response and action. But this acting is only possible because an agent capable 
of motor action is able to “understand” the motor significance of the perceptual, and vice versa. 
Thus, Hurley says that the agent’s point of view is that from “which what you perceive depends 
systematically on what you do and vice versa, and such that you keep track of this 
																																																								
9 This means, for example, that an olfactory experience may afford a spatial judgment, but not an auditory one. 
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interdependence of perception and action. Such perspectival self-consciousness involves 
ordinary motor agency” (Hurley 2001, 427–428).  
It is in this context that Hurley understands “reasons for action” as constraints on making 
sense of the relation between action and perception in general, where making sense is not the 
capacity of verbalizing those reasons, but the capacity of acting so that it is evinced that the 
agent is able to cast motor significance in sensory terms, and sensory significance in motor 
terms. This, she says, characterizes the first person point of view.  
Hurley is right in saying that reasons for action or not reasons for belief for action (See 
Chalmers 2006, 100; Toribio 2007).10 In fact, in the expression “reasons for action” reasons is a 
bit of a misnomer. The main reason is that practical reasons “don’t require the language, or the 
kind of theoretical inferential/conceptual abilities that language makes possible” (Hurley 2001, 
430), which explains the attunement of animals to their environments. Reasons for actions are 
rather basic and common to all perceptive and motor beings. Practical reasons may be better 
understood under the model of what characterizes motor tacit, appropriate responses to 
situations, as judged by the apparent goal of the action, which is normally more than the mere 
motor display. Having a language or being able to make language-based inferences are not 
needed to make sense of practical rationality as I understand it.  
5.1.4 Perceptual Experience Grounds Perceptual-Related Emotion 
The purpose of this section is not so much to offer a conclusive argument for the idea that 
perceptual experiences ground emotion, but to offer a couple of remarks that make this thesis 
compatible with the social enactive theory of perception as a whole. This should increase the 
attractiveness of the view.  
An argument coming from SEP’s commitment to the perception of high-level properties 
says that part of the high-level properties perceived are the hedonics of the chemical senses. The 																																																								
10 These are certainly not reasons of the kind that one is supposed to be able to give in the face of doubts about one’s 
rationality. Second, and most importantly, reasons for action are normally amenable to be the only ground that there 
is: I throw X with a certain force because I see the target in such a position and I experience X to be of a certain 
weight. It does make sense to ask for further evidence of the connection between the sensory and the motor than 
appeal to the other person’s understanding of that inter-significance.  
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hedonics of smell, flavor, and taste are the part of the smell, flavor, or taste experience that 
expresses a liking or disliking of the thing experienced, to the point of being inseparable. As I 
showed in section 2.3.2, hedonics are explained by a dynamic interaction between the object and 
the perceiver. They cannot be explained by reference alone to the object. The common 
phenomenon in which smells or flavor conjure up emotionally loaded memories supports the 
idea that perceptual consciousness grounds emotions. Evidently, SEP does not hold that all 
emotions are perceptually grounded, but that some emotions are. In those cases, part of the 
answer for the emotions is found in the way we perceive something.  
The perception of others and the phenomenon of empathy also suggest that perceptual 
consciousness grounds emotion, that is, that some of the ways I feel about X are justified in my 
perceiving X in a certain way. In empathy, we experience others and understand some of their 
psycho-physical experiences as theirs and as similar to ours (Stein 1964). In the case of empathy, 
the character of immediacy of the experience of the other and of parts of her 'mental' life is 
coupled with a particular reaction to it. A quick example that comes to mind is our perception of 
someone's anger in her speech, which Zahavi credits Husserl with and which is also a well-
known point made by Wittgenstein (2010, 294). In fact, to be empathetic with someone's 
situation partly means to respond to that situation not in judgment-based way, but in an 
immediate way in which the feeling (say, compassion) is not 'judged' appropriate and then 
generated, but rather immediately felt and at times acted upon. Expressions of moral rage upon 
the experience of someone's pain or humiliation, or expressions of compassion upon the 
experience of someone's pain or plight fit well in the framework of SEP. If we accept that there 
is such a thing as the emphatic experiences, and we have every reason to do so, SEP provides a 
useful framework to understand part of the experience as perceptual. The understanding of this 
type of experience as partly perceptual has the advantage of explaining its immediate character 
and its bodily dimension. Since SEP provides a pragmatic understanding of the perceptual, the 
phenomenon of empathy can also now be understood in its intersubjective and practical 
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dimensions, and would be compatible with interaction-theory (IT) and other phenomenological 
proposals (PP) about the nature of empathy that can fall under the label direct-social perception 
(some of the alternatives to the orthodox ways of looking at empathy, namely, theory-theory 
(TT) and simulation-theory (ST)) (Gallagher 2005; Gallagher and Zahavi 2008; Zahavi 2010; 
Zahavi 2011). SEP would then be the general theory of perception able to accommodate a 
central desideratum of IT and PP views, to wit: "to take the embodied and environmentally 
embedded nature of psychological life seriously and acknowledge a more immediate experiential 
access to the minds of others which is prior to and more fundamental than any imaginative 
projection or theoretical inference" (Zahavi 2011, 546). This feature makes SEP an attractive 
view based on its comprehensive character.  
 
5.2 The Normativity of Perceptual Content 
Perceptual experience is partly constituted both by phenomenal character and by full content11 
(core plus environing). This means that two experiences would be if they had the same 
phenomenal character and the same content, but they would not be identical since each 
experience depends on the pragmatically defined interaction with the object. In SEP’s view, 
phenomenal content is only part of experience, for experience is the actual interaction with 																																																								
11 As I have stated before, I hold disjunctivism about metaphysics to be true, and disjunctivism about phenomenology 
to be underdetermined in trivial cases (hence a deflationism about the comparing of properties in trivial cases: “Is the 
blue of my dream the same as the blue of my real perception?” where the answer is yes, but only in this trivial sense), 
but true in the final analysis (cf. chapter 3, section 3.4). In the present case, the significance is that, by saying that I 
see or touch something to be of a certain size or shape, I refer to the case in which I engage in a visual or tactile 
relation with a thing and its subjective impression, and not only to a putative subjective impression without referent. 
My use of “I see X” or “I touch X” includes cases where I deviate from what is generally agreed upon. My use of “I see 
X” or “I touch X” does not include cases where I am merely imagining or remembering the thing, for in those cases I 
am not actually seeing or touching anything, that is, I am not engaged in a sensory visual/tactile-based way with a 
thing in the world.  
The claim that narrowly conceived phenomenal character (momentary sensation of X) and content can come 
apart, despite the claim that content is constitutive of phenomenal character, points to a version of disjunctivism. In 
other words, it is the idea that the content and the phenomenal character can be exclusive disjuncts, that they are not 
necessarily linked. I do not think that it really happens—in the context of spatially and temporally extended 
perceptual continua—that two perceptions with the same phenomenal character can have different contents, but for 
the sake of argument I accept this can be ruled out entirely. For the cases in which it happens, namely, hallucinations 
(extended hallucinations, if you will), I hold that the experiences are different in virtue of having different content (a 
real one vs. a hallucinatory one). This is compatible with my acceptance of disjunctivism about metaphysics and my 
claim that disjunctivism about phenomenology is underdetermined. As I have expressed, once ‘phenomenology’ is 
understood in the context of a temporally extended, contextually dependent, internally coherent structure of things’ 
appearings, phenomenology about content is also true (see chapter 3, n.21). 
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objects.  This section of the chapter deals with the normativity of perceptual content, namely, 
how the contents of perceptual experience hold together. 
 This section accounts for how, at the level of content, simultaneous and consecutive 
experiences hold together, what governs intra-, inter-, and multi-modal perceptions, what are 
the relations between parts (properties, perspectives, etc.) and wholes in perception, what are 
the transitions between liminal experiences and fully saturated ones, and so on. Content has 
been explained already to be a composite of core plus environing content. The present account 
of content operates within that composition.  
 To be clear, if the perceptual interaction is formed by a practice component that relates 
in specific ways to objects, and those objects, perceptual normativity occurs at both ends. In this 
section, I don’t deal with the practice aspect —neither as to perceptual practices (chapter 1) nor 
as to perceptual dependencies (chapter 3)—but with the content side of those interactions. 
Perceptual interactions are like the axle of two wheels, one being the acting, the other being the 
content. I address here the content wheel.  
In keeping with the ontological and epistemological priority of practices in relation to 
perception, SEP’s take on content normativity is pragmatic, as opposed to syntactic or semantic. 
The master argument of this section will show that what makes perceptual moments stand with 
each other in systematic relations, is a pragmatically governed field of perceptual fulfillment, 
consisting of possibilities, expectations, and actualization of perceptual content. In other words, 
to say, for example, that a series of perceptual contents (according to its specific composition in 
the full=core+environing model) are part of a certain perceptual experience means that they are 
glued together by being part of actual or possible interactions with objects, events, or states of 
affairs. In other words, perceptual content is pragmatically individuated. I will argue in this 
respect that content is partly individuated by (1) local pragmatic considerations (specific links of 
content to other close contents), and (2) holistic pragmatic considerations (placement within 
high-level, holistic pragmatic motivations: embeddedness in pragmatic sequences). These actual 
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and possible interactions are partly specified by what objects, events or states of affairs afford. It 
is evident that our interaction with objects depends on what we can do with those objects, so in 
this sense the what of perception has imposed a normative horizon on pragmatics: a horizon 
spelled out in terms of both constraints and possibilities.  
This account of normativity of content will allow me to offer a view about content-
individuation at the lowest level of contact with the world—a relation that was left open in 
chapter 4. To be sure, the domain of possible perceptual interactions that constitutes the 
pragmatic level on which the normativity of content depends is the domain of intersubjectively 
constituted, sensory-based practices of interaction with worldly objects, such as food, dance, and 
dress. These are, not surprisingly, the perceptual practices defined in chapter 1.  
5.2.1 Core Content Is Not Individuated Conceptually 
My first argument for the pragmatic dependency of perceptual content concerns core content. 
This is a negative argument: it argues that content is not individuated conceptually, and rejects 
the conceptual thesis on pragmatic grounds. This argument does not prove that content is 
individuated pragmatically, but its conclusion is necessary for the further pragmatic thesis. 
The core aspect of content has the peculiarity that it can be understood, under a certain 
description, as a type content that is such in virtue of being a function of concepts. It is true that 
a description of the content of my auditorily perceiving a car as an instantiation of the concept 
‘car’ picks up something correct about my perception of it. This description is, however, 
secondary. This content can be characterized, and so primarily, in terms of its placement in a 
pragmatic context, and not as the instantiation of a concept.12 Not every time I perceive a car I 
am aware that I perceive a car, or verbally report that I hear a car, such report being explicit 
and standing in the first line of my cognitive relation to the car. In other words, my car-
involving perception is not necessarily the perception of a car, and the actual perception is 
pragmatically determined in complex ways, where objects are rarely all that is perceived, and 																																																								
12 Some alternatives for a pragmatic casting of the noema in general and the core of the noema in particular include, 
among others, its casting it in terms of my perceptual geographies, Gibson’s affordances (1979), Cussins’ cognitive 
trails (1992), or Noe’s access (2012). 
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the whole perception normally just involves objects. Since it involves objects, but not 
necessarily qua the objects they are, everyday perception is rarely, if ever, individuated 
conceptually. The individuation issues from the whole pragmatic framework in which the object 
is presented, as the Bycicle Ride and Ambulance Siren examples of chapter 4 illustrate.  
Hopp drives the point home in an interesting way when pointing to the for-the-sake-of-
action character of perception: It is very easy to persuade oneself that perception has the same 
sort of intentional content as judgments when one’s paradigmatic instance of perception is 
visually attending to an already familiar sort of object and reporting, either to others or 
internally, what you see, and do so for the sake of doing just that. But this is not a paradigmatic 
case of perception. Most perceptual experiences do not have perception, or even knowledge, as 
their goal. Perception is more typically done in the service of action” (Hopp 2011, 48).  
5.2.2 Full Content’s P-Properties And The Case of Attention 
This section addresses perceptual content as full=core+environing and constantly refers to the 
parallel between perceptual content and object-as-perceived, provided in chapter 4 (esp. Section 
4.1.1). This being the case, the specific determination of the perceptual object, hence of 
perceptual content (that insofar as object-as-perceived is content) can, and often does, acquire a 
certain life of itself that rules on its perceptual horizon and can affect other perceptual objects. 
This content’s life of itself own is brought about by attentional dispositions, both consciously 
aware ones or deeply seated attentional habitualities. To the latter case belong, for instance, the 
perception of written language or speech, which SEP holds exist in a world as it appears to a 
suitably situated perceiver.13  
In accounting for the three types of dependencies of perception in section 3.3.1, I presented 
the concept of perspectival properties, P-properties. Noë defines them as follows: “P-properties--
the apparent shape and size of objects—are perfectly ‘real’ or ‘objective.’ Indeed, the relation of 
P-shape and P-size to shape and size can be given by precise mathematical laws (e.g., the laws of 
linear perspective)” (Noë 2004, 83). All that is necessary for my argument is to say that P-																																																								
13 Cf. chapter 2, section 2.3.2. 
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properties thus defined do not exhaust the whole range of perspectival properties. While in 
chapter 3 the emphasis was on the perceptual dependencies that made them possible, I want now 
to focus on those properties themselves as part of the content of perception, and I want to 
articulate the claim that part of the content of perception is given in the form of P-properties 
that are not defined in Noë’s way. This difference is another aspect that distinguishes SEP from 
other enactivisms (see also 4.1.1).  
 In Noë’s view, “P-properties are real in the sense that they do not depend, for their nature, 
either on what goes on in us (e.g. sensations), or on what we do” (2004, 84). I hold, in contrast, 
that it is not the case that P-properties do not depend on what we do, or on what goes on in us. 
More often than not, P-properties depend on what we do, and derivatively on what goes on in 
us, both regarding sensations (what stimulates our sensory endings) and in terms of both core 
content and the phenomenal character associated with that type of content. Take, first, the case 
of attentional dispositions that fix content, as happens in the case of series of dots forming a 
cube that can be seen in two different ways.14 The perceptual content qua content is entirely 
dependent on a certain attentional disposition, and it can become fixed in a way that even rules 
out other possibilities. It is the case of learning to see something as something specific, in a way 
that makes it really difficult, or perhaps impossible, to change that specific take on the thing. 
The Müller-Lyer lines, which westerners “learn” to see as of different lengths but the San 
foragers of the Kalahari do not, are a perfect example here. Back to Noë, P-properties are 
properties of the environment only under the assumption that there is nothing else to the way 
things appear than relations between their objective properties, relations between objects, 
locations, and, at least in the visual case, illumination, as Noë describes them. But there is often 
more than relations between objective properties in cases where attentional direction fixes the 
content, that is, where attentional regard decides the issue. In other words, it is often the case 
that there is no fact of the matter in the environment as to the perceptual specification of a state of 																																																								
14 It is conceivable that there are internal divisions in these attentional dispositions. For instance, it may seem 
premature to say that seeing-as or seeing aspects phenomena, as illustrated by Wittgenstein, are due to changes in 
attention alone. It may be a matter of further investigation to determine what divisions are possible here. 
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affairs—what core content, what environing content—, and in those cases the definition of the 
perceptual object is attention-dependent.  
Take, for instance, cases like those of change blindness or the case of holistic or atomistic 
perception of visual scenes in research on social cognition. These are cases where the object of 
perception cannot be established independently of the pragmatic interaction. Take also the case 
of perceptual attention based on relations of familiarity or harmoniousness, of eating with a view 
on food-enjoyment: in those cases perceived properties are not ‘objective’ properties, but 
perspectival properties, in the sense that they are possibilities of things to appear, based on the 
pragmatic intention with which it is seen. Along the same lines, when I am at a furniture 
showroom, looking for items of colors that could potentially be harmonious with other colored 
items I own, objects and their colors would start showing up perspectivally, but not only in 
terms of objective relations between objects, subject, and environmental conditions, but also in 
terms of the pragmatic intention that guides my looking at them. The harmoniousness of a 
shade of green with a beige lamp would not show up in many other perceptual interactions. 
Although I don’t provide the full proof here for high-level properties as normatively governed, 
the case of relations of familiarity or harmoniousness provides a clue about how a case of this 
kind would stand in a content-normative sense.15 
5.2.3 Master Argument for Pragmatic Normativity of Perceptual Content: A Pragmatic 
System of Possibilities 
Content has a normative element constitutively in it since the parsing of full 
content=core+environing entails a series of relations of containment and sequentiality in the light 
of the dynamism of perception that accounts for the way contents hold up together. This section 
spells out those relations and other aspects constitutive of the normativity of content. SEP’s 
take on content accounts for (i) the holistic character of perception and for (ii) the coexistence of 
change and identity in perceptual continua, both these aspects being of normative significance. 																																																								
15 Other types of high-level properties include perceiving particulars as natural kinds, perceiving agents performing 
actions, perceiving processes, relations like harmoniousness or familiarity, the hedonics of chemical senses, visual and 
haptic object recognition, and written word and speech recognition, among others. See 2.3.2. 
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The present arguments for the pragmatic location of content cash out the potential of the 
parsing of content in full=core+environing. First, Environing content will be understood as a 
pragmatically governed system of possibilities. This entails that core content is determined by 
the perceptually relevant system of possibilities in which it is embedded.16 Two further aspects 
are discussed in this section. The first one is that core content is partly defined in virtue of its 
relation to a pragmatically related environing content, hence in virtue of its role in full content. The 
second element is that environing content is defined in virtue of its nature as a system of 
possibilities. This system of possibilities is horizonal in nature. This is what makes it possible for 
environing content to be a geography in which core content can take place. As to its normative 
and explanatory work, environing content does a good deal of work accounting for the relations 
between the sides, parts, elements, and transitions that form perceptual continua.  
The distinction between core content and environing content is one of structure and not a 
hard distinction about two natures of content. All content is in a sense at the same level—the 
level of possibilities. This is what allows core content to be dynamic and continuously change 
within environing content. An apt analogy is a center of gravity. The center of gravity of a 
volume is real but it is not one specific atom or molecule, and it moves around as the object 
moves. The nature of content was resolved as a specific combination of perceptual object and 
object-as-perceived, with the emphasis on the latter (section 4.1). A further but separate step is 
the structural distinction between core and environing content (section 4.2). This distinction is a 
desideratum of a theory of content, as argued at length in chapter 4, on account of the pragmatic 
differential treatment of the specific object of our perception, however dynamic it might be, and 
of the relation between change and identity, and multiplicity and unity in the perceptual object.  
The structure of content presented in the equation full=core+environing is roughly 
described as a combination where core content is the concrete object of our attention, action, or 
																																																								
16 In SEP, the domain of the perceptually relevant is broad. For instance, someone’s body smell may affect the 
possibilities of social interaction, including aspects of social distinction and class issues, giving rise to treatment of the 
other as the same, as indifferent, as superior, or as inferior, among others, wherever those distinctions are in place in 
human communities. 
  231 
predication, among others, and environing content comprises perceptually relevant (i) objectual, 
unintended aspects, and (ii) extra-objectual aspects and properties, extended temporally, (at 
times) spatially, and modally, reaching all the way down to the moment of initial contact with 
physical aspects of the world. The question that paves the way to understand the normativity of 
content is: What makes all those aspects of content be contentful? The answer in the case of core 
content seems evident: core content is contentful because it is that which I most attentively or 
explicitly experience perceptually. If core content is the object of my perceptual experience, it is 
precisely its being the object side of my interactive perceptual experience what makes it be the 
content that it is. After all, content is but a specification of aboutness, just as experience is. 
(Notice, however, that this does not specify everything that there is to know about core content: 
it gives the most straightforward sufficient condition for something to be content, not a set of 
the determinants that make a piece of core content to have the specific nature it has. For that, 
we also need, on the side of content, the connection with environing content. Another aspect of 
that definition comes from perceptual practices.).  
Things are not this straightforward in the case of environing content: What makes the 
objectual-unintended and the extra-objectual (hence also unintended) aspects contentful? What 
makes them relevant for perception? The answer to this question is the mark of perceptual 
normativity, and that answer, in turn, is the source for understanding the scope, depth, and 
fineness of grain of perceptual normativity.  
Let me put it in a different way: If content’s nature was already established following the 
notion of object-as-perceived, of which the perceptual object is a part (the object that appears in 
perspectives), why do core and environing content need an additional justification? Core content 
can in any case ratify its membership easily. Some can object, however, that environing content 
(objectual but unintended aspects, or extra-objectual aspects and properties of perceptual 
wholes) is not clearly an object-as-perceived, hence not content in the first place. When singled 
out, doesn’t environing content fall through the cracks? And to the extent that I said that both 
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environing and core are part of the same fabric of content, doesn’t all content lose its character 
too? The answer is no and the argument I now present takes us to the whole system of 
possibilities of which both environing and content transient and real specifications.  
Environing content comprises aspects or properties of perceptual objects or situations that 
are not explicitly intended, such as the color of a soccer ball as I kick it or the texture of the 
surface of a table where I simply rest my hand, or the olfactory background on which further 
smells can acquire significance as they come to be experienced. I am not paying attention to 
those aspects but they somehow partake in my perceptual engagement with the world. How? In 
what sense and way?  
One might at first consider that what makes this type of content contentful is simply its 
being sensationally present, that is, that all things that reach our sensory endings are part of 
content, whether or not they make it to awareness. The problem with this merely sensational 
description of such contents is, first, that it would force us to declare every element of sensory 
impingement part of the content of a perceptual situation.17 This alternative partly is based on 
the wrong assumption that our nerve endings are like doors always open through which 
everything that fits gets through: that sensory impingement is the same meaning all the way to 
experience. Further, this is not a good alternative because although what becomes content does 
so first in virtue of being available sensorially, through our perceptual apparatus, it is so easy to 
mistake the perceptually meaningful sensory with sense data, and sense data is a bad hypothesis 
for reasons that have been profusely discussed in the literature and that I have addressed in 
previous chapters. Thus, contenfulness of environing content is not availability of sensory 
information per se, without an understanding of what a perceptually meaningful sensory 
																																																								
17 An argument that I don’t explore here is the argument based on the physiological fact that even at the nerve 
ending level, there are selective forces that determine what is felt, e.g. the simple case of sensory fatigue. 
Neurologically downstream things get even more complicated, for sub-personal processes already operated with 
filters upon impulses. Backward judging has the enormous problem of assuming that things of which we are 
phenomenally aware always had that specific interpretation, hence the idea that initial impulses were simply 
“captured.” 
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contribution means.18 That understanding is not to be found in the sensory information in some 
sort of brute, basic level. Further, to insist on the merely sensory would make too big of a gap 
between content and experience, and both content and experience are specifications of 
aboutness, that is, there has got to be a common ground for both content and experience.  
However, it is true that whatever comes to be content and experience must be able to be 
felt. In section 4.2.1 where I talked about at an interpretive taking up of things of the world at a 
very basic, sensory-like level. What is this interpretive taking up grounded on? Whatever this 
interpretive taking up is grounded on, I argue, is the same ground on which content stands, 
both core and environing.  That ground is what makes content contentful, and on SPE’s view 
that is the placement of content in a pragmatic system or field of references and expectations, of 
possibilities and fulfillments.  
Let’s start with what Husserl calls the present and the absent parts of the perceptual object, 
and let’s proceed to analyze their relations. To start with, think of a relatively simple perceptual 
experience, such as touching a book. Imagine that it is nice old volume and someone is admiring 
it tactilely. We notice at once that the whole book is not perceptually present to the person at 
each moment, and yet, regions yet-untouched of the book are present—the feeling of the book 
right there includes aspects unseen. The whole book is present: it is not that the story ends 
simply by noting that I don’t feel the parts I don’t see. There’s more than that.  
Part of the book being present consists in the availability and likelihood of a normal, deft 
exploration of the book, so that you would explore tactilely (also visually, perhaps olfactorily) 
those regions you have not explored. One may also be examining a book (perhaps a thinner and 
longer one) and find it suitable for scratching one’s own back—a desire that appeared suddenly, 
connected in quite a simple way with quite a simple action, touching a book. But if it is an old 
volume (perhaps someone’s treasure), it may not as easily become a back-scratching tool. I am 
																																																								
18 Even in information-process and functionalist frameworks, a syntactic requirement that a definition of the 
computational task and its logic are needed points to a deficiency in a notion of impulse that would be self-sufficient. 
Furthermore, the very idea of input needs to be specified in semantic terms, that is, in terms of how it will be turned 
into a specific representation (See Marr 1982). 
  234 
certain that the reader gets my point: the domain of what is possible on the basis of the 
perceptual is, in everyday life, multimodal and rather creative.  
The object is always incomplete from the point of view of perception although it comes 
with a sense of full presence. When we perceive an object there are certain aspects of the object 
that are evident to me in a factual way: these are the sides of the book which I actually touch at a 
moment. There are other aspects of the object that are experienced as perceptually present but 
not directly. Strictly speaking I am not touching several sides of the book and yet, my entire 
experience of the book is not only of one side of the book but of the whole book. In his Lectures 
on Thing and Space, Husserl refers to this duality in terms of proper and improper appearances. 
Proper appearances are supported by presentational content, that is to say, by sensorily 
perceived aspects of objects in the world that give rise to a certain experience. Improper 
appearances are supported by a system of intentional references that yield expectations to be 
‘fulfilled.’ Proper appearances are full intentions, in Husserl’s terminology, because they are 
intended perceptually and realized or fulfilled. Improper appearances are empty intentions, for 
they intend an aspect of the object but that intention is not at the very moment fulfilled (Husserl 
1997, 35–50, <42–60>).  
In improper appearances, the intention may be said to be “synchronically” empty, but not 
entirely empty. It in fact seems misleading to call it empty, since it is not empty in two different 
senses. First, the object is given in what Husserl calls horizonal intentionality: as a part of the 
consciousness of the object, the ‘hidden’ profiles are also given in experience (Gallagher and 
Zahavi 2008, 96–97). In the case of a physical object perceived visually or tactilely, like the book 
of the example above, its back side is given to me in experience. This means, on the one hand, 
that I don’t experience the book as lacking the aspect I am not currently “sensing,” and, on the 
other, that I am for the most part able successfully to interact with the book: I can grab it with 
an appropriate grip, and at least begin lifting it with an idea (somewhat vague, for sure), of its 
weight. Part of the background at work here is naturally our habituation with the world: we find 
  235 
ourselves at home in the world. We find the world stable, dependable, and regular; we know 
materials that have properties we are acquainted with (e.g. weight or resistance), and at the 
basis of this are also physical laws. This stability of the world is part of the conditions on which 
perception takes place in everyday life.   
Second, the not-yet-present profiles are often pro-tended, that is, they are expected. In this 
second sense, the situation is two-fold: the perceptual object is extended in time and since object 
consciousness operates within a time-consciousness that pro-tends, any specific ‘chunk’ of 
object-consciousness is part of a continuum formed by an impression that lingers on in 
consciousness—retention—and protends, that is, paves the ground for the following ‘chunk’ to 
appear, based on the type of object at stake. In a sense, this chunk of intention is forward-
oriented, or as Husserl would put it, anticipatory. In the broader, governing sense, perceptual 
intention is dynamic and continuous. Perceptual consciousness would otherwise be impossible 
(Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, 97).   
Proper and improper appearances (to use Husserl’s 1907 terminology) are structured as 
systems of perceptual expectations: if I am touching a book, say the back of it, and get to the 
edge of the spine, my movement would likely proceed as if the next surface will be shorter, and 
my intending to touch the spine of book will be a fulfilled expectation if such surface is in fact 
shorter than the back of the book. Notice, however, that even if there is no “actual confirmation” 
of the hidden side, in terms of actual sensation-based interaction, a certain fulfillment takes place 
when the object behaves in accordance with those expectations.  
 These expectations are not cashed out as propositions; they are implicit in perceptual 
action. It is now to be noticed that the system of expectations and fulfillments—a “system of 
referential implications” or “pointings” (Hinweisen)—is a system of pragmatic possibilities on 
which the core content may or may not take on determinations it did not have before. Husserl 
describes this situation as follows, making the perceptual object “call out on us” and saying: 
“There is still more to see here, turn me so you can see all my sides, let your gaze run through 
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me, draw closer to me, open me up, divide me up; keep on looking me over again and again, 
turning me to all sides. You will get to know me like this, all that I am, all my surface qualities, 
all my inner sensible qualities” (Husserl 2001a, 41, <5>). It is plain that the sensory dimension 
does not stand by itself: perceived aspects of the world are not simply aspects passively received. 
In the view that I am arguing, there is no clear cut between action and perception in several 
ways, as I have argued in several places in this and previous chapters. One of the connections 
occurs here, because the system of expectations is one of expectations as affordances, for what I 
expect (implicitly, to be sure) is something I can or can’t do. The expectations are to be fulfilled 
as I interact with the object, or rather, in virtue of my interacting in this or that way with the 
object. A practically unsurprising object, then, is an object that fulfills expectations and in that 
sense does not ‘disprove’ the original sense of reality that comes with our perceptual 
experiences. Notice how the base line here is a normal world that at times may be “challenged” 
and not a putative world that is “confirmed” at each step.  
These expectations, or better, these referential implications have feelers in every direction: 
towards more or less determination of the perceived object, or, also, for instance, towards more 
determination in regards to one sensory property and the detriment of another. Their 
fulfillment can both increase or decrease in saturation of the presence of the object, e.g. in the 
form of smelling a dessert more fully as I approach the kitchen, or losing it as I walk away. 
These evidence-giving sequences strengthen or weaken initial takes on things (Mohanty 2008, 
392–394). In my view, it is crucial to see that this fulfillment of a system of references or 
indications, of expectations, does not point towards a better perception of the object —for there 
is no standard of “best” perception for every pragmatic situation in which a perceptual object is 
present, and sometimes ‘best’ would be indefinable or very context-specific (think in a 
background that is to remain precisely in that way)—, but in every possible direction of 
coherent existence of perceived objects, including its disappearance from the perceptual field.  
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As we saw earlier, it cannot be a merely sensational criterion that characterizes 
contentfulness in the case of environing content. The criterion (which is also common ground to 
the interpretive taking up that takes place at the most basic level of content with physical 
reality, as I’ll show below) is pragmatic in nature: only those objectual-unintended and extra-
objectual (hence also unintended) aspects that at least play a functional role in the transitions 
between moments of perception are aspects of environing content, including transitions in 
terms of affordances. These transitions, to make sure, operate in every direction: it is just as 
perceptually meaningful a smell that fades away in its fading away, as it is a smell that will 
always remain vague, as yet another one that increases in determination. In terms of 
affordances, it is perceptually meaningful that an object appears as graspable, as one whose 
‘graspableness’ fades away as the distance between subject and object gets longer.    
There is an interesting yet puzzling consequence of my account, which I shall call the thesis 
of unspecifiability of total content. The totality of contents of a perceptual interaction is 
unspecifiable, for the horizon of possibilities that is opened up by a state of affairs (a specific 
perceptual interaction) is always changing, becoming fulfilled or actualized at each moment in a 
specific direction, thereby opeining new horizons. At the moment in which one course of action 
or perception is pursued, others start to change, to morph, and some to disappear. Now, at the 
moment in which only one state of affairs is pursued, the horizon of possibilities is in a sense 
present as a repertoire of possible implications or pointings-towards of the actual state of affairs. 
Those possibilities figure in content, exactly in that measure, as possibilities.  
This unspecifiability of content is not the same as the radical incompleteness of perception, though 
both belong to the open-ended nature of perception, its perspectival nature in a changing world. 
The incompleteness of perceptions means that perception is never fully achieved because it is 
about dynamic continua, constantly in change. The unspecifiability of content means that the 
whole set of contents at a given moment cannot be pinned down, because some of them are 
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indeterminate, some are vague—they are possibilities that have not achieved their specific 
determination. Some of these contents should rather be understood as fields of possibilities.  
The pragmatic nature of content applies then full content. It applies to environing content as 
field of possibilities in which more specific perceptions can happen, and as the concrete 
background that gives its specific grain to pieces of core content. This pragmatic nature applies 
to core content in two ways: first, core content is the object of our pragmatic endeavors, and 
second, it is partly individuated by its connection to the field of possibilities surrounding it, such 
that it acquires a specific grain or flavor, and such that it is part of a dynamic sequence in which 
there is a continuous determination issuing from precisely the continuous dynamic nature of the 
perceptual object. It follows from this partial determination, that core content would not have 
its specific nature were it not placed in precisely such environing content.  
The pragmatic normativity of content provides an intrinsic way of understanding the 
relation between core and environing content, that is, between the explicit object of our actions 
and predications and to the unintendend and extra-aspectual aspects of the systems of 
perceptual possibilities in which whole perception takes place. The pragmatic normativity of 
content also provides a way to provide a normative justification for the different aspects of 
perceptual consciousness. The claim, in this sense, is that the determinate configuration of 
full=core+environing is operative in an understanding of our awareness of things, of the way we 
relate to perceptual objects in thought, judgment and inference, of perceptual-related action and 
perceptual-related emotion (see 5.1.1-5.1.4 above). 
The Ambulance Siren case of chapter 4, for example, helps to exemplify how the specific 
determination of the siren at each moment has to do with the whole sequence in which it 
appears to me. When the siren is away from me, I do not perceive it as entailing perhaps a 
certain action on my part, such as making sure I am out of the way, but I may perceive it as 
entailing a warning that it will come closer to me. I won't pursue a detailed elaboration of the 
different ways in which I am related to the siren as I perceive it, but the general idea is that the 
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specific mode in which I am aware of it, or the particular actions or non-actions that I am called 
upon at each time, can be partly explained by recourse to the structure of content. The fact, for 
instance, that when the siren gets closer to me it starts to cover over the voice of a person I am 
talking to explains my anticipations of what is to come (complete covering over of the voice), 
my actions in that respect (pausing for a moment) and my awareness of it as a powerful presence 
in my perceptual field, interfering broadly with many other immediate activities, including, 
perhaps, a quiet, reflexive introspection moment another bystander may have had at that 
moment. Yet, for the caught-by-surprise introspective bystander, the ambulance may mostly be 
absent from her field of awareness, save for the moment of inescapable presence (when the 
sound is very loud, and everybody around the person moves in function of the siren). This last 
case highlights, once again, that the pragmatic orientation of a person in the world, her taking 
of position, governs the perceptual interaction, for it even gives the inescapable a specific tone or 
grain. 
5.2.4 Environing Content at the Lowest Level 
The explanatory desideratum of content (namely, that perceptual content functions as an 
explanation of the transitions and transformation of the way the world is presented in 
perceptual interaction) finds part of an answer in the lowest level of contact with a physically 
defined reality. The pragmatic nature of environing content as a field of possibilities extends to 
the lowest level of environing content. In this section, I wish to sketch SEP's take on perceptual 
content at this level. While this aspect needs a fuller treatment, the overview provided in section 
4.2.1 and here should suffice for the account of normativity in general.  
 Let us first recall that the idea of the lowest level of contact with the world is to be 
understood as part of environing content. This lowest level (for which I initially took an inkling 
from Husserl’s hyletic stuff) is the idea that there something to be said about the relation 
between a physical world whose physical characteristics (reflecting light, having a certain 
kinetic molecular energy, having a certain material composition, the vibrations of airwaves at 
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certain frequencies, etc.) make it possible for a being like me to perceive it, that is, for me to take 
heed of it in the manner in which I do (as being visible, as having a temperature, as telling of 
shape, as opposing resistance, as being audible, etc.). In one sense, then, this is an issue of 
sensory modalities: it is about my engaging in perceptual relation with aspects of the world, 
such that I am able to be about them in the way that the different sensory modalities (as well as 
inter and multimodal interactions) are about things. In another sense, while all of our 
perceptions involve an interaction that can be defined in this basic sense—the sound of the 
french horn or the bassoon is still a piece of audibilia in the sense that a physical property of the 
world is available for auditory interaction—, parts of environing content remain at an 
undetermined low level which I have characterized as marginal, and as the level of the 
perceptually unsatured—perceptual inklings. To borrow Thompson’s way of talking about this 
(see chapter 4, n.36), some things remain weak as to the force of their affective allure, while 
other emerge into “affective prominence or salience”  (2007, 263–264). Affective, to be sure, is 
appropriately perceptual since affectivity refers to what has “a kind of affective force or allure, or 
affective ‘grabbiness,’ in relation to one’s attention” (2007, 263). 
 Let me then clarify the claim that the pragmatic rationale for environing content extends 
to this most basic level of contact with the world. How to understand the pragmatic at play at 
the lowest level? And the question is puzzling because in the previous section I built the 
pragmatic account upon the denial that the merely sensory can individuate content. And yet, to 
the extent that perception relates a sensory being to its Umwelt, in a way that couples senses 
and sensibilia—to that extent there is, at least, a limiting character in what the sensory allows. 
Sets of sensations are tied to specific sensory horizons, and not to others: for instance, what is 
audible is closer to what is loud than to what is freezing cold, and it stands in continua of 
audible material rather than in continua of felt temperatures. By the same token, what is tasteful 
(taste-bilia) is closer to what is sweet than to what is dark, and it stands in continua of smells 
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and flavor rather than in continua of illuminations.19 Part of what gives a hypothetical sensory 
chunk its character is precisely its standing in the midst of some modal sequences and not in the 
midst of others, and those sequences are a determining factor in the pragmatic possibilities of 
perceptual interactions.    
While the dynamic account of content I am proposing involves causal determinants in the 
workings of perception, it is not a causal domain: perception is not simply determined by the 
physically defined realities to which a perceiver is exposed. Rather, it is pragmatic in the rich 
sense that a person’s being in the world is determined by her pragmatic relations to things and 
people.20 While SEP’s take on content does not exclude causal conditions, they are for the most 
part built into higher, more socially-informed and personally-enriched levels.21 The riches of the 
world of food, its combinations and ways of enjoyment in terms of where sequences, 
temperatures, amounts, and mixtures (intra- and inter-modal)  are partly built upon the physical 
and chemical properties of material items that can be combined in some ways and not others 
(e.g. drinks that must be drank fast before they sediment), food items that cool down relatively 
fast and are to be eaten warm, proportions in intensity of flavor of, say, hot sauces, etc. One does 
not find the meaningfulness of food at the mere sensory level, but sensory-material conditions 
feature in the meaningfulness of food, for they have implications in the manners of consumption 
and enjoyment.  
The information-theoretic approach of Dretske is seemingly compatible with my proposal. 
It may be helpful briefly to consider that view in order to spin the idea of the pragmatic nature 
of perceptual content that I have been. The idea of seeing as simple seeing, consisting in rich 
information delivery (channeled modally, or rather, getting informationally rich in virtue of 
modality) with no epistemic upshot seems to capture all my environing content (Dretske 2000). 																																																								
19 A related claim, belonging to the specification of the idiosyncratic dependencies, is that the materiality of the world, 
and the materiality-attunement of perceptive capacities (according to each type of being), conditions the modes and 
horizons of perceptual experiences: it sets their limits and possibilities, according to the specific sense-sensibilia 
matches, without precluding further non-sensational configurations deriving from personal history, intersubjective 
influences, or in general, circumstantial configurations that give (or impede) further shape to material interactions. 
20 See my (Arango 2014) for an account of the pragmatic in relation to our being in the world around the Husserlian 
notion of Stellungnahme. 
21 See (Rorty 2009, 165–212) for an even broader discussion of these topics in a general epistemological terms. 
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Dretske crafts these contents epistemically inane; all things epistemic depend on the conceptual 
powers of perceivers, hence not on the information, however rich it is. But can this be so? Can 
there be mere information with no epistemic value in itself? This is part of my rejection of the 
sensational criterion for environing content. Information’s specific richness depends on a system 
for which it is information, but the perceptual system, with so much fineness of grain even in 
terms of sensory modalities, puts part of that richness in the information itself, even if it is not 
fully defined at that level. This means, in turn, that ‘information’ —environing content—cannot 
be epistemically inane. Modal channeling has, in SEP’s view, a meaningful, epistemic 
component. It seems then that rich information is not epistemically empty and that it is its 
placement on a system of possibly related processes or outcomes that makes such information 
what it is.  
I have said that what makes content what it is, even in the case of environing content, is 
that it, at least, plays a functional role in the transitioning between moments of perception or 
that it marks possibilities for affordances. I must confess that I am not entirely convinced that 
my ‘at least’ carries the weight I think it carries. Part of the problem is that it is difficult to 
conceptualize and determine the role of what is not explicitly perceived. An approach like 
Dretske’s has the advantage of starting light. Yet, when analyzed in detail it seems as if he’s just 
unloaded information from the role it plays, turning an at least into a nothing, and wrongly 
sending that unloaded aspect into ‘higher’ levels. If the idea is that the role of 
information/environing content is undefined and could therefore not be specified or adjudicated 
to concrete perceptions, I object to thinking that the only way to deal with it is making its 
relevance a matter of a higher, non-conceptual processing. That vagueness or undefined 
character is already built into lower levels of perception. Here is an argument: a low-level 
sensory acquaintance with the world is not good for everything—i.e. it cannot combine with 
any thing whatever (sounds aren’t good for tasting). Rather, it is only good for some transitions 
(from sweet to bitter, as opposed to from sweet to loud), and is only a possible antecedent for the 
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appearing of certain affordances and not others. That field of implicit and explicit possibilities is 
part of the sensory modal aspect of the perception. Hence, it seems that even in a minimal sense 
it can be argued that no perceptual content is epistemically empty, even when, as said before, 
epistemic content that is merely a potential for possible transitions is never accomplished or 
actualized.22 
 
5.3. Objections 
5.3.1 Crowell, Environing Content, and the Lowest Basic Level of Contact With Physical 
Reality  
At this point I have the resources to object to Crowell’s take on the sensory in his account of 
normativity (2013), according to which there is no place for the sensory in the perceptual 
because the normative, he says, must respond to norms that are either fully conceptual or at 
least very determinate, as is the case of bodily action aiming at the successful, optimal grasp of 
something. The general conception of environing content in SEP (the unintended), and 
especially the most basic level of contact with the world (the unsaturated, perceptual inklings), 
do not belong in Crowell's conception of determinate objects guiding bodily action. The 
normative then does not reach to the undetermined in perception, such as the sensory 
contribution to perception found in the lowest level of contact with reality, or in the radical 
incompleteness o perception.23  
Crowell seems to agree that the normative dimension in perception entails a system of 
references or implications obeying the law of motivation and not the law of association or 
causation (2013, 24-26). Here we see a parallel between these two Husserlian notions and 
																																																								
22 As a normative framework, the pragmatic system of possibilities and expectations that explains the long braids in 
which perceptual aspects occur offers intelligible connections between events. The normative connection is found 
preeminently in the pragmatic position-taking of the perceiver. There is, however, an aspect in which the answer is 
yet to be investigated: how to understand the traffic and transitions between lack of stimulus, unsaturation, and 
saturation. This issue must be postponed for further inquiry. 
23 Crowell’s position is that Husserl did not have the resources to provide a truly normative account for the 
perceptual, whereas Heidegger did. I object to this reading. As my references to Husserl all along this work show, 
Husserl does have the apparatus to offer true normativity. 
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McDowell’s and Davidson’s space of reasons and space of causes. The difference between the two 
domains is that in associations or causes there are only sequences of things that simply follow 
one another, whereas in motivations and reasons there are relations that can be justified by a 
subject, such that the non-necessary connections can be made intelligible to self or to another. 
What is at stake is, in a sense, a space that is between natural necessity and randomness. 
Perception, Crowell and I agree, is fundamentally located in that middle space.  
Crowell identifies the system of references or implications as guided by a model of 
intention fulfillment in which fulfillment is governed by a concept-like determination that 
allows for a veridicality judgment, in which one succeeds or fails, and one of whose tasks is "to 
provide warrant for our judgments" (2013, 125, 129). In Crowell's own words: "My perception, 
and not just my judgment, has a meaning, and this meaning has a structure identical to that of 
the corresponding judgment, namely, a conceptual structure" (2013, 126). I perceive something 
and if I perceive it correctly if the thing is what I thought (judged) it was. Notice, first, that this 
is the same model I criticized profusely in chapter 3: a philosophy of perception built around a 
veridicality concern.   
Crowell adds a type of bodily intention-fulfillment somewhat different from the merely 
conceptual to veridicality according to concepts. In his view, the difference between conceptual 
fulfillment and perceptual-bodily fulfillment is that perception admits to a type of 
counterfactual. This counterfactual is based on mastery of sensorimotor knowledge that allows 
us to infer variations in the perception of objects according to movement (Crowell 2013, 129, 
143–144). I will not rehearse once again my arguments against a sensorimotor-only 
understanding of perceptual interaction in chapter 3, which led me to postulate the three 
dependencies of perception. My point here is to show the closeness of conceptuality with 
optimality-directed bodily skill at work in Crowell. The key here is to look at the commitment 
to a notion of veridicality having a central role in normativity. For Crowell, talking of 
normativity is to locate oneself in a space in which we can ask how an experience “might go 
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wrong.” In other words, to experience something perceptually for Crowell involves setting 
oneself in “reference to normative satisfaction conditions that determine what the thing is 
supposed to be, a certain meaning that establishes how the current experience must necessarily 
be related to (former and) subsequent experiences if the thing perceived is in fact what it gives 
itself to be” (2013, 16–17; 129)(2013, 16-17; 129).  
What Crowell rejects is the Husserlian view, which SEP spouses, according to which there 
can be epistemologically rich, intentionally-laden, nonconceptual content at the level of what I 
have been referring to as the most basic level of contact with the world, in which physical 
realities are taken up by us as something perceptually meaningful (Crowell 2013, 138).24   
It is not difficult to see in this context why for Crowell the undetermined character of what 
is taken up at the interpretive level and is at times unsaturated does not have a role in the 
normative: there are not satisfaction conditions for them; there is nothing that determines “what 
the thing is supposed to be.” What motivates his take on perceptual content to be occurring at 
the level of optimality-directed bodily skill is that his view is “norm-governed” in a strong sense: 
“getting a better look at something depends on knowing how to look — that is, being skilled at 
bringing oneself into the circumstances that will allow the optimal look to emerge” (2013, 142, 
emphasis mine). Perception, for Crowell, is skill based, entails success conditions, and constantly 
aims at improvement of one’s body’s stance in relation to a phenomenon. My central critique at 
this point is that, although in SEP’s view these are possibilities for perceptual interaction, this is 
not all there is about perceptual interaction. Just as I have argued that the sensorimotor does 
not exhaust the possibilities for embodiment and enaction in perception, the normative is not 
exhausted (i) by what can be subsumed under goal-oriented perception, and (ii) certainly not in a 
way in which actual perception confirms seeming-perception. The latter point (ii), a version of 
the veridicality concern, constitutes a fundamental difference between SEP and Crowell’s view. 
The former point (i), about goal-oriented bodily activity, is possible in the context of SEP. In 																																																								
24 In Husserlian terminology, the issue at stake has to do with the status of hyletic stuff (see 4.2.1 for details) and the 
role of the lived body as an orthoaesthetic system, that is, as a system of “concordant perceptions,” as Ricoeur puts it 
(1967, 50). 
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SEP, the perceptual and perceptual normativity extend to aspects of content that are not yet 
defined or determined. Thus, a view like SEP’s differs from Crowell’s, among other things, in 
allowing for vague and unsaturated aspects of perception, namely, the connections between 
physical realities and the perceptual interpretive take on them. Further, the role of pragmatic 
orientation even at this most basic level of contact with the world is broader than the bodily 
skill directness of Dreyfus’ view, which Crowell adopts. The crux of the problem might be 
condensed thus:  
Even if there is a pre-conceptual level of consciousness where concatenations of sensory 
fields emerge through the associative syntheses of similarity, contrast, and contiguity — 
and even if all higher-order conceptual syntheses (such as judgment) presuppose such an 
organized "pre-given" sensory field — we still do not know how such an association can 
admit of normative assessment, without which talk of intentionality is empty (Crowell 
2013, 139–140). 
 
In contrast to Crowell, SEP holds that the intentionality of perception operates within 
pragmatically governed fields of possibilities in which the dynamic continua of perception are 
structured in such a way that everything that is within their field of possibilities and 
expectations is a legitimate fulfillment of perceptual intentions. These continua are always 
directed to core contents, and those take a leading role in guiding perceptual continua. In SEP, 
possibilities and expectations operates within an idea of gradual fulfillment, not with a hard 
notion of confirmation, as Crowell does (2013, 23). (Perceptual surprises are exactly surprises, 
but we all know that the surprising takes a moment to be understood as part of a world in which 
new things occur.25) These fields of possibilities and expectations are based on the regularity of 
the physical world, our habituation to our life on earth, to the internal constrain of sensory 
modalities and, above all, to our skilled knowledge of perceptual practices, such that we stand, 
																																																								
25 SEP’s dynamic account of content is holistic in that it takes every bit of content to be located within 
full=core+environing in specific ways. But the sequences are not supposed to be always existing and always related 
to specific goals. One of the features of SEP’s normativity that Crowell’s theory, following Drefyus, cannot account 
for is that of the immediate perception of perceptual surprises where no optimality or specific direction of bodily 
stance improvement is in sight. A fitting example comes from William James: “Into the awareness of the thunder 
itself the awareness of the previous silence creeps and continues; for what we hear when the thunder crashes is not 
thunder pure, but thunder-breaking-upon-silence-and-contrasting-with-it" (James 1981, 240). SEP is perfectly 
equipped to deal with this case. 
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forward-looking, in the midst of perceptual continua knowing how to deal with, how to 
manipulate, and what to expect of the perceptual realities we interact with.  
To be clear, then, I agree with Crowell in the desiderata of a theory of normativity 
regarding motivation or reasons. I have extensively accounted for a rejection of the causal as 
capturing the nature of perception. I have, however, made some room for the causal in the 
normative. SEP’s view understands causal impingements from the world as entailing 
constraints on what is possible, and what is possible is a necessary basis for the pragmatic. 
However, when these causal impingements can actually be called perceptual they have already 
been subject to the interpretive taking up that is located at the most basic level. In Husserl’s 
view, these are the ‘functional connections’ featuring in pyscho-physical correlations, that is, 
between the causal impingement and the location of its subjective or presenting aspect 
(Drummond 1990, 146–149). But precisely the presenting aspect is not just caused by a physical 
aspect of the world. Although it is conditioned by the physical configuration of the world, its 
sense is located in the domain of the personal, which is governed by motivations. Still, the 
domain of motivation is a relation at the personal level, and this means that the pragmatic 
depends on the goals of the person who lives a life of projects and complex activities. One does 
not have a limb that is elevated, with an appendix at the end that is moved to the sides: one 
raises one’s own hand and waves the hand to say hello to a friend.  
In the specific domain of the most basic level of contact with reality, in which some modally 
taken up aspects of the world are still ’sensory’ in a way, SEP holds that the pragmatic nature of 
perception still governs the occurrence and the movements between unsaturation and saturation 
of perceptual happenings. Crowell is wrong about ruling out normativity from this area of 
perception, arguing that it is empty to place intentionality and content there because there is a 
relevant sensory element. His mistake is to assume that every reference to sensation is a matter 
of causal sequences and that only what can be experienced as guided by norms (and not just in 
accordance with them) generates meaning (Crowell 2013, 28). For SEP, the normative system 
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belonging to perception includes the embodied, practical, and social levels, as Crowell grants, 
but it also extends to (contra Crowell) to the basic level on which physical events in the world 
are just taken up sensationally. This basic level does not constitute meaning is contentful 
independently or in isolation, but only by belonging to a pragmatic system of references in 
which it plays a functional role.  
Linking this discussion back to the diachronic account of perceptual practices, it is 
important to remember that conceiving of practices as the ground of normative relations means 
that we are within the normative space when we act in accordance with shared ways of doing 
things, but this does not require knowing why things are done thus or so, or being conscious of 
doing things thus or so. In the pragmatic spirit of SEP, the normative does not come from a 
distinction between acting “in accord with norms” and not “in light of them,” as Crowell holds—
between being guided by a rule, or simply acting according to a rule, in the Wittgensteinian 
discussion. The pragmatic take I have been articulating rejects a semantic requirement ('how to 
proceed' is fixed semantically), and consciousness of a semantic requirement ('knowing how to 
proceed') as essential to perceptual normativity.  
It is in this sense that there is normativity at the level of basic contact with reality. As 
accounted in chapter 1, the partaking in perceptual practices means to relate to perceptual 
things in the manner of unreflective engagements with seemingly given aspects of perceptual 
reality.26 Skilled practitioners display the normativity of perception in their relation to sensory 
properties and ranges of them, to harmony or disharmony relations, to possible combinations, to 
available moves, and to connections to objects and events. Practitioners experience the 
familiarity of these elements and are disposed to act in specific ways about them. The sharing of 
meaning that takes place in the perceptual interaction with the world starts at the level of 
familiarity with different sensory configurations, which is acquired by training and 
acculturation.  																																																								
26 See chapter 1 for a detailed discussion of the seemingly given, which is SEP’s extension of the Wittgensteinian take 
on Quine-analytic sentences. The seemingly given is at the basis of the structure of perceptual appropriatenesses and 
entitlements that belongs to shared ways of doing things, to practices.  
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5.3.2 Siegel's Comparisons and Properties 
I dispute Siegel’s reasoning according to which accepting that properties are presented in 
experience entails the (detachable) content view (d-content view, from now on). The d-content 
view holds that properties are presented in perception and that accuracy assessment is necessary 
for perception. Whether it is taken in a strong or a weak form (either understanding properties 
propositionally or in a more 'neutral' framework, as Siegel puts it), the content view entails that 
contents are detachable and comparisons can be made, and these comparisons are first of all 
meaningful in order to check for accuracy. Checking for accuracy (what I have referred to as the 
veridicality concern) is at the basis of Siegel d-content view. I call her view the detachable content 
view because the rationale based on accuracy-checking and the possibility of comparisons 
essentially assumes that contents are a type of things that are detachable or able to be 
abstracted from experiences themselves. It seems, however, that the argument that takes her 
from someone’s admitting that perceptual experience is also about properties (as SEP does) to 
the seemingly consequential claim that perception involves detachable contents and that 
accuracy checking is essential to perception trades on two equivocations: the meaning of 
comparisons and the meaning of properties, and with properties piggybacking on comparisons.  
Siegel claims that to hold that real objects or situations are constituents of experience does 
not preclude the possibility of comparing the experience of a situation against the situation, even 
when the situation is not separable from the experience (Siegel 2010, 69). She says: “When we 
focus on the subjective character of the experience, comparing it with the situation in which it is 
had seems to make sense, no matter what metaphysical structure it may have […] We can ask 
whether things are as they appear. In making this comparison, we don’t have to make any 
assumptions about the underlying metaphysical structure of the experience. So the idea of 
comparing a Good experience with the situation in which it is had is not illicit,” even if those 
experiences have objects, situations, and properties as non-detachable constituents (Siegel 2010, 
69, emphasis mine).  
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The equivocation about comparisons rests on a confusion between a comparison making 
sense and a comparison being licit or illicit. In saying that for Naive Realism comparisons of the 
accuracy-check kind are illicit is to say that they are not real comparisons because they do not 
compare things of the same kind (or of the ‘metaphysical structure,’ as she puts it). To say, on 
the other hand, that it makes sense to make a comparison is to say that there can be some 
common aspect between the compared items. Does this mean that they are of the same kind? 
Does this mean that a comparison is always of things of the same kind? More specifically, the 
question is whether they are of the same kind in relevant perceptual terms. The answer of SEP 
is negative. See Wittgenstein's picture-object, a simple drawing of a face with a sort of neutral 
smile. It makes sense to ask a boy whether the guy in the picture-object is like or unlike a crying 
baby. The comparison is more evidently perceptual when the game accentuates the shape of the 
smiling mouth or the frown. A father, for instance, can help the boy compare by exaggerating 
the frown. What does not make sense is to say that the meaningfulness of this comparison is 
based upon the perception of a smiling property in the Picture-object, detachable from it, and a 
perception of a smiling property in a real face, detachable from it. For, in this case, the 
comparison is not a mental putting side by side of elements already existing in the mind. Rather, 
it is the ‘mastery of a technique’ consisting in singling out an element of a picture, or rather, an 
aspect of it. It is an aspect that does not exist in isolation from the interaction with a perceiver, 
suitably situated to see it as such. Being able to find an aspect in an object perceived and 
compare it with others is, in this case, perceptually based, but it does not rest on some basic 
structure of the direct objects of perception. The same goes for a comparison between the colors 
of flowers in the nightmare I had last night, and the color of the flowers of the tree I am going 
by. While it makes sense for me to tell someone about my nightmare and compare with the 
color of real flowers, that does not mean that in my real perception of the flowers there is a 
property that is represented, that is of the same kind as another property represented in my 
dream, such that the two are color properties, one instantiated in a nightmare, one instantiated 
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in a tree's flower. This last move, to turn what makes sense into something licit, is itself illicit. 
Comparisons like this one show that a comparison can make sense and be illicit by the more 
stringent requirement of whether the things compared are of the same metaphysical structure.  
A related issue has to do with the situation of asking whether things are as they seem, 
which features a baseline comparison. I will not rehearse the arguments of chapter 3, where I 
took good care of the veridicality concern, thereby setting SEP apart from that view. Right now, 
I would like to add a couple of elements to it. First, I would like to point to how confusing 
things get by the language used in the d-content view. In this case, the "intuition" that 
perception is essentially in need of confirmation as to its accuracy reflects more of the 
intellectual and verbal behavior of some perceivers, some of them are practitioners of 
philosophy, that on the nature of perceptual experience. I accept that we can meaningfully ask 
the question of whether things are as they appear. It seems that the English language in which I 
write these words allows for such an utterance and its meaning to be intelligible. Take this as a 
piece of verbal behavior. I propose that the explanation for this verbal behavior is that such a 
question is meaningful vis-a-vis hallucinations (not illusions), and then imported to perceptual 
situations. This route is blocked by SEP and its disjunctivist commitment. 
Alternatively, such a statement is meaningful because it makes sense in the framework of 
intra-perceptual comparisons. In that case, the question is rather about in what way a given 
perspective stands in relations with a range of other perspectival aspects. This question is a heuristic 
device in perceptual exploration. For instance, one may initially perceive a certain smell in a 
friend’s kitchen that one takes to be the smell of X, although with a certain hesitation. One then 
proceeds to smell more carefully to supplement the initial impression. SEP treats this case (and 
like cases in other sensory modalities) as evidence that perception does not occur in snapshots, 
but in sequences, and that everything that is given in perception is given perspectivally in 
spatial, modal, temporal, and pragmatic ways, and that the more perspectives one has, the richer 
the experience can be. One does not check the perception for accuracy. Rather, one explores and 
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supplements to be better acquainted with an object. And yet, we live constantly with partial 
perceptions, that is, with a world that we take to be what it is as it presents itself to us, 
‘knowing’ that most perceptual things would admit of further exploration to more fully 
determine what things are from every point of view. The point of better exploring some things 
is not to check upon initial but rather to get a richer perception of something, according to 
pragmatic orientations. That is why the type of question of whether something is as it seems to 
be makes some sense, and yet, why it should be understood along the direct realist, 
interactionalist view of SEP, that is, understanding that the comparison aims not to confirm 
whether X is X but rather to situate aspect X in a continuum of perspectival appearances that 
are normatively structured in the manner elaborated in this chapter.    
In sum, I bite the bullet that at times—when one is delirious or had a nightmare, one may 
ask whether what one is seeing is true. The question makes sense but is rapidly suppressed 
when confronted with the full perceptual sequences that immediately provide an internal 
coherence of its own. I acknowledge, then, that there could be bad cases. (Let's recall that the 
baseline for SEP is only the (minimal) ‘good case,’ where a perceiver actually interacts with an 
external object). But in the good case (understood in sequential, continuous, dynamic terms), 
where the question of whether things are as they appear makes sense but more in an open-ended 
way, all comparison is intra-perceptual, and since perception is necessarily perspectival, there is 
no room for a sense of accuracy in which contents could be true or false (Siegel 2010, 28).  
Let us now look at the issue of properties. According to Siegel, accepting that properties 
are presented in experience follows from something more basic, to wit: that some bits of 
experience that can be compared with some other bits of experience. Whatever the ontological 
status of properties is, Siegel's view seems committed at least to properties being detachable, so 
that they can be compared with one another, thereby allowing a link to veridicality assessment 
(2010, 48). Even with all the relatively neutral framework that Siegel uses to define properties 
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(2010, 71, n.45), I hold that she is committed to a version of properties characterized by some 
abstract detachability. I will call hers strong perceptual properties or strong properties.    
Strong properties are definitional of her description of perception: "Suppose you see a cube, 
and it looks red and cubical" (2010, 48). This means, she says, that the experience presents the 
properties of being red and being cubical. I suggest that one can look at Siegel’s view in this 
other way:  
A Strong Perceptual Property: A strong perceptual property is what is needed to make sense 
of comparing things. A property is the type of theoretical entity that grounds a comparison 
between two things in one respect, assuming that the making-senseness of comparisons means 
that they are grounded on the real existence of the aspects compared.   
This is because for an aspect to be compared with others, the argument goes, I should be 
able to abstract that aspect and compare it with another. Because this comparison is possible 
(including the baseline case of asking whether things are as they seem), it seems that properties 
are detached from their worldly entanglement with things, that is, detached from the things 
they are instantiated in.  
But, as I have just argued in relation to comparisons, there is no reason to assume the 
existence of properties prior to the comparison, because they are brought about by the practice 
of comparing and guided by the type of comparison sought. In other words, if in a 
transcendental fashion one concludes that the fact that comparisons are possible make it 
necessary that there are strong perceptual properties, then what is needed is a different 
conception of the explanandum generating other conditions of possibility. SEP has such an 
alternative conception, which does not fall on the confused version of comparisons that Siegel 
spouses.  
A Strong Perceptual Property is an exaggeration: A strong perceptual property is an 
exaggeration of what is needed to make sense of comparing things. A property is the type of 
theoretical entity that grounds a comparison between two things in one respect, when one 
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misunderstands that the making-senseness of comparisons does not mean that they are 
grounded on the real existence of the aspects compared.   
Think in a comparison between a billboard and a certain building, more wide than tall. Can 
I ask someone to compare whether both objects have something like a rectangular shape? The 
question is perfectly meaningful, and in both cases I refer to a way of looking at the object by 
relating width and length, but this absolutely does not mean that in my perceptions of the 
billboard and the building (more wide than tall)—that is, in my immediate acquaintance with 
the object as I walk down the street—I perceive a property, rectangularity, which I am then able 
to compare to other geometric-like properties. By the same token, Siegel’s position seems to be 
committed to saying that there will be a perceived property for every aspect that we could 
reasonably articulate in questions or statements based on comparisons. This is evidently absurd. 
The same holds for the use of the Picture-Object in the comparison with a frown.  
In the case of the baseline comparison “Are things as they appear?” I argued that they are 
intra-perceptual comparisons between different perspectives of possible continua, which are 
normatively structure. So what properties are compared when I ask for intra-perceptual 
comparisons? I must bring back the difference between perceptual properties and properties of 
the objects, events, and states of affairs can further be specified thus: objects, events, states of 
affairs and their properties are presented perspectivally in perception and can only do so. We are 
acquainted with F but only via F’, F’’, F’’’, etc. If a perceptual presentation is only perspectival, 
a perfect presentation (F as F) is an impossibility. Physical occurrences—e.g. material objects in 
their modal aspects—cannot be experienced by perceivers but in perspectival sequences.  
We are now in the position to revisit a rejection of the veridicality concern I presented in 
chapter three. I identified the traditional commitment to veridicality by two points: binary 
nature, in which objects are presented as they are, or as they are not (F or no-F) and discrete 
nature, in which at each moment it is possible to assess whether appearances match reality or 
not (F or no-F at T1). But SEP sees things differently. F=F’, F’’, F’’’, etc., and (1) All F’, F’’, and 
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F’’’ are Fs, in the sense that perceptual profiles actually reveal how things are F-wise, and (2) a 
single F’, F’’ or F’’’, etc. could not be assessed in isolation, but only as a part of a sequence, 
where F* could be deviant, but only in relation to F’, F’’, F’’’, etc. Siegel confuses P-properties 
with properties of the object (strong perceptual properties). In SEP’s model of comparison, it 
makes no sense to say: “F and no-F are the only and exclusive alternatives.” Rather, there are F-
wise properties. As a matter of fact, there is no perceptually meaningful standard that is not one 
perspective among others, so there is no extra-perceptual instance that can ground judgments of 
accuracy in any robust sense (see my elaboration of Ayer’s ‘privileged appearance’ in chapter 3). 
The possibility of intra-perceptual comparisons is taken as grounding the internal-coherence 
and horizonal nature of perceptual normativity that I have elaborated in this chapter. 
This line of thought explains why SEP's position is compatible with some versions of Naive 
Realism and Radical Naive Realism. According to Siegel, Naive Realism depends on whether 
experiences are individuated “by the particular things that the subject of the experience 
perceives” (Siegel 2010, 76). And: “As standard versions of Naïve Realism construe Good 
experiences, those experiences contain the relevant situations as constituents” (Siegel 2010, 69). 
Thus, while under Siegel’s classification, SEP’s position would be that of the Naïve Realist, that 
would be a mischaracterization. I accept that we can meaningfully talk about perceiving 
properties of the things we perceive, like the Naïve Realist and unlike the Radical Naïve Realist, 
who says that we are only presented with objects and not with properties.  
The Radical Naive Realist, in Siegel’s taxonomy, denies that a good experience requires 
superstrong veridicality: “seeing o when o looks F, o is F, and o’s looking F is due to o’s F-ness” 
(Siegel 2010, 37, emphasis mine). SPE understand “o looks F” as “o looks F-wise,” where F-wise 
refers to all the possible presentations of F’, F’’, and F’’’ etc. The relation F - F’,F’’,F’’’ is a one-
many relation. SEP holds that “o is F” is underdetermined because F is not necessarily 
predicable of o in the absence of the perceptual interaction (think of the color of a pond as one 
walks around it), even if it is meaningful to talk in such terms. As it follows from my discussion 
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of Ayer in chapter 3, I dispute that “o’s F-ness” (hence “o is F”) has a determined meaning 
outside of a perceptual interaction. This is because the F that belongs to the object is not the F 
that appears in the specific profiles or perspectives that are presented in perception. In 
perception there are Fs or ‘F-wise Fs’, not just F.  Lastly, SEP also finds underdetermined that 
o looks F “due to o’s F-ness” since it discards interaction as a source of perceptual 
determination, and SEP’s interactionalist nature holds just the opposite. I hold that perceptual 
mediations of the kind I call idiosyncratic dependencies—e.g. eyeglasses that systematically 
correct what a person would see, a person having a cold, so it systematically alters for the time 
involved what the person smells or tastes, or Siegel’s case of stimulation in brain area V1—are 
not only no threat to a legitimate perceptual interaction, but they are part of the constituting 
factors of perceptual interactions. Pragmatic dependencies, social and non-social, render “due to 
o’s F-ness” underdetermined. In SEP’s view, the good case is constituted only by an actual 
interaction with a proper object of perception. SEP denies the need for superstrong veridicality. 
Furthermore, SEP takes superstrong veridicality to be wrongheaded about the nature of 
perceptual properties. 
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